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 Nicolaus Cusanus is an extraordinary figure in the history of Western thought, and particularly 
in the history of the Christian and Neoplatonic tradition. A relatively «isolated figure» as a thinker in 
the context of his time1 (in spite of his extensive and close ties to mid-15th century Roman and 
Florentine Renaissance circles2), he has been the object of ever-increasing scholarly interest over the 
past century3, yet there are still a number of outstanding issues regarding which scholars have not yet 
found any general agreement, and intellectual disputes are common. One of the most prominent issues 
about which there is a great variety of interpretations of Cusanus’ thought (and likely one that is 
paradigmatic for many others) is the problem of the status of ‘philosophy’ and ‘theology’ in his works4. 
The De Beryllo, a smaller treatise, much less known and studied than his ‘major’ works, is in fact able 
to help us shed light on this problem in Cusanus’ thought in a new way. 
 It is a remarkably synthesis between a highly structured, almost formalized method and a clear 
focus on theological themes. Arguably, it shows signs that it was a work written in the midst of the 
Wegestreit, the struggle between the via antica and the via moderna which also affected his intellectual 
milieu, involving his friends at the Tegernsee monastery (Caspar Aindorffer and Bernard of Waging)—
and in this context, Cusanus’ own ‘intellectualized’ understanding of the mystica theologia and his 
interpretation of Pseudo-Dionysius came under attack from an intellectual opponent, the Carthusian 
                                                          
1 As Eugenio Garin has argued about Cusanus viewed particularly in the context of  the contemporary Neoplatonic tradition: 
E. GARIN, Cusano e i platonici italiani del Quattrocento, in Die Toleranzidee bei Nikolaus von Kues und in der Neuzeit, in 
Nicolò da Cusa. Relazioni tenute al Convegno Interuniversitario di Bressanone nel 1960, ed. G. Flores d’Arcais, Florence 
1962, pp. 75-100, esp. p. 86. There are problems even calling him a ‘humanist’; see M. SIEDLMAYER, Nikolaus von Kues 
und der Humanismus, in Humanismus, Mystic und Kunst in der Welt des Mittelalters, ed. J. Koch, Leiden, 1953, pp. 1-38.  
2 On the complex intellectual network of connections centered around Florence and Rome in the early fifteenth century that 
Cusanus was a part of, see T. MÜLLER, Der “Florentiner Stammtisch”, eine frühe “Akademie” der Wissenschaften und der 
Künste, in Das europäische Erbe im Denken des Nikolaus von Kues: Geistesgeschichte als Geistesgegenwart, ed. H. 
Schwätzer, Münster 2008, pp. 89-128. Müller describes the network of informal connections as a Stammtisch, approximately 
translated as a «regulars’ table». 
3 On the development of scholarship on Cusanus through the past century, see e.g., M. WATANABE, An Appreciation, in 
Introducing Nicholas of Cusa: A Guide to a Renaissance Man, ed. C. M. Bellitto – T. M. Izbicki – G. Christianson, New 
York 2004, pp. 3-19; also, ID., The Origins of Modern Cusanus Research in Germany and the Establishment of the 
Heidelberg Opera Omnia, in Concord and Reform: Nicholas of Cusa and Legal and Political Thought in the Fifteenth 
Century, ed. M. Watanabe, Burlington (VT) 2001, pp. 35-60. 
4 On the widely varying positions taken on this question, ranging from seeing Cusanus as a radically innovative 
‘philosopher’ (e.g. Cassirer and his tradition) to, in essence, a theologian and essentially ‘medieval’ figure in continuity with 
the tradition (e.g. Rudolf Haubst, Jasper Hopkins or David Albertson), see the excellent overview of the massive existing 
literature in K. M. ZIEBART, Nicolaus Cusanus on Faith and the Intellect: a Case Study in 15th-century Fides-Ratio 
Controversy, Leiden 2013, pp. 33-52. 
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monk Vincent of Aggsbach—a controversy that saw its most important developments between 1453 
and 1459, the years of Cusanus writing De Beryllo5. Behind the optimistic focus in De Beryllo on a 
philosophical and theological method which could be used by anyone and help them ascend to a 
mystical visio intellectualis, one can hear clear echoes, in how Cusanus interacts with his sources and 
focuses on ‘integrating’ the philosophi and theologi, of needing to justify and defend, in effect, his life’s 
work as a thinker. Yet, he chose in the end to not engage directly in the controversy with Aggsbach, 
unaccountably delayed completing De Beryllo for years, and it is likely that the Tegernsee monks did 
not even receive a copy of it during his lifetime. 
 This thesis will investigate the method that is the main focus of De Beryllo in great detail, using 
an approach of the Strukturanalyse type, developing a system of notation to analyze and reconstrucct 
Cusanus’ remarkably consistent and powerful mode of thought. It will be structured as follows: in 
Chapter 1, I will examine briefly the history of De Beryllo and its existing manuscripts and editions, 
and I will do a thorough review of the existing literature on this work and the outstanding problems yet 
to be addressed. In Chapter 2, I will perform a detailed analysis of the methodologies used in the 
literature (focusing on Flasch’s influential ‘genetic’ analysis, Platzer’s Strukturanalyse and the issues 
involved in close reading), and develop an account of the ‘B-notation’ system as well as the main form 
of the ‘beryllus’ method it will be used to represent (Chapter 2.3). In Chapter 3, I will turn to the analysis 
of the text of De Beryllo: the title, with a detailed analysis of its meaning and significance in the tradition 
(Chapter 3.1); the ‘Introduction’ section, i.e. paragraphs 1-2 (Chapter 3.2); the ‘Methodological’ 
section, i.e. paragraphs 3-8 (Chapter 3.3); and an extended analysis of the passages featuring 
geometrical constructions that Cusanus employs, paradigmatically, in the application of the method 
(Chapter 3.4). Chapter 4 will focus on the notion of hierarchy in the application of the method, featuring 
an extended analysis of the passages featuring the paradigmatic ‘political’ image of 
rex/princeps/imperator (Chapter 4.1), an analysis of the issue of how to hierarchize ‘divine names’ 
                                                          
5 See ZIEBART, ibid., pp. 137-200 for a detailed account of this controversy and the events surrounding it, which offers an 
excellent background for some of the intellectual issues preoccupying Cusanus during the long period of writing De Beryllo 
(although De Beryllo receives little mention in the text). 
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obtained through the method (Chapter 4.2), and an analysis of the Neoplatonic ontological framework 
of simplicitas guiding Cusanus’ application of the method in the text, though independent from it 
(Chapter 4.3). Finally, in Chapter 5 I will focus on the Christological character that De Beryllo 
ultimately shows, examining the powerful Christological image of a (precious) stone in a little-studied 
1453 sermon, Sermon CXXVI (Chapter 5.1), then exploring the ontological role of Christ as mediator 
for bridging the gap between finite creature and infinite creator in Sermon CLXXXVIII from 1455 
(Chapter 5.2), and introducing an ‘update’ to the ‘B-notation’ described in Chapter 2.3 to account for 
the characteristics of such an ontological structure (Chapter 5.3); then, I will do a close reading of the 
‘Christological passages’, 69-70, with the newly-developed notation, as well as of the final paragraph, 
72, showing ultimately that if one uses Cusanus’ rigorous approach for employing the method of the 
beryllus, ‘theology’ (even what we would call of the ‘revealed’ or ‘dogmatic’ type) is not only not in 
conflict with ‘philosophy’, but, in a strikingly innovative and original synthesis, they ultimately 
coincide. Then, in Chapter 5.5, I will examine what this means for the title image of the beryllus 
(intellectualis), what its ontological status is within Cusanus’ construction, and will offer a conjecture 
as to why Cusanus, in the end, chose not to send this treatise, unfinished for years, to his friends in 
Tegernsee, and not engage in the ongoing Aggsbach debate, even though his new synthesis in De 
Beryllo might seem to be a perfect defense. 
 Accordingly, the present work hopes to further our understanding of this unfairly neglected 
work, conduct the most detailed study and close reading of the De Beryllo attempted so far, and 
integrate the conclusions of the existing literature (highly fragmented, in five different languages, 
within traditions that often do not cite each other), avoiding as much as possible any one-sidedness and 
always aiming to pursue the path which seems most intellectually fruitful for understanding the text. It 
will propose and argue for an overall method of interpretation that attempts to bridge the extremes in 
interpretations, and which might help deepen our understanding of Cusanus’ thought overall.  
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CHAPTER 1 – Background, editions and secondary literature on De Beryllo 
1.1 Circumstances of the development and writing of the text 
 
The treatise De Beryllo6 was developed, from its initial conception, over a long gestation period 
of more than 6 years, most likely from June 1452 until August 18, 1458, the date on which it was 
completed7. We first encounter a mention of this project—a work titled after the beryllus or beryl stone, 
clearly meant to be understood as a ‘lens’ to help with obtaining a certain kind of knowledge (under an 
overarching metaphor of knowledge as vision)—in Cusanus’ correspondence with the monks of the 
Benedictine monastery at Tegernsee at the beginning of 1454. The term beryllus, in clear reference to 
a (yet unwritten) new work by Cusanus, first appears in a letter to him by Caspar Aindorffer, the Abbot 
of Tegernsee, written sometime between January 15 and February 12, 1454, in which Aindorffer, 
speaking on behalf of the Tegernsee monks, asks Cusanus to send them, among other works they were 
interested in, a certain beryllus8. The term also appears in a letter by Bernard de Waging of the same 
Tegernsee monastery, written around the same time, i.e. before February 12, 1454: «we desire before 
all other things the new translation of [Pseudo-]Dionysius, Eusebius and the Beryllus»9. These passages 
are found within the context of a list of works that the Tegernsee monks were asking Cusanus to send 
them, and representing a clear mention of a very specific object assumed to be immediately familiar to 
Cusanus. Thus, they appear to reflect prior face-to-face conversations between Cusanus and the 
Tegernsee monks on the topic of a prospective work by Cusanus that would be called Beryllus/De 
Beryllo. These initial conversations likely took place on the occasion of the previous visit by Cusanus 
                                                          
6 All references to Cusanus’ works will be to the Heidelberg critical edition: NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Opera omnia, Iussu et 
auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Heidelbergensis ad codicum fidem edita, 22 vol., Leipzig – Hamburg, 1932-2010. 
Individual passages will be referenced using the name of the work, the number of the book with Roman numerals and the 
chapter with Arab numerals (where these exist), then the number of the paragraph, the page number and the line number 
with Arab numerals. Accordingly, references to De Beryllo will be exclusively to De beryllo, XI/I, ed. H. G. Senger - K. 
Bormann, Hamburg 1988. All Biblical references are to the Vulgate. All translations are mine unless otherwise specified. 
7 For a thorough overview of the existing evidence, see Senger and Bormann’s introduction to the critical edition of De 
Beryllo: De beryllo, pp. XI-XIII. 
8 E. VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour de la Docte Ignorance. Une controverse sur la Théologie Mystique au XVe Siècle, Münster 
1915. See pp. 119-121, esp. p. 120: «specialiter mustum beryllum». 
9 VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, pp. 123-125. See in particular p. 123: «Translationem novam Dionysij, Eusebium et Beryllum 
prae omnibus habere desideremus». 
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to the Tegernsee monastery in June 145210. Our information about the idea for the work comes from 
the mentions of it in Cusanus’ correspondence. Aindorffer, in his letter, adds a short sentence explaining 
why the monks want this work from Cusanus: «in order that we might see in the De Docta Ignorantia 
and in other places where many obscure things are seen to lie, most of all about the coincidence of 
contraries, about the infinite sphere, etc.»11 From this passage we may conclude that Cusanus’ initial 
idea involved writing a work titled Beryllus/De Beryllo12 centered on the notion of the image of a beryl 
stone (beryllus) conceived as an aid for better understanding (conceptualized as «vision», with the 
implicit metaphor of the beryllus as an aid to a certain type of ‘sight’ associated with knowledge, which 
is in some way deficient13), mainly of certain passages in Cusanus’ other works, particularly in De 
Docta Ignorantia, concerning, in particular, the coincidence of opposites (coincidentia oppositorum)14, 
and the «infinite sphere», one of the paradoxical objects constructed according to it15. 
                                                          
10 VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, p. 108, note 1. This point is underlined by Senger and Bormann in their introduction to the 
critical edition of the work: see De Beryllo, p. XIII. 
11 VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, p. 120: «ut videamus in docta ignorancia et alibi que multis obscura videntur, precipue de 
coincidentia contradictoriarum (sic), de spera infinita, etc.» 
12 On the ambiguity of the title of the work between these two options, see the in-depth discussion of the title in Chapter 
3.1. At this point, it is sufficient to note that both titles for the work are used in the correspondence from the beginning – 
while in Aindorffer and de Waging’s letters the work is referred to as beryllus, Nicholas’ reply to Aindorffer refers to the 
work as De Beryllo. 
13 A theme explicitly confirmed in a later letter by Bernard de Waging to Cusanus, written before March 18, 1454: «Et 
quoniam visus eorundem obtusus est, lippus et obscurus, necesse haberent uti Beryllo […]» (VANSTEENBERGHE, ibid., p. 
133).  
14 In the context of the correspondence between Cusanus and the Tegernsee monks, the coincidentia contrariarum can be 
safely interpreted as referring to the notion of coincidentia oppositorum, the coincidence of opposites, a central notion 
recurring throughout Cusanus’ works, which roughly consists in the simultaneous affirmation of logically contrary 
propositions about an object considered as having in some way inherently paradoxical properties – most importantly, for 
Cusanus, God. For a general account of this theme in Cusanus, see T. LEINKAUF, Nikolaus Cusanus: Eine Einfuehrung, 
Münster 2005, pp. 89-102; K. FLASCH, Nicolaus Cusanus, München, 2001, pp. 46-70. For an account of the origins of this 
notion in the tradition, see Senger and Bormann’s extended and well-sourced note in De Beryllo, pp. 93-100; with particular 
focus on the sources within the theological tradition, see R. HAUBST, Streifzüge in die cusanische Theologie, Münster 1991, 
pp. 117-141. For the context of the discussion in the letters, see the letter by Cusanus to the abbot and monks of Tegernsee 
of September 14, 1453 (VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, pp. 113-117), which discusses this as a methodological issue for the 
possibility of the highest form of (philosophy-)theology, mystica theologia, with a focus on the thought of Pseudo-
Dionysius, the most prominent of Cusanus’ sources – a theme that will be highly prominent in De Beryllo, which Cusanus 
had already conceived at least on a theoretical level. It must be noted that there is a more general longstanding problem in 
Cusanus scholarship concerning how to interpret Cusanus’ coincidentia oppositorum, with some older (particularly neo-
Thomistic) approaches trying to eliminate paradoxes in Cusanus’ thought by interpreting it as something other than a 
coincidence of logical opposites, thus rendering the paradoxical formulations common in Cusanus as merely rhetorical – 
for a thorough criticism of such approaches and a strong argument for the need to take seriously the paradoxical and 
irreducible character of the coincidentia oppositorum that Cusanus himself insists on, see K. FLASCH, Nikolaus Cusanus: 
Geschichte Einer Entwicklung: Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Cusanische Philosophie, Frankfurt am Main, 1998, 2008 
(3rd ed.), pp. 57-70.  
15 The «infinite sphere» refers to a series of arguments in De docta ignorantia regarding the coincidence of all infinite 
geometrical figures: line, triangle, circle and sphere. Cf. De docta ignorantia, I, 17, 40-56, pp. 29, 5 – p. 38, 12; I, 10, 27, 
p. 20, 7; I, 13, 35, p. 25, 17 – p. 26, 2. This topic is not mentioned in De Beryllo. 
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Aindorffer and de Waging continued to ask Cusanus for the De Beryllo, with the apparent 
implicit assumption that Cusanus would complete the work in a short time—thus showing that the 
initial idea for the work was undoubtedly of a short one. However, Cusanus only managed to complete 
the work over 4 years later, on August 18, 1458 at Andraz Castle (Buechenstein), where he lived in the 
period between July 10, 1457 and September 14, 1458 in self-imposed exile from his bishopric in 
Brixen due to the continuing political conflict with Duke Sigismund of Austria and the Tirol, convinced, 
apparently, that his life was in danger16. In his letters to Caspar Aindorffer from 1454 to 1456, Cusanus 
excuses himself for not having been able to complete the De Beryllo because of «eye pain»17 and later 
(repeatedly, in 1454 and 1455) due to not having time, particularly because of his bishop duties18. While 
in the context of the correspondence we can interpret the ‘eye pain’, as we will see in the analysis of 
the title in Chapter 3.1, as not (only) a physical affliction but (also) one involving the special sense of 
                                                          
16 De Beryllo, p. XII. For a more in-depth account of the circumstances of Cusanus’ exile to Andraz Castle, see Ε. MEUTHEN, 
Die letzten Jahre des Nikolaus von Kues. Biographische Untersuchungen nach neuen Quellen, Köln - Opladen 1958, pp. 
15ff; and, by the same author, ID., Nikolaus von Kues 1401-1464. Skizze einer Biographie, Münster 1964, pp. 98ff.  
17 In the letter from Cusanus to Aindorffer of February 12, 1454, cf. VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, p. 122: «propter oculorum 
dolorem». 
18 This theme of his lack of time and respite in order to complete the work recurs, with small variations, in his answers to 
the monks’ repeated requests. In his letter to de Waging on March 18, 1454 (VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, p. 134), Cusanus 
writes: «activitas illa, que me totum occupant, speculativam suspendit».  
On August 16, 1454, he writes to Aindorffer: «Petijt missus De Beryllo compilacionem atque dubiorum certorum 
solucionem. Nondum complevi opus, nam setractus per pontificiales curas, non potui totus illi operi prout res ipsa petit 
adesse; non desistam tamen quin data oportunitate quoad potero perficiam» (ibid., p. 139). One may note that it seems that 
at this stage he was thinking about the De Beryllo as a compilatio or accompanied by a compilatio of solutions to theoretical 
problems (which fits the pattern of the work’s final form in 1458, with a short main part accompanied by an extended set of 
applications).  
On the same date, August 16, 1454, he also writes to de Waging with similar words: «Librum De Beryllo nondum complevi; 
indiget enim longa explicatione, ut videatur praxis in aliorum dictis. Utinam possem esse vobiscum, liberates de cura 
pastorali! tunc in illo proficerem.» (ibid., p. 140). This description of the work also fits perfectly with its final version with 
its focus on praxis and the sententias and opiniones of the doctissimi (De Beryllo, 1, p. 3, 6-7; p. 4, 10).  
To the monks’ renewed requests, he answers again on September 9, to Aindorffer: «Habete nunc pacienciam; distractus, 
non adsum totus ad componendum opus quod me totum deposcit» (VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, pp. 142-143), and to de 
Waging, on the same date, that «the eyeglasses are not yet finished»: «Ocularia non sunt polita; requirunt enim ocium 
sacrum» (ibid., p. 150). There is no more mention of the De Beryllo in the correspondence until July 1455, when de Waging 
asks him again for the beryllus: «oculus doleo, beryllum non habeo» (ibid., p. 158). Cusanus answers him on July 28: 
«Applicui ingenium ad opus quod petistis; non possum recollecte proficere; nisi liberer perdam meipsum. Parcite pater se 
nichil mitto, quod nichil dignum habeo» (ibid., p. 160). Finally, on January 9, 1456, Cusanus promises the monks a volume 
of his sermons, «et habebitis in quibus omnia que ex parvulo meum intellectu, sive De Beryllo, sive alias» 
(VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, p. 162). This passage is interesting because it explicitly connects the project of De Beryllo to 
the sermons he wrote and had collected around the same period, where we can find interesting correspondences with the 
final form of De Beryllo (see Chapter 3.1). 
This is the last mention of De Beryllo in his correspondence with the Tegernsee monks; the work would not be completed 
until more than two years later, and the date at which a copy finally reached Tegernsee is uncertain, but likely later, possibly 




sight involved in the beryllus image, and thus reflecting Cusanus’ theoretical difficulties in composing 
the treatise, the unexpected (at least on the part of the Tegernsee monks) delay of more than four years 
until the completion of the De Beryllo in August 1458 seems to defy any easy explanation.  
In the background of this correspondence and exchange, an important theological dispute was 
taking place involving the Tegernsee monks regarding the true meaning of mystical theology and the 
way to achieve mystical union with God19. It was a typical local manifestation of the ongoing  
Wegestreit between the via antiqua and the via moderna, and ultimately at stake were different 
conceptions of the relationship between faith and reason; in the monastic realm, this manifested in 
particular as a conflict between an ‘intellectualized’ idea of mystical ascent and a Gersonian one which 
based itself entirely on affectus. Cusanus’ De Docta Ignorantia was decidedly on the side of the former 
approach, and its ‘mathematizing’, methodical theology came under attack by the Carthusian Vincent 
of Aggsbach, who, taking issue in particular with Cusanus’ interpretation of Pseudo-Dionysius in his 
Letter of September 14, 1453 to Aindorffer and de Waging, wrote a letter to John Schlitpacher (of 
Weilheim) on Dec. 19, 1454, a part of which would become famous for his criticism of Cusanus (among 
others) as the Impugnatorium laudatorii Doctae Ignorantiae20, taking as his aim, in particular, a 
summary of Cusanus’ doctrines written by Bernard de Waging, who in turn, in 1459, wrote his 
Defensorium laudatorii Doctae Ignorantiae, a defense of Cusanus against Aggsbach’s criticism, also 
in letter form. At issue, on the theoretical level, seemed to be precisely the interpretation of Pseudo-
Dionysius, in particular whether Cusanus’ view of an intellectual ascent via the coincidentia 
oppositorum was correct; in reality, the participants divided into camps based on old loyalties to the 
conciliarist movement that Cusanus had rejected at the Council of Basel, and scorn aimed at his Papal 
loyalties21. It was in the middle of this dispute, and, likely not coincidentally, in connection to the matter 
                                                          
19 For a detailed account of the events and texts surrounding this controversy, see ZIEBART, Nicolaus Cusanus on Faith and 
the Intellect, pp. 137-200. 
20 For an edition and translation of this text, see ZIEBART, Nicolaus Cusanus on Faith and the Intellect, pp. 295-301.  
21 Ziebart carefully underlines this dimension of political conflict and underlying loyalties in this dispute, which, while not 
negating the substantive theological differences between the participants, arguably made reconciliation between them 
implausible, if not outright impossible, since Aggsbach «was an opponent of Cusanus long before this exchange began» 
(see ZIEBART, ibid., p. 137). 
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being disputed (the role of the intellect and the possibility to use the coincidentia oppositorum for 
mystical ascent), that Cusanus tried, and failed, to complete the De Beryllo. Aindorffer and de Waging 
stopped asking after 1455, and their correspondence gradually shifted to Cusanus’ unsuccessful efforts 
at local ecclesiastical reform. Cusanus would complete De Beryllo in 1458, on the run from the fallout 
of these unsuccesful efforts, and (likely) left for Italy shortly thereafter while never even sending a copy 
to Tegernsee during his lifetime at all22. 
One cannot help but read Cusanus’ mysterious failure to complete a relatively small work such 
as De Beryllo as a decision to not get involved in the philosophical-theological dispute at hand, even 
though he would have had an opportunity to explain the way he wanted his thought to be interpreted—
which is, as we will see in the analysis of the text, one of his main concerns in De Beryllo. By examining 
the particular philosophical-theological synthesis he achieved in De Beryllo, one might be able, in the 
end, to offer a conjecture as to why he would have chosen not to complete it and not to send it to his 
Tegernsee friends for whom (at least in the beginning) he planned to write it in the first place. 
1.2 Circumstances of the transmission of the text. Editions 
 
The text of De Beryllo has been preserved in 4 manuscripts (Codex Cusanus 219, Cusanus’ own 
copy still held today at the Cusanusstift library in Bernkastel-Kues; Codex Monacensis 18621, likely 
dating from 1469, which was found at the monastery of Tegernsee; Codex 166 Domgymnasium 
Magdeburg, a manuscript put together by Thomas Hirschberg after Cusanus’ death in 1464, containing 
a number of his later works; and the earliest known copy, Codex Yale 343, which seems to have been 
made in Rome at the beginning of 1459), the autograph manuscript being presumed lost. For a more 
in-depth account of the manuscripts and the transmission history of the text, see Bormann and Senger’s 
excellent introduction to the critical edition23 and my own analysis in Chapter 3.1 on the issue of the 
title of the work. 
                                                          
22 According to Senger and Bormann, the Tegernsee monks only received a copy no earlier than 1469 (De Beryllo, p. XVIII). 
23 De Beryllo, pp. XVI-XXIV, particularly the genealogical chart on p. XXIV. 
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Up until the third decade of the 20th century, the only editions of Cusanus’ works available in 
print were the 1488 Strasbourg edition, the Milan edition of 1502, the 1514 Paris edition by Faber 
Stapulensis and the Basel edition of 1565, which all included the text of De Beryllo. Together with the 
increase in scholarly interest regarding Cusanus’ works, particularly after the important role Ernst 
Cassirer assigned to him in his Individuum und Kosmos (1927)24, the critical edition by the Heidelberg 
Academy of Sciences was inaugurated in 1932 with the publication of the De Docta Ignorantia and the 
Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae25. The De Beryllo was first published in a critical edition in 1940, in 
volume XI of the Heidelberg Opera Omnia, edited by L. Baur26. That critical edition, however, was 
rendered outdated by the later discovery of the earliest known manuscript of the De Beryllo in Codex 
Yale 334, a manuscript found at the Beinecke Rare Books Library of Yale University27. A new critical 
edition was prepared by Bormann and Senger and published in 1988 as volume XI, I of the Heidelberg 
edition28. This highly valuable and authoritative edition, featuring a full discussion of the manuscript 
tradition, the previous editions, as well as valuable interpretive notes and references, is the edition of 
reference for the Latin text of the work, and is still one of the most useful, or even the essential 
authoritative source for studying the De Beryllo for a scholar today, 30 years after its publishing, since 
none other of the small number of scholarly works focused at least in part on the De Beryllo manages 
to gather a comparable breadth of sources. However, the fact that a 30-year-old critical edition written 
in Latin maintains such an outsized importance in the realm of secondary sources on the De Beryllo is 
itself a sign of an unsatisfactory situation: there is a need in the scholarship for resources that are up-
                                                          
24 E. CASSIRER, Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance, Leipzig 1927. Cassirer influentially claimed 
Cusanus was the first modern thinker, «de[r] erst[e] modern[e] Denker» (p. 10), triggering both great scholarly interest in 
Cusanus’ works and pushback against Cassirer’s arguably too-reductive, systematizing, Kantian-influenced reading of 
Cusanus’ thought. Eugenio Garin argued forcefully against Cassirer’s reading of Cusanus in E. GARIN, Cusano e i platonici 
italiani del Quattrocento, in Die Toleranzidee bei Nikolaus von Kues und in der Neuzeit, in Nicolò da Cusa. Relazioni tenute 
al Convegno Interuniversitario di Bressanone nel 1960, ed. G. Flores d’Arcais, Florence 1962, pp. 75-100. 
25 For an in-depth account of the development of Cusanus research in the 20th century focusing on the German scholarly 
space and the genesis of the Heidelberg Opera Omnia, see M. WATANABE, The Origins of Modern Cusanus Research in 
Germany and the Establishment of the Heidelberg Opera Omnia, in Concord and Reform: Nicholas of Cusa and Legal and 
Political Thought in the Fifteenth Century, ed, M. Watanabe, Burlington (VT) 2001, pp. 35-60. 
26 De Beryllo, XI, vol. I, ed. L. Baur, Hamburg 1940.  
27 Cf. Κ. BORMANN, Eine bisher verschollene Handschrift von De Beryllo, in «Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der 
Cusanus-Gesellschaft» 10 (1973), pp. 104-105. 
28 De Beryllo, XI/Ι, ed. K-H. Senger - K. Bormann, Hamburg 1988. 
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to-date with the research published on De Beryllo and more accessible. This thesis hopes to offer a 
contribution in this regard. 
1.3 Translations of De Beryllo 
 
 This section recounts the main existing translations of De Beryllo into the five languages 
corresponding to the five scholarly traditions that the present work attempts to bridge: English, German, 
Italian, French and Spanish. Generally, De Beryllo has only rarely been translated as a standalone work, 
and most often only as part of a collection of multiple texts by Cusanus, which has resulted in it 
receiving less focus in terms of extended introductions and commentaries to the translations. 
Fortunately, in recent years translations have begun to be published which remedy these deficiencies 
(particularly in Italian, Spanish and French). 
 In English, De Beryllo is available as part of Jasper Hopkins’ translation of Cusanus’ collected 
philosophical and theological works published in 2001, under the title On [Intellectual] Eyeglasses29, 
which, while not having its own dedicated introduction, boasts detailed and reference-rich endnotes, 
according to Hopkins’ usual detail-oriented scholarly approach.  
In German, De Beryllo is found in the 1964 translation of the collected works of Nicholas of 
Cusa by Wilhelm and Dietlind Dupré30, and also as a standalone work in a newer translation by Karl 
Bormann31, who is also one of the editors of the critical edition, with a short but notable Introduction32 
where Bormann recapitulates the fundamentals of the method developed in De Beryllo, identifying the 
systematic use of coincidentia oppositorum as an innovative element which allows Cusanus to 
formulate innovative conclusions and a criticism of the philosophical tradition. 
                                                          
29 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Complete philosophical and theological treatises of Nicholas of Cusa, tr. by J. Hopkins, 2 voll., 
Minneapolis 2001, vol. 2, pp. 791-838. 
30 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Philosophisch-Theologische Schriften, tr. by D. - W. Dupre, ed. L. Gabriel, 3 voll., Vienna 1964, 
2002 (8th ed.), vol. 3, pp. 1-91. 
31 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Über den Beryll, tr. by K. Bormann, 1977, 2002 (4th ed.). 
32 K. BORMANN, Einleitung des Herausgebers, in N. CUSANUS, Über den Beryll, pp. VII-XIII. His extensive and detailed 
notes to the translation also offer interpretive insights: ibid., pp. 92-134. 
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In Italian, De Beryllo can be found in two older translations of Cusanus’ collected works, by 
Giovanni Santinello33 and Graziella Federici-Vescovini34, and, most notably, in a new 2017 translation 
of the Cusanian corpus by Enrico Peroli35, which includes a commentary, presented in the form of 
extensive annotations added to his notes to the translation36. Peroli’s detailed notes and commentary, 
after Corrieras’ book and Senger and Bormann’s Annotationes to the critical edition (which Peroli 
follows to a great extent), is one of the richest resources available for a study of this text, valuable 
particularly for its thoroughness and a relatively up-to-date bibliography37. 
In French, the De Beryllo was first translated as Le béryl in an older translation by Maurice de 
Gandillac of a collection of Cusanus’ works38. Recently, the standalone translation by Maude Corrieras, 
Le traité du béryl. Tome I39 has been a highly notable contribution to the scholarship, accompanied later 
by a second volume40 featuring her extendend introduction to De Beryllo, which remains the only book-
length scholarly interpretive work on De Beryllo in the literature so far. 
In Spanish, De Beryllo is available as a standalone work in González’s recent Spanish 
translation41 with a general introduction by the same author that touches on broadly the same general 
themes42.  
1.4 Early research on De Beryllo before the works of Kurt Flasch 
 
The history of the modern reception of De Beryllo—a comparatively much less studied work—
begins with Johannes Übinger, a German scholar active in the late nineteenth century who introduced, 
                                                          
33 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Opere filosofiche, tr. by Graziella Federici-Vescovini, Turin 1972, pp. 641-687. 
34 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Nicolò Cusano, Scritti filosofici, tr. by Giovanni Santinello, 2 voll., Bologna 1980, vol. 2, pp. 382-
459. 
35 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Opere filosofiche, teologiche e matematiche, tr. by Enrico Peroli, Florence - Milan 2017, pp. 1155-
1240. 
36 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Opere filosofiche, teologiche e matematiche, pp. 2700-2751. 
37 Ibid., pp. 3019-3066. Notably, however, like almost all other scholars, Peroli also omits Katrin Platzer’s work. 
38 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Oeuvres choisies de Nicolas de Cues, tr. by Maurice de Gandillac, Paris 1942, pp. 474-490. 
39 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Le traité du béryl. Tome 1. Texte, traduction et notes, tr. by Maude Corrieras, Paris 2010. 
40 M. CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl, Tome 2: Introduction au traité de Beryllo de Nicolas de Cues, Paris 2012. 
41 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, El Berilo, tr. by Á. L. González, Pamplona 2007. González’s translation of De Beryllo has been 
republished more recently as part of his translation of a collection of works by Cusanus: NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Dialogus de 
deo abscondito ; De quaerendo Deum ; De dato patris luminum ; Apologia doctae ignorantiae ; De Beryllo ; De aequalitate 
; De principio ; Directio speculantis seu de non aliud, tr. by Á. L. González, Pamplona 2013.  
42 Á. L. GONZÁLEZ, Introducción, in NICOLAUS CUSANUS, El Berilo, pp. 5-17. 
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as part of his studies on Cusanus, the concept of periodization and of a gradual development of his 
thought43, which is a methodological perspective that has been adopted (if not also the conclusions of 
Übinger’s analysis, overly generalizing and less focused on detail compared to today’s studies) by the 
most important scholars working on De Beryllo today. Übinger devotes some pages to De Beryllo44 in 
particular, and identifies it as the place where Cusanus presents his fully-developed philosophy of 
mathematics, a topic of high importance for the issue of his philosophical method generally45. In 
addition, the German scholar identifies an important aspect of the work: in De Beryllo, the recurring 
theme of the use of the coincidence of opposites, and in particular the use of the maximum and 
minimum of any particular property, leads to a reevaluation (Verwertung) of the minimum that is not 
found in Cusanus’ previous works46, which hints at the interesting and problematic status of the theme 
of hierarachy, a recurring issue in later scholarship on De Beryllo.  
The next scholar who devoted at least one chapter to De Beryllo was Karl-Heinz Volkmann-
Schluck in 1957, in his book Nicolaus Cusanus. Die Philosophie im Übergang vom Mittelalter zur 
Neuzeit47. Volkmann-Schluck, in the broad tradition of Ernst Cassirer, identifies the thought of Cusanus 
as the transition to a type of ‘modern’ thought. However, Volkmann-Schluck criticizes Cassirer’s 
reading, as well as ‘systematizing’ readings in general48. His own work traces the development of 
Cusanus’ thought through three stages: the first based on the insight of the incommensurability of 
human knowledge and absolute truth, represented by De Docta Ignorantia, then the acknowledgment 
of the human mind as image of God in the Idiota dialogues, and finally the ‘re-thinking of the whole of 
                                                          
43 J. ÜBINGER, Der Begriff der docta ignorantia in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung, in «Archiv für Geschichte der 
Philosophie» 8 (1895), 1- 32, 206-240; ID, Die mathematischen Schriften des Nicolaus Cusanus, in «Philosophisches 
Jahrbuch» 8 (1895), pp. 301-317, 403-422; 9 (1896), pp. 54-66, 391-410; 10 (1897), pp. 144-159. 
44 Ibid., pp. 43-52. 
45 ÜBINGER, Die mathematischen Schriften des Nikolaus Cusanus, in «Philosophisches Jahrbuch» 10 (1897), pp. 144-159. 
For the German scholar, De Beryllo, along with the earlier De Mathematica perfectione, together form the ‘perfection’ 
(«Die Vollendung») of Cusanus’ thought concerning mathematical philosophy (p. 149), elaborationg on the fourth of the 
‘premises’ from the beginning of the De Beryllo, i.e. man being a secundus Deus as creator (p. 151). We note that the 
accounts of Cusanus’ method inevitably deal with his regular use of mathematical and geometrical images, which he indeed 
presents as paradigmatic, as we will see in Chapter 3.   
46 ÜBINGER, ibid., p. 151. 
47 K-H. VOLKMANN-SCHLUCK, Nicolaus Cusanus. Die Philosophie im Übergang vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit, Frankfurt 
1958. 
48 VOLKMANN-SCHLUCK, ibid., pp. X-XI. 
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metaphysics’ according to this insight in the De Beryllo49, with a conception of being itself as infinite 
unity50. In addition, in the same year 1957, the German scholar published an article on the Cusanian 
doctrine of species, which refers exclusively to De Beryllo51. According to Volkmann-Schluck, by the 
peculiarities of Cusanus’ method as reformulated in De Beryllo, Cusanus manages to reformulate his 
old considerations on the problem of species from De Docta Ignorantia into a new form, an «enigmatic 
ontology» of specific forms, or species («aenigmatische Ontologie der species»52), which allows him 
to also maintain the irreducibility of particular objects as unique reflections of the One Creator, thus 
offering an alternative to the conception of the Aristotelian tradition. Obviously, this problem of species 
is tied to the fundamental problem of the ontological or metaphysical hierarchy, which is rendered even 
more interesting, and problematic in the special case of Christ—two crucial aspects that the analysis of 
Volkmann-Schluck does not directly address. 
In the English-speaking world, the American scholar Pauline Moffit-Watts, in her 1982 book 
Nicholas of Cusa: A Fifteenth-Century Vision of Man, a study of the philosophical anthropology of 
Nicholas of Cusa in the context of the Renaissance in the fifteenth century, devotes one chapter to De 
Beryllo53. According to her, this work is already (along with, and completing, the 1453 De Visione Dei) 
an «almost complete account of Cusanus’ mature conception of man»54. Moffit-Watts points out that 
the anthropological thought of Cusanus is basically derived from his philosophical method of the 
beryllus, which gives the work its fundamental unity55. The centrality of man in Cusanus’ argument, 
which is the result of man’s similarity with God in terms of creative power, and particularly the presence 
of this similarity as the foundation for the structure itself and for the possibility of knowledge, are, 
together with the rest of Cusanus’ results in this work, obtained by the systematic application of the 
                                                          
49 VOLKMANN-SCHLUCK, ibid., pp. XV: «durchdenkt er dann das Ganze der Metaphysik in der Schrift De Beryllo noch 
einmal». 
50 VOLKMANN-SCHLUCK, ibid., p. 24. 
51 K. VOLKMANN-SCHLUCK, Die Lehre des Nicolaus von Cues von der species, in «Kant-Studien» 48 (1957), pp. 235-246. 
52 VOLKMANN-SCHLUCK, ibid., p. 242. 
53 P. MOFFITT-WATTS, Nicholas of Cusa - A Fifteenth-Century Vision of Man, Leiden 1982. The chapter on De Beryllo is 
at pp. 153-188. 
54 Ibid., p. 187. 
55 Ibid., pp. 186-187. 
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method De Beryllo presents (because, as Moffit-Watts very perceptively notes, the four ‘premises’ at 
the beginning of De Beryllo56 are not in fact assumptions to be accepted without proof before one can 
use the beryllus; rather, they are applications of the beryllus which can be used to prove them57). What 
is left out of her account is how all this reflects on the question of hierarchy, and particularly the status 
of Christ in the Cusanian construction—issues that Moffit-Watts also leaves open. 
In 1988, the new authoritative critical edition of De Beryllo58 in the Opera Omnia published by 
the Heidelberg Academy, with Hans-Georg Senger and Karl Bormann as editors, included also a 
number of extended notes on important themes and passages in De Beryllo, presenting a wealth of 
information, particularly as to the sources within the tradition of many of Cusanus’ formulations, and 
adding up, in the end, to a small ‘interpretive treatise’ on De Beryllo – a valuable resource, and the only 
such attempt so far with the exception of Flasch and Corrieras’s work59. 
1.5 The influential account of Kurt Flasch 
 
Among the scholars who have written recently in the context of Cusanus studies, Kurt Flasch 
has had an enormous influence with his book proposing to track the development of Cusanus’ thought 
throughout his works: Nikolaus Cusanus: Geschichte Einer Entwicklung: Vorlesungen zur Einführung 
in seine Philosophie60, which is an indispensable addition to the bibliography, particularly regarding 
the interpretation of De Beryllo and its significance61. Flasch’s chapter on the De Beryllo assigns a 
special importance to it in the context of the development of Cusanus’ thought, and as the most suitable 
                                                          
56 De Beryllo, 4-7, pp. 6, 1 – 10, 2. 
57 MOFFITT-WATTS, ibid. 
58 Updated after the discovery of the oldest manuscript, the so-called Codex Yale 334 (Ms. 334, Beinecke Rare Book and 
Manuscript Library, New Haven, CT., fol. 1r-22r), unknown to the editor of the first 1940 critical edition, Ludwig Baur. 
59 De Beryllo, pp. 87-117. The language of the interpretive notes is, of course, Latin. 
60 K. FLASCH, Nikolaus Cusanus: Geschichte Einer Entwicklung: Vorlesungen zur Einführung in seine Philosophie, 
Frankfurt am Main 1998, 2008 (3rd ed.). 
61 FLASCH, ibid., pp. 445-479. The strong influence of Flasch’s reading (which constitutes the implicit framework of 
Corrieras’ work as well) in today’s scholarship can be seen, for instance, in J. MARENBON, Oxford Handbook of Medieval 
Philosophy, New York 2012, where Marenbon writes that De Beryllo is «the treatise written by Nicholas himself to 
introduce his thinking» (see ibid., endnote 46 to the short account of Cusanus’ thought found at pp. 225-226) – a near-
verbatim reiteration of Flasch’s interpretation, presumably seen by Marenbon as such a commonplace view as to not even 
require particular attribution. 
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introduction for his mature thinking62. According to Flasch, it is meant by Cusanus especially for all 
those who have trouble understanding his most important works such as De Docta Ignorantia and De 
Visione Dei63 and a decisive text for guidance from Cusanus on his philosophy, in which he tells how 
he would like his philosophy to be interpreted64. The main idea of Flasch is that Cusanus’ thought, 
especially with De Beryllo, turned decisively toward the nature of mind and the human faculties (mens; 
intellectus, ratio) to develop, with the help of the notion of coincidentia oppositorum, a formulation of 
a universal method65 which led him to make a radical critique of the philosophical tradition (particularly 
Aristotle). After the publication of Geschichte einer Entwicklung, the next book by Flasch on Cusanus 
pursued and put into practice his view on the special role of De Beryllo for introducing Cusanus’ 
                                                          
62 FLASCH, ιbid., p. 446: «die geeigneteste Einführung in die Cusanische Philosophie in ihrem reifen Stadium. Wer die in 
Denkwelt des Cusanus Eintreten will, sollte, meine ich, beginnen mit De beryllo [...]». 
63 FLASCH, ibid., p. 433: «Cusanus De beryllo geschrieben hat für Leser von De docta ignorantia und De Visione Dei, die 
nicht mit diesen Büchern zurecht kammen. Wir sollten diese Gelegenheit nutzen». This statement could be seen as 
problematic in light of the letter exchange between Cusanus and Aindorffer and de Waging, as briefly examined in Chapter 
1.1 and examined in more detail at the beginning of Chapter 3.1, which gives a precise timeline: the letter by Aindorffer of 
before February 12, 1454 which is the first to ask Cusanus for the Beryllus is also the letter in which Aindorffer expresses 
gratitude on behalf of the Tegernsee community for the De Visione Dei that they had just received. Thus, as we have seen, 
it is clear from the terms of Aindorffer’s request that, at least as regards Cusanus’ original plan for De Beryllo/Beryllus 
likely elaborated starting from June 1452 and still held as valid at the beginning of 1454 when the Tegernsee monks were 
expecting the work to be delivered in the near future, it was supposed to be a work which would help those who were 
familiar with De docta ignorantia in particular but had difficulties with certain doctrines – in particular, the coincidence of 
opposites and the sphaera infinita, as Aindorffer writes to Cusanus. De Visione Dei seems to have been developed to a 
significant degree separately from these concerns, as seen in Cusanus’ letter of 13 September 1453 (VANSTEENBERGHE, 
Autour, pp. 113-117) to the Tegernsee community on mystica theologia more generally. The Tegernsee monks do not 
mention, in subsequent letter, any particular difficulties they had with De Visione Dei, nor does this work seem to meet their 
needs for which they keep requesting De Beryllo. Thus, one would be justified in maintaining a fundamental separation 
between the scope of the two works, given the context outlined by the letters. However, Flasch’s observation casting De 
Beryllo as, in the end, a broader introductory work to Cusanus’ though, is plausible if we take into account the fact that 
Cusanus took more than 4 years to finish the work, so that we cannot restrict its final scope to being merely an explanatory 
work in relation to (primarily) De docta ignorantia, as the initial plan seems to have been at the beginning of 1454. 
Furthermore, the final version of De Beryllo does not take up the issue of the sphaera infinita, the second point of difficulty 
mentioned by the Tegernsee monks, which suggests that Cusanus’ thinking as regards the scope of the work must have 
changed significantly in the years he spent working on it until 1458. 
64 FLASCH, ibid, pp. 467-468: «De beryllo ist für die Selbstorientierung der Philosophie Cusanischen entscheidendes ein 
Dokument. Hier Cusanus sagt zum ersten Mal ohne Versteckspiel, wie er seine Philosophie interpretiert sehen will». On 
this issue, Hopkins accuses Flasch of «subjectivism», noting that nowhere does Cusanus explicitly say any of this in De 
Beryllo (J. HOPKINS, Nicholas of Cusa’s Metaphysical Speculations, vol. II, Minneapolis 2000, p. 113), and indeed that 
Cusanus says how he wants his works interpreted already in the Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae (HOPKINS, ibid., pp. 110-
111). However, that is not a very strong criticism, as Flasch’s interpretation takes into view the whole of Cusanus’ corpus; 
thus, even if Cusanus had said this explicitly at the beginning of De Beryllo, this would not prove it to be valid overall; nor 
can it be settled by Cusanus’ claims in the Apologia or, indeed, in De Apice Theoriae where he gives his own ‘developmental 
account’ of his thought. My close reading of the introductory paragraph of De Beryllo will offer some further circumstantial 
evidence to support of Flasch’s reading, to the effect that, at least at the moment of finishing De Beryllo, Cusanus thought 
of it such terms. The truth of Flasch’s claim, of course, requires formulating a broad account of Cusanus’ thought throughout 
his corpus, which is outside the scope of this thesis. However, the influence and fruitfulness of Flasch’s account as a starting 
point for the interpretation of De Beryllo can be pointed to as circumstantial evidence towards its ultimate validity. 




thought. His 2001 book Nicolaus Cusanus66 is his attempt at an introductory exposition of Cusanus’ 
thought, structured no longer chronologically, like Geschichte, but following in large part the structure 
of De Beryllo itself as outlined in Geschichte einer Entwicklung, and adding up to an extended 
interpretation of the De Beryllo itself. The fundamental idea remains the same: Cusanus develops a 
method based on the coincidentia oppositorum that is universal in scope67, according to which man and 
the characteristics of his knowledge, and the boundaries of the same, become fundamental in order to 
obtain the most certain knowledge possible, also, paradoxically, from the unknowable. Inevitably, the 
radical critique of the philosophical tradition from this perspective problematizes the notions of 
ontological-cosmological hierarchy in the tradition, arguably having as a result a «dehierarchization» 
(Ent-Hierarchisierung) of the world68, which is followed by an attempt at re-founding them according 
to his method69. 
The Flasch approach has showed itself to be very fertile, and his remarks on De Beryllo are 
particularly perceptive and have had great influence (e.g. as we will see, Corrieras bases her approach 
explicitly on his). However, there is one element that is constantly overlooked and not an object of 
focus for Flasch: namely, the role of Christ as a particular type of element within Cusanus’ theoretical 
construction, and, as a consequence, the issues encountered by Cusanus in integrating these highly 
distinct aspects of his thought. This shortcoming is connected to what seems to be a latent ‘rationalistic’ 
tendency in Flasch’s approach when it comes to interpreting the explicitly Christian elements in 
Cusanus’ thought, especially in his later period – as identified e.g. by Karen Ziebart70. My account in 
Chapter 5 of Christology in De Beryllo aims to provide a useful corrective towards this deficiency. 
                                                          
66 FLASCH, Nicolaus Cusanus. 
67 FLASCH, Nicolaus Cusanus, p. 58: «Die Koinzidenzlehre wird dadurch zu einem universalen Erkenntnisverfahren». 
68 FLASCH, Geschichte einer Entwicklung, p. 100.  
69 FLASCH, Nicolaus Cusanus, pp. 58-61, esp. p. 58.  
70 K. M. ZIEBART, Nicolaus Cusanus on Faith and the Intellect: a Case Study in 15th-century Fides-Ratio Controversy, 
Leiden 2013, p. 7. 
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Flasch’s approach, while highly influential, has also been the object of serious criticism, e.g. by 
Hopkins71 and Albertson72 – particularly as regards aspects of his methodology in his interpretation of 
particular passages in Cusanus, which, they contend, end up too much informed by (and neatly fitting 
into) his overall account and its presuppositions (these criticisms will be analyzed in more detail in the 
discussion of his methodology in Chapter 2.1). Notwithstanding some particular deficiencies, however, 
his work has become and remains essential, and even central, for any discussion of the development 
and periodization of Cusanus’ thought, and undoubtedly so for any discussion of De Beryllo. Even the 
critics who criticize Flasch harshly (e.g. Hopkins) admit that his work is a «monumental effort»73, and 
it forms the implicit background, as we will see, of later work on De Beryllo. 
1.6 Katrin Platzer and scientia aenigmatica 
 
Katrin Platzer’s 2001 work Symbolica venatio und scientia aenigmatica: eine Strukturanalyse 
der Symbolsprache bei Nikolaus von Kues74 is an interesting work on these two notions in Cusanus’ 
thought and their connection to his identifiable ‘methods’ more generally, which has been unfairly 
neglected in subsequent Cusanus research75. She takes on a wide subject matter, i.e. the development 
of Cusanus’ method throughout his entire corpus, focusing on his characteristic modes of using specific 
terms, particularly in his own account of his method(s)76. Via statistical analysis of word usage 
throughout Cusanus’ works, she finds that Cusanus used symbolum and symbolica venatio much more 
in his works before De Visione Dei, and he seems to have changed to using aenigma/scientia 
aenigmatica in the later works as a preferred way of talking about his overall method77. Accordingly, 
her account (in dialogue with that of Volkmann-Schluck) says that Cusanus’ thought develops in a 
                                                          
71 HOPKINS, Nicholas of Cusa’s Metaphysical Speculations, pp. 79-121. 
72 D. ALBERTSON, Mathematical Theologies. Nicholas of Cusa and the Legacy of Thierry of Chartres, New York, 2014, pp. 
18-19. 
73 HOPKINS, ibid., p. 120. «Monumental» is also, in fact, the adjective chosen by Albertson, another strongly critical voice, 
in order to characterize Flasch’s Geschichte: see ALBERTSON, ibid., p.18. 
74 K. PLATZER, Symbolica venatio und scientia aenigmatica: eine Strukturanalyse der Symbolsprache bei Nikolaus von 
Kues, Frankfurt am Main 2001. 
75 This work is almost never cited, or even mentioned, in subsequent literature. One of the only articles mentioning it is Ü. 
ZAHND, Nikolaus von Kues und die virtus verborum, in Die Modernitäten des Nikolaus von Kues, ed. T. Müller – M. 
Vollet, Bielefeld 2014, pp. 107-143.  
76 PLATZER, Symbolica venatio und scientia aenigmatica, p. 22ff. 
77 PLATZER, ibid., p. 93, 195ff. 
22 
 
movement from a method based on the symbolum (understood as a basic notion of ‘object that stands 
for something else’, and corresponding to his early employment of geometrical illustrations in De Docta 
Ignorantia), described as symbolica venatio, in his earlier works, to a method of scientia aenigmatica, 
based on the aenigma (broadly speaking, an object ‘in which’ we are able to see, in a coincidental and 
inseparable way, an infinite object – such as the beryllus78), in his later works starting from the period 
of De Visione Dei around 1453. She devotes considerable space to De Beryllo, seeing the beryllus as a 
paradigmatic case of aenigma79, and offers a complex and innovative account of the various aspects of 
light metaphysics and Lichtsymbolik in Cusanus, crucially connected to his development of the scientia 
aenigmatica80.  
A particular merit of Platzer’s account is the methodological application of the notion of 
‘structural analysis’ (Strukturanalyse), accomplished by means of both careful interpretive reading and 
computer-aided text processing81, by which she endeavors to prove the central thesis of her book: the 
development in Cusanus’ thought from an emphasis on symbolum in the earlier works as a means to 
developing names for God to a focus on aenigma (itself a particular form of symbolum, characterized 
by a dynamic quality and always ultimately referring to the infinite/unnameable, representing in fact 
an encapsulation of Cusanus’ three-step method82) in the later works, starting from De Visione Dei. 
This type of analysis, which finally aims at an inventory/’concordance’ of the most important uses of 
the method83, represents a foundation for developing the method of interpretation used in the first part 
of this work. 
The main defficiency in Platzer’s work, however, is the too-broad scope of her subject matter. 
Because of the number of highly complex works involved (De Docta Ignorantia, De Conjecturis, the 
                                                          
78 PLATZER, ibid., p. 93, 110. It is to be emphasized, however, that both symbolum and aenigma represent, in the end, 
different ‘steps’ in a three-step account of Cusanus’ overall method (which Platzer names as that of transcensus), in an 
account which is in fundamental agreement with Volkmann-Schluck and Jacobi; see PLATZER, ibid., pp. 48-50, 94, 205. 
79 PLATZER, ibid., p. 93. 
80 PLATZER, ibid., pp. 127-194. 
81 For her defense of the methodology, see PLATZER, ibid., pp. 26-31. 
82 PLATZER, ibid., pp. 45-50, 195. 
83 PLATZER, ibid., pp. 201-205. Here one may note, in particular her analysis of the deficiencies inherent in a previous 
attempt at a concept-focused concordance of Cusanus’ thought, that of Zellinger.  
23 
 
Idiota dialogues, De Visione Dei, etc.), her word-frequency analysis cannot engage in sufficient detail 
with the issues posed by the use of the respective terms in each passage of these works, which results 
in an overly bold interpretation of a passage from symbolum to aenigma in Cusanus’ thought, especially 
as, in the end, this seems to be not so much a radical ‘change’ in the initial method but rather a matter 
of emphasizing different steps of a single ‘unifying’ method of transcensus. Furthermore, more than a 
third of the work84 is devoted to an investigation of light metaphysics and imagery in Cusanus, a highly 
interesting topic in itself (and one for which she offers a very interesting account, unfortunately mostly 
overlooked by later scholars) but one which doesn’t necessarily pair well with her account of a passage 
from symbolus to aenigma in the first part of the book. Notwithstanding these deficiencies, the fact 
remains that this is a valuable work that has been unjustly neglected in the scholarship, particularly on 
De Beryllo, for which she provides a highly interesting analysis. In Chapter 3, with the analysis of the 
text, this work will aim at giving Platzer’s often higly perceptive remarks their deserved place among 
the work of the most important interpreters of Cusanus who have worked on De Beryllo and on these 
issues in Cusanus’ thought. 
1.7 Maude Corrieras and the first book-length treatment of De Beryllo 
 
The most extensive work on De Beryllo so far is due to the French scholar Maude Corrieras. 
After publishing her French translation of De Beryllo in 2010 as Le traité du béryl. Tome 185, she 
followed it up in 2012 with her Le traité du béryl, Tome 2: Introduction au traité de Beryllo de Nicolas 
de Cues86, meant to be taken as ‘volume two’ in conjunction with her translation of the work into 
French, and representing her extended Introduction for her translation as well as her commentary on 
the whole of De Beryllo, as shown by the (additional) subtitle found in the printed edition of this book: 
Le De Beryllo: une ars cognoscendi. This has the distinction of being the only book ever published so 
far that is devoted to a commentary on De Beryllo. This highly relevant and useful work, continuing in 
                                                          
84 Ibid., pp. 127-194. 
85 CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl, Tome 1. 
86 CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl, Tome 2: Introduction au traité de Beryllo de Nicolas de Cues. 
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the tradition of Flasch’s interpretation, provides a background for my interpretation in this work, one 
of whose goals is to fill in the gaps and incompleteness remaining in (what has by now become) the 
‘standard’ interpretation Corrieras offers.  
The work of Corrieras fills an important gap in the scholarship by providing an interpretive-
focused introduction to De Beryllo as a whole, something that was lacking not only in the French 
language but in Cusanus studies generally, since no other book-length works dedicated to De Beryllo 
exist in any language. Corrieras’ work, presenting itself (according to its second subtitle) explicitly as 
an introductory study, is by far the most detailed introduction to De Beryllo published so far, 
undertaking to reconstruct the main parts of Cusanus’ argument, performing close readings of some of 
the most important passages, and emphasizing three general topics which form the main divisions in 
her book: the method of the beryllus as the focus of the work, the use of mathematical images/analogies, 
and Cusanus’ criticism of Plato and (particularly) Aristotle.  
Corrieras’ highly valuable contribution does show, however, clear signs of its admitted origin 
as an extended version of her introduction to her French translation of the work, visible in certain 
aspects of the argumentation which, if one is to consider the work as a free-standing scholarly 
interpretive work on De Beryllo, would have to be judged as in various ways defficient. First and 
foremost, the discussion of the scholarly bibliography is highly limited87 and fails to mention some 
important authors (e.g. Platzer) and a number of more recent contributions to the scholarship. 
Furthermore, her analysis remains on a fairly general level, trying to cover all the important aspects of 
the method presented in the text, but inevitably not dedicating the full space needed for a more complete 
and exhaustive treatment (or to the close reading of more than just the most relevant passages). The 
main theme of her interpretation is Cusanus’ method itself, and she underlines the particular importance 
of the De Beryllo as a methodological and introductory work within in the context of Cusanus’ works, 
                                                          
87 The discussion of the previous literature is confined to a few remarks within the first few pages: CORRIERAS, Le traité du 
béryl, Tome 2, pp, 10-11, and the section of scholarly works on the De Beryllo in her bibliographical section only mentions 
the two works by Kurt Flasch that we have mentioned above (CORRIERAS, ibid., p.133). From the pattern of citations 
throughout the work, Corrieras seems to rely almost exclusively on Flasch for issues of interpretation in De Beryllo. 
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following the arguments of Kurt Flasch and offering a more powerful defense of them by means of a 
closer reading of passages of De Beryllo, to an extent that Flasch’s general account of the development 
of Cusanus’ thought did not pursue (and could not have been realistically expected to, given its 
enormous scope).  
The main merit of Maude Corrieras’ work is indeed the fact that she makes a powerful argument, 
with an overwhelming amount of textual support, for speaking of Cusanus’ (philosophical-theological) 
«method» in De Beryllo. In this, she cites and endorses Flasch’s own outlining of an Universalverfahren 
formulated by Cusanus in De Beryllo, and his explicit caution not to impose the notion of «method» in 
an anachronistic sense and avoid introducing any modern Cartesian-style premises as regards the 
reductibility of all philosophy to a «method»88. Corrieras demonstrates convincingly, using a great 
quantity of textual support, the existence of a well-defined method and its applications throughout De 
Beryllo, and traces the development of the main elements of this method with reference to Cusanus’ 
earlier works (De Docta Ignornatia, De Conjecturis, the Idiota dialogues and De Visione Dei)89. One 
of her stated goals is framing the method of De Beryllo in the context of a Flasch-inspired account of 
the development of Cusanus’ thought, taking into account the interests and problems that preoccupied 
him in this period and that led him to compose De Beryllo with a strong ‘educational’ focus, aimed at 
meeting a need to explain his proposed mode of thought simply and systematically and demonstrate its 
applications, particularly (but not exclusively) intended for the use of his friends, the monks of 
Tegernsee90. Crucially, Corrieras underlines that the method has the character of a praxis, something 
that by its very nature (and the nature of its ultimate object, God) has not (only) the form of an 
intellectual exercise but also that of a «spiritual exercise» or discipline91. 
                                                          
88 FLASCH, Geschichte einer Entwicklung, p. 475, CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl, Tome 2, p. 10, note 7. 
89 CORRIERAS, ibid., pp. 15-27. 
90 To whom, however, he likely failed to send it during his lifetime (see note 18 for the timeline), which leaves open the 
question of why, and how, Cusanus changed his mind between 1454 and 1458. Corrieras here follows Flasch, who also does 
not explore this question in any further detail. I argue throughout that proposing a possible answer to this question requires 
an examination of the contemporary Aggsbach controversy—which, not coincidentally, is an element that goes unexamined 
in both Flasch and Corrieras.   
91 CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl, Tome 2, pp. 33-34; cf. p. 48: «exercice spirituel». 
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However, Corrieras’ account is not (and does not claim to be) a definite and exhaustive account 
of all the aspects of the method Cusanus presents in De Beryllo. Beside the scarcity of the bibliography, 
some theoretical issues remain underdeveloped. In particular, this is the case for the notion of hierarchy 
and Flasch’s account of its problematic status, a topic which is not taken up by Corrieras directly92, and 
for the issue of Christology and the role of Christ, which is overlooked in Corrieras’s work93. These 
deficiencies do not invalidate her important results as to the importance, role and main characterisctics 
of Cusanus’ method in De Beryllo, but remain to be addressed. 
1.8 De Beryllo in Italian scholarship 
 
 Italian scholars working on Cusanus have not, as a rule, given much attention to De Beryllo as 
a standalone work. For instance, Graziella Federici-Vescovini, in her comprehensive and influential Il 
Pensiero di Nicola Cusano94, aimed at an overview of Cusanus’ thought and the development of themes 
throughout his works, makes very little mention of this particular work. Giovanni Santinello, in his 
Introduzione a Nicola Cusano, devotes a few pages to De Beryllo95, particularly noting the important 
point of the highly recurring ‘political’ image of the rex/princeps/imperator, which is ultimately 
connected to Cusanus’ insistence on God’s absolute freedom, and his innovative criticism of Aristotle 
where he proposes intentio conditoris as the solution for the problem of substantia96. Davide Monaco 
has also written recently about this topic, underlining it as a key development in De Beryllo, crucial for 
understanding the development in Cusanus’ later thought of a theology of absolute freedom97.  
                                                          
92 She does, however, approach in more speculative detail the (paradoxical-seeming) hierarchies yielded by the method in 
the form of the concept of species in De Beryllo in her article M. CORRIERAS, Identité e difference dans le De Beryl, in 
Identité e difference dans l’oeuvre de Nicolas de Cues, ed. H. Pasqua, Louvain-la-Neuve 2011, pp. 129-155, a highly 
concentrated and dense analysis of the mechanics of Cusanus’ arguments. 
93 See, for instance, her interpretation (CORRIERAS, ibid., pp. 116-118) of paragraphs 69-71 of De Beryllo, which gives no 
notion that the implicit and explicit invocations of Christ represent in any way a different object than the ones Cusanus 
usually constructs. This is an erroneous interpretation, as I will show in Chapter 5. 
94 G. FEDERICI-VESCOVINI, ll Pensiero di Nicola Cusano, Turin 1998.  
95 G. SANTINELLO, Introduzione a Nicola Cusano, Bari 1987, 2008 (6th ed.), pp. 94-98. 
96 SANTINELLO, ibid., pp. 96-97. 
97 D. MONACO, Cusano e la pace della fede, Rome 2013, p. 56, 60, note 63; cf. ID., Dio come libertà nell’ultimo Cusano, 
in «Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft» 33 (2011), pp. 213-227. See also D. MONACO, Deus 
Trinitas: Dio come non altro nel pensiero di Nicolo Cusano, Rome 2010, pp. 284, 328, esp. pp. 290-296. 
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By far the most comprehensive interpretation and resource on De Beryllo in Italian is Enrico 
Peroli’s recent interpretive commentary, in the form of extended annotations on his translation 
published in 201798. His goal is to give an exhaustive account of both the correspondences between 
terms, concepts and themes in De Beryllo and Cusanus’ other works, as well as Cusanus’ use of his 
sources99, and provides a thorough and comprehensive resource. 
1.9 Recent articles and further relevant works 
 
For a relatively up-to-date and highly detailed reference work on the status of current Cusanus 
research, Senger’s work Nikolaus von Kues - Leben, Lehre, Wirkungsgeschichte (2016) is a very 
valuable resource. Its section on secondary research devoted to De Beryllo, however, shows itself to be 
rather incomplete, failing to mention the work of Katrin Platzer and Maude Corrieras100. However, it 
does offer a good overview of the latest research on De Beryllo and connected issues, which has been 
furthered through a series of recent articles. 
In 2004, Isabelle Mandrella wrote a notable, though short, article on the basics of the 
philosophical method of the beryllus in De Beryllo101. In the same volume, Glas and Schwaetzer offered 
an account of precious stones in Cusanus’ works, dedicating some space to the beryllus102 and its 
possible significance and meaning – a topic which will be examined in much greater detail in Chapter 
3.1. 
In the last 10-15 years, particularly in the field of research on Cusanus in the Spanish language, 
and most of all in the South American space, there has been significant interest on the part of scholars 
towards less-studied works from Cusanus’ late period, and De Beryllo has also benefited from this 
attention, in the form of some excellent articles dealing with a number of recurring issues. Two 
                                                          
98 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Opere filosofiche, teologiche e matematiche, tr. by E. Peroli, Florence - Milan 2017, pp. 1155-1240 
(for the translation of De Beryllo), pp. 2700-2751 (for the notes and commentary). 
99 E. PEROLI, Nota editoriale, in NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Opere filosofiche, teologiche e matematiche, p. lxi. 
100 H. G. SENGER, Nikolaus von Kues - Leben, Lehre, Wirkungsgeschichte, Heidelberg 2016, p. 133. 
101 I. MANDRELLA, De Beryllo - Die richtige Brille gewährt Einblick in die Koinzidenz, in «Litterae Cusanae» 4.2 (2004), 
pp. 67-78. 
102 M. GLAS - H. SCHWAETZER, Beryll, Diamant, Karfunkel. Edelsteine im Werk des Nicolaus Cusanus, in «Litterae 
Cusanae» 4.2 (2004), pp. 79-94. 
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researchers stand out in particular for their repeated contributions: Claudia D’Amico and Cecilia 
Rusconi. Rusconi has written a number of articles on different aspects of scientia aenigmatica 
(understood as a terms standing for the philosophical method) in De Beryllo103, and a cogent article on 
Cusanus’ criticism of Aristotle in the same work104. The criticism of Aristotle and Plato in De Beryllo 
has gotten a lot of interest from scholars in this new ‘wave’ of research in the Spanish-speaking context, 
as Martin D’Ascenzo105 and more recently Victoria Arroche106 have both written on this theme. 
In turn, Claudia D’Amico has written on the role of geometric illustrations for the scientia 
aenigmatica in De Beryllo107, as well as two articles with the theme of the Intellect as ultimate principle, 
the coincidence of opposites and the One-multiple relationship, which are crucial themes in Cusanus’ 
ontological-structural account of his method at the start of De Beryllo108.  
One of the most interesting recent contributions to the scholarship is a 2012 article by Klaus 
Reinhardt, a scholar who emphasizes the theological dimension of Cusanus’ thought, focusing here on 
the conception of the intellectus in De Beryllo (itself crucial for the foundations of Cusanus’ method) 
by way of connecting it with a sermon Cusanus composed in 1455, Sermon CXXVII («Spiritus autem 
paraclitus»)109. Although Reinhardt’s article is short and chooses to focus primarily on the sermon and 
                                                          
103 C. RUSCONI, The nature of the mirror in the light of the scientia aenigmatica in De Beryllo, in Spiegel und Porträt. Zur 
Bedeutung zweier zentraler Bilder im Denken des Nicolaus Cusanus, ed. I. Bocken - H. Schwaetzer, Maastrich 2005, pp. 
95-112. C. RUSCONI, Annäherung an die cusanische ‘Scientia aenigmatica’ im Licht aus seiner Lektüre des Aristoteles in 
De beryllo, in Das Europäische Erbe im Denken des Nikolaus von Kues. Geistesgeschichte als Geistesgegenwart, ed. H. 
Schwaetzer - K. Zeyer, Münster 2008, pp. 315-324, which is a translation into German of C. RUSCONI, Aproximación a la 
"Ciencia enigmatica" de Nicolás de Cusa a la luz de su lectura de Aristóteles en el opúsculo De beryllo, in De memoria y 
silencio en la Filosofía medieval, Buenos Aires 2006, pp. 215-224. 
104 C. RUSCONI, La Critica a Aristoteles en De Beryllo de Nicolas de Cusa, in «Principios» 9, vol. 11-12 (Jan/Dec 2002), 
pp. 203-218. 
105 M. D’ASCENZO, La crítica a Aristóteles en el De Beryllo de Nicolás de Cusa, in A recepção do pensamento greco-
romano, árabe e judaico pelo Ocidente Medieval, ed. L. A. de Boni – H. Pich, Porto Alegre 2004, pp. 705-15. 
106 V. ARROCHE, Acerca de las críticas a Platón y Aristóteles en el De beryllo, in La dimension simbolica del Pensamiento 
de Nicolas de Cusa. Genealogia y Proyeccion, ed. J. González Ríos, Buneos Aires 2015, pp. 41-58. 
107 C. D’AMICO, Die Rolle der geometrischen Figur in der Zusammensetzung der Scientia aenigmatica, in «Mitteilungen 
und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft» 29 (2005), pp. 265-278. 
108 C. D’AMICO. Principle intelectual y coincidecia dei oppositi a la luz de las tradiciones filosóficas en el De Beryllo. In 
Coincidencia dos opostos and concórdia: Caminhos do pensamento em Nicolau de Cusa, ed. J. A. Maria – M. Á. Gómez, 
Coimbra 2002, pp. 101-117. D’AMICO, El Principio Uno-Intelecto en Nicholas de Cusa. A lectura de De Beryllo y De 
Principio, in Nicolaus Cusanus: Perspektiven seiner Geistphilosophie, ed. H. Schwaetzer – K. Reinhardt, Regensburg 2003, 
pp. 15-33. 
109 K. REINHARDT, Der Intellekt als Prinzip des Seins in De Beryllo und Sermo CLXXXVII Spiritus autem Paraclitus, in 
«Verbum» 14 (2012), pp. 5-16. On the unfortunate relative neglect of theology in Cusanus studies generally, see his cogent 




less so on De Beryllo and the method it proposes, it still manages to show the extraordinarily fruitful 
(and largely otherwise unexplored) field of examining connections between De Beryllo and 
contemporary sermons from the (highly prolific) period of 1453-1458, which brings to light the 
inescapably philosophical-theological background and significance of the apparently abstract elements 
of the ‘method’ in De Beryllo. 
1.9.1 Other notable accounts of Cusanus’ late works (giving less importance to De Beryllo) 
 
In contrast to the importance given to De Beryllo in Flasch’s account and those within its broad 
sphere of influence, there have also been a number of important accounts of the ‘late period’ of 
Cusanus’ thought which have not given it a significant role. For instance, Dirk Cürsgen starts his 
account of Cusanus’ late works, focused on negative theology and the development of a ‘logic of 
negation’, from De Aequalitate (1459)110. Thus, Flasch’s account of the importance of De Beryllo 
cannot be said to be uniformly shared among all scholars working on the late period of Cusanus’ 
thought, and depends fundamentally on the type of development one sees in Cusanus’ late works and 
on which aspects thereof are judged most important111.  
The approach taken in this thesis will focus on the De Beryllo starting from the framework 
outlined by Flasch and developed in further detail by Corrieras, focusing on the method that is the focus 
of Cusanus’ text and paying particular attention to the theological-Christological aspects (thus 
following the lead of Reinhardt), seen as a particular aspect of the method that has not hitherto been 
carefully studied. While this work will not deal directly with the question of what importance De 
Beryllo has in the wider context of the development of Cusanus’ thought, it will add an important 
                                                          
110 D. CÜRSGEN. Die Logik der Unendlichkeit: die Philosophie des Absoluten im Spätwerk des Nikolaus von Kues, Frankfurt 
am Main 2007. For further work in this direction of research on the late works of Cusanus, again skipping over De Beryllo, 
see ROHSTOCK, Der negative Selbstbezug des Absoluten: Untersuchungen zu Nicolaus Cusanus’ Konzept des Nicht-
Anderen, Berlin 2014, which applies this framework, ultimately, to De Non Aliud. 
111 It is clear that Cürsgen’s approach develops a very different account of the development of Cusanus’ thought than 
Flasch’s own – simplifying, one might say that Flasch (and most scholars influenced by him) posits a progression from 
‘darkness’ (focused on some form of negative theology) to ‘light’ (a new foundation for what would be some form of 
‘positive’ theology) culminating in De Apice Theoriae, whereas Cürsgen focuses on the development of the particular 
structures of the ‘logic of negation’ that, in the end, he argues, underlies such apparently ‘positive’ names as posse ipsum. 
Rohstock complains that Cürsgen’s interpretation has been mostly ignored by the scholars of the so-called ‘positive’ 
tradition («fast vollig ungeachtet geblieben» - ibid., p. 4). The problem of these two ‘competing’ account of Cusanus’ 
intellectual development in his late period is interesting and yet to be played out in the literature. 
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consideration pointing to its particular importance that Flasch/Corrieras do not mention: namely its 
development of the issue of incarnational Christology on many levels (including the significance of the 
title image of the beryllus), to the point that De Beryllo can justly be described not only as a 
‘methodological’ and philosophically-focused work but also as a Christological one. If this suggestion 
holds, this would be a further argument that De Beryllo deserves recognition as a highly interesting 
synthesis in any account of the development of Cusanus’ thought. 
1.10 Conclusions and outstanding scholarly problems 
1.10.1 A conjectural pattern of development in Cusanus scholarship 
 
There is an interesting pattern which seems to recur in Cusanus research, found in many 
disparate contexts and regarding most problems that issue in longstanding scholarly controversies, 
which shows the recurring form of two ‘stages’. The first ‘stage’ is an initial investigation of (a certain 
aspect of) Cusanus’ thought, most often identifying his thought as being in some way or another 
‘modern’, or at least containing some form of innovation that one would not expect for his intellectual 
context, which interpretation brings Cusanus’ thought to a new level of interest and scrutiny on the part 
modern scholars. Then, the ‘second stage’ is a scholarly reaction against this initial ‘paradigm’, 
insisting on a better intellectual-historical contextualization of Cusanus’ thought, based on a closer 
reading and/or one with a greater focus on his sources and his immediate intellectual influences and 
environment, which most often aims to ‘recover’ the nuances of his thought in its context, and most 
often characterized him as a thinker working firmly within the established traditions and intellectual 
context of his time. Thus, such scholars reject the ‘stage one’ interpretation as generalizing, 
overinterpreting, and even distorting Cusanus’ thought to make it fit with the particular (usually 
modern) school of thought to which the scholar who initially made the ‘stage one’ appraisal belongs. 
Thus, while at ‘stage one’ Cusanus’ thought comes into view as extraordinarily interesting precisely as 
an anachronistic ‘precursor’ of the school of thought favored by that scholar himself, ‘stage two’, which 
comes as a reaction to the heightened scholarly interest in the issue and in Cusanus more generally as 
a result of the ‘phase one’ interpretation, pushes back against this interpretation, arguing, implicitly and 
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explicitly, that Cusanus is not that ‘extraordinary’ within his context after all. However, the ‘stage two’ 
accounts turn out to have their own shortcomings, and do not represent the end of the scholarly debate, 
as there simply is ‘something about’ Cusanus’ peculiar mode of thought112 (which might be his 
development and constant use of the ‘paradoxical’ coincidentia oppositorum) that ultimately motivates 
the ‘stage one’ interpretations, which are not reducible to mere scholarly carelessness and 
overinterpretation. Indeed, ‘stage two’ scholars end up criticized for imposing their own ideological 
presuppositions on the text, and can then be treated themselves as the ‘stage one’ to another application 
of the same pattern. The result is a dialectical back-and-forth which recurs with surprising constancy 
throughout the modern reception of Cusanus’ thought, and tends to yield no ‘definitive answer’ to the 
most pressing questions regarding how Cusanus’ thought can be understood and how it fits within the 
context of his time. 
This pattern can be found more or less clearly present at any moment in the development of 
Cusanus research that we choose to examine, and most prominently in what can be characterized as the 
important moments, or turning points, of its development: from Übinger in the late 19th century, 
introducing the idea that Cusanus’ works should be examined from the perspective of a development 
in his thought (fighting against the ‘totalizing’ and reductive interpretations of nineteenth-century 
Thomists), to Cassirer’s highly influential highlighting of Cusanus as the first modern thinker and the 
many subsequent writers who criticized this reading, such as Volkmann-Schluck and, influentially, 
Jacobi (who dedicates a long discussion to the types of misreading Cusanus in his influential Die 
Methode der cusanischen Philosophie113); then, later on, Hopkins’ thorough criticism of Cusanus’ 
twentieth century interpreters in the English-speaking world (to which he dedicates a large part of his 
1983 book Nicholas of Cusa’s Metaphysic of Contraction114) as, fundamentally, too reductive, like all 
                                                          
112 Arne Moritz, for instance, gives an interesting account of this overall dynamic in A. MORITZ, Was kann Cusanus dafür, 
das wir Ihn modern Interpretieren, in Die Modernitäten des Nikolaus von Kues, ed. T. Müller – M. Vollet, Bielefeld 2014, 
pp. 467-485. 
113 K. JACOBI, Die Methode der cusanischen Philosophie, Freiburg 1969. 
114 J. HOPKINS, Nicholas of Cusa’s Metaphysic of Contraction, Minneapolis 1983, pp. vii-16 et passim. 
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interpretations that try to present Cusanus as ‘modern’115, and his attempt to reach a more historically 
informed understanding of Cusanus’ thought, faulting Jacobi as well for an interpretation that was too 
much in line with the ‘functional ontology’ of Rombach, his teacher116; then Haubst, with his studies 
on Cusanus from a ‘traditional’, theology-focused perspective, also arguing against the interpretive 
excesses of his forebears, particularly in the German tradition117; then Bond and Casarella in the 
English-speaking sphere, putting further emphasis (against Hopkins) on the importance of the 
coincidence of opposites as such in Cusanus’ thought (not as mere rhetorical device, as Hopkins at 
times argues118). The same pattern can also be seen in the groundbreaking work by Kurt Flasch, who 
put together an impressive account of the evolution of Cusanus’ thought in his 1998 Geschichte einer 
Entwicklung, dedicating long passages to criticizing the previous, reductive approaches, whether by 
neo-Thomists or modernizing interpreters119—only to be criticized in turn by Hopkins, at great length, 
for committing the same sin of reductionism himself, by, in effect, being too attracted to ‘novelty’ in 
Cusanus’ thought and casting him into a story of ‘modernizing’ philosophical development120. In 
another way, Albertson seeks to overturn Flasch’s conclusions in his attempt at a radical 
‘historicization’ of Cusanus’ thought, emphasizing the ‘traditional’ element to such an extreme effect 
that he removes, in effect, any and all ‘original’ elements from it, considering them, in essence, 
accidental121—which interpretation, in turn, seems to be guilty of the same fundamental sin it accuses 
(as we will see in Chapter 2.2.1 in the account of Albertson’s own methodological problems). The 
dialectic continues, leaving the fundamental issues ‘unsettled’122—yet in a movement that is itself 
highly fertile and productive. We know and understand much more of Cusanus himself and his works 
                                                          
115 See J. HOPKINS, Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464): First Modern Philosopher?, in Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXVI 
(2002): Renaissance and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. H. French - P. Wettstein, Malden MA 2002, pp. 13-29. 
116 Hopkins criticizes Rombach’s reading at length in HOPKINS, Nicholas of Cusa’s Metaphysic of Contraction, pp. 59-90. 
117 R. HAUBST, Streifzüge in die Cusanische Theologie, Münster 1991. 
118 J. HOPKINS, Faith and the Rhetoric of Religious Paradox, unpublished, available online at www.jasper-
hopkins.info/FaithAndParadoxJune2007.pdf (accessed 20.04.2018). 
119 FLASCH, Geschichte einer Entwicklung, pp. 44-70. 
120 J. HOPKINS, Nicholas of Cusa’s Metaphysical Speculations vol. II, Minneapolis 2000, pp. 79-119. 
121 ALBERTSON, Mathematical Theologies, p. 169ff. on the ‘accidental triumph’ of De docta ignorantia. 
122 For a paradigmatic example of this pattern as it applies to the state of Cusanus research, on the particular topic of the 
relationship between fides and ratio (but with much wider applicability), see Karen Ziebart’s overview of, and commentary 
on the state of, the existing literature in ZIEBART, Nicolaus Cusanus on Faith and the Intellect, pp. 11-47. 
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through each ‘iteration’ of this pattern, as his life and works are being studied in more and more 
detail123. The lack of a ‘definitive’ interpretation of Cusanus’ thought on the most important issues, 
whatever reason one gives for it, is proving to be an exceptionally fertile terrain for scholarship. The 
present work, an examination in greater detail of a work by Cusanus that has received comparatively 
little attention and focusing on challenging the consensus on an element (theology in De Beryllo) that 
has been overlooked, inevitably fits within such a ‘movement’, responding, as it inevitably must, to the 
insufficiencies and over-reductiveness of some in the tradition before it, and advancing the state of our 
knowledge of this fascinating thinker in the process. 
1.10.2 Particular issues in the scholarship on the De Beryllo 
 
First of all, it must be underlined that the secondary literature is in near-unanimous agreement 
that Cusanus has a «method» in general terms124, indeed a «philosophical-theological method»125, and 
that it is precisely such a method that is the focus of De Beryllo126. Thus, it is not a particularly 
controversial issue that De Beryllo presents something that can indeed be called a philosophical-
theological method. What still remains to be done, however, is to analyze this method in exhaustive 
detail (in both its philosophical and theological aspects) and give an appropriately in-depth 
interpretation of De Beryllo as a whole. 
Beside the ‘dialectical’ dynamic of development of scholarly positions outlined above, and the 
fact that there are rather few ‘data points’ in terms of articles and books devoting significant space to 
                                                          
123 A fundamentally similar view of the developments in Cusanus scholarship can be seen, for instance, in D. ALBERTSON, 
Mystical Philosophy in the Fifteenth Century. New Directions in Research on Nicholas of Cusa, in «Religion Compass» 4/8 
(2010), pp. 471-485, who describes the same dynamic I am outlining here in terms of successive «waves» of scholarship. 
124 A term used often in the literature. For an influential older account, see e.g. JACOBI, Die Methode, pp. 174-240. Platzer, 
herself using this term, inventories its widespread deployment in the literature on Cusanus, in such authors as Leo Gabriel 
(«translative Methode»), Stephan Otto («transsumptive Methode»), Maurice de Gandillac («symbolische Methode»), and 
Volkmann-Schluck («aenigmatische Methode») (PLATZER, Symbolica venatio, p. 195). For a more recent and highly 
influential defense of the notion of ‘method’ for interpreting Cusanus’ thought, particularly in De Beryllo, see FLASCH, 
Geschichte einer Entwicklung, pp. 474-475, who also underlines the need to avoid anachronism in using this term. 
125 For this precise expression, see SENGER, Nikolaus von Kues, pp. 153-154, who speaks in the context of the whole of 
Cusanus’ corpus of his «philosophisch-theologischen Methoden». Senger’s view is that of a Methodenpluralismus, i.e. that 
there are several identifiable ones, corresponding mainly to the various stages of development of Cusanus’ thought, which 
in the end can be reconciled, or rather should «function without conflict» («konfliktfrei funktionieren sollen», p. 154). 
126 Suggested explicitly by FLASCH, Geschichte einer Entwicklung, pp. 474-475; Corrieras explicitly and convincingly 




the De Beryllo, one of the greatest deficiencies in the existing literature on De Beryllo is simply that 
some of the most important works in the literature fail to mention and cite each other, creating different 
‘strands’ of research that do not effectively communicate. Certainly, this is at least partly due to the 
different languages in which the works have been published: German for Flasch and Platzer, French 
for Corrieras, Spanish for D’Amico/Rusconi, English for Hopkins. More than anything else, this 
deficiency must be remedied if we are to make clear progress in the scholarly discussion on De Beryllo 
and establish more conclusively its importance within Cusanus’ work. Accordingly, one of the chief 
aims of the present work is to reunite these different strands of research, something that has not been 
achieved in the research on De Beryllo so far. Existing research at the moment offers us a working 
paradigm with the highly useful interpretation of Flasch, but neither Flasch nor Corrieras, the arguable 
continuator of his work on the De Beryllo, offer a sufficiently comprehensive bibliography, particularly 
of sources in languages other than their own. The closest thing to a ‘reference work’ that a scholar 
working on De Beryllo can use today is still Senger and Bormann’s critical edition in the Heidelberg 
Opera Omnia, dating from 1988 and written entirely in Latin. One aim of this thesis is to fill the gap in 
the existing literature by providing a unified resource, which could serve researchers interested in De 
Beryllo or in issues in Cusanus’ late thought as a useful tool for furthering scholarship in the field of 
Cusanus studies.  
A further deficiency of the existing research lies in the fact that Platzer’s proposal for a structural 
analysis (Strukturanalyse), although rendered even more promising by the development of electronic 
means of access to the text of Cusanus’ works127, has not been taken up in the research published in the 
intervening years (very little of which, indeed, acknowledges the existence of Platzer’s research at all). 
But it is precisely such a methodological approach that would be most fruitful for properly investigating 
Cusanus’ method in all its aspects in a given work, while addressing possible objections such as 
                                                          
127 In particular, the entirety of the text of the Heidelberg critical edition of Cusanus’ Opera Omnia is available online at 
http://urts99.uni-trier.de/cusanus/content/werke.php (last accessed 22.04.2018), with a powerful search function that allows 
anyone to perform testing of various ‘structural’ hypotheses similar to Platzer’s own for any subset of Cusanus’ works. This 
resource can be of particularly great value for interpretations that would attempt to formulate a type of Strukturanalyse in 
the vein of Platzer’s own attempt. 
35 
 
Hopkins’ (and those of Platzer herself128), to the effect that an interpretation is being imposed from 
outside on the text. This deficiency is only partly addressed by Corrieras’ close reading (limited, 
unfortunately, to only certain passages of the De Beryllo) and Platzer’s own attempt at a 
Strukturanalyse, which takes on a scope that is arguably too great and complex for the space available 
to her (i.e. the question of Cusanus’ method in all his works). However, a framework powerful enough 
to account for all the instances of the use of the (proposed formulation) of Cusanus’ ‘method’ in the De 
Beryllo would—to the extent that it would prove to be a simple and powerful enough approach that 
would show itself able to help our understanding of different passages and their commonalities within 
Cusanus’ intended project—offer a much stronger way of arguing for the nature of Cusanus’ method 
in the De Beryllo, much less vulnerable to the Hopkins type of criticism (i.e. the pointing out of 
particular passages which can be invoked, through close reading, in order to contradict the main overall 
interpretive thesis). Resolving this vulnerability would indeed constitute progress, particularly in the 
context of the universally acknowledged great diversity of opinions and interpretations within Cusanus 
scholarship, and might even be able to show a way out of the mire of apparently irresolvable interpretive 
conflicts.  
In an attempt to address this issue, I will propose an approach similar at its core to the 
Strukturanalyse suggested by Platzer129 as applied to a particular object, i.e. the philosophical-
theological method of the beryllus, in that it identifies a particular recurring argument structure (the 
‘method’) in the De Beryllo, catalogues its main uses in the text (in the form of the two most used types 
of images, which make up the vast majority of the images employed by Cusanus as ‘material’ for his 
method: the geometrical images, analyzed in Chapter 3.4, and the political images, analyzed in Chapter 
4) and proposes a simple type of formal notation (the ‘B-notation’) for distinguishing it. By undertaking 
such an approach, which is shown to be highly fruitful in practice, and narrowing the scope to a 
                                                          
128 See her cogent criticism of the earlier attempt by Zellinger towards constructing a philosophical ‘concordance’ for 
Cusanus’ works, in PLATZER, Symbolica venatio und scientia aenigmatica: eine Strukturanalyse der Symbolsprache bei 
Nikolaus von Kues, p. 201ff.  
129 For her arguments in favor of this methodology, see PLATZER, ibid., pp. 26-31. For a more in-depth justification, see my 
arguments in Chapter 2 below. 
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manageable one (thus avoiding the problems Platzer runs into), this work hopes to achieve tangible 





CHAPTER 2 – Methodology 
2.1 Methodologies used in the literature on De Beryllo 
 
a) Flasch – ‘genetic analysis’ 
One of the most important and influential aspects of Kurt Flasch’s account is undoubtedly the 
methodology he uses in order to arrive at his developmental of Cusanus’ thought. He does not formulate 
it in extensive detail, but outlines a set of principles and desiderata, calling it ‘genetic analysis’ – 
genetische Analyse130. There are four main features of this highly influential methodology: 1) the 
rejection of claims to present Cusanus’ thought as a unified, unchanging system, something to be 
deduced from first principles; 2) while the developments in Cusanus’ personal circumstances are taken 
into account, Cusanus’ thought is not reduced to a biographical account of his life, but allowed its own 
course of development according to its own internal logic; 3) the interpretation keeps a balance between 
‘constant elements’ and ‘novelty’ in such a developmental account; and 4) Cusanus’ works are seen as 
part of a development in his thought which is not assumed to be teleological, moving towards a 
predefined end131. At the core of his method lies the close reading of the individual texts, avoiding as 
much as possible the use of wider, abstract historiographical categories such as ‘medieval’ or 
‘modern’132. The characteristics of the type of close reading proposed are not systematically outlined; 
Flasch says, however, that it should be based on an attempt to «immerse ourselves in the inner 
problematic, in the immanent development of faultlines within Cusanian thought»133. Flasch’s highly 
influential approach lies to a great extent behind the current interpretations of De Beryllo in the 
scholarship, since Flasch’s thesis about the importance of De Beryllo generally in the context of 
Cusanus’ thought has been highly influential134. Subsequent scholars have taken it as their aim to 
improve upon the basic framework of this methodology, as we will see below.  
                                                          
130 FLASCH, Geschichte einer Entwicklung, pp. 11-12. Cf. ibid., p. 121-123. 
131 These four principles are outlined in FLASCH, Geschichte, p. 12. 
132 FLASCH, Geschichte, p. 11. 
133 FLASCH, Geschichte, p. 43: «Dazu mussen wir uns vertiefen in die innere Problematik, in die immanenten Verwerfungen 
des Cusanischen Denkens». The question of how to achieve this lies at the core of the methodological debate here outlined. 
134 See e.g. J. MARENBON, ed., Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy, New York 2012, pp. 225-226, note 46: «[De 
Beryllo is] the treatise written by Nicholas himself to introduce his thinking», which is a straight-up restatement of Flasch’s 
position, not being seen as even requiring attribution. 
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Several imperfections and deficiencies in Flasch’s approach have been pointed out by critics. 
The first problem is the fact that due to the enormous scope of his work (the whole of the Cusanian 
corpus), he does not spend much space dealing explicitly with Cusanus’ sources and instead refers the 
reader to other scholars for more in-depth treatment135. This issue, however, does not much affect 
Flasch’s treatment of De Beryllo, which (in line with Cusanus’ own focus in the work itself) is strongly 
geared towards Cusanus’ treatment of his sources: almost half of Flasch’s account of De Beryllo in 
Geschichte einer Entwicklung is devoted to Cusanus’ relationship with his tradition, Aristotle and 
Albert the Great136. 
Another issue with Flasch’s method, also connected to its wide scope spanning multiple works 
and a lengthy time period, is that, by necessity, only a small number of passages can be chosen for close 
reading in order to support his overall interpretation, and, furthermore, these are inevitably interpreted 
focusing on their place in the argument constructed by his book overall. This raises the risk of readings 
distorted by the overarching presuppositions of the author—and this charge lies at the core of the most 
important criticism made of Flasch’s method, which we will now examine.   
b) Hopkins’ criticism of Flasch and his method 
In his extended critique of Flasch’s Geschichte einer Entwicklung in volume II of his Nicholas 
of Cusa – Metaphysical Speculations137, Hopkins attacks Flasch’s overall interpretive framework and, 
in particular, the results of his close reading of selected passages to support his highly ambitious 
account. Ultimately, these passages—Hopkins argues—end up distorted by the presuppositions behind 
this overall account. 
The core of Hopkins’ lengthy critique concerns a large number of readings of particular 
passages by Flasch: he accuses Flasch of «misleading’ readings, «half-truths», «subjectiveness» and 
«unevenhandedness», and of readings that are «highly impressionistic as well as unscholarly»138, as 
                                                          
135 See FLASCH, Geschichte, pp. 14-16 for his justification of this part of his approach. Cf. also Flasch’s criticism of excessive 
Quellenforschung in ibid., pp. 291-292, 307-308.  
136 FLASCH, Geschichte, pp. 465-479. 
137 J. HOPKINS, Nicholas of Cusa’s Metaphysical Speculations, vol. II, pp. 79-121. 
138 HOPKINS, ibid., p. 120. 
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well as simply wrong139. He identifies the source of the problems as, in the end, Flasch’s 
presuppositions in laying out his overall developmental account, which leads him to an overemphasis 
on the «newness» of particular passages in Cusanus’ works140. One must point out, however, that 
Hopkins has his own longstanding presuppositions which determine his preferred readings (which 
include, in particular, seeing Cusanus as constantly preoccupied with giving an appearance of 
«novelty», and, on the other hand, interpreting him as, in the end, highly «traditional», to the point that 
any apparently novel notion, both in the development of his thought across his works and in relation to 
the traditions he is a part of, is merely an appearance141). However, the problem he points to is a valid 
one: a work of wide enough scope will inevitably rely on the close reading of only some passages, and 
the resulting readings run the risk of being miscontextualized and misintrepreted to fit the ‘narrative’ 
of the whole. Another way of putting this would be that Flasch’s third and fourth methodological 
principles (maintaining a balance between constancy and novelty and avoiding a ‘teleological’ account) 
become that much harder to maintain the wider the scope of the work is, and the more one is forced to 
remain ‘distant’ from the texts. 
c) Albertson’s critique of Flasch and attempt at a methodological correction 
In his 2014 book Mathematical Theologies – Nicholas of Cusa and the Legacy of Thierry of 
Chartres142, David Albertson seeks to give a very different account of Cusanus’ overall intellectual 
development—based, first and foremost, on an updated methodology, in turn explicitly based on 
                                                          
139 HOPKINS, ibid., p. 121: «many of the interpretations can be shown bei frontaler Bestreitung to be wrong».  
140 HOPKINS, ibid., p. 99: «We are now beginning to see what goes wrong with Nikolaus von Kues. Geschichte einer 
Entwicklung: viz., that its author, being far too intent upon portraying the newness of Cusan thought, eagerly pounces upon 
unusual-sounding passages that he finds in Cusa’s works. These passages are then given unusual interpretations that make 
the passages into novel expressions of unprecedented thought—thereby signaling an alleged Cusan tendency toward a new 
physics, an alleged new Cusan conception of Geist überhaupt, alleged new metamorphoses of the doctrines of coincidence-
of-opposites and of negative theology, and so on». See also p. 120: «He does not give us a close reading of the texts but 
records for us the ways in which Nicholas’s writings have struck him in his quest to ferret out their newness» 
141 Hopkins’s own interpretive approach is a constant throughout his works, and is always centered on the notion that any 
‘radical’ or unusual-seeming pronouncements by Cusanus are not so after a closer examination of his sources in the tradition. 
See e.g. his extended criticism of other readings in HOPKINS, Nicholas of Cusa’s Metaphysics of Contraction, esp. pp. 3-17; 
or his Translator’s Introduction to his translation of De Docta Ignorantia in NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Nicholas of Cusa on 
Learned Ignorance - A Translation and an Appraisal of De Docta Ignorantia, tr. by J. Hopkins, Minneapolis 1981, 1985 
(2nd ed.), pp. 1-50; or his article against ‘modernizing’ interpretations of Cusanus’ thought, J. HOPKINS, Nicholas of Cusa 
(1401-1464): First Modern Philosopher?, in Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXVI (2002): Renaissance and Early Modern 
Philosophy, ed. H. French - P. Wettstein, Malden (MA) 2002, pp. 13-29. 
142 ALBERTSON, Mathematical Theologies. Nicholas of Cusa and the Legacy of Thierry of Chartres, New York 2014. 
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Flasch’s own, but «intensifying»143 or making «more rigorous» Flasch’s «genetic method»144. 
Albertson clearly endorses Flasch’s methodological prescriptions—in particular, the four principles we 
have examined145. However, he identifies an interpretive bias in Flasch’s overall account, namely 
claiming that Flasch is under the influence of what Albertson calls the «mathesis narrative»: a «Neo-
Kantian narrative of modernity’s origins» that «often continues to inform, sometimes unconsciously, 
contemporary accounts of European modernity», which speaks of «the dramatic leap into a 
mathematized or geometrized vision of the cosmos by Galileo and Descartes», and which is «not so 
much incorrect as gravely incomplete»146. He aims to correct for this systematic bias in applying the 
‘genetic method’—a bias which, he alleges, leads Flasch to a privileging of «moments when the Cusan 
mind was temporarily freed of its medieval theological limitations» (thus one can see that the 
‘philosophical’ vs. ‘theological’ conflict lies just beneath the surface of Albertson’s criticism). This 
leads Albertson to instead try to fit Cusanus into a conjectural tradition of «Christian Neo-
Pythagoreanism», which paints a different picture of Cusanus’ overall intellectual development, not at 
all moving towards an overcoming of the traditional doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation and becoming 
a «true philosopher» (as Flasch’s account, according to Albertson, would have it), but rather 
developing, in its culmination, «a theology of Trinity and Incarnation»147. 
Another aim of Albertson’s is to correct for the relative de-emphasis of Quellenforschung in 
Flasch’s work, claiming that, ideally, one would have to perform ‘genetic analysis’ on Cusanus’ sources 
as well148. Apparently in order to remedy this deficiency, he chooses to apply the method to one 
                                                          
143 ALBERTSON, ibid., p. 227: «not in retreat from Flasch’s genetic method but by way of intensifying it». 
144 ALBERTSON, ibid., p. 18. 
145 ALBERTSON, ibid.: «it is especially crucial for our study of mathematical theology to follow Flasch’s prescriptions with 
care». 
146 ALBERTSON, ibid., p. 8. His account of this systematic bias has, in fact, great similarities to that of Hopkins, indicting the 
idea of radical change, i.e. novelty: that «an altered (modern) vision of nature has discredited (medieval) religious 
cosmologies, the way is freshly cleared for an autonomous new foundation unhindered by the habits of the past». As an 
aside, one might also remark that this is a perfect illustration of a particular ‘stage’ in our conjectural account of the 
development of Cusanus scholarship in Chapter 1.10.1. 
147 ALBERTSON, p. 20; see also ibid., p. 228. It must be noted that Albertson’s criticism of Flasch in this regard appears well-
justified; see, for instance, Flasch reducing Cusanus’ ‘theology’, particularly in De Beryllo, to «ancient natural theology» 
(FLASCH, Nicolaus Cusanus, p. 140) in his summarizing account of Cusanus’ thought (ibid., p. 138-140); this is simply not 
an accurate reading of De Beryllo, as I will shown in Chapter 5. 
148 ALBERTSON, ibid., p. 19, where he notes this would «double scholarly burdens», but in the end applies it to only one 
possible source for Cusanus, the so-called Fundamentum, as we see below. However, the problem is that this principle, 
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particular source, an anonymous text from the tradition of Thierry of Chartres, thus identifying a 
«Neopythagorean» tradition into which he places Nicholas. Why does he choose this particular source? 
The answer comes down to one particular scholarly controversy in Cusanus studies: that of Maarten 
Hoenen’s discovery of an anonymous text, Fundamentum naturae, within the tradition of Thierry of 
Chartres, which bears an uncertain relationship to De Docta Ignorantia, as it contains the same text as 
a part of its cosmological section in Book II149. This has led to a debate on whether the anonymous text 
copied from Cusanus’ work or the other way around, or whether they both drew from some third, 
unknown source150. Albertson is of the strong opinion that Cusanus must have discovered this 
preexisting treatise and been so fascinated by it that he build the entirety of De Docta Ignorantia around 
it151, and in fact devoted his entire career to solving various problems within the Chartrian tradition 
(involving other, unknown sources that Cusanus is supposed to have known) that the Fundamentum 
raises152.  
The source of Albertson’s rather surprising account of Cusanus’ development thus seems to be 
the inclusion of the Fundamentum naturae in the ‘genetic method’ itself, with the fundamental 
                                                          
applied consistently, would lead not to a doubling of efforts but to an exponentially larger investigation, as ideally one 
would have to do this at least for Pseudo-Dionysius, Proclus, Plato, Albert the Great, etc., to name just some of the sources 
much prominently invoked by Cusanus, and, of course, the various intermediaries through which Cusanus would have had 
access to them; thus a genetic analysis would have to encompass, in the end, a great part, if not all of, the most important 
figures in the Western tradition. In order for it to be usable in practice, genetic analysis must be given limitations, with some 
inevitable risk of distorting the overall image. 
149 M. HOENEN, Ista prius inaudita. Eine neuentdeckte Vorlage der De docta ignorantia und ihre Bedeutung für die frühe 
Philosophie des Nikolaus von Kues, in «Medioevo: Rivista di Storia della filosofia medievale» 21 (1995), pp. 375–476. 
150 For the wider debate on the proper dating of the Fundamentum, the possible common source between it and De Docta 
Ignorantia and the role (if any) which it could have played for the development of De Docta Ignorantia, see e.g. I. 
MANDRELLA, Rara et inaudita. Erneuerungsansprüche in der Philosophie des Nicolaus Cusanus, in Isti moderni: 
Erneuerungskonzepte und Erneuerungskonflikte in Mittelalter und Renaissance, ed. C. Kann, Düsseldorf 2009, pp. 239–
258, esp. pp. 247–248; W. BEIERWALTES, Nicolaus Cusanus: Innovation durch Einsicht aus der Überlieferung—
paradigmatisch gezeigt an seinem Denken des Einen, in “Herbst des Mittelalters”? Fragen zur Bewertung des 14. und 15. 
Jahrhunderts, ed. A. Speer, Berlin 2004, pp. 351–370; A. MORITZ, Explizite Komplikationen: Der radikale Holismus des 
Nikolaus von Kues, Münster 2006, pp. 234–235; C. RUSCONI, Commentator Boethii ‘De Trinitate’ [ . . . ] ingenio 
clarissimus. Die Kommentare des Thierry von Chartres zu De Trinitate des Boethius als Quellen des Cusanus, in 
«Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft» 33 (2012), pp. 247–290. 
151 For his argument stated in a comprehensive form, see D. ALBERTSON, A Learned Thief? Nicholas of Cusa and the 
Anonymous Fundamentum Naturae: Reassessing the Vorlage Theory, in «Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie 
médiévales» 77 (2010), pp. 351–390. 
152 ALBERTSON, Mathematical Theologies, p. 17: «the [Fundamentum] is no pedestrian source but a crystalline recapitulation 
of long-term controversies over the role of number in Christian theology reaching back to antiquity. Were it anything less, 
how could it have fascinated the erudite Cusanus for over twenty years?»; ibid.: «[the Fundamentum contains] a map of the 
missing Neopythagorean landscape within medieval Christian theologies. Captivated by its unexplored territories, Cusanus 
could not look away». This is an effective rhetorical strategy to counter what is clearly the weakest part of his argument, 
namely justifying why Cusanus would place such importance (without ever acknowledging it explicitly) on such a text. 
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assumption that the Fundamentum naturae was Cusanus’ source which he used to build the whole of 
De Docta Ignorantia around. From this starting point, the broadening of the ‘genetic method’ places 
the Chartrian tradition at the core of Cusanus’ entire thought-development. Rather predictably, the 
attempt to move away from the «mathesis narrative» (and thus to mitigate a too-modernizing, or indeed 
a too-‘philosophical’ as opposed to ‘theological’ reading of Cusanus’ development) by placing a high 
emphasis on one particular (possible) source (the Fundamentum), and including this source within the 
‘genetic analysis’ method while attempting to give it the same importance and level of attention as 
Cusanus’ own works, resulted in a reduction of the latter to developments of the problematic of the 
former, with differences being classed as «accidental»153—an interpretation which seems to drift 
inexorably further and further away from the plain meaning of the texts154.  
Albertson’s approach shows in stark relief an important danger and limitation of the genetic 
method, which appears particularly when another criterion is chosen for reading passages instead of 
close reading. Albertson argues against Flasch’s method of «immanent» analysis of the «inner 
problematic» of Cusanus’ thought, able to be analized in its «self-questioning» without necessarily 
depending on an analysis of its sources, calling such a task of remaining close to the text «arbitrary 
positivism»155. This is because, in Albertson’s view, sometimes «the meaning of a passage is 
inescapably codetermined by its source», which, «in [his] experience, […] occurs frequently in 
Cusanus, particularly when he is depending on Thierry of Chartres.»156 But this plainly begs the 
question of how one can know that this ‘overdetermination’ and ‘depending’ is actually there, and how 
one can guard against a judgment of ‘this passage is overdetermined by this source’ becoming a cover 
for introducing a reading extraneous to the passage itself but amenable to the author’s overall 
argument—which is precisely the deficiency that Hopkins and Albertson, as we have seen, accuse in 
Flasch’s reading, a trap into which Albertson seems to have fallen himself. 
                                                          
153 ALBERTSON, Mathematical Theologies, esp. pp. 169-190 and passim. 
154 This becomes particularly obvious in the case of De Beryllo: see ALBERTSON, ibid., pp. 151-152 and my account below. 
155 ALBERTSON, ibid., p. 18. Cf. FLASCH, Geschichte, p. 43. 
156 ALBERTSON, ibid. 
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The validity of any method lies in the results it can produce when applied to the actual texts. 
The result of Albertson’s interpretation is an image of Cusanus which is, in the end, historically 
implausible, not to say unrecognizable (as no solid evidence exists that he actually possessed a «dossier 
of Chartrian sources»157 that he was thoroughly preoccupied with reconciling for two decades, as 
Albertson’s narrative would have it). Reading a work such as De Beryllo within this interpretive 
framework, one is struck by how far removed Albertson’s account appears to be from the surface 
meaning of the text158: everything must be seen as a constant dialogue with the Fundamentum, while 
Albertson has to contrive an explanation to the effect that Cusanus’ explicit criticism of the 
Pythagoreans159 does not mean what it appears to be: a (rather characteristic) denial of any special 
ontological status for number, rendering Cusanus’ ‘Neopythagoreanism’ problematic160. Inevitably, 
Albertson also has to argue that behind doctrines that Cusanus ostensibly assigns to «Plato» or 
«Aristotle» are actually doctrines of Thierry, about whose provenance Nicholas might have been 
perhaps «sufficiently confused»161. Even if it seems possible to ‘translate’ from a more mainstream 
interpretation of the text (i.e. one built without needing to ‘translate’ all references such as ‘Plato’, etc., 
to references to doctrines from the Chartrian tradition) to Albertson’s ‘pan-Thierry’ theory and back162, 
it is unclear what interpretive benefit the supposition of mysterious and always unacknowledged 
Chartrian sources can bring that is superior to Flasch’s close reading of the text163. Most of all, there is 
                                                          
157 ALBERTSON, Mathematical Theologies., p. 201. Cf. ibid., p. 175: «When Nicholas sat at his desk to compose the final 
version of De docta ignorantia, he evidently had several Chartrian sources before him». Albertson’s entire account hinges 
on the existence of such a «dossier», for which the main evidence is his interpretation, and which in fact might be merely 
an artifact of his methodological overemphasizing of Chartrian sources in his attempt to correct Flasch’s ‘genetic analysis’. 
158 ALBERTSON, ibid. pp. 251-252. Very little space is devoted to De Beryllo in his developmental account, which Albertson 
justifies by classing it under the category of «works focused on Proclian philosophy», which makes them much less 
important in his account (as opposed to Flasch’s) than those (he conjectures are) devoted to Chartrian-tradition-specific 
issues (ibid., p. 227). 
159 De Beryllo, 56, p. 63, 22-26: «Et si sic considerassent Pythagorici et quicumque alii, clare vidissent mathematicalia et 
numeros, qui ex nostra mente procedunt et sunt modo quo nos concipimus, non esse substantias aut principia rerum 
sensibilium, sed tantum entium rationis, quarum nos sumus conditores». 
160 ALBERTSON, ibid., pp. 251-252 and p. 383, note 9. This is clearly one of the weakest points in Albertson’s argumentation, 
although he devotes great effort to mitigating it. 
161 ALBERTSON, ibid., p. 252: «even if he remained sufficiently confused about [Thierry’s modal theory’s] provenance to 
hope that it represented the universal philosophy of Plato and Aristotle alike». 
162 Albertson himself seems to claim this is possible, and he gives a very cogent parallel between his interpretation of 
Cusanus’ development and the one of Flasch: ALBERTSON, Mathematical Theologies, pp. 226-228. 
163 Albertson does point out, importantly, that the «mathesis narrative» which casts intellectual history as a movement 
towards modern conceptions predisposes us to privilege certain elements over others: he claims accordingly that there are 
«modern prejudices against Neopythagoreanism» (p. 227), and accuses Flasch’s «suspicion of Neopythagoreanism and 
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something radically unsatisfying about a reading that assumes it is impossible for a reader to understand 
a work such as De Beryllo (for which we know in various ways that Cusanus wrote for the specific 
purpose of being better understood) without knowledge of an utterly obscure work such as the 
Fundamentum, a work whose relationship to Cusanus is highly debatable to start with.   
One may note also that Albertson’s method, although in its divergence from Flasch it claims to 
be able to give a better picture of Cusanus as a theologian, particularly in the late works164, seems to 
completely miss the theological and Christological resonances of De Beryllo, which he says is a 
«rigorously philosophical» work165. It does no better in this than Flasch’s own account, which also 
failed to note the pervasive theological aspects informing, as we will see, crucial aspects of this work. 
While it is outside the scope of this thesis to make a judgment on which is, in the end, the most 
plausible view on the development of Cusanus’ thought, Albertson’s paradigm seems to be particularly 
problematic and hard to support when reading De Beryllo. The point to be noted here is that a crucial 
part of the ‘genetic method’ is the choice of focus (and of which sources to give most weight to), and a 
crucial danger is overemphasizing the import of any particular source (work, author or tradition) to the 
text one is reading, so that the unique nature of the text one is examining is lost (as particular passages 
end up ‘overdetermined’ by the source one has identified for them, possibly on considerations 
                                                          
Chartrian sources as so many impediments to the cardinal’s philosophical maturation to be overcome» (p. 226). But one 
suspects that what underlies Albertson’s forceful dissent from the ‘standard’ reading is a choice of emphasis, or of what one 
considers important. Accordingly, for instance, Albertson declares that instead of the «apophatic mysticism» and the 
«[discovery of] epistemological and ontological models in the language of Christian revelation» that Flasch and others deem 
as the central aspects of De Docta Ignorantia, «the essential event in De docta ignorantia is rather Nicholas’s struggle to 
deploy his conflicting Chartrian sources» (p. 226). This methodological point is at the core of the dispute: most scholars 
indeed deem Cusanus’ innovative epistemology/ontology/negative theology to be the interesting elements, and assume that 
Cusanus thought the same; Albertson, however, tries to argue for a view of Cusanus for whom most important throughout 
his career was his attempt to reconcile some sources he had found, and not (for instance) to develop new ways of speaking 
and thinking about God. However, all the historical evidence we have regarding Cusanus seems to point to him considering 
his usual subject matter in his philosophical-theological works (ways of talking and thinking about God) as more important 
than reconciling the thought of other philosophers (particularly, in De Beryllo, the doctissimi such as Aristotle and Plato, 
which in Albertson’s account seem to be reduced to different positions taken in the Fundamentum and other supposed 
Chartrian sources), which comes across as merely a secondary goal—see e.g. De Beryllo, 1, p. 3, 5 - p. 4, 10. It seems to be 
the most plausible interpretation that developing ways of thinking about God would be more important (particularly to a 
Christian monastic who, in De Beryllo, appears to be developing a philosophical-theological method focused on praxis) 
than reconciling sources, however important these might be. It is thus arguable that Flasch’s supposed ‘bias’ towards 
philosophical-theological issues is fully appropriate here.   
164 ALBERTSON, ibid., p. 20. 
165 ALBERTSON, Mathematical Theologies., p. 251. He identifies the theological developments of the late period as starting 
with De Aequalitate and De Principio (p. 256). 
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completely extraneous to the text itself). Accordingly, a remedy for this danger would be performing 
the closest reading possible, while 1) remaining close to the particular text one is reading (and not 
taking on an overly large scope, a problem from which Albertson ends up suffering even more than 
Flasch), and 2) noting influences and references to other sources without pre-judging that any one of 
them is the ‘crucial’ or fundamental one that would explain the whole. This involves a fundamental 
assumption of the integrity of the text one is reading as a whole, and a willingness to consider all 
possible ramifications, references and meanings, as much as possible without pre-judging what the 
account of its ‘ultimate meaning’ would be – which includes not assuming from the start where the 
overall development of Cusanus’ thought will lead. 
One must acknowledge, at the same time, the valuable contributions to Cusanus research 
brought by Albertson’s work. He focuses on «mathematical theology» and the influence on Cusanus of 
the Chartrian tradition, which, as he shows through a thorough engagement with the literature, have 
been relatively undervalued, particularly in developmental accounts such as Flasch’s—and the tracing 
of a «Neopythagorean» tradition through Thierry to Cusanus is itself an important result. He is right to 
draw attention to the limitations of Flasch’s account due to his view of what is truly important in 
Cusanus’ development, which tends towards privileging ‘philosophy’ as opposed to ‘theology’. 
Accordingly, Albertson’s view that, even in his late works, Cusanus’ thought is still, as always, 
explicitly Trinitarian and Incarnational166 is an important result (and, arguably, a welcome corrective).  
At the same time, Albertson’s account and its pitfalls caution us against attempting to remedy 
deficiencies in Flasch’s methodology by falling into another extreme, and concluding that an 
overemphasis of the role of Cusanus’ sources, to the detriment of Flasch’s more ‘traditional’ close 
reading, offers by itself the key for understanding the development of Cusanus’ thought167.  
d) Maude Corrieras – a mixed approach 
                                                          
166 ALBERTSON, ibid., p. 20. 




Maude Corrieras does not enter into an explicit discussion of methodology in her Le traité du 
béryl, Tome 2168 – however, her framework is clearly Flasch-influenced, as she cites Flasch exclusively 
as an interpretive authority on De Beryllo169. Starting from Flasch’s considerations on the method 
Cusanus develops in De Beryllo, she undertakes to prove it exists and to show its characteristics, as 
well as its ancestry within Cusanus’ previous works and, to some extent, within the overall tradition he 
is a part of.  
Compared to Flasch, her methodology includes more extensive close readings of passages (yet 
still of only a limited selection thereof), and a more developed Quellenforschung with deeper analyses 
of Cusanus’ sources within the tradition, particularly as regards Pseudo-Dionysius and Aristotle. She 
inserts her account of Cusanus’ method within a ‘genetic analysis’ of the development of his thought 
that is entirely compatible with Flasch’s general account, here narrowed down to the issue of the 
development of the method itself—a highly useful result (mostly limited, though, to pre-De Beryllo 
development, with little mention of how it plays out in the later works). However, her account is limited 
by the fact she does a close reading of only a small number of passages, and vulnerable (although 
arguably to a lesser extent) to a number of the same criticisms as Flasch’s account: most importantly, 
that the close readings of various passages are removed from their context and placed within her overall 
interpretative ‘narrative’, which might distort and limit our understanding of them. One can point to a 
clear example of this deficiency in the form of the absence of Christology in her account of De Beryllo: 
her reading of the final paragraphs, as we will see in our analysis, is reductive and deficient170, 
(mirroring precisely the latent ‘rationalism’ that Albertson, as we have seen, identifies in Flasch in the 
form of a latent form of the «mathesis narrative»171). 
Thus, we can conclude that Corrieras’ work, a highly valuable effort for De Beryllo scholarship, 
represents an incremental improvement over Flasch’s account and method. While an excellent step 
                                                          
168 CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl, Tome 2: Introduction au traité de Beryllo de Nicolas de Cues.  
169 CORRIERAS, ibid., pp. 10-11, 132, et passim. 
170 CORRIERAS, ibid., pp. 116-118. 
171 ALBERTSON, Mathematical Theologies, pp. 18-20. 
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towards a better understanding of De Beryllo, it points to the need of an even more thorough, detailed 
and exhaustive account in order to place our view of the text on a surer footing. 
e) Katrin Platzer and ‘structural analysis’ 
In her account of her own methodology, Platzer endorses the desideratum of a ‘structural 
analysis’, Strukturanalyse, of Cusanus’ works172, a notion originally proposed by Stephan Otto173 and 
Michael Stadler174, precisely as a possible solution to the problem of the «irresolvable immanent 
aporetic»175 of performing close reading while employing, in particular, a ‘genetic’ method for 
interpreting Cusanus’ thought. A ‘structural analysis’ would identify recurring patterns and structures 
in Cusanus’ use of language, including regarding the manner he employs his sources and uses them in 
different ways across his works176. According to this argument, an identification of recurring patterns 
would offer a better perspective on how particular issues develop in Cusanus’ thought, and would 
approach Cusanus’ own proposal for an ‘interpretive method’ in the later work Compendium177. 
The most important result of using this method in Platzer’s work is her thorough examination 
of the metaphysics of light throughout Cusanus’ works178, capped with an exhaustive index of passages 
mentioning speculatio and speculum179. However, the rest of her work, comprising a highly ambitious 
attempt at analysing Cusanus’ method(s) throughout his whole corpus, is more problematic due to the 
enormous scope of the project. She identifies a three-step «universal method» of «transcensus»180 and 
                                                          
172 Cf. PLATZER, Symbolica venatio und scientia aenigmatica: eine Strukturanalyse der Symbolsprache bei Nikolaus von 
Kues, pp. 26-31. 
173 S. OTTO, Nikolaus von Kues (1401-1464), in Klassiker der Philosophie, ed. O. Höffe, Munich 1981, vol. I, pp. 245-261, 
esp. pp. 259. 
174 M. STADLER, Rekonstruktion einer Philosophie der Ungegenständlichkeit: zur Struktur des Cusanischen Denkens, 
Munich 1983. 
175 STADLER, ibid., p. 18: «einer unauflösbaren immanenten Aporetik». 
176 STADLER, ibid., pp. 8-20. Interestingly, Albertson refers to this argument in Stadler approvingly (ALBERTSON, ibid., p. 
288, note 89), and he suggests that he developed his own method in an attempt to fulfill this desideratum and accomplish, 
himself, a Strukturanalyse. 
177 Compendium, 10, 28, p. 22, 1 - 23, 14. Cf. also Idiota de mente, 67, p. 103, 1-3: «Hae omnes et quotquot cogitari possent 
modorum differentiae facillime resolvuntur et concordantur, quando mens se ad infinitatem elevat», and Platzer’s 
commentary, PLATZER, Symbolica venatio, pp. 90-91. 
178 PLATZER, ibid., pp. 127-195. 
179 PLATZER, ibid., pp. 275-302. 
180 She formulates this with reference to the Complementum Theologicum (PLATZER, ibid., pp. 48-50), but it goes back, in 
the end, to a reading of De Docta Ignorantia: ibid., p. 94: «Das Stufenmodell des transcensus, das eine universale Methode 
darstellt, wird in der Schrift DDI darum als eine Methode der matematischen Symbolik dargestellt». 
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proceeds to analyze what are, in the end, two different ways of formulating it, which emphasize 
different parts of what remains one fundamentally unified mode of thought: the symbolum (before De 
Visione Dei) and the aenigma (afterwards, starting particularly with De Beryllo)181. At the end, she adds 
a collection of all passages containing relevant terms connected with the transcensus method 
(symbolum, aenigma, manuductio, transcensus, translatio, transsumptio, transfusio)182. While her 
interpretation is highly interesting, it remains in the end at the level of a speculative hypothesis, as space 
constraints183 only allow her to do a close reading on a limited number of passages, and the reproduced 
passages in her final index do not come with individual interpretations184. Thus, while certainly an 
interesting result and a step in the right direction proposed by Stadler, Platzer’s account arguably 
remains at a too general level for a fully developed Strukturanalyse of these complex themes in 
Cusanus’ thought185.   
2.2 The proposed methodology – ‘genetic analysis’/close reading/Strukturanalyse 
 
We have analyzed the major methodological approaches by the scholars who have worked on 
the De Beryllo overall so far. As we have seen, recent research builds upon Flasch’s highly influential 
‘genetic analysis’ while criticizing its various methodological shortcomings and attempting to 
overcome them and provide a more solid basis for its conclusions. Corrieras chooses a methodology 
that improves incrementally upon Flasch’s, remaining in continuity with it and its ‘immanent’ type of 
close reading, but vulnerable to some similar criticism. At the same time, paradigmatic for recent efforts 
to improve on Flasch’s methodology is Albertson, who pursues a good-faith and valuable attempt to 
                                                          
181 Cf. PLATZER, ibid., pp. 90-91, 93-94; «[D]ie symbolica venatio und die aenigmatica scientia als metodische Ansätze 
cusanischen Philosophierens» (ibid., p. 205). 
182 PLATZER, ibid. pp. 233-274.  
183 The chapter on the issue of the development of this method in all of Cusanus’ works is at ibid., pp. 33-126, which gives 
Platzer too little space to develop it in detail. 
184 To a certain extent, this problem could have been mitigated had she developed a formal system of notation for the 
transcensus method, as I propose with the ‘B-notation’ in the present thesis, which would have made possible a wide-scope 
inventory of the details of each application of the method, and which would be much stronger proof for her case than simple 
keyword identification. 
185 One other problem with Platzer’s work that needs to be mentioned is her decision not to cite the Heidelberg Opera Omnia 
for Cusanus’ texts, not even providing paragraph or page numbers from the critical editions, but instead citing passages 
exclusively via page numbers referencing one particular German-Latin edition. There does not appear to be a good reason 
for this decision, and one might speculate that it had a lot to do with later scholars’ reluctance to cite and make use of her 
work.   
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improve on Flasch’s methodology but which falls into another extreme, featuring an overreliance on 
Cusanus’ sources which ends up ‘overriding’ close reading and producing a highly implausible image 
of Cusanus and his works. An interesting and promising suggestion for mitigating the problems posed 
by Flasch’s type of reading is Stadler’s Strukturanalyse, which Platzer attempted to employ for a (too) 
wide-ranging account of Cusanus’ development of methods in his works. 
The methodology I propose to use is one that tries to fulfill Flasch’s desiderata while managing 
to avoid the previously identified shortcomings inherent in Flasch’s methodology. Ideally, it is, 
therefore, a combination of ‘genetic analysis’ and Strukturanalyse. It cannot be itself fully-developed 
‘genetic analysis’, as it deals fundamentally with only one work, De Beryllo, and even though it will 
offer correspondences and conjectures regarding similar structures in other works by Cusanus, these 
will be offered only as working hypotheses, in the absence of a similar close reading/Strukturanalyse 
done on each of those particular works (which is required in order to have strong evidence of an actual 
structural similarity). Such a method would arguably be a helpful precursor of an even more 
comprehensive ‘genetic analysis’ of Cusanus’ thought, which could only be completed after the 
methodology is applied to the whole corpus. This would result in an ‘expansive version’ of Flasch’s 
original project (which would require, of course, many thousands of pages, and perhaps even lead to 
different conclusions than his). The ‘B-notation’ I propose in this work, useful for the categorization 
and indexing of structures and terms in De Beryllo, also aims to fulfill Stadler’s desiderata for a true 
Strukturanalyse, furthering Platzer’s own attempt. Indeed, if Flasch’s account of De Beryllo as having 
a central importance within Cusanus’ corpus turns out to be broadly true on deeper analysis, the ‘B-
notation’ (or something like it) may serve as a tool for conducting similar Strukturanalyse-type 
investigations on other works by Cusanus as well. 
The methodology of the present thesis will be based on a version of the ‘immanentist’ close 
reading that Flasch proposes, trying to follow the inner logic of the text, using clearly-laid-out 
presuppositions. For interpretive purposes, two interpretive perspectives will generally be employed: 
of a ‘novice’ reader and of a reader with thorough knowledge of Cusanus’ sources and other works: the 
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first perspective will allow for a full and exhaustive ‘immanent’ reading, while the second will allow 
for a well-developed examination of correspondences with Cusanus’ other works and with his sources, 
without either one negating or overriding the other.    
Furthermore, the analysis will aim to develop a version of a Strukturanalyse regarding the 
beryllus method, by proposing a simple system of formal notation, the ‘B-notation’, which aims to mark 
the presence of the structures of the method which arise from our interpretation (even when Cusanus 
does not explicitly say he using them). 
2.2.1 The issue of ‘close reading’ – principles and presuppositions 
 
Regarding the criticism by Albertson directed at «arbitrary positivism» of the «immanent»186 
type of close reading that Flasch proposes, one can remark that the crucial assumption at stake is that 
the passage being read is a certain type of ‘whole’, with clear enough internal logic so that we are able 
to reconstitute a certain intellectual structure, for which the sources and external references would be 
‘inputs’, but which would not fundamentally change it—as if we were deciphering the proof of a certain 
mathematical or logical theorem. The question is how we can know that the passage we have chosen to 
analyze possesses such a structure, and how we can determine it without distortion.  
One point to note, however, is that even if this might be debatable for particular passages taken 
out of context, a text taken as a whole seems to fit these preconditions, as it is reasonable to suppose it 
would have been intended by the author to be basically comprehensible even for someone who is not 
familiar with some particular external source or another. This points towards a ‘structural analysis’ of 
the whole, by identifying clearly repeating patterns, as a way to overcome the problems that a close 
reading of only some select passages would pose. 
In light of the methodological insufficiencies previously examined, it is of high importance to 
lay out explicitly the presuppositions that will lie at the basis of the close reading of the text: 
                                                          
186 ALBERTSON, Mathematical Theologies, p. 18. 
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1. The text as a whole is meant by Cusanus to be understandable to a reader of Latin (whether 
or not this reader is already familiar with any of Cusanus’ previous works or with other works 
in the tradition) 
Thus, the text is assumed to be understandable to a reader at a basic level, prior to assuming any 
knowledge of Cusanus’ works or Cusanus’ implicit and explicit sources and references187. Indeed, if 
this presupposition is not satisfied, Cusanus’ project in De Beryllo has clearly failed, according to his 
own proposals in the first two paragraphs (analyzed here in Chapter 3.2). While that is indeed possible, 
we will start out with the default assumption that he did not. This should not be a controversial 
assumption, as a) it is inevitably the assumption we must make whenever we start studying a text of 
any kind, and b) it is fundamentally falsifiable: it is entirely possible that having made the assumption 
in the beginning, the text will be found at the end to be e.g. incomplete, off-topic or nonsensical. We 
must remain open, as much as possible (certainly a difficult task, as we inevitably already have our own 
expectations about the text), to any of these possibilities, and let the text guide us in making our 
determinations. As with all ideal standards, we will inevitably fall short of achieving this to the fullest 
in practice – although the exact degree of our success or failure depends on us, and it is what our 
resulting account must be judged on. But if this type of close reading is dismissed as ‘arbitrary 
positivism’ (as Albertson seems to want to do), it is hard to see how studying any written text would 
still be possible. 
The resulting methodology must also be the most appropriate for the fundamental object of the 
thesis: the in-depth analysis of the nature and applications of the method developed in De Beryllus, for 
which Cusanus has various names (beryllus, visio intellectualis, visio per speculum et aenigmate, 
scientia aenigmatica) in the text; since the De Beryllo as a whole (as we will see) seems to be aimed 
first and foremost at presenting this method, and there is no section of the book where the method is 
not used at least implicitly, my analysis throughout the book focuses on it, while taking into view the 
                                                          
187 This criterion fits particularly well for De Beryllo, as in the first paragraph Cusanus sets up such a scope in explicit terms: 
De Beryllo, 1, p. 3, 6: «cuiusque intellectus»; 1, p. 4, 12-13: «in cuiusque potestate». 
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book as a whole, given that the fundamental concept around which it is structured, the beryllus 
intellectualis, reproduces in certain ways the central structure of the method (as we will see as a result 
of the reading), and we even have reason to believe that Cusanus meant the entire text as an image, or 
illustration, of said method (as we will note in Chapter 3.2 with the analysis of the title). For this, the 
existence of this method as the object of De Beryllo is a necessary, if uncontroversial, starting 
assumption: 
2. There is a philosophical-theological method in De Beryllo, which forms the main object of the 
work (and is, indeed, what the titular beryllus refers to). It is aimed, at least in part, at developing 
particular ways of thinking and talking about God. 
As detailed in the previous chapter, this is an uncontroversial claim, backed by all scholars who 
have worked on De Beryllo specifically, for which Corrieras argues thoroughly and persuasively as the 
main object of her book. Furthermore, Cusanus’ own words in introducing De Beryllo, together with 
his correspondence with the Tegernsee monks188, suggest, in their plain meaning, that this is indeed his 
aim in this work as a whole. It is thus a perfectly reasonable presupposition to start with in reading the 
text. Of course, the possibility that this assumption is wrong should be taken into account, and the issue 
should be decided by the reading of the text itself—which will offer, as we will see, extensive 
confirmation of this hypothesis at every stage. No matter how skeptical the reader might be, there seems 
to be no grounds for an interpretation that would contradict this basic presupposition, and none has yet 
been argued for in the literature. We are thus on very firm ground, and the fruitfulness of the reading 
can only bring further circumstantial evidence to strengthen this basic interpretive framework. 
The proposed close reading of the main ‘methodological’ part of De Beryllo (paragraphs 1-8), 
and that of all geometrical images used in the text, will be conducted in Chapter 3. The analysis will 
then make possible the investigation of two major questions connected to the method in De Beryllo:  
                                                          
188 With the caveat that this correspondence takes place several years before he actually completes the work. See note 18 
above for the timeline. 
53 
 
1. The presence of a cosmological and ontological hierarchy in De Beryllo (Chapter 4). The traditional 
notion of hierarchy, particularly in the cosmological context, is, as Flasch argues, in certain ways 
undermined by the focus on the beryllus method. At the same time, a ‘hierarchy-like’ structure is an 
essential structural element of the same method, which is based on the identification of two distinct 
ontological levels in each use (and which can become a whole series of ontological levels, given the 
possibility for repeated applications of the method – which makes possible, as we will see, the Cusanian 
reconstruction of a hierarchy of species), and thus offers a way in which Cusanus seems to believe that 
he can preserve without any fundamental problems the notions of hierarchy inherent in the Christian-
Neoplatonic tradition within which he works. This investigation will take the form, in Chapter 4, of 
examining all the uses in De Beryllo of a paradigmatically ‘hierarchical’ image: the ‘political’ image 
of the rex/princeps/imperator – res publica. The hierarchical ontological premises which Cusanus is 
presupposing and which guide the application of his method (while themselves independent from it) 
will be examined separately (Chapter 4.3) and their use analyzed in the context of the application of 
the method itself, in order to make possible a balanced view of the character of the method itself and 
its external ‘inputs’, i.e. Cusanus’ underlying Proclean metaphysics of simplicitas. 
2. The role of Christ and Christology in De Beryllo (Chapter 5), an issue less previously examined, but 
highly important in light of the structural features of the application of the beryllus method: the 
incarnate Christ presents a different type of structure than the one described by Cusanus’ regular 
beryllus-informed account of ontological-gnoseological hierarchies, and poses particular interpretive 
issues when introduced clearly and explicitly at the end of the book, in paragraphs 69 and 70. Even 
more, there are striking structural parallels in the construction of the beryllus intellectualis and the 
Incarnation, bolstered by Christological resonances of the beryllus stone in the tradition, which Cusanus 
was most likely aware of (Chapter 3.1), connotations evident in the analysis of a sermon from the same 
time period of the early conception of the De Beryllo project, Sermon CXXVI («Tu es Petrus», 1453), 
which explicitly offers the image of Christ as a precious stone, lapis/calculus. All these combine to 
offer a new way to look at De Beryllo as a Christologically-focused work. 
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2.2.2 The two perspectives for close reading – ‘novice reader’ and ‘expert reader’ 
 
The reading of the text will, accordingly, proceed, for each passage, according to two distinct 
perspectives (though not always explicitly distinguished): that of a ‘novice’ reader, not already familiar 
with Cusanus, who would be trying to interpret the text as well as possible strictly according to its own 
internal logic, and that of the reader familiar with both other works of Cusanus and his various sources, 
the ‘expert’ reader (while the particular works that such a reader would have to be familiar with are 
noted where appropriate). The necessity for this ‘double perspective’ (i.e. the necessity of the ‘novice 
reader’ perspective to be added, as the ‘expert reader’ perspective is simply the default expected one 
for a scholarly work dealing with close reading) is suggested, first of all, by the important fact that this 
is the first non-dialogical work by Cusanus not addressed to one specific reader (i.e. not addressed or 
dedicated to anyone in particular) but to a general one189, and which clearly shows the signs of being 
aimed (also) at a reader unfamiliar with his other works, as will be shown in the analysis of paragraph 
1 in Chapter 3.2.1. This implicit rhetorical commitment by Cusanus will be shown to have had influence 
on the text, in the form of carefully considered word choices and a careful manner of referring to his 
previous works and to his sources, aspects which can easily be overlooked if we adopt exclusively the 
‘expert reader’ perspective. The particular challenge faced by Cusanus to speak to an ‘uninitiated 
reader’ is one he evidently approached with great care, and the details of his chosen rhetorical solutions, 
                                                          
189 This aspect, not previously remarked upon in research on De Beryllo, hints that Cusanus is doing something 
fundamentally new in his approach to writing, at least on the rhetorical level. All his previous works which are not dialogues 
are dedicated to particular persons, who often also come up in the text as the rhetorical addressee: the De Docta Ignorantia 
is dedicated/addressed to Cardinal Cesarini, as is the De Conjecturis; the De Patris Dato Luminum is dedicated to Father 
Gerard, bishop of Salone; De Filiatione Dei is dedicated to Conrad de Wartberg (De filiatione Dei, 51, p, 39, 1-2); De 
Quaerendo Deum is dedicated to an unknown but specific person (De quaerendo Deum, 16, p. 13, 1-2). De Deo Abscondito, 
Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae, the three Idiota dialogues, Dialogus De Genesi and De Pace Fidei are dialogic works, to 
which this consideration would not in any case apply, since Cusanus does not have the rhetorical opportunity to speak 
directly to the reader. This holds also for the mathematically-themed works: De geometricis transmutationibus and De 
arithmetricis complementis were dedicated to Paolo Toscanelli; the De circuli quadratura was dedicated to an unknown 
friend, probably Cardinal Bessarion; and De theologicis complementis, De mathematicis complementis and Caesarea circuli 
quadratura were dedicated to Pope Nicolaus V. For an inventory of the addressees of Cusanus’ works, see WATANABE, 
Nicolaus Cusanus, A Companion to His Life and Times, pp. xx-xxvi. 
While De Beryllo, as we have examined (cf. note 18 above), was conceived first as an aid for the benefit of Cusanus’ friends, 
the monks of Tegernsee, there are no signs of this in the finished work (and indeed, it is possible, as Senger and Bormann 
argue, that Cusanus did not even send a copy to Tegernsee at all, and that they only received the work after his death in 
1464, cf. De Beryllo, p. XVIII). Therefore, this is the first Cusanian work not dedicated to any particular addressee, in which 
Cusanus, however, makes extensive use of first-person address. This aspect certainly also informs the ‘introductory’ quality 
that Flasch assigns to this work. 
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as we will see, will clarify how Cusanus intends such a reader to understand his text, and how he has 
constructed it carefully for this purpose—a crucial aspect for interpretation, which would otherwise be 
easy to omit.  
Clearly, the perspective of the ‘expert reader’ is also crucially important, not only because the 
question of the location of De Beryllo and its method in the context of Cusanus’ works is a very 
important issue to examine, but also for the fact that it is also unquestionable that Cusanus conceived 
the text (at least in the beginning) for his friends, the monks of Tegernsee, with whom he likely 
discussed the initial idea for De Beryllo around 1452. They were already familiar with some of his 
previous works, particularly De Docta Ignorantia, regarding which they had problems and unclarities, 
for which explicit reason they asked him repeatedly to write De Beryllo in their correspondence190. This 
complex developmental history of the work strongly suggests using a ‘double perspective’ as I have 
adopted in my analysis. The ‘expert reader’ will allow us to make connections with 
previous/contemporary works by Cusanus (evidently including the sermons, and also, where 
appropriate, other relevant documents, such as his letters from this period). His extensive use of 
secondary sources (in particular Pseudo-Dionysius, Proclus, Plato, Aristotle) will be carefully examined 
in this perspective; however, it will not be an aim of this work to perform a similar type of close reading 
of each of these identified secondary sources, as this would, of course, increase the scope of this work 
exponentially. The perspective adopted will be always that of a reader focusing on De Beryllo and at 
most identifying parallels in Cusanus’ sources and closely examining those particular passages – but 
not turning to them for a close reading of those works as they stand by themselves according to the 
same in-depth methodology. Due to the various constraints inherent in this proposed methodology, or 
any similar one, it must always remain focused on a particular work by a particular author—although 
it can, and should be, a starting point and building block for a more general and rigorous ‘genetic 
analysis’ in the vein of Flasch’s own. 
                                                          
190 For a good account of their relationship in this context, see e.g. FLASCH, Geschicte einer Entwicklung, pp. 445-446. For 
the correspondence covering the De Beryllo, cf. VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour de la Docte Ignorance, pp. 120ff, discussed in 
note 18 above. Cf. Chapter 1.1 and 3.2.1 for a more detailed analysis. 
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2.3 The ‘B-notation’ and the schematization of Cusanus’ method – towards a Strukturanalyse 
 
During the reading of paragraph 3 of the text (i.e. as soon as the method is explicitly introduced 
and applied for the first time), a simple form of notation will be introduced as an interpretive device to 
mark specific applications of the method. The notation is meant to be the simplest and easiest to apply, 
and is meant to be understood as a formal device to help us analyze the recurring structures in the text, 
and not as introducing any anachronistic or ‘modernizing’ assumptions into it.   
This ‘B-notation’ (evidently named after the titular beryllus) takes the following form, to be 
understood in the most general way possible that does not contradict the context where it is applied: 
B[Level II objects, ordering criterion X] -> Level I object 
- relation a holds between the Level I object and the Level II objects 
- relation b holds between the Level I object and the Level II objects 
… 
The ‘B-notation’ is a way of marking Cusanus’ recurring expression «let us apply the beryl» 
(applicemus beryllum) and other equivalent formulations in the text, which indicate to the reader that 
the particular method Cusanus outlined in the beginning paragraphs should be applied, and with what 
parameters. It can be translated in plain words as meaning: ‘We look through the beryllus at the Level 
II objects, considered as ordered by criterion X, and we see the Level I object.’ To apply this, one must 
distinguish between two distinct ontological levels191, Level I and Level II. For some illustrative 
examples, the three most commonly used Level I-Level II pairs in De Beryllo are: ‘the Infinite’ (Level 
I) and ‘finite things’ (Level II); ‘one-dimensional objects’ (Level I) and ‘two-dimensional objects’ 
(Level II – a distinction on which Cusanus’ geometrical images are mostly based); and the monarchical 
ruler (rex/princeps/imperator) (Level I) and the subjects/elements/laws etc. of a kingdom (Level II).  
After identifying these elements, one must apply to some objects of Level II type a particularly 
defined criterion X which is applicable to them, in relation to which an object on Level I can be 
                                                          
191 The notion of ‘ontological level’ should be understood with as little content as possible: it could be explained as ‘a 
particular type of thing, which is different from another type of thing and not reducible to it’. An example would be one 
used often in De Beryllo and throughout Cusanus’ works: one-dimensional objects (a line) and two-dimensional objects 
(angles, triangles, etc.) are a paradigmatic example different ontological levels. The framework in which these distinctions 




considered (in some way) as ‘the most-X Level II object’ and at the same time ‘the least-X Level II 
object’, thus the maximum and the minimum for that particular property X. This leads us to be able to 
draw various relationships (a, b, …) between the Level I object and the Level II objects considered, 
based on this identification of the Level I object as, in effect, an instance of coincidentia oppositorum 
from the point of view of Level II objects, namely that in which the ‘most X’ and ‘least X’ coincide. 
These relationships, effectively ‘new ways of speaking’ about Level I objects in terms of Level II 
objects, are always noted below the B-structure in the notation, with a larger indent. 
The method of the beryllus in its full development, which, as we will see, Cusanus claims can 
solve quaeque indaganda («anything to be investigated»), consists of two of these B-structures which 
are compared/placed in parallel, so that the ‘new ways of speaking’ obtained from the application of 
the first structure can be ‘transferred’ to the second B-structure, which features different objects and 
different ontological levels altogether – we may call them Level III and Level IV, which again need to 
be identified as ontologically distinct, together with another ordering criterion Y applicable to them: 
B[Level II objects, ordering criterion X] -> Level I object 
- relation a holds between the Level I object and the Level II objects 
- relation b holds between the Level I object and the Level II objects 
… 
SICUT 
B[Level IV objects, ordering criterion Y] -> Level III object 
- relation a holds between the Level III object and the Level IV objects 
- relation b holds between the Level III object and the Level IV objects 
… 
The two structures are usually connected by a conjunction in the Latin, usually sicut (also ut, 
tam…quam, etc.), although sometimes Cusanus leaves the parallel as implicit. We will mark the 
connection between two such structures by means of the Latin connective word actually present in the 
text (‘sicut’ in the above example), unless it is missing but implicit, in which case we will add [SICUT] 
in square brackets for clarity. As a general principle, if any of the elements of this structure are not 
explicitly present in Cusanus’ text but the structure itself clearly suggests they should be understood 
implicitly to be there, they will be inserted and clearly marked in the B-notation preceded by an asterisk 
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(*). The B-notation for a particular passage will attempt to include only the Latin words in the text 
which refer to each of the elements of the structure, both as regards the ‘ontological levels’ as well as 
the relationships identified. When, for instance, there is no explicit criterion X named in the text and 
none is clearly implicit, the B-notation will specify *gradus, intended to mean ‘the most general 
possible ordering criterion for which one could construct the argument in the context’192. 
Cusanus’ method in De Beryllo is based (as all scholars who have investigated the matter agree) 
on the fundamental principle of coincidentia oppositorum193 and the notion that it could help ‘bridge 
the gap’ between things found at different ontological levels (by effectively describing one as an 
instance of another with contradictory properties), and that the novel relationships which can be 
described between such objects in this way (e.g. a two-dimensional line can be said to be the ‘minimum 
and maximum angle, the absolute angle, the cause/principle of all angles’, etc.) can be ‘transferred’ to 
any other types of objects also identified as being at different ontological levels: most importantly 
‘Infinite’ (the level of Deus/principium) and ‘finite’. Thus, for example, whatever ‘names’ for a line in 
relation with angles might be found in this way, these can become ‘names for God’ in relation to finite 
things—no more and no less than ‘divine names.’ 
                                                          
192 Cf. Cusanus’ own use of the term at De Beryllo, 32, p. 36, 18. 
193 For the coincidentia oppositorum see also the discussion and sources in note 14. In the case of De Beryllo, all interpreters 
agree explicitly that Cusanus’ method is based on an application of coincidentia oppositorum: e.g. FLASCH, ibid., pp. 449-
450; Bormann in his introduction to his translation, NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Über den Beryll, p. IX; cf. also Peroli in his 
interpretive note, NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Opere filosofiche, teologiche e matematiche, p. 2701, note 5, etc. The notion that 
some objects of thought manifest coincidentia oppositorum is in fact the only conceptual prerequisite for my account of the 
method, or any similar one, since the only issue remaining after one accepts this basic principle is to describe how Cusanus 
makes use of the relationship between ‘regular’ objects and objects that manifest coincidentia oppositorum in order to derive 
new ways of speaking, in particular about God—which is uncontroversially a highly important goal for Cusanus. Scholars 
who have researched the characteristics of the method in De Beryllo in detail are in agreement on its main features, which 
are entirely compatible with my formulation: CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl, Tome 2, pp. 15-28; PLATZER, Symbolica 
venatio, pp. 48-50, 195ff; D’AMICO, Die Rolle der geometrischen Figur in der der Zusammensetzung Scientia aenigmatica, 
pp. 265-278.  
For scholars proposing a general account of precisely such a method in Cusanus’ thought overall (all favoring similar 
accounts of a ‘three-step’ method and referring it explicitly to Cusanus’ interpretation of Pseudo-Dionysius) see e.g. L. 
BOND, Nicolaus Cusanus: Selected Spiritual Works, New York 1997, p. 33 («affirmative», «negative», «coincident 
theology»); C. L. MILLER, Reading Cusanus: Metaphor and Dialectic in a Conjectural Universe, Washington D.C. 2003, 
pp. 19-26 («affirmation», «negation», «hyper-negation/eminence»); N. HUDSON, Becoming God: the Doctrine of Theosis 
in Nicholas of Cusa, Washington D.C. 2007, pp. 115-117 («supereminence»); E. BRIENT, The Immanence of the Infinite: 
Hans Blumenberg and the Threshold to Modernity, Washington D.C. 2002, pp. 188-200, and ID. How can the infinite be 




This way of interpreting Cusanus’ method is not meant to be controversial, as it is entirely 
compatible with (and, in the end, a restatement of) the main scholarly attempts to describe Cusanus’ 
method in De Beryllo. A clarification, however, is due: most accounts speak of a ‘three-step’ process, 
which corresponds to the account just presented as follows: the ‘first step’ represents the identification 
of Level I, Level II, and the X criterion for the first application of the B-structure; the ‘second step’ 
would be the construction of the B-structure itself, which results in the relationships a, b, etc.; and the 
‘third step’ is the second B-structure (typically involving the infinite vs. finite distinction in order to 
transfer the a, b, … relationships to ‘names for God’)194. Thus, Cusanus’ sicut (and equivalent 
connective words) marks the passage between steps 2 and 3. Of course, whether one chooses to describe 
the method by identifying B-structures in the way I propose, or by identifying each of the ‘three steps’, 
etc., the result of the analysis is ultimately the same, and different choices might be more appropriate 
(in the sense of making the interpreter’s job easier) in different contexts.  
This notation is therefore a ‘heuristic’ part of the approach to the text, which tries to make 
available the benefits of a Strukturanalyse, making it easier in particular for the modern reader, more 
used to this type of abstract notation, to understand that Cusanus’ various formulations have the same 
underlying structure, and to classify all Cusanus’ formulations and deployments of his method in De 
Beryllo accordingly. The notation should not be taken as implying any anachronism imputed to Cusanus 
himself, and the interpretations I develop in the reading of each individual passage should be valid even 
if the B-notation was completely removed and the argument was presented exclusively in ‘narrative’ 
form. In effect, the B-notation is simply meant to be a standardized shorthand for a certain type of 
interpretation that identifies a particular recurring structure in Cusanus’ text, meant to make 
interpretation of common recurring structures easier and to offer a new perspective on the ‘higher-level’ 
structure of Cusanus’ text. 
  
                                                          
194 See note 193 above. This is also in line with the three-step process described in De Docta Ignorantia for geometrical 
images: De docta ignorantia, 1, 12, 33, p. 24, 10-25. 
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CHAPTER 3 – Textual Analysis 
3.1 The title: De Beryllo / Beryllus 
 
a) De Beryllo or Beryllus? A close look at the sources 
 According to the methodology outlined, we will start with the title, and assume for ourselves 
the perspective of a reader who would not have read other works by Cusanus, but who would have the 
required inclination to try to parse the text in its depth195. What would such a reader be able to think 
about the work from looking at its title alone? 
The first issue to be examined is what the title of the work actually is. This investigation leads 
us immediately to an interesting problem, because among the manuscripts we find two variants of the 
title: De Beryllo and Beryllus. An additional question (although secondary and pertaining more to the 
‘expert’ reader’s perspective) would be: what was the title of Cusanus’ autograph manuscript (now 
presumed lost), which would presumably be the exact title that Cusanus himself had decided on? 
We will now examine the four extant manuscripts in this regard, as well as the printed editions 
of the Latin text up to the Heidelberg critical edition196. Since some manuscripts in fact contain the De 
Beryllo without a title197, we will add both the beginning (incipit) and the final sentence (or explicit) to 
our analysis, given that this is also a common place where the title of a work might be found, and easily 
accessible to a reader. 
Manuscripts 
Codex Cusanus 219 
Incipit - De Berillo 
Explicit - Deo laus. 1458, 18a augusti in castro sancti Raphaelis (alio vocabulo dicto boechensteyn - 
added) 
                                                          
195 The characteristics of the prospective reader are a crucial underlying factor in understanding Cusanus’ construction of 
his text. See the analysis of paragraphs 2 (Chapter 3.2.2) and 72 (Chapter 5.4.3) for a discussion of the nature of the reader 
presupposed in Cusanus’ conception, which is reflected, of course, in his approach to the book – however, as we will see in 
paragraphs 1 and 2, Cusanus is by no means assuming that his prospective reader will be similar to the ‘best’ reader, and is 
structuring the text accordingly.  
196 Cf. De Beryllo, pp. XIV-XXIV. 




Codex Yale 334 
Incipit - (no title) 
Explicit - Finis 1459, 8uA Ianuarii. Deo laus 
 
Codex Monacensis 18621 
Incipit - Ihesus (addition by another hand: Tractatus domini nycolai cardinalis de Cusa qui ab eo 
intitulatur Berillus) 
Explicit - Finis 1458, 18 augusti In castro sancti Raphaelis 
 
Codex Magdeburg 166 
Incipit - Ihesus. De berillo 
Explicit - Explicit Berillus per quem videtur deus et omnia eius [...] 
 
Printed editions: 
Strasbourg edition (1488) 
Title - De berillo 
Explicit - Explicit tractatus de berillo 
 
Milan edition (1502) 
Title - De Berillo 
Explicit - Explicit tractatus de berillo 
 
Basel edition (1565) 
Title - REVEREND. P. NIcolai de Cusa Cardinalis, liber, qui inscribitur De Beryllo, incipit. Cap. I. 




Paris edition (1514) 
Title - R. P. NICOLAI DE CVSA CARDINALIS, LIBER QUI INSCRIBITVR DE BERYLLO INCIPIT, 
CAP. I 
Explicit - LIBELLI DE BERYLLO SAPIENTISSIMI ET OPTIMI REVERENDISSIMIQUE PATRIS 
NICOLAI DE CVSA CARDINALIS. FINIS. 
 
We can observe that all the printed editions are in agreement in choosing to render the title of 
the book as De Beryllo (with minor spelling variations), which was also the choice made by Bormann 
and Senger for the Heidelberg critical edition198. However, in the manuscript tradition we also find 
another possibility: Beryllus, as seen in the Codex Monacensis 18621 and in the explicit of Codex 
Magdeburg 166. 
This alternative name for the book would be known to any reader familiar with the 
correspondence between Cusanus and Caspar Aindorffer, the abbot of the Benedictine monastery at 
Tegernsee, during the (early stages of the) composition of De Beryllo: both Cusanus and Aindorffer 
refer to the book as Beryllus (sometimes without capitalization, as if referring to the common name of 
the stone)199, while Cusanus also uses the name De Beryllo200. Furthermore, Cusanus uses beryllus as 
a name for the work in the De Beryllo itself201 and in De Aequalitate, written around 1458-1459202, 
while he refers to it as De Beryllo in his Sermon CCLXXXVIII, preached in September 1458203. There 
does not seem to be any pattern to these usages, and it appears the two names are simply 
                                                          
198 A choice made without particular discussion by Senger and Bormann, which is reasonable, since the greatest part of the 
manuscript sources, and particularly the oldest manuscripts, are concordant with this choice. However, it is important to 
discuss the ambiguity inherent in referring to the book, as we will see that Cusanus does, not only as a book ‘about the 
beryllus’ but indeed as if it were a beryllus itself. 
199 See the analysis of the correspondence in Chapter 1.1, esp. note 18. 
200 E.g. VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, p. 122. 
201 De Beryllo, 2, p. 4, 2. 
202 De Aequalitate, 3, p. 6, 1. 
203 Sermon CCLXXXVIII, in Sermones XIX/7, 5, p. 648, 11: «in libello De Beryllo» (preached on September 8, 1458). 
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interchangeable. We can thus say that Cusanus must have considered both beryllus and De Beryllo as 
valid names for this book. 
As for the title of the work in the original manuscript, or in the master copy conjectured as the 
ultimate source of all extant manuscripts204 (with the possible exception of Codex Magdeburg 166), it 
was likely De Beryllo. The Codex Monacensis 18621 was copied from the same source as Codex 
Cusanus 219 (owned by Cusanus and featuring his corrections), but it is highly likely that it was copied 
without a title, and that the title berillus was added by a later hand, likely in reference to the passage in 
De Beryllo where Cusanus himself calls it beryllus205. Then, the explicit in Codex Magdeburg 166 likely 
has more the character of a gloss or marginal note on the content of the work (perhaps also with implicit 
reference to the same passage), while the title remains De Beryllo, the most likely title for the book in 
the original manuscript. 
 So, the hypothetical reader would most likely have encountered the text titled De Beryllo, or 
beryllus in the Tegernsee Codex Monacensis 18621, and we note the ambivalence about the title, which 
would be familiar to a reader who knew the correspondence mentioned above with the Tegernsee 
monks, and also for a reader familiar with Cusanus’ later works, e.g. De Aequalitate («Beryllus»), 
Sermon CCLXXXVIII («De Beryllo»), and also the latest work that mentions it, De Venatione 
Sapientiae206, these being the only places where Cusanus refers explicitly to the book by name. 
                                                          
204 See the discussion on the transmission of the work and the genealogy chart of manuscripts in De Beryllo, p. XXIV. 
205 De Beryllo, 2, p. 4, 12. We can however point out that the Codex Monacensis (found at Tegernsee) was copied sometime 
after 1459 and before 1476; according to Senger and Bormann, likely around 1469. One might imagine that Cusanus would 
have wanted to send a copy to Tegernsee as early as 1459, given the great importance of the work for the monks of Tegernsee 
evidenced by the correspondence with them, but Senger and Bormann believe this close relationship ended up counting for 
little: in their argument, Cusanus’ move to Rome immediately after finishing De Beryllo in 1458 made him unable to find 
the opportunity to send a copy of it to Tegernsee, which he equally failed to do even when he returned to the region in 1460: 
«affermare vix possumus…occasione nanctus esse» (De Beryllo, p. XVIII); according to this interpretation, De Beryllo only 
reached Tegernsee in 1469, 5 years after the death of Cusanus. While the question of the most likely date remains open, 
Senger and Bormann’s account is highly plausible given the evidence, although they offer no explanation for why Cusanus 
decided not to send this work to Tegernsee during his lifetime. 
It is possible, in any case, that among the monks of Tegernsee who knew Cusanus and his correspondence with Aindorffer 
and de Waging a tradition was preserved to name this book beryllus (while Aindorffer himself died in 1461). In this case, 
the added title by another hand in the Codex Monacensis 18621 would not be merely a reference to Cusanus’ own words in 
paragraph 2, given a lack of knowledge of the original title from the manuscript from which the text was being copied 
(conjectured by Senger to be the same master copy which was also the source for Codex Cusanus 219 and for Codex Yale 
554 – which, interestingly enough, ended up untitled as well), but rather a correction based on an oral tradition preserved in 
Tegernsee. 
206 Here the book is named as the «libellus De Beryllo» (De venatione sapientiae, 18, p. 19, 8). 
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b) Beryllus in medieval sources 
 What would a ‘novice’ reader have thought about the title? On the significance of the beryl 
stone and the traditions surrounding it, Senger and Bormann add a very useful extended note in the 
critical edition207. Furthermore, the issue has been briefly examined more recently in an article by Glas 
and Schwaetzer208. Let us examine the main sources and interpretations, expanding greatly upon the 
findings (limited in scope) of both Senger and Bormann and, in turn, Glas and Schwaetzer. 
 We will first examine the various traditions concerning the beryl stone which focus on its 
physical properties. The most important major reference works for someone interested in the properties 
of the beryllus in Cusanus’ time would have undoubtedly included the widely-known Etymologiarum 
of Isidore of Seville209, where one can read that the beryllus is a stone from India, similar to the emerald 
but pale (cum pallor), of which there are nine varieties. Isidore largely follows the account in the 
Naturalis Historia of Pliny the Elder210, which, in a chapter on how to distinguish precious from false 
gems, distinguishes eight types of beryllus of various colors, describing it as a valuable stone which 
can be imitated by colored crystallum; the least valuable is the colorless variant, which contains 
imperfections211. In another source, the Mineralium libri V of Albert the Great212, the beryllus is 
described as pale in color and transparent, probably indeed referring to colorless beryllus (the one to 
which Cusanus is referring)213. The colorless variety was, furthermore, often assimilated and confused 
                                                          
207 De Beryllo, pp. 89-93.  
208 GLAS - SCHWAETZER, Beryll, Diamant, Karfunkel. Edelsteine im Werk des Nicolaus Cusanus, pp. 79-94, about the 
beryllus at pp. 86-90. This short but useful account is limited to Albert the Great’s Liber mineralium (identified as Cusanus’ 
likely source for the colorless beryl stone), which is contrasted with the tradition of the Speculum Naturae featuring colored 
beryllus. However, the full image of the traditions involved is vastly more complicated, as we examine here below.   
209 ISIDORE OF SPAIN, Isidori Hispalensis episcopi Etymologiarum sive Originum libri xx, 2 voll. Oxford, 1911, XVI, 7, 5: 
«Beryllus in India gignitur, ventis suae lingua nomen habens, viriditate similis smaragdo, sed cum pallore. Politur autem ab 
Indis in sexangulas formas, ut hebetudo coloris repercussu angulorum excitetur; aliter politus non habet fulgorem. Genera 
eius novem». 
210 PLINY THE ELDER, Naturalis Historia, ed. K.-F.-T. Mayhoff, Leipzig 1906, XXXVII, 76-79.  
211 PLINY THE ELDER, ibid., XXXVII, 77, 5-7: «…postremi [beryllos] crystallo similes. hi fere capillamenta habent 
sordesque, alioqui evanidi, quae sunt omnia vitia» («... and, last, the [beryl] similar to the crystal. These generally have 
filaments and dirt, and others have faded color, which are all imperfections»).  
212 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Mineralium libri V, in ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Opera Omnia, ed. Borgnet, vol. V, Paris 1890, book 
II/2, chapter 2, p. 32: «Beryllus autem est lapis coloris pallidi, lucidi, transparentis». 
213 Glas and Schwaetzer propose the identification of Cusanus’ source as this passage of Albert’s Mineralium (GLAS - 
SCHWAETZER, ibid., p. 83). 
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with crystallus in the Middle Ages214. Vincent of Beauvais, in his Speculum naturale215 (an 
encyclopedic work, bringing together a great wealth of other sources), writes about the beryllus, citing 
a certain Dioscorides, that it is a «lapis lucidus .. et clarus»; then he recounts verbatim the words of 
Isidore and Pliny that we have already examined, adding further interesting information: for instance, 
the claim that, if given a round shape, the beryllus could be used to light a fire from the sun216. But the 
most interesting source that Vincent records verbatim is certainly the Anglo-Normano lapidarium De 
Natura Rerum by Thomas of Cantimpre, where, in addition to another mention of the power of the 
beryllus, if round in shape, to light fires, the original lapidarium217 records a very interesting anonymous 
poem on the properties of the beryllus: 
Deinde vedit insignem virtus quae format in ignem 
Solis splendorem non ignis passa calorem 
Sic lux eterna descendit ab arce superna 
Et incarnata: non matre tamen violata 
These verses can be translated as follows: 
«From this, one can see the sign of the power that takes shape in fire 
It is not sunlight that gives heat to the fire 
This is how the eternal light descends from the celestial citadel 
And it is incarnated, without corrupting its mother» 
                                                          
214 Cf. e.g. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De mineralibus et rebus metallicis, ed. J. Birckmann – T. Baum, Cologne 1569, I, 1, p. 12, 
cf. p. 19; or another source available at the time, the Liber lapidum / De lapidibus / Liber de gemmis of Marbode of Rennes: 
MARBODE OF RENNES, Liber lapidum, XII, PG 171, p. 1747, col. 1649-50 (on the beryllus); cf. (the modern edition of the 
same text) MARBODE OF RENNES, De lapidibus: considered as a medical treatise, ed. J.-M. Riddle, Wiesbaden 1977, p. 123 
(on the crystallus confusion issue), p. 49 (on the beryllus). Cf. De Beryllo, p. 90, where Senger and Bormann comment that 
we cannot precisely know whether Cusanus had thought of crystallus rather than beryllus, because both possibilities are 
concordant with his text. But instead, as we see later, Cusanus probably also thought of the powers (virtutes) associated 
with the beryllus when he made his choice for the name of the book and its central image. 
To note: references to the Patrologia Latina and Patrologia Graeca will be made to Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series 
Latina, ed. J.-P. Migne, 221 voll., Paris 1844-1864 (heretofore abbreviated as PL [volume number]) and Patrologiae Cursus 
Completus. Series Graeca, ed. J.-P. Migne, 161 voll., Paris 1857-1866 (heretofore abbreviated as PG [volume number]). 
215 VINCENT OF BEAUVAIS, Bibliotheca mundi Vincentii Burgundi, ex ordine praedicatorum venerabilis episcopi 
Bellovacensis, speculum quadruplex, naturale, doctrinale, morale, historiale. In quo totius naturae Historia, omnium 
scientiarum Encyclopaedia, moralis philosophiae Thesaurus, temporum et actionum humanarum Theatrum amplissimum 
exhibetur, ed. B. Bellerus, Douai 1624 (reed. Graz 1964), vol. I (Speculum naturale), VIII, 47-48, col. 517ff on the beryllus. 
Cf. Bormann and Senger, De Beryllo, pp. 89-91. Cusanus also knew this source around 1455, having consulted it for a 
number of 1455 sermons, as we examine below. 
216 VINCENT OF BEAUVAIS, ibid., where he cites to this effect ARNOLD THE SAXON, Die Encyklopaede des Arnoldus Saxo, 
Erfurt 1905, De finibus rerum naturalium, III, IV, 8, p. 70, 85: «si oculo soli opponitur ac rotundatur ignem accendit», and 
then Aristotle: «comburenda facile attrabit et accendit». Plus, according to Vincent, Aristotle is said to have written that the 
beryllus «attracts the rays of the sun», i.e. changing their path. 
217 THOMAS OF CANTIMPRE, De Natura Rerum, in P. STUDER - J. EVANS, Anglo-Norman Lapidaries, Paris 1924, p. 363. 
For the poem, see Appendix D, p. 226. The text on the beryllus is: «Berillus si formam sexangularem habeat, arcus celestis 
colores efficit in radio solis. Si rotunde forme sit velut pomum, humectatus aqua in calore solis carbones mortuos vel pannum 




 We have found here an explicitly Christological meaning given to the beryllus, particularly 
mentioned in connection with its property of lighting fires when it has a circular shape218. This is a 
highly important passage, due to the fact that Cusanus seems to have known this work by Vincent of 
Beauvais, as we show in the analysis of Sermon CXXVI below. 
A fundamental aspect of the conception of stones in this period is the fact that gemstones were 
conceived as each having particular powers (virtutes), including curative or magical effects. For the 
beryllus, in the sources we have examined, these are the main ones mentioned: as a remedy for eye 
diseases219, as generating love between spouses220, as ‘magnifying’ the one who wears it (i.e. in the 
perception of others)221, and generally as bringing good fortune222. Another recurring element is the 
notion that the beryllus heats or burns the hand when held223. 
One element that might seem surprising is the absence of any mentions of the beryllus used for 
the purpose that Cusanus seems to be most interested in: as a material for lenses. There are few sources 
to be found on lenses generally, and nothing in Latin which mentions the beryllus in particular as a 
material for this type of use, despite the fact that the beryllus in a circular shape is mentioned as 
                                                          
218 Another explicit use of beryllus as an ‘Incarnational’ image is in GERARDUS MORESENUS SEU CSANADIENSIS, Deliberatio 
supra hymnum trium puerorum, ed. G. Silagi, Turnhout 1978, VI, 841: «… berillus, qui duos colores habet, uiridem et 
palentem, per quem demonstratur ille, qui ex forma Dei uiridis, id est robustissimus, mansit, et ex forma hominis pallidus, 
id est mortalis, est factus». Some interesting similiarities (although no proof of a direct connection) with the Christological 
image of the lapis in Sermon CXXVI by Cusanus, which we analyze below. 
219 E.g. MARBODE OF RENNES, De lapidibus, p. 103: «ad oculorum vitia valet»; BARTHOLOMEUS ANGLICUS, De 
Proprietatibus Rerum, ed. Koberger, Nuremberg 1492, XVI, 21, p. 727: «humidos oculos»; ARNOLD THE SAXON, De 
Finibus rerum naturalium, ibid.; ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Mineralium libri V, ibid. 
220 VINCENT OF BEAUVAIS, ibid., «amorem coniugis facit». 
221 MARBODE OF RENNES, De lapidibus, ibid.; ARNOLD THE SAXON, ibid., p. 17, BARTHOLOMEUS ANGLICUS, ibid., VINCENT 
OF BEAUVAIS, ibid. 
222 «ingenium bonum adhibere seu dare», in BARTHOLOMEUS ANGLICUS, ibid., cf. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Mineralium libri 
V, ibid. 
223 Sources that speak of it «burning» the hand: VINCENT OF BEAUVAIS, Speculum quadruplex, vol. I, VIII, 47-48, col. 517ff: 
«dextra stringens adurit», then, quoting Arnoldus, «gestatem adurit», and citing Aristotle: «Manum quoque se tenentis ad 
urere dicitur»; MARBODE OF RENNES, Liber lapidum, XII, PG 171, p. 1747, col. 1649-50: «Dicitur et sese stringentis adurere 
dextram»; ANSELM OF LAON, Enarrationes in Apocalypsim, 21, PL 162, col. 1580A: «urit manum tenentis»; BEDE THE 
VENERABLE, Explanatione Apocalypsis, PL 93, III, 21, col. 200BC: «manum adurere dicitur», cf. RABANUS MAURUS, De 
universo sive de rerum naturis, XVII, 7, De Gemmis, PL 111, col. 468BC; PSEUDO-THOMAS (-14c.), Super Apocalypsim 
expositio, II («Vox Domini»), in THOMAS AQUINAS, Opera Omnia, ed. P. Fiaccadori, Parma 1869, vol. XXIII, p. 705: «lapis 
urit manum tenentis se». Sources that say it «warms» the hand: DENIS THE CARTHUSIAN, Enarratio in Exodum, in DENIS 
THE CARTHUSIAN, Opera Omnia, vol. I, Cologne 1896, p. 79: «calefacit manum tenentis»; PSEUDO-HUGH OF ST. CHER, 
Super Apocalypsim expositio I («Vidit Iacob»), in THOMAS AQUINAS, Opera Omnia, ed. P. Fiaccadori, Parma 1869, vol. 
XXIII, p. 504: «Qui etiam tantae caliditatis dicitur esse, ut calefaciat manum tenentis». 
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something that can start a fire, as we saw above, and something that ‘attracts’ sunlight (probably 
referring to its refractive effects)224; or we might see a hint of this in the notion that it ‘magnifies’ the 
bearer. This situation is, in the end, due to the fact that this use of beryllus simply was not known when 
the vast majority of the sources already examined were being written: we know of the existence of 
lenses as vision aids only from the 13th century. In the Germanic world in particular, we have clear 
evidence that the beryllus was being used as a material for lenses: the first mention dates from around 
1270, in the poem Jüngeren Titurel, where we find: «Sam der berillus grozzet die schrift ...» («just like 
the beryl magnifies the writing»)225. It is thus not at all unexpected that 150 years later, Cusanus and 
his Tegernsee friends would think of this use of the beryllus as common knowledge226. 
Beside the physical and ‘supernatural’ properties of the beryllus, the sources mention many 
symbolic, allegorical, and indeed theological interpretations, particularly traceable to the fact that it is 
mentioned in Revelations (21:19-20), where there are 12 walls of the divine Jerusalem and beryllus is 
the material that adorns the eighth: «Et fundamenta muri civitatis omni lapide pretioso ornata. 
Fundamentum…octavum beryllus». On the basis of this text, many commentators on Revelations have 
also written on the beryllus, particularly giving it symbolic or allegorical meanings. Let us analyze the 
most important interpretations of this kind which could have been known to a contemporary reader 
(and to Cusanus himself). 
Among the commentaries on Revelations who have considered the meaning of the beryllus227, 
the symbolic interpretations, even when made by very different authors, almost always follow a very 
recognizable pattern: the beryllus has a combination of two distinct aspects, which are seen as 
contrasting, or even as opposites: either its color (i.e. at the same time viridus and pallidus), or the way 
in which it reflects light, «like water pierced by the rays of the sun» («aqua a sole/solis fulgore percussa» 
                                                          
224 Cf. Vincent of Beauvais, who reports (attributing this to Aristotle) that the beryllus «radius solis ad se trahit»: VINCENT 
OF BEAUVAIS, ibid., XLVIII, 1. For this tradition, see also the PHILIPPE DE THAON, Bestiary, ed. T. Wright, London 1849, 
lines 1516-17: «Li Beriz at vertu en sei / Le rai del soleil trait a sei». 
225 Cf. Lexikon des Mittelalters, vol. II, Munich 1983, 689-692. See also further sources in De Beryllo, p. 90. 
226 Cf. VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, p. 158: «oculus doleo, beryllum non habeo» (de Waging). Several other uses are found 
in our examination of the correspondence in note 18 to Chapter 1.1 above. 
227 It should be noted that the great majority of the sources cited speak of the beryllus in the context of the interpretation of 
the book of Revelations. 
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- the water and the sun being the contrasting elements)228. Among the interpretations which make use 
of the duality of color, we find in De XII Lapidibus, by an unknown author, previously attributed to 
Augustine229, and in the Expositio in Apocalypsim of Autpert Ambrose, an interpretation which makes 
the beryllus into a symbol for the saints: the green color signifies their vitality in the contemplation of 
God/eternal things (playing with all senses of viriditas), while the paleness (pallor) signifies their 
disinclination to judge and regulate the lives of others, especially in a monastic context (fraterna 
administrationis, with a possible meaning of simply admonishing them towards the right path). 
Connected to this, Ambrose adds the fear (timor) experienced by the apostle Paul in 1 Cor. 15:9 («Not 
sum dignus uocari Apostolus, quoniam persecutus sum Ecclesiam Dei»), due to his virtus 
contemplationis230. This is, therefore, an opposition between contemplatio and administratio, which 
would serve to illustrate the dual nature of the saints231. In addition, we must make mention of a 
                                                          
228 An often recurring formula among authors, with small variations, apparently originating from Bede as the oldest source: 
«lucet quasi aqua sole percussa» (MARBODE OF RENNES, Liber lapidum, p. 1774, col. 1682); «ut enim aqua sole percussa 
refulget» (ANSELM OF LAON, Enarrationes in Apocalypsim, ibid.); «ut sol in aqua limpidus» (Cives caelestis patriae, in 
Analecta hymnica medii aevi, ed. G. M. Dreves – C. Blume, Leipzig 1888, vol. II, p. 94ff.); «Berillus est quasi consideres 
aquam solis fulgore percussam» (BEDE THE VENERABLE, Explanatione Apocalypsis, III, 21, PL 93, col. 200BC, found 
identically in RABANUS MAURUS, De universo sive de rerum naturis XVII, 7, De Gemmis, PL 111, col. 468BC, a fragment 
which we know Cusanus possessed; see note 233 below); «cujus color similis est aquae coloris a sole repercussae» (BRUNO 
OF SEGNIA, Expositione in Apocalipsim, VII, PL 165, col. 727AB); «limpidi et aliqualiter pallidi est coloris, similis aquae a 
sole percussae» (DENIS THE CARTHUSIAN, Enarratio in Exodum, in DENIS THE CARTHUSIAN, Opera Omnia, Cologne 1897, 
vol. II, p. 79, col. 2, line 33), «lucet, quasi aqua a sole percussa» (PSEUDO-HUGH OF ST. CHER, Super Apocalypsim expositio 
I («Vidit Iacob»), in THOMAS AQUINAS, Opera Omnia, ed. P. Fiaccadori, Parma 1869, vol. XXIII, p. 504). 
229 PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE, De XII Lapidibus, PL 40, col. 1230: «Beryllus viridis et palidus designat sanctos, contemplatione 
Dei virides, sed fraternae administrationis actione quasi pallentes». 
230 AUTPERT AMBROSE, Expositio in Apocalypsim, in Corpus Christianorum Continuation Mediaevalis, vol. 27A, ed. R. 
Weber, Turnhout 1975, 10, 21, v. 19b, line 128: «Berillus, lapis colore uiridis, sed pallorem habens, octauus in ordine 
inuenitur, per quem illorum uita designatur, qui et aeternorum contemplatione bonorum ad tempus inherent, et tamen cura 
fraternae administrationis ab illa uiriditatis refectione pallescunt, uel certe uiriditas in eis contemplationem, pallor ostendit 
timorem. Hinc est forte quod Paulus, qui unum quod retro oblitus, ad ea quae in ante sunt per contemplationis uirtutem 
extendebatur, timore pauidus dicit: Castigo corpus meum et in seruitutem redigo, ne forte aliis praedicans, ipse reprobus 
efficiar. Et rursum cum ex uirtute contemplationis diceret: Siue mente excedimus Deo, pauidus tamen atque suspectus de 
transacta conuersatione loquitur dicens: Non sum dignus uocari Apostolus, quoniam persecutus sum Ecclesiam Dei». 
231 A somewhat similar use of beryllus, using the same opposition pallens - virens, is found in the Speculum virginum, a 12th 
century work attributed to Conrad of Hirsau and written in Andernach (CONRAD OF HIRSAU, Speculum virginum, in Corpus 
Christianorum Continuation Mediaevalis, vol. 5, ed. J. Seyfarth, Turnhout 1990, Epithalamium A, 74):  
«Extra pallenti formula  
uirens intus per merita,  
Talis berillus ponitur,  
Qui ce+sus fulgens redditur. 
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symbolic use of the beryllus’s ‘color duality’ in Gerardus Moresenus to illustrate the two natures of 
Christ: «ex forma Dei viridis ... ex forma hominis pallidus»232. 
A much more widespread type of symbolic interpretation for the beryllus is one connected to 
the recurrent description of it as «aqua a sole/solis fulgore percussa». For this we can find a highly 
prominent tradition, which has its origin with Bede the Venerable and his Explanatione Apocalypsis, 
and is copied, in almost identical words, in the De universo sive de rerum naturis of Rabanus Maurus233, 
and, in abbreviated form, in Anselm of Laon’s Enarrationes in Apocalypsim234. According to this 
interpretation, the water signifies intelligent men (homines ingenio sagaces) or particularly their 
faculties (sensus hominis in Anselm, while Bede and Rabanus cite a passage from Proverbs235 to argue 
that the water would mean «sensus altitudinem»). Then, the light of the sun which «pierces through» is 
the light of the divina gratia, also associated with the sapientia, divided into divina and humana – 
although never, in the end, perfecta236. This interpretation, reporting verbatim the words of Bede and 
Rabanus, is found in the hymn Cives caelestis patriae237, mistakenly attributed to Anselm but rather 
                                                          
232 GERARDUS MORESENUS SEU CSANADIENSIS, Deliberatio supra hymnum trium puerorum, VI, 841: «berillus, qui duos 
colores habet, uiridem et palentem, per quem demonstratur ille, qui ex forma Dei uiridis, id est robustissimus, mansit, et ex 
forma hominis pallidus, id est mortalis, est factus». 
233 RABANUS MAURUS, De universo sive de rerum naturis, XVII, 7, De Gemmis, PL 111, col. 468BC. Cusanus possessed 
books XII-XXII of this work in what is now British Museum Ms. Harley 3092, where this passage is found on fol. 15rb, 
line 40ff. 
234 ANSELM OF LAON, Enarrationes in Apocalypsim, 21, PL 162, 1580A-1579D. 
235 Prov. 18: «Aqua profunda verba ex ore viri». This is found in Bede and Rabanus, but no longer in Anselm. 
236 BEDE THE VENERABLE, Explanatione Apocalypsis, III, 21, PL 93. col. 200BC: «amplius supernae gratiae lumine 
refulgentes .. Sed non est perfecti fulgoris vel humana vel etiam divina sapientia, nisi operum quoque et consummatio 
subnectatur». RABANUS MAURUS, De universo sive de rerum naturis, XVII, 7, PL 111, col. 468BC: «amplius supernae 
gratiae lumine refulgentes ... sed est perfecti fulgoris vel humana vel etiam divina sapientia, nisi operum quoque 
consummatione subvertatur». ANSELM OF LAON, Enarrationes in Apocalypsim, 21, PL 162, col. 1580A summarizes the 
passage: «Aqua sensum hominis significat; splendor solis, divinam sapientiam, qua amplius fulget; sed non perfecta divina 
vel humana sapientia, nisi operibus consummetur». 
237 Cives caelestis patriae, in Analecta hymnica medii aevi, ed. G. M. Dreves – C. Blume, Leipzig 1888, vol. II, p. 94ff., 
with the subtitle «De XII lapidibus pretiosis in fundamento caelestis civitatis positis»: 
«Figurat vota mentium 
ingenio sagacium 
quod (quis) magis libet mysticum 
summae quietis o[s]tium». 
Note that in the manuscript where it has been found, among the works of Anselm of Laon (cf. PL 162, 1580D and the 
editor’s note found there), the hymn is somewhat different, but it records Bede’s words in a very similar way:  
«Berillus est lymphaticus 
Ut sol in aqua limpidus 
Figurat vota hominum 
Ingenio sagacium 
Quibus pius libet sumere 
Pulchrae quietis otium». 
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attributable to Amatus of Monte Cassino238. In the same interpretive category we can also class the 
interpretation by Bruno of Segnia, according to which we should understand the similarity of the 
beryllus to water pierced by solar rays as an image of «the true and sensible interpretation (siceram, 
sanam) of the doctrines of Scripture», illuminated by the sol justitiae. Then, the beryllus signifies, in 
analogy with the manner in which Christ «gave form» to Scripture, the manner in which the «intellectus 
sanus et sincerus» must be formed (formatus)239. We find a similar interpretation in Marbode of 
Rennes: human beings are weak, but «pierced by the ray and the grace of the true sun, who is Christ, 
they shine in their good deeds»240. We can also identify in this category the interpretation of an 
anonymous author previously attributed to Hugh of St. Cher, in which the divine gloria shines in the 
physical form of the beryllus, connected to its appearance «as water pierced by the sun»241. This is an 
interpretation which links the beryllus to «those who contemplate God» because of its «purity» and 
«clarity»242. One should note this recurrent theme of the conjunction of the divine and human in the 
dualities identified in the beryllus, particularly with respect to the contemplatio, and also to the 
scientia/intellectus/intelligentia of divine matters. 
Such an interpretation we also find in Pseudo-Hildefonsius Toletanus, Libelli de corona 
virginis, where the beryllus is compared with the Virgin, its clarity and reflectivity associated with 
knowledge, particularly of mysteries (mysteria) and divine matters (divina)243. 
                                                          
238 Attributable to Amatus of Monte Cassino, according to Lentini (cited in De Beryllo, p. 92). 
239 BRUNO OF SEGNIA, Expositione in Apocalipsim, VII, PL 165, col. 727AB: «beryllus, cujus color similis est aquae coloris 
a sole repercussae, per quem sinceram intelligentiam, et sanam doctrinam Scripturarum intelligimus, quae nisi a sole justitiae 
illuminata fuerit, facile erroris deformitate tenebrescit. Sole igitur in aquis relucente, berylli color efficitur, quia Christo 
Domino nostro Scripturarum aquas illustrante, sanus et sincerus formatur intellectus». 
240 MARBODE OF RENNES, Liber lapidum, XII, PG 171, p. 1774, col. 1682 (under the title «Lapidum pretiosorum de quibus 
in praecedenti prosa, Mystica seu moralis applicatio»): «Notat eos qui sunt fragiles, sed percussi radio et gratia veri solis, 
id est Christi, lucent bonis operibus». 
241 PSEUDO-HUGH OF ST. CHER, Super Apocalypsim expositio I («Vidit Iacob»), in THOMAS AQUINAS, Opera Omnia, ed. P. 
Fiaccadori, Parma 1869, vol. XXIII, p. 504: «Hic lapis in se primo gloria formae politus lucet, quasi aqua a sole percussa». 
242 JOACHIM OF FIORE, Expositio in Apocalypsim, Venice 1527 (reed. Frankfurt 1964), p. 220: «similes esse perhibentur: 
quia corda contemplantium deum: munda sunt et perspicua». 
243 PSEUDO-HILDEFONSIUS TOLETANUS, Libelli de corona virginis 24, PL 96, col. 316CD: «offero tibi Beryllum lapidem 
pretiosum ... Tu enim, Domina, hunc lapidem quodammodo repraesentas; nam per donum sapientiae fuisti clara et 




Another major interpretive approach is concerned with the fact that the beryllus (according to 
the sources we have examined) heats or burns the hand that holds it. This is taken to signify the way in 
which association with a holy person would lead someone to renew their ‘fire’ for living religiously 
(cf. Bede, Rabanus, Anselm of Laon244, Pseudo-Thomas245)—or, in particular, the virtue of 
misericordia, which, when exercised, «warms the heart of the infirm with regard to the love for God 
and men»246. 
Another particular aspect of the beryllus, remarked upon since Pliny, is also to be considered: 
that this stone reflects light in the strongest manner when it is cut into a hexagonal form247 (as we know 
now, this is because of its crystalline structure). This is reported in the symbolic interpretations of Bede, 
Rabanus and Anselm (who reports it incorrectly: «heptagonal»), as connected to the fact that God had 
accomplished the creation of the world in six days, a number «often» considered to mean «perfection 
in practical matters»248. 
                                                          
244 BEDE THE VENERABLE, Explanatione Apocalypsis, PL 93, III, 21, col. 200BC: «Quodque tementis manum adurere 
dicitur, procul dubio patet quia quisquis sancto viro conjungitur, eius nimirum bonae conversationis igne recreatur». This 
passage is identical in RABANUS MAURUS, De universo sive de rerum naturis, XVII, 7, PL 111, col. 468BC. ANSELM OF 
LAON, Enarrationes in Apocalypsim, 21, PL 162, col. 1580A has: «urit manum tenentis, quia qui sancto jungitur, ejus 
conversatione accenditur». 
245 This anonymous author repeats the same interpretation but connects ‘heat’ with ‘light’, citing a passage in Matthew: 
PSEUDO-THOMAS (-14c.), Super Apocalypsim expositio, II («Vox Domini»), in THOMAS AQUINAS, Opera Omnia, ed. P. 
Fiaccadori, Parma 1869, vol. XXIII, p. 705: «Hujusmodi lapis urit manum tenentis se; et per hoc designatur, quod qui talis 
ac tantus est, eos qui sibi conjunguntur, per sui conversationem ad justitiam accendit. sic luceat lux vestra coram hominibus, 
ut videant opera vestra bona, et glorificent patrem vestrum qui in caelis est» (cf. Matt. 5:16).   
246 PSEUDO-HUGH OF ST. CHER, Super Apocalypsim expositio I («Vidit Iacob»), in THOMAS AQUINAS, Opera Omnia, ed. P. 
Fiaccadori, Parma 1869, vol. XXIII, p. 504: «Qui etiam tantae caliditatis dicitur esse, ut calefaciat manum tenentis: et 
significat virtutem misericordiae, quae sex operibus se exercet, corda frigida hominum infirmorum calefaciens in amorem 
Dei et proximi». 
247 PLINY THE ELDER, Naturalis Historia, XXXVII, 76, 1: «poliuntur omnes sexangula figura artificum ingeniis, quoniam 
hebes unitate surda color repercussu angulorum excitetur. aliter politi non habent fulgorem». This important passage is 
reported and paraphrased by very many later authors. For example: MARBODE OF RENNES, Liber lapidum, XII, PG 171, p. 
1747, col. 1649-50: «Conspicuos reddit sexangula forma beryllos / Qui nisi fiat hebes, his pallor inesse videtur». 
One should particularly note a rather unique passage from the De natura rerum of Thomas Cantimprensis, reported by 
Vincent of Beauvais (and thus likely known to Cusanus), which says that «if the beryllus has a hexangular form, it shows 
the colors of the rainbow in the ray of the sun», i.e. works as a prism («si forma sexangulare habuerit: arcus celestis colores 
in radio solis efficit», in VINCENT OF BEAUVAIS, Speculum quadruplex, I, VIII, 47-48, col. 517ff.  
The Bede-Rabanus-Anselm tradition reports this descriptive passage, drawing from Pliny while adding the clarification that 
«The reflexes due to the angles make its shine stronger» («Sed non fulget, nisi in sexangulam formam poliendo figuretur. 
Repercussus enim angulorum splendor illius acuitur» in BEDE THE VENERABLE, Explanatione Apocalypsis, PL 93, III, 21, 
col. 200BC; cf. the identical text in RABANUS MAURUS, De universo sive de rerum naturis, XVII, 7, PL 111, col. 468BC; 
cf. ANSELM OF LAON, Enarrationes in Apocalypsim, 21, PL 162, col. 1580A, who, clearly committing an error, refers to 
the form as «seven-cornered»: «Ut enim aqua sole percussa refulget : qui non aliter nisi septangula politur forma, quia ex 
angulorum percussione splendor acuitur». 
248 BEDE THE VENERABLE, Explanatione Apocalypsis, PL 93, III, 21, col. 200BC: «Nam senario saepe numero perfectio 
designatur actionis, maxime cum in hoc numero mundi hujus sit opus consummatum». RABANUS MAURUS, De universo 
sive de rerum naturis, XVII, 7, PL 111, col. 468BC is identical. ANSELM OF LAON, Enarrationes in Apocalypsim, 21, PL 
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We have thus inventoried what a scholar from Cusanus’ time would be able to know about the 
beryllus stone249 if one were to conduct an exhaustive search of available sources, both those in the 
tradition of the Naturalis historia and biblical commentaries (particularly to Revelations). But which 
of these sources can we say with some certainty that Cusanus himself would have known? 
We know with certainty that Cusanus already owned a manuscript with the relevant part of the 
De universo sive de rerum naturis of Rabanus Maurus, i.e. books XII-XXII250. Then, we have 
compelling evidence from a passage in Sermon CXXVI that Cusanus had consulted the Liber lapidum 
of Marbode of Rennes around 1453251. Furthermore, we know from a number of sermons from 1455 
that he seems to have repeatedly consulted the section on stones of the Speculum naturae of Vincent of 
Beauvais252. If we limit ourselves only to these works for which we have evidence of Cusanus’ access 
to them, with the assumption (probably much too restrictive) that Cusanus did not know any of the 
others, we can say with a high degree of plausibility that Cusanus must have been familiar with nearly 
all of the interpretations we have inventoried above, due to the comprehensiveness of the sources cited 
in each of these works, of which Vincent of Beauvais in particular is the best example. The only strand 
of interpretation of those we have mentioned that is not included in these works that we know Cusanus 
consulted, and thus one which Cusanus might not have been familiar with, is the one dealing with the 
‘dual color’ of the beryllus, because we do not know whether Cusanus knew the De XII lapidibus of 
Pseudo-Augustine or the Expositio in Apocalypsim of Autpert Ambrose. However, it remains the case 
that the beryllus mentioned by Cusanus in De Beryllo is colorless, as one might expect from an aid to 
                                                          
162, col. 1580A has the error mentioned above (seven- instead of six-sided): «perfectio operum per septem intelligitur, cum 
hoc numero opus mundi factum sit». 
249 For completeness, we should also mention some interpretations recorded without explanation, in a list, in DENIS THE 
CARTHUSIAN, Enarratio in Exodum, found in DENIS THE CARTHUSIAN, Opera Omnia, vol. I, Cologne 1896, p. 79: «Per 
quam gemmam, timor Dei filialis, consolatio spiritualis, gratitudo seu poenitentiae virtus intelligi potest». 
250 Now British Library Ms. Harley 3092; the passage on beryllus is at fol. 15rb, lin. 40ff. Cf. De Beryllo, p. 92. 
251 Sermon CXXVI, in Sermones XVIII/1, 10, p. 25, 3 – p. 26, 8, which is analyzed below. See the apparatus in Sermones 
XVIII/1, pp. 20-27 and the index of citations in Sermones XVIII/0, p. 490. 
252 These are Sermons CLXX (January 1, 1455), CLXXI, CLXXII, CLXXIV, CLXXXIV, CXCVIII (July 31, 1455). Cf. 
Sermones XVIII/0, p. 490. 
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vision that is «clarus» and «lucidus», and thus the significance of colored beryllus might indeed be 
deemed irrelevant for our purposes253. 
  
c) The beryllus in previous works by Cusanus 
We will investigate now the beryllus as used in the previous works of Cusanus, and thus what 
a reader familiar with his previous books would have thought when encountering a text entitled De 
Beryllo (or indeed Beryllus, as we have seen). This investigation is highly interesting for our task to 
examine the De Beryllo (particularly keeping in mind the properties and interpretations of the beryllus 
we have highlighted and shown that Cusanus was likely familiar with from the tradition), because the 
beryllus was indeed used in very specific contexts by Cusanus before De Beryllo. These bring into play 
issues that will show themselves important for the use he puts it to in the work we are concerned with: 
i.e. beryllus as a medium for light, beryllus as something shiny that can mimic diamond according to 
its appearance, and beryllus as an aid for vision. 
The first mention of beryllus in the works of Cusanus is found in De Conjecturis (written 
between 1441-1442): «Si enim medium diaphanum, per quod alteritas lucis in visum ascendit, est 
alteratum colore rubeo vel alio, huius coloris res visa apparet, quoniam ipsa non attingitur in unitate 
simplici, puta luce pura, sed in luce alterata in diaphano, puta beryllo aut vitro aut flamma vel radio 
colorato vel alterato»254. In this passage, Cusanus speaks of seeing the way in which the light passes 
through a «medium» and changes its characteristics due to its properties: this results in an alteration of 
the pure light («lux pura in unitate simplici» in contrast to «lux alterata in diaphano»). We have here 
an argumentative structure (here applied to light) of a type used often in Cusanus, and, as we will see, 
one of the crucial ones for De Beryllo: the opposition between a thing as it is ‘in itself’ and ‘in another’, 
i.e. altered in some way, as an image of the former, etc. We can observe that the main point of the 
                                                          
253 This is the contrast drawn by Glas and Schwaetzer between the «zwei Berylli», one colorless and one colored, in the 
tradition; cf. GLAS - SCHWAETZER ibid., pp. 84-85. However, their account is much too simplifying and restricted, as they 
do not consider all the sources that Cusanus likely knew which reported the great variety of interpretations and properties 
of the beryllus that we have inventoried. 
254 De conjecturis, 170, p. 172, 3-8. 
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illustration here, i.e. the cause of the alteration, is color: «colore rubeo vel alio», «colorato vel alterato». 
Thus, the type of beryl which is referred to in this passage seems to be one of the colored variants, and 
not the colorless («albus et lucidus») of De Beryllo. In this passage, the alteration of visible things seen 
through a medium makes their image further away from their true nature that their image viewed 
without any medium255: an almost opposite interpretation, therefore, to that of beryllus as an aid for 
vision.  
Later on, in his dialogue Idiota de staticis experimentis (1450), we find a mention of «beryllus 
aut cristallus», opposed to «lapides pretiosi» and «diamantus»: «ut, si quae sophisticationes in berillo 
aut cristallo colorato fierent, deprehendi possent»256. In this passage, the beryllus is clearly presented 
as a stone of lesser value, which can be used to imitate precious stones; accordingly, only by means of 
the titular «weight experiments»257 can someone detect this kind of fraud, by measuring their respective 
weights. Interestingly, in this passage Cusanus seems to use interchangeably, at least for the purpose of 
the argument, «beryllus» and «crystallus» (at least coloratus), perhaps a reflection of the common 
identification of colorless beryllus with crystallus258, or a modified reference to Pliny via Vincent of 
Beauvais259, as we have seen. In this passage, they are both treated as transparent and reflective stones, 
which can be distinguished from the more precious pretiosi lapides not through any visual means but 
only with a special kind of non-visual investigation (i.e. the measurement of weights). 
Later on, in 1454, we find a mention of beryllus in a very different key, in a sermon that was 
preached in the period in which Cusanus was already working on De Beryllo, and indeed corresponding 
                                                          
255 This theme remains of interest for Cusanus. See the similar argument made in the De Visione Dei (1453), but at this point 
using colored glass as an example, and not beryllus: De visione Dei, 17, p. 20, 11-16: «Sicut enim oculus iste carneus per 
vitrum rubeum intuens omnia, quae videt, rubea iudicat et, si per vitrum viride, omnia viridia, sic quisque oculus mentis 
obvolutus contractione et passione iudicat te, qui es mentis obiectum, secundum naturam contractionis et passionis. Homo 
non potest iudicare nisi humaniter». 
256 Idiota de staticis experimentis, 174, p. 228, 23-25. 
257 On the significance of these ‘experiments’ within the general concept of Cusanian proportio, see eg P. PICO ESTRADA, 
Weight and proportion in Nicholas of Cusa’s Idiota. De Staticis Experimentis, in Nicolaus Cusanus: ein bewundernswerter 
historischer Brennpunkt: philosophische Tradition und Wissenschaftliche Rezeption, ed. K. Reinhardt – H., Schwaetzer – 
O. Dushin, Regensburg 2008, pp. 135-146. 
258 See note 214 above. 
259 Vincent reports the words of Pliny in paraphrase, saying that the beryllus (considered a precious stone, similar with the 
smaragdus) is imitated with less-valuable colored crystallum: «Indi et alias qvidem gemmas Crystallum tinguendo 
adulterare invenerunt, sed praecipue berullos» (VINCENT OF BEAUVAIS, Speculum quadruplex, ibid.). 
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with the Tegernsee monks about it: the Sermon CLIII, preached on April 7, 1454260. Here, in the context 
of a discussion of the soul and its instruments in the body, and particularly within the argument that 
physical defects, especially those of the senses due to old age, do not affect the soul itself, Cusanus says 
«experimur per beryllos animam non senescere, sed membrum»261, i.e «we see by means of the beryl-
stones that the soul does not grow old, but the (bodily) organs (actually do)». The context, immediately 
after an example taken from Aristotle262, makes clear that it is a reference to the use of beryllus stones 
(in plural, berylli) as an aid to vision, i.e. as lenses, the precursors at least of what we would recognize 
as eyeglasses263. 
The context of this last usage is important to note: i.e. the beryllus as an aid to vision problems 
due specifically to old age. We know in fact that Cusanus (who was already 53 years old at this time) 
likely had vision problems at least as early as this period, from his correspondence with Caspar 
Aindorffer, the Tegernsee abbot, where he apologized for not being able to write the De Beryllo 
promised «propter oculorum dolorem»264. It is indeed likely (although we have no certain indication) 
that he started using lenses as vision aids from this time or earlier – which he would keep using until 
his death, when among his possessions was found a «capseta cum oculariis» (i.e. «capsella», a box 
containing eyeglasses)265. The fact that the sense of beryllus as an aid for vision appears in his works 
precisely from this period (after he had considered it in his previous works, as we have seen, as a kind 
of transparent stone that ‘alters’ vision (in a negative sense), or as a material for the imitation of more 
                                                          
260 Sermon CLIII, in Sermones XVIII/2, pp. 154-157. 
261 Sermon CXXVI, in Sermones XVIII/2, 4, p. 155, 10-11. Hereafter cited as «Sermon CXXVI». 
262 This is the argument: «Corpus est instrumentum animae, sicut martellus artis fabrilis, quae martello destructo non perit, 
ut Aristoteles exemplificat dicens: ‘Si senex haberet oculum iuvenis, videret ut iuvenis’, et experimur per beryllos animam 
non senescere, sed membrum etc» (Sermon CXXVI, 4, p. 155, 6-11). The reference is to ARISTOTLE, De anima, I, 4, 408b 
21-22. 
263 The use of the plural follows the etymological development of the term in German, cf. the modern German «die Brille» 
(implicitly plural) for «spectacles». Cf. Lexikon des Mittelalters, vol. II, col. 690. 
264 «Propter oculorum dolorem De Beryllo quem petitis scriber not potuis», cf. VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, p. 122. 
265 Cf. the list of his possessions in G. MANTESE, Ein notarielles Inventar von Büchern und Wertgegenständen aus dem 
Nachlaß des Nikolaus von Kues, in «Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft» 2 (1962), p. 85-116; 
see p. 102, n. 122. 
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precious stones), and is at the heart of the central notion of De Beryllo, suggests a possible interesting 
connection with this detail of his biography: his own use of eyeglasses to help his eyesight266. 
 
d) Christ as lapis – Sermon CXXVI (1453) 
Before reaching conclusions about the possible meanings of the title for a reader versed in the 
works of Cusanus, we cannot omit a very important text, albeit never analyzed by scholars in connection 
with the De Beryllo and generally little studied267: a sermon preached in Brixen on June 29, 1453, the 
Sermon CXXVI  («Tu es Petrus»)268, a text which is centered around a crucial image: Christ as a 
(precious) stone (lapis).  
It is important to note that Cusanus’ sermons, particularly in the period of his activities as Bishop 
of Brixen, were important vehicles for Cusanus to develop his philosophical-theological ideas, were 
recorded in written form by his secretary, Peter of Erkelenz (in Latin, although preached in his native 
Mosel Germanic dialect), and were edited by Cusanus himself in the period 1454-1459 into a 
collection269, as he had decided to do by 1454270, and to which De Aequalitate and De Princpio, 
completed a short time after De Beryllo, would be added. Therefore, Cusanus would have considered 
these sermons by this time to be part of his works, one of his libri, and thus equally available to the 
prospective reader he is addressing in De Beryllo. 
                                                          
266 Note that in De Beryllo Cusanus describes (for the first time in any written source) a beryllus lens of a concave shape, 
thus suitable for correcting myopia, cf. Lexikon des Mittelalters, vol. II, col. 690-691. If perhaps this beryllus is modelled 
after the lenses on his own eyeglasses that he had already likely been using in the period of writing De Beryllo, we would 
thus have a conjectural diagnosis for his own vision problems: myopia, due to age and to the fact that he was an avid reader 
and writer, writing in his own hand for the entire period of his maturity. See, for example, the article by C. BIANCA, Niccolo 
Cusano e la sua biblioteca: note, notabilia, glosse, in Bibliothecae selectae. Da Cusano a Leopardi, ed. E. Canone, Florence 
1993, pp. 1-11, for an account of Cusanus’ practices as a writer and reader. 
267 This sermon seems to have been relatively neglected so far in the literature, and it should be investigated more in the 
context of Cusanus’ intellectual development between De Visione Dei and De Beryllo.  
268 Found in Sermones XVIII/1, ed. Haubst, Pauli, Hamburg 1995, pp. 20-27. Hereafter cited as «Sermon CXXVI». 
269 See R. SERINA, Nicholas of Cusa’s Brixen Sermons and Late Medieval Church Reform, Leiden 2016, pp. 47-49; also W. 
A. EULER, Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Etappen und schwerpunktmäßige Themenverschiebungen in den Sermones?, in 
«Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft» 30 (2005), pp. 71-91. 
270 See Cusanus’ letter to the Tegernsee monks of August 14, 1454: «de sermonibus meis propono librum facere» 
(VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, p. 140). 
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In the quest to uncover what an ‘expert reader’ familiar with Cusanus’ works would understand 
of the title and its significance, a short analysis of the text of this sermon will be undertaken here, which 
is highly interesting in connection with the problematic of the beryllus stone, the central image of the 
De Beryllo. This sermon will be considered again in Chapter 5, which will analyze the extraordinary 
structural-Christological resonances of this sermon together with the latent Christology of De Beryllo 
and the central image of the beryllus itself. 
The sermon is built around two gospel passages: Matt. 16:18: «et ego dico tibi quia tu es Petrus 
et super hanc petram aedificabo ecclesiam meam et portae inferi non praevalebunt adversum eam», 
and Rev. 2.17: «qui habet aurem audiat quid Spiritus dicat ecclesiis vincenti dabo ei manna 
absconditum et dabo illi calculum candidum et in calculo nomen novum scriptum quod nemo scit nisi 
qui accipit». Cusanus makes clear from the beginning the conceptual link he is developing between 
them: the image of the stone271, evidently connected to the name of the apostle Peter, which 
immediately connects to the notion of nomen novum; furthermore, the Church and its ‘adversary’ (cf. 
vincens) recur in both passages. This makes for highly fertile ground for Cusanus to develop his favorite 
themes, and he follows a very concentrated argumentative thread: calculus-calculare-numerus-ratio-
nomen272. Then, Cusanus invokes the image of Christ as lapis vivus and lapis angularis of the domus 
spiritalis from the famous passage in the first Epistle of St. Peter, 1 Pet. 2: 4-6273. After an excursus on 
the errors of the Jews and pagans (paragraph 4), Cusanus presents Christ as the solution, as a 
coincidental mediation between the two positions, in which is combined, in the Incarnation, «the 
[abstract] nature that the Jews worship, and the deified nature, through those [sc. the pagan gods] who 
pagans worship»274. Then he returns to the image of the stone and the «construction» of the Church 
                                                          
271 Sermon CXXVI, 2, p. 20, 1: «Petrus a petra, petra calculus». 
272 Sermon CXXVI, 2, p. 20, 7 – p. 21, 29. 
273 Sermon CXXVI, 3, p. 21, 1ff. Cf. 1 Peter 4-6: «ad quem accedentes lapidem vivum ab hominibus quidem reprobatum a 
Deo autem electum honorificatum / et ipsi tamquam lapides vivi superaedificamini domus spiritalis sacerdotium sanctum 
offerre spiritales hostias acceptabiles Deo per Iesum Christum / propter quod continet in scriptura ecce pono in Sion lapidem 
summum angularem electum pretiosum et qui crediderit in eo non confundetur». 
274 Sermon CXXVI, 5, p. 22, 1-4: »in quo est unita natura, quam colebant Judaei, scilicet Dei, et natura deificata per eos, 
quam colebant gentiles». Cf. ibid., 5, p. 22, 14-19: «Si Deus colendus, quia creator, Christus colendus, quia ipse est, ‘per 
quem facta sunt omnia’; si homo colendus est, quia in eo relucent divinae operationes, Christus maxime colendus est, quia 
in eo maxime relucent. Nam in eo ‘habitat divinitas corporaliter’ [Col 2:9]». 
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(paragraph 6)275. In paragraph 7, Cusanus returns to the errors of the Jews and gentiles, i.e. those who 
do not accept Christ, who represents the veritas, perfectio and complementum of any religion276. Then, 
he identifies Christ with the verbum and the veritas of God, something that makes him also manna 
absconditum for the intellect to «taste» quoniam dulcis Dominus277. Cusanus then returns to the passage 
from 1 Peter on the lapis vivus278, and builds a crucial image: the lapis that has all conceivable powers, 
and precisely reflects the attitude towards it of the intellectus279 - thus it is a stone that is clear / 
transparent / reflective like a mirror (lapis candidus specularis)280. We note here the transition from 
stone to mirror, and the recurrence of the same theme of mirror applied to visio in De Visione Dei281, a 
work on which he may have been already working on. This sermon provides what appears to be an 
important connection point between De Visione Dei and the De Beryllo. 
However, the most interesting part of this sermon for our purposes begins with paragraph 10, 
where Cusanus engages in what he calls «the sweetest speculations»282. First of all, he says that stones 
each have their own power, virtus, of «unspeakable» variety: they can make someone love, win, stay 
healthy, they can remove an illness or an evil spirit, and they can direct the sailors on their route 
(referring here to the compass)283. 
                                                          
275 At the end of the paragraph, Cusanus adds a Christological-hierarchical image on a model of the faculties: the incarnation 
of Christ as a parallel to the intellectus-sensus relationship: «ita quod in Christo absoluta divina natura assumpsit humanam 
contractam in unitate suppositi, sicut in homine intellectualis natura unitur sensibili» (6, p. 22, 13-15). 
276 Sermon CXXVI, 7, p. 23, 20-23. Cusanus adds that everyone who believes in eternal life necessarily believes in Christ, 
«whether one wants to or not»: «Credit igitur, sive velit sive nolit, Christum» (7, p. 23, 43). 
277 Sermon CXXVI, 8, p. 23, 1 – p. 24, 55. Cf. 1 Pt 2:3. Cf. also De visione Dei, 91, p. 72, 17. 
278 Cf. Eph. 2:20: «superaedificati super fundamentum apostolorum et prophetarum ipso summo angulari lapide Christo 
Jesu». 
279 Sermon CXXVI, 9, p. 25, 20-23: «Et non est virtus, quae appeti possit per intellectum extra hunc lapidem, Quidquid 
impendis ei, recipies». Cf. lines 35-39: «Hinc prout tu te ei repraesentas, sic tibi respondet. Sicut, si sensibile speculum foret 
rectum et vivum, tunc eo modo te respiceret, quo modo tu te eidem repraesentares». There is an interesting parallel with the 
virtus absoluta as a divine name in De visione Dei, 24-25, p. 25, 1 – p. 27, 17, from the image of the virtus of a seed. 
280 Sermon CXXVI, 9, p. 25, 34-35, because it is a «speculum sine macula», cf. Wisdom 7:26: «candor est enim lucis 
aeternae et speculum sine macula Dei maiestatis et imago bonitatis illius». One can also note an interesting correspondence 
with the oculus specularis of God in De visione Dei, 30, p. 30, 1 – 31, 19. 
281 Cf. e.g. De visione Dei, 14-15, p. 18, 1 – 19, 19; 17, p. 20, 1-13; 30, p. 30, 1 – 31, 19; 48, p. 41, 1 – 42, 19. 
282 Sermon CXXVI, 10, p. 25, 2-3: «circa lapidem illum plura occurrunt dulcissime speculanda» 
283 Sermon CXXVI, 10, p. 25, 3 – 26, 8: «Nam virtus inest lapidibus. Alius enim lapis reddit hominem omnibus amorosum, 
alius victoriosum, alius sanum custodit, alius pellit morbum: alius phantasma pellit, alius spiritum malignum, alius dirigit 
nautas per viam ad intentum, et sunt indicibiles virtutes lapidis.» 
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The crucial observation to be made here is that Cusanus accepts without doubt that the stones 
have virtus according to the sources known in his time284. He appears to have consulted the Liber 
lapidum of Marbode of Rennes for the formulations given as an example285: a source which, as we have 
seen, also speaks of the beryllus. Cusanus goes on: not only do specific virtutes for each stone exist, 
but he affirms they have virtus according to their appearance, as we find in them, he says, the «virtutes 
caeli» or «images of herbs, trees, men, fish, lions and other animals with extraordinary virtutes», which 
means that Cusanus believes that stones, if one sees in them such images, also posses the specific virtus 
of the object which the image represents. Indeed, it is for this reason that «the value of precious stones 
infinitely exceeds that of gold»286. In the end, Cusanus concludes that «there is a power (vis) in the 
stones, which is above all that is perceptible (super omnem sensum, an unmistakable reference to Phil 
4:7287), and which we perceive from their effects (ex operibus)»288. Therefore, this is a power nothing 
short of divine, inherent in precious stones (among whom, in this context, the beryllus also belongs). 
Then, Cusanus builds what is (to a reader familiar with his works) a very familiar construction 
(and which also lies at the core of his method in De Beryllo): he constructs a theoretical ‘maximal 
stone’, which would have all the virtutes of all the stones, he examines the properties of this 
construction, then compares the relationship between this ‘maximal stone’ and ordinary items of that 
kind (i.e. stones) with the relationship between God and finite objects, seen in various ways289; this is, 
in summary, the topic of the last paragraphs of the sermon, paragraphs 11-14. We note at this point 
certain highly interesting aspects of the construction: in paragraph 11, the ‘maximal stone’ is described 
as «a small, bright or clear stone» («calculus parvus candidus sed lucidus»)290. Then, Cusanus says that 
                                                          
284 Cf. also De visione Dei, 110, p. 84, 1-10, which has «spiritus lapidis». 
285 The reference to «pellit morbum» is traceable to MARBODE OF RENNES, Liber lapidum, XII, PG 171, p. 1758, col. 1638ff; 
cf. ibid., p. 1743, col. 1643-44 about jasper («phantasmata noxia pellit») (Cf. MARBODE OF RENNES, De lapidibus, ed. J.-
M. Riddle, p. 41). 
286 Sermon CXXVI, 10, p. 25, 9-14: «Reperiuntur in lapidibus virtutes Caeli, imagines herbarum, arborum, hominum, 
piscium, leonum ceterorum animalium et cum mirabilissimis virtutibus. Unde valor lapidum pretiosorum excedit valorem 
auri in infinitum». 
287 Cf. Phil. 4:7: «et pax Dei quae exsuperat omnem sensum custodiat corda vestra et intellegentias vestras in Christo Iesu». 
This is presented as a vis described as something divine. 
288 Sermon CXXVI, 10, p. 26, 20-21: «Deinde est vis in lapide, quae est super omnem sensus, quam ex operibus experimur». 
289 See the discussion of the basic form of the method in Chapter 2.3. 
290 Sermon CXXVI, 11, p. 26, 1-4: «Considera igitur, si foret calculus parvus candidus seu lucidus, qui haberet in se 
complicite omnem omnium lapidum pretiosorum virtutem ...». Cf. De Beryllo, 3, p. 5, 1. 
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such a stone, despite having all the virtutes of all the stones, would be ignored and deemed «as nothing» 
(pro nihilo haberetur – implicitly, by people judging it by its appearance alone); however, «if someone 
were to believe some great and erudite teacher (magno et doctissimo magistro), who showed the stone 
and announced its power (virtutem eius), [the one who believed], after he believed, would see that [the 
stone] is indeed such (reperiret ita esse), and would place it above all the stones (super omnes lapides), 
in Zion»291. Thus Cusanus ties back to the image of the stone «in caput anguli» in 1 Pt. 2:7292. We 
should note this remarkable epistemological structure for the examination of paragraph 2 of De Beryllo. 
In paragraph 12 of the sermon, Cusanus builds, with the help of the small stone (calculus), an 
image for the body-soul relationship and the relationship between them and God293. In this, the 
Incarnation is represented by the creation of the stone, combining matter with «the shining or rational 
soul, because the light is ratio, from the most resplendent sky»294. Then, in paragraph 13, he 
characterizes this small «perfect» stone as also unnameable, connecting this image to the «new name 
written on the pebble» of Revelations 2:17295. Interestingly, this makes the notion of accepting «the 
white stone on which is written a new name that no one knows except he who receives it» into a general 
metaphor for knowledge, at least intellectualiter296: the mystical experience of Paul of being «caught 
                                                          
291 Sermon CXXVI, 11, p. 26, 6-11: «Sed si quis crederet alicui magno et doctissimo magistro, qui ostenderet calculum et 
annuntiaret virtutem eius, ille postquam crederet, reperiret ita esse. Talis poneret lapidem illum super omnes lapides in 
Sion». Cf. Rm. 9:33, 1 Pt. 2:6. 
292 1 Peter 2:7: «vobis igitur honor credentibus not credentibus autem lapis quem reprobaverunt aedificantes hic factus est 
in caput anguli». 
293 Sermon CXXVI, 12, p. 27, 18-19: «Et sic habes corpus, animam et deitatem optime figurari in calculo». 
294 Sermon CXXVI, 12, p. 26, 7-10: «Et habet calculus ille materiam ex terra virginea, candorem seu animam lucidam seu 
rationale, quia lux ratio, de caelo lucidissimo». Note the similarity, at least structural or implicit, between this image and 
that of the beryllus in the symbolic interpretations that we have examined, for example in the Liber lapidum of Marbode (a 
source which, as we saw above, seems to have been consulted by Cusanus for this sermon), where the beryllus «lucet quasi 
aqua sole percussa», like «eos qui sunt fragiles, sed percussi radio et gratia veri solis, id est Christi, lucent bonis operibus» 
(MARBODE OF RENNES, Liber lapidum, XII, PG 171, p. 1774, col. 1682). 
295 Rev. 2:17: «in calculo nomen novum scriptum quod nemo scit nisi qui accipit». 
296 Sermon CXXVI, 13, p. 27, 11-17: «Nomen enim est omnibus rebus inscriptum, et quicumque intellectualiter accipit 
quamcumque rem, ille reperit nomen eius in re, quia ‹nomen est notitia. Intellectus si accepit, cognoscit seu intelligit. Simul 
igitur cum re recipit nomen; alias non accipit, nisi simul nomen videat in re, quam accipit». The theme of «nomen est notitia» 
seems to show an influence from Meister Eckhart, as it is a theme often present in his work, cf. e.g. MEISTER ECKHART, 
Expositio in evangelium secundum Ioannem, in MEISTER ECKHART, Lateinische Werke, ed. K. Christ – B. Decker – J. Koch 
– H. Fisher – L. Sturlese – A. Zimmerman, vol. III, Stuttgart 1994, p. 110, 1, 12-13, a work that Cusanus owned (found in 
Cod. Cusanus 21). 
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up to the third heaven» becomes an explicit example of «accepting the pebble» (i.e. the «perfect» or, 
one may say, ‘Christological’ stone)297. 
We should keep in mind this series of arguments written around June 1453, centered around a 
small stone «candidus seu lucidus» and its resonance as Christological image, in our analysis of De 
Beryllo, a work likely already conceived in discussions with the Tegernsee monks a year prior, in June 
1452298. After the analysis of the De Beryllo, we return to this sermon in Chapter 5.1 to examine the 
various structural parallels and reflections already present in this small sermon and which also 
characterize the final structure of the De Beryllo, and how, at the end, the beryllus shows an interesting 
structural correspondence with the lapis/calculus as Christological image from this sermon. 
Conclusions – notes on the meaning of the name ‘De Beryllo’ / ‘Beryllus’ 
The first thing that a reader familiar with the earlier works of Cusanus would point out when 
first learning about De Beryllo would have to be that the title is unusual for Cusanus, if we compare it 
with his previous works: all of them, without exception299, have titles that name the main issue that is 
dealt with in the respective work. Although Cusanus often uses images to illustrate its arguments, he 
has never used one of these as the title of one of his works before De Beryllo300. A reader familiar with 
his works would thus be likely to think that he is trying to do something different and new with this 
work, structuring it around an explicit image, evidently one of unique importance. 
Then, the reader familiar with the passages mentioning beryllus in his previous works, as we 
have examined them above, when confronted with a title like De Beryllo/Beryllus for a new Cusanian 
work, could, from its use in the title, start thinking about a transparent (or possibly colored, but 
                                                          
297 Sermon CXXVI, 13, p. 27, 7: «Sicut Paulus, quando in tertium caelum raptus, accepit calculum». Cf. 2 Cor. 12:2. 
298 The beryllus was mentioned for the first time in the letters of Caspar Aindorffer and Bernardus de Waging from before 
February 12 1454, as something known to both writers, and likely developed as an idea in discussions with Cusanus from 
around June 1452. See the analysis in Chapter 1.1. 
299 The titles of his theoretical works written before finishing De Beryllo, in chronological order: Concordantia Catholica, 
De Docta Ingnorantia, De Conjecturis, De Deo abscondito, De Quaerendo Deum, De Dato Patris Luminum, De 
Transmutationibus Geometricis, De Arithmeticis Complementis, De Filiatione Dei, Dialogus de Genesi, Apologia Doctae 
ignorantiae, Idiota de Mente, De Visione Dei, De Pace Fidei, De Theologicis Complementis, De Mathematicis 
Complementis. It is clear how De Beryllo stands out in this series from the outset. 
300 This observation remains valid also for the later works, with the sole (partial) exception of Trialogus de Possest (1460) 
and De Non Aliud, which both, like De Beryllo, contain their central innovative theoretical construction in the title. 
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translucent) stone, which would be a ‘medium’ for light, and which, if it is to be considered less valuable 
than diamond301, it still could not be differentiated from such a precious stone by any optical properties; 
finally, one might suppose it could serve as an aid to vision. Given the familiar patterns of Cusanus’ 
investigations, which always seem to be directed in one way or another towards knowledge about God, 
one might be able to predict, e.g., that the beryllus has to do with the intellect, and thus with a type of 
visio intellectualis, being most likely a reformulation of Cusanus’ old divine-name-deduction patterns 
(including geometrical ones) from De Docta Ignorantia, etc. Therefore, it is not hard to see how one 
might deduce, just from the title, the presence of a great part of the elements we actually find in De 
Beryllo. Obviously, it would be a highly unexpected result if Cusanus were to do something 
fundamentally different in a work with the title De Beryllo (for example, a treatise on actual 
mineralogy). Taken from this point of view, one might even be inclined to agree with Senger and 
Bormann’s terse opinion in the Preface to the critical edition of De Beryllo that in this work Nicholas 
«rem non magnam not novam tractavit»302. However, the issue about the relative importance of what 
Cusanus achieves in De Beryllo can only be settled after a thorough interpretation of the text.  
Furthermore, if the reader were to be familiar with some of the sources discussed above on the 
known properties and powers of the beryllus stone, and especially with the interpretations of 
Revelations which interpret the ‘dual’ aspects of the stone as an ‘incarnational’ image, in combination 
with the lapis used as Christological image in Sermon CXXVI, one could expect an occurrence of the 
titular beryllus as a Christological image. At this point, we can remark that what seems to be surprising 
in the text is rather the lack of prominence of Christology in De Beryllo, which is certainly reflected in 
the lack of study of this issue among scholars. This analysis will be taken up again in Chapter 5. 
 
                                                          
301 One may note that in Idiota de staticis experimentis there is a clear hierarchy among the stones, and beryllus is not 
included among the lapides pretiosi; however, in Sermon CXXVI, written more or less three years later, and after clearly 
having consulted a lapidarium (most likely Marbode’s), the stones, each manifesting a specific power, are not hierarchized, 
and all receive the adjective «pretiosus» (cf. Sermon CXXVI, 10, p. 26, 12 and 15). One may surmise that in the meantime, 
Cusanus abandoned the ‘low’ status he had assigned to beryllus in De Conjecturis and the Idiota de staticis experimentis, 
after consulting relevant sources as to its virtus and that of other stones. 
302 De Beryllo, p. XI. 
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3.2. Analysis of the ‘Introduction’ section (paragraphs 1-2) 
3.2.1 Text Analysis: Paragraph 1 (p. 3, 1 – p. 4, 13) 
 
Qui legerit ea, quae in variis scripsi libellis, videbit me in oppositorum coincidentia crebrius versatum 
quodque nisus sum frequenter iuxta intellectualem visionem, quae excedit rationis vigorem, concludere. 
(De Beryllo, 1, p. 3, 1-4) 
 
The first sentence begins directly with a reference to the activity and previous works of Cusanus 
(ea quae in variis scripsi libellis), which makes obvious to the reader that the topic of the reader’s 
understanding of his previous works, and thus his thought generally, is urgent in Cusanus’ mind. 
As we have noted, De Beryllo has no dedication and there is no sign of it being rhetorically 
addressed to a particular person as addressee, as it is the case for all his previous non-dialogic works303. 
Cusanus starts with an indefinite construction: «who[ever] reads» (cf. cuiusque intellectus, in cuiusque 
potestate later in the paragraph) – suggesting a basic ‘universality’ (or indifference) as regards the 
prospective reader. In addition, explicit reference is made to previous writings, in an undifferentiated 
way (in variis libellis). This suggests that, from the perspective of Cusanus at this time (i.e. presumably, 
the moment when he finished the book: August 18, 1458), his previous works, at least in the manner 
he chooses to present them to ‘whoever’ might read them, are to be considered as containing the same 
type of exercise or activity304.  
What is the nature of this activity? Two aspects are mentioned, both introduced with me videbit 
– «[the reader] will perceive me doing …»305. The first is that he often «turns to the coincidence of 
opposites» (in oppositorum coincidentia crebrius versatum); second, that he often tries to reach 
                                                          
303 See Chapter 2.2.1 and the analysis of the rhetorical situation. As we will see, Cusanus will use direct address extensively 
in De Beryllo as well. A quantitative study of this aspect (and others) of Cusanus’ rhetoric throughout his works would be 
interesting to undertake. 
304 Expressed as actions with me videbit + verbs, thus not at all necessarily issuing in the same opinions or doctrines. But as 
Cusanus presents matters here, the activity itself is what is given as most important in this context. 
305 However, is this meant as an ‘accurate’ perception on the part of a reader, or does Cusanus mean that a reader would in 
fact misunderstand his works in this manner? As we will see below, the context overall suggests Cusanus views this account 
of his activities in the other works as accurate, although not necessarily complete. 
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conclusions in accordance with «intellectual vision» (nisus sum frequenter iuxta intellectualem 
visionem concludere). Again, it must be emphasized that the ‘content’ of his conclusions in these earlier 
works is not the focal point here, but the manner of his activity, i.e. what one might call his 
‘methodology’. What a reader unfamiliar with Cusanus’ other works would understand from this first 
sentence is that in these works, Cusanus will be seen to «turn to» or «try to» (versatus sum, nisus sum 
– these are not ‘achievement’ verbs and nothing is said of whether he actually ‘succeeds’) perform a 
particular type of intellectual activity, about which only two aspects are mentioned: the coincidence of 
opposites306 and «intellectual vision», visio intellectualis307. Then, the visio intellectualis is mentioned 
here as having a ‘instrumental’ role or as a criterion for achieving results (juxta intellectualem visionem 
concludere), more than the coincidence of opposites, which is referred to as something like a broad 
                                                          
306The theme of the coincidence of opposites is recurring in most of his previous works, and of crucial importance in De 
Beryllo. For additional sources on this notion in Cusanus, see note 14 above (Chapter 1), and the other sources in De Beryllo, 
p. 93-100. For the centrality of the coincidentia oppositorum for Cusanus’ method, see Chapter 2.3, note 193. The passages 
in Cusanus’ previous works where it is explicitly invoked as a principle are: De docta ignorantia, I, 4, 12, p. 11, 16-18; 16, 
43, p. 30, 19ff; 19, 57, p. 38, 22ff; «Epistola Auctoris», 264, p. 163, 14-16); De Genesi, I, 145, 8-13; Apologia Doctae 
Ignorantiae, 13, p. 6, 8-9; 21, p. 10, 3-7; 23, p. 15, 10-16, p. 16, 7ff.; Idiota de sapientia 32, p. 64, 10 – 65, 24; De conjecturis 
I, 6, 24, p. 30 1-3; De visione Dei, 36, p. 35, 1-9; 75, p. 60, 1 – 61, 14; De theologicis complementis, 13, p. 76, 1 – p. 80, 60. 
See also the letter by Cusanus to the Tegernsee monks of September 14, 1453 (VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, pp. 122ff), where 
Cusanus discusses this theme at length while giving his interpretation of Pseudo-Dionysius’ De Divinis Nominibus. 
307 The theme of visio intellectualis is also used recurrently in previous works by Cusanus as a specific way of perceiving, 
non-discursively, a coincidentia oppositorum, which can be (indirectly) turned into a certain type of knowledge. It does not 
name the regular activity of the intellect (intelligere, intelligibilia), but rather is itself a certain type of ‘coincidence of 
opposites’, combining the immediacy and non-discursivity of sight (which allows one to ‘see’ opposites coinciding even as 
reason, ratio, cannot grasp them) with objects constructed by the intellect, which include ultimately all aenigmata. This 
does not need to be understood in a particularly elevated or ‘mystical’ sense; a paradigmatic example of visio intellectualis 
would be, for example, simply ‘seeing’ that the minimum and maximum angle coincide in the line in the geometric 
construction provided in De Beryllo, paragraph 9. Cusanus’ method in De Beryllo can be accurately characterized as a way 
of using the visio intellectualis to derive knowledge from aenigmata featuring the coincidence of opposites. The ‘B-notation’ 
described in Chapter 2.3 is another way of conceptualizing precisely this process. 
This theme is often treated at length in Cusanus, as it is essential to his various ‘methods’ for deriving knowledge about 
paradoxical objects, i.e. those featuring the coincidentia oppositorum. In works previous to De Beryllo: De conjecturis, II, 
1, p. 72, 1 – p. 73, 11; De quaerendo Deum, 19, p. 15, 5-14; De filiatione Dei, 52, p. 39, 4 – p. 40, 5 (visio intuitiva); 
Apologia Doctae ignorantiae, 9-10, p. 7, 10-26; 20-21, p. 14, 14-15, p. 15, 13 (visus mentis); Idiota de sapientia, 47, p. 79, 
1-4; De visione Dei, 40, p. 36, 1 – 42, p. 38, 19 (a work where it is particularly central); Sermo CCLXXXVIII, XIX/7, 5, p. 
648, 8-14. 
In De Beryllo, as we will see, it is also named visus subtilissimus (7, p. 9, 11-12). 
In the later works, it recurs under different names: De possest, 15, p. 19, 2 (visio mystica), 38, p. 44, 6 (visio intellectualis), 
57, p. 68, 13 (aenigmatica visio), 74, p. 87, 19 (visio in tenebra); De Li Not Aliud, 24, p. 16, 12-14; 33, p. 19, 28-30; 87, p. 
46, 12-13; De ludo globi, II, 65 p. 77, 1 - 66, p. 79, 22; De theologicis complementis, 14, p. 81, 1 – 83, 40.  
For De Beryllo in particular, some scholars overemphasize the ratio – intellectus distinction as the key to understanding the 
place of the visio intellectualis (e.g. CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl, Tome 2, pp. 16-21, esp. pp. 20-21). However, ratio 
appears only rarely in De Beryllo and the visio intellectualis is implied to be distinct from and ‘above’ the intellectus; see 
Chapter 3.3, the analysis of paragraphs 6 and 7, as well as Chapter 5. 
On visio intellectualis in Cusanus’ thought generally, see in particular B. HELANDER, Die visio intellectualis als 
Erkenntnisweg und -ziel des Nicolaus Cusanus, Uppsala, 1988; W. BEIERWALTES, Visio facialis: Sehen ins Angesicht: zur 
Coincidenz des endlichen und unendlichen Blicks bei Cusanus, Munich 1988; G. CUOZZO, Esperienza religiosa e pensiero 
speculativo in Cusano, Trauben, 2012. 
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field or direction of research (in oppositorum coincidentia versatum). As we will see further below, this 
account of his earlier works by Cusanus seems to reinterpret them in terms of the themes of De Beryllo, 
which proposes precisely a philosophical-theological method which has at its basis a type of visio 
intellectualis, always invoking the coincidence of opposites as its crucial characteristic. This visio 
intellectualis is further described as going beyond the power of ratio (excedit rationis vigorem)308. 
Already in this first sentence we have a hierarchical account of the faculties, intellectus and ratio, which 
will be a basic framework used throughout the work: the aim is to surpass the limits of ratio, which is 
to be done using a type of vision309, connected to the coincidentia oppositorum. The aim of this type of 
effort described by Cusanus is clearly not (only) not only an experience such as the visio intellectualis 
in itself, but judging, or formulating conclusions – implicitly, about some questions or problems of a 
kind that can be put into writing (a novice reader will not know at this point to what they refer, but they 
must pertain to matters that exceed ‘the power of ratio’), and about which Cusanus has written in his 
earlier works. At the same time, the process described implies an essential ‘experiential’ component310 
(at least at the level of how it is spoken about) – i.e. the intellectualis visio, as Cusanus’ words suggest 
in this first paragraph that it is the proper way to proceed in these matters: in no way does Cusanus hint 
that his approach in the previous works was wrong or inappropriate. Thus we have the outline of a 
method that exhibits a certain fundamental duality, emphasized by the two sub-clauses chosen by 
Cusanus: namely involving the coincidentia oppositorum and the visio intellectualis. 
We also note that Cusanus is putting particular focus on the experiential aspect of the reader 
who might read his other works: if he/she reads, he/she «will see me» (videbit me) doing these activities. 
There is a ‘theatrical’ aspect invoked with this formulation: the reader will see (and should see) Cusanus 
                                                          
308 See the analysis in CORRIERAS, ibid., pp. 16-21, concerning the distinction between ratio and intellectus. We interpret, 
at this point, the adjective intellectualis as meaning (at least) ‘above the realm of ratio’ and connoting the scope of the 
‘coincidence of opposites’. 
309 The visio intellectualis, in all its formulations and terms, is always distinguished by Cusanus from regular ‘knowledge’ 
as such. See, e.g., Cusanus’ marginal note to Albertus Magnus’ commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius’ Fifth Letter to Dorotheus 
(ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Super Dionysii epistolam V, in ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Opera Omnia, ed. Borgnet, vol. XXXVII, 2, p. 
493, 58-60): «cognictio refertur ad scienciam conclusionum. Visio ad intellectum principiorum» (Cod. Cusanus. 96, fol. 
236rb).   
310 Corrieras highlights the praxis element, which is essential for how Cusanus conceives of his method in De Beryllo: 
CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl, Tome 2, pp. 13, 22-24, 116. 
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working (or trying to work) in this way (i.e. «drawing conclusions», while the actual topics he was 
working on in these other works are de-emphasized)311.  
At the same, as we have examined in previous, the De Beryllo was, at least in the beginning, 
planned to be a work written for the benefit of the monks of Tegernsee, who had specific difficulties 
about his previous works. From the exchange of letters between Cusanus and Aindorffer and de 
Waging312, the work about which the monks specifically had difficulties and needed the help of the 
beryllus is De Docta Ignorantia «and other places» (alibi); they did not know other works, such as, for 
example, the De Conjecturis313, and no specific problems are mentioned about the De Visione Dei that 
they had just received314—as we see in the letters by Abbot Aindorffer315 and prior Bernard de 
Waging316. Specifically, the two issues they mention is the «coincidentia contrariarum» (i.e. the 
coincidence of opposites) and the «spera infinita», a geometrical image from De Docta Ignorantia317. 
Even though several years passed until the completion of the work, there is no sign of it being dedicated 
specifically to the Tegernsee monks, and it is likely that they did not even receive a copy of it within 
Cusanus’ lifetime318, we should still consider the Tegernsee monks as particular possible addressees319, 
if certainly not the only. Clearly, Cusanus had different possible audiences in mind, with various levels 
of familiarity with his previous works: the qui legerit ea does not seem to either exclude a reader 
completely unfamiliar with Cusanus’ other works, or require such familiarity as a prerequisite for 
                                                          
311 This setup brings to mind the dialogic form, which Cusanus indeed used in some of his previous works; he himself 
appears as a character in Apologia Doctae Ignoratiae and De Genesi. One may note that after De Beryllo, he makes much 
more regular use of the dialogic form with himself as character, employing this form for some of his major late works: De 
Possest, De Non Aliud, De Ludo Globi, De Apice Theoriae. Speculatively, we might identify here a further turn in De 
Beryllo towards how others perceive his works and how he himself wants to be perceived.  
312 See Chapter 1.1, note 18 for the discussion of the correspondence and timeline. 
313 Cf. VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, p. 110ff. Cf. the analysis in FLASCH, Geschichte, p. 446, which emphasizes that Cusanus 
does not offer De Conjecturis to the monks to clear up their difficulties, because they would have considered «zu abstrakt-
prinzipiell». 
314 Nor does it seem to make any difference to their particular difficulties. 
315 «Beryllum pre omnibus habere desideramus» (VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, p. 123). 
316 See Caspar Aindorffer’s letter: «specialiter mustum berillum, ut videamus in docta Ignorantia et alibi que multis obscura 
videntur, precipue de coincidentia contradictoriarum (sic), de spera infinita, etc.» (VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, p. 120). 
317 This particular geometrical image, as we noted in the discussion in Chapter 1.1, does not appear in De Beryllo at all. 
318 Cf. Chapter 1.1, note 18. 
319 Flasch, for instance, seems to take it for granted that the monks were the primary addressees of the work (FLASCH, 
Geschichte, p. 445); see also the discussion in note 63 above. One should not overlook the years that passed between the 
Aindorffer/de Waging/Cusanus correspondence and the actual completion of this (rather short) work. It is thus most 
reasonable to consider a more diverse type of audience that Cusanus could have had in mind. Corrieras follows Flasch in 
this; see note 90 above. 
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understanding the De Beryllo. While he does not say explicitly that a reader would not understand his 
other works properly without the help that De Beryllo provides, it is clear that the present work is aimed 
at least at making this understanding easier in some way320: first of all, one might conclude, by his short 
summary of his varii libelli, that it sets the stage for De Beryllo to account, in detail, for how he wants 
the crucial notions of visio intellectualis and coincidentia oppositorum understood321. We will note the 
implicit duality and ambiguity (left explicitly unresolved by the hypothetical grammatical structure of 
‘whoever reads…’), addressing both a specific audience (someone who knows his previous works) and 
a general reader (who might not know them, and who might end up reading them or not322)—a duality 
we are also maintaining at a methodological level between a ‘novice’ reader and an ‘expert’ one. 
According to this account of Cusanus’ ‘dual’ intended audience, it is crucially important to 
always follow his argument from the perspective of the ‘novice reader’ as well323, even when it seems 
to contradict (our notions of) what Cusanus does and says in his other works. As such, this first sentence 
leaves us with a clear and complex view: Cusanus has in his other works put effort into certain 
speculations in the realm of the coincidence of opposites, for which the visio intellectualis, something 
involving the intellectus, is the most appropriate as it possesses a higher ‘power’ than ratio; yet he has 
not achieved an exhaustive investigation in his (implicitly many and various) works, and something 
must be now added; indeed, as we will see, it is possible that the other works are imperfect precisely 
because ‘whoever reads them’ would only manage to ‘see’ Cusanus himself attempting to work in the 
way he describes. 
Unde ut quam clare legenti conceptum depromam, speculum et aenigma subiciam, quo se infirmus 
cuiusque intellectus in ultimo scibilium iuvet et dirigat, et graviores doctissimorum in difficilibus 
ponam paucas sententias et opiniones, ut applicato speculo et aenigmate visione intellectuali iudex 
fias, quantum quisque propinquius ad veritatem accedat. (De Beryllo 1, p. 3, 4-12) 
                                                          
320 Flasch underlines the fittingness of De Beryllo as an introduction to Cusanus’ thought overall: FLASCH, Geschichte, p. 
446: «geeigneteste die Einführung in die Philosophie Cusanische in ihrem reifen Stadium. Wer die in Denkwelt des Cusanus 
Eintreten will, sollte, meine ich, beginnen mit De beryllo [...]». 
321 Cf. FLASCH, Geschichte, p. 467-468: «De beryllo ist für die Selbstorientierung der Philosophie Cusanischen 
entscheidendes ein Dokument. Hier Cusanus sagt zum ersten Mal ohne Versteckspiel, wie er seine Philosophie interpretiert 
sehen will». 
322 Pursuing this line of thought, one might even conclude that De Beryllo provides, in Cusanus’ view, a full-on substitute 
for reading any of his other works, implicitly viewed as imperfect attempts; but this seems excessive to base solely on the 
structure of the initial if-clause.  




The second sentence clarifies the basic framework already built by the first. It starts with a 
consecutive conjunction (unde) and a purpose clause answering the unspoken question of why Cusanus 
wrote this particular book, in the context of his account of his previous activities in his prior works. 
Indeed, the purpose clause suggests the first sentence described a situation that was in some way 
problematic and needed resolving. By describing his previous works in this way, it is implicitly 
suggested that this particular book, the De Beryllo, will (in some crucial way) not be the same. 
That there is a need for something different than he has done before has been suggested already 
by his choice of words: versatus sum, nisus sum, which suggest that Cusanus has not, in some ways, 
successfully completed the activities involved. The current sentence, with its purpose clause, clarifies 
what exactly this previous failure was: quam ut clare legenti conceptum depromam, «to develop the 
concept/notion as clearly as possible for the reader». This work, therefore, achieves the development 
of a certain conceptus in a (finally) clearer way324.  
Let us examine the argumentative structure here. The particle unde indicates that the purpose 
clause can be taken as a consequence of what has been said, and therefore that the fact that the reader 
would see Cusanus do these things (nisus sum, versatus sum) leads directly to the fact that the conceptus 
(whatever it actually is) has never been developed clearly enough for the reader (i.e. the present reader, 
whoever he/she is). Thus, we might interpret this to say that, according to Cusanus325, there is in fact a 
single conceptum, recurrent in his work, which he has not succeeded so far in making as clear as 
possible/needed (but he should have, and failed). It is left unspecified here what the conceptus is, but 
                                                          
324 Corrieras remarks on this introductive section that the verbs are mostly in the indicative, inasmuch as grammar allows, 
giving the text the greatest immediacy and clarity, until the text to the appearance of «un maître che dirige il son eleve» 
(CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl, Tome 2, p. 13, footnote 19). 
325 This seems to be his view at least circa August 1458, when he completes the work. It is very interesting to consider the 
fact that Cusanus, since he likely did not believe De Beryllo would be his last book (although he did appear to be worried 
about possible assassination around the time of its completion), seems to be willing to offer this framework for the reader 
of any of his future works as well: i.e. that they will all be seen in the same way by the reader, that they will all involve the 
same conceptus and that they will all have the problem of the conceptus not being clear enough. 
In any case, a close reading of this first paragraph seems to confirm Flasch’s notion of De Beryllo as an introduction for all 
Cusanus’ works. It is possible, however, that Cusanus could have changed his mind about some aspects of this, for instance 
that he wouldn’t have characterized his later works with the same scheme of nisus…versatus…and an unclear conceptus. 
We have no direct evidence of this, as he hardly ever mentions De Beryllo later on. 
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the reader who has read De Beryllo can plausibly identify this as referring to the method which is the 
main focus of the work, like modus, beryllus, speculum et aenigma, visio intellectualis. This completes 
the situation described in the first sentence, describing Cusanus as visible to the reader as nisus sum, 
versatus sum: this might be in fact a misperception (or somehow a deficient perception) on the part of 
the reader, as they will ‘see’ (videbit) Cusanus engaged in these activities, but at the same time will not 
understand the conceptus involved, which is clearly a problem that De Beryllo is aimed at fixing. The 
problem might therefore be that of misperception: an error in ‘seeing’, or a failure to see ‘clearly’ 
(because, implicitly, Cusanus himself failed in making the conceptus clear enough). The first two 
sentences thus set up a duality of ‘appearance vs. reality’ (which corresponds below, as we will see, 
with aenigma/visio), playing on the senses of the verb videre, i.e. to see and to understand. This will be 
a recurring structure, characteristic for De Beryllo. 
Then Cusanus says what he intends to do to (finally) achieve the desideratum of presenting the 
conceptus in the most clear way to the reader: he will «propose a mirror and symbolism» – «speculum 
et aenigma», a direct reference to 1 Corinthians 13:12326, and an expression Cusanus employs often as 
                                                          
3261 Cor. 13:12: «videmus nunc per speculum in enigmate tunc autem facie ad faciem nunc cognosco ex parte tunc autem 
cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum». 
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a technical term327, used in De Beryllo to describe precisely the method that is its focus328. Thus, the 
(first part of the) purpose clause shows that the speculum et aenigma is to be the object that De Beryllo 
now offers, and which will have to fix the problem of developing the conceptus in the clearest possible 
way329—since the second part of the sentence, after et, clearly refers to applying it. 
In this long sentence full of purpose clauses, Cusanus also clarifies what should be, 
grammatically and logically, the ‘end goal’ of this type of investigation proposed—i.e. why indeed he 
was (seen to be) versatus and nisus concludere in his earlier works. He is now proposing (subiciam) a 
                                                          
327 This passage has been crucial for epistemological reflection in the Christian tradition, cf. PLATZER, Symbolica venatio, 
p. 103: «kann…als Leitwort dienen» (citing Gerda von Bredow). It refers to the inability to ‘see God’, i.e. (in the common 
interpretation that parallels knowledge with vision) a contrast between the limited way in which we have access to the 
knowledge (or vision) of God in this world, nunc, versus the future world, tunc. A reader versed in the tradition might 
remember, at this point, the interpretation of this passage by Augustine in De Trinitate, which identifies the aenigma as a 
similitudo: «Proinde quantum mihi videtur sicut nomine speculi imaginem voluit intellegi, ita nomine aenigmatis quamvis 
similitudinem tamen obscuram et ad perspiciendum difficilem. Com igitur speculi et aenigmatis nomine quaecumque 
similitudines ab apostolo significatae intellegi possint quae accomodatae sunt ad intellegendum deum eo modo quo potest, 
nihil tamen est adcommodatius quam id quod imago eius non frustra dicitur. Nemo itaque miretur etiam in isto videndi 
modo qui concessus est huic vitae, per speculum scilicet, in aenigmate, laborare nos ut quomodocumque videamus» 
(AUGUSTINE, De trinitate libri XV, PL 42, XV, 9, 16, 41-51, col. 1069, lines 22-33). Cf. CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl, p. 
22-24, who cites the same passage from Augustine, just as Senger and Bormann also do in their extended note in De Beryllo, 
p. 101. Cf. also the analysis of paragraph 5 in Chapter 3.3 below. 
In previous works, Cusanus often mentioned aenigmata, symbolus, similitudo in a similar sense, in fundamental agreement 
with Augustine’s interpretation, in the context of knowledge of God, even appealing to the «consensus» of the doctores: cf. 
De docta ignorantia, I, 9, 30, p. 22, 4-6: «Consensere omnes sapientissimi nostri et divinissimi doctores visibilia veraciter 
invisibilium imagines esse atque creatorem ita cognoscibiliter a creaturis videri posse quasi in speculo et in aenigmate»; I, 
11, 32, p. 24, 6-9: «cum ad divina non nisi per symbola accedendi nobis via pateat»; 33, p. 24, 23-25: «Et tunc nostra 
ignorantia incomprehensibiliter docebitur, quomodo de altissimo rectius et verius sit nobis in aenigmate laborantibus 
sentiendum»; Idiota de sapientia, II, 47, p. 44, 2-4: «ut intuearis omnia in simplicissima rectitudine verissime … licet medio 
aenigmatico, sine quo in hoc mundo dei visio esse nequit»; De visione Dei, 2, p. 5, 1-2: «Si vos humaniter ad divina vehere 
contendo, similitudine quadam hoc fieri oportet», 12, p. 16, 1-3: «Contemplor nunc in speculo, in eicona, in aenigmate 
vitam aeternam«; 21, p. 23, 12 («velate et in aenigmate»): «In omnibus faciebus videtur facies facierum velate et in 
aenigmate. Revelate autem non videtur». 
In De Aequalitate, a small work written immediately after the completion of De Beryllo, Cusanus continues adding 
references to aenigma, a theme that was clearly a prominent focus for him in this period: De aequalitate, 2, p. 4, 23-25: 
«cuius modus, licet sit inexpressibilis et incomprehensibilis, tamen in figura et aenigmate comprehensibilium describitur» 
(for «figura» cf. Hebr. 1:3); 13, p. 18, 22-25: «ita de reliquis, ad sui principium quod est aeternum transsumit, ut in se 
tamquam in speculo et aenigmate suum principium aliqualiter possit intueri»; 16, p. 22, 7-9: «In hoc ut in aenigmate anima 
videt in aeternitate principium creationis aeternum per rationem suae notitiae omnia creabilia creare». This all suggests, in 
particular, that the De Beryllo and De Aequalitate stand in some kind of continuity, and that the type of Strukturanalyse 
proposed here for De Beryllo would also give interesting results when applied to De Aequalitate. 
Platzer’s work has an interesting interpretation of Cusanus’ overall intellectual development in terms of his method: 
according to her account, starting after De Visione Dei, i.e. with De Beryllo, he changes from a focus on symbolum to 
aenigma (itself a different type of symbolum, characterized by a dynamic quality and always ultimately referring to the 
infinite/unnameable, representing in fact an encapsulation of Cusanus’ three-step method; cf. PLATZER, Symbolica venatio, 
pp. 45-50, 195. 
328 As we will see later, aenigmatica scientia is given as an explicit name for the method (De Beryllo, 7, p. 9, 11). Cusanus 
refers explicitly to aengimata in paragraphs 9, 15, 21, 23, 27, 31, 32, 33, 44, 53, 60, 61, 63, and this word occurs in De 
Beryllo much more often than in any other one of Cusanus’ works. This aspect was noted by Platzer’s quantitative analysis, 
which she uses to support her thesis as to the change to a focus on aenigma and scientia aenigmatica in the method used by 
Cusanus in his late works (PLATZER, ibid., esp. pp. 45-50, 195-205).  
329 Crucially, the conceptus is implied to be the same, both for the ‘not clear enough’ previous works and for De Beryllo. 
The speculum et aenigma is merely meant to be how Cusanus explains it «as clear as possible» for the reader. 
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speculum et aenigma as a tool with which the intellectus (which is, interestingly, the active subject) can 
help itself (iuvet) and direct itself (dirigat) «to the final level of knowable things» (in ultimo scibillium). 
A question immediately arises concerning the intellectus infirmus cuiusque – does this imply that all 
intellects are infirmi? The universal scope of the addressee/reader in these sentences suggests that yes, 
this is indeed the case330, and it justifies why the ‘failure of perception’, and of presentation (not clear 
enough) of the conceptus by Cusanus have occurred, and why there is a need for a specially constructed 
resource, which De Beryllo shall provide: namely, the speculum et aenigma. 
The ‘directionality’ of the expression Cusanus used to speak of in coincidentia oppositorum (in 
+ Acc.) is now paralleled with the in + Abl. of ultimo scibilium, defining, it seems, a ‘domain’ which 
is difficult to navigate and in which the intellect must «assist» and «orient» itself (dirigere)331. 
Interestingly, the ultimate goal of Cusanus’ activities, both in the previous works as in De Beryllo, thus 
appears to be not the reaching of a final stage, or doctrine, but rather simply helping the intellect work 
(properly) in the ‘realm’ of the «ultimo scibilium», which might be interpreted as something like an 
inexhaustible ‘domain’ of activity332. For a novice reader, Cusanus still has to justify why this is the 
ultimate goal.  
The second goal of the book is described in the second part of the sentence, connected by an et 
which puts the two goals on a grammatically equal footing: Cusanus also wants to «place» (i.e. in the 
work, in front of the reader) «certain propositions and important opinions of the most learned 
(doctissimorum) in difficult matters (in difficilibus)» – again a formulation with ‘in + Ablative’. Here 
Cusanus brings into play the adjective doctus, substantivized to refer to the authors of these «judgments 
and opinions»—an adjective which he has used with a special meaning since De Docta Ignorantia, 
where the term is redefined as measuring the level of ‘education’ of a person in Cusanus’ doctrines of 
                                                          
330 This is clearly Cusanus’ own view; see an analysis of this insufficiency in Chapter 5.2, in the examination of Sermon 
CLXXXVIII (1455). 
331 CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl, p. 20, points out that Cusanus develops prior to De Beryllo a longstanding conception of 
intellectus as a regio, thus something like an ‘ontological realm’ rather than an instrumentalizable faculty. 
332 Cf. CORRIERAS, ibid.. However, it is important to note that the «ultimo», «final/ultimate [thing]», might also be 
(speculatively) interpreted otherwise, namely Christologically. This fits well with the latent Christological structural themes 
throughout this work, which will be brought into cohesive view in Chapter 5. 
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«learned ignorance», docta ignorantia333. Here, however, as in De Visione Dei, the term can be 
understood in its usual meaning of ‘famous figures in the tradition’, the views of which will be analyzed 
not in order to argue that they are not «learned» at all, but instead to see «how close» (quantum 
propinquius) they have come to the truth. The result may imply their ‘reordering’ (in a hierarchy of the 
docti) but not an exclusion, and Cusanus’ methodology, as we will see later in the criticism of Aristotle 
and others who «were lacking the beryl» (beryllo caruerunt), merely says that they did not get as close 
to the truth as they could have334. 
The following purpose clause (ut applicato speculo… - 1, p. 3, 7 – p. 4, 9) clarifies what role 
these sententias et opiniones will have, and why they will be brought into the work at all. They are there 
so that ‘you’, the reader (Cusanus’ first use of the second person singular verb to address the reader, a 
mode of address that will recur throughout the work), «may become a judge (iudex fias) of how close 
(quantum propinquius) each of these [learned persons] (quisque) approaches the truth». We see here a 
construction with ‘ad + Accusative’ and the verb accedere, which must be understood as implying a 
degree (because propinquius is obviously quantifiable): this does not denote a static condition, but 
suggest an active work of ‘approaching’ (performed by the thinkers themselves, quisque, not by their 
opinions). This quisque, while referring primarily in this context to the doctissimi already mentioned, 
                                                          
333 De docta ignorantia, I, 1, 4, p. 6, 19-22: «Nihil enim homini etiam studiosissimo in doctrina perfectius adveniet quam 
in ipsa ignorantia, quae sibi propria est, doctissimum reperiri; et tanto quis doctior erit, quanto se sciverit magis ignorantem.» 
As remarked by Flasch, in the period of writing De Beryllo Cusanus criticizes again the doctissimi (without naming names), 
particularly for their inability to make correct use of the coincidence of opposites, in his letter of September 14, 1453 to 
Caspar Aindorffer (VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, pp. 114-116); Flasch gives an excellent analysis of the content of this letter, 
which explores the theme of mystica theologia and the interpretation of Pseudo-Dionysius, explicitly linking it with the 
coincidence of opposites and criticizing philosophers for failing in this (a theme continued and developed in the De Beryllo, 
as we will see), in FLASCH, Geschichte, pp. 440-443; cf. also the very similar analysis of the same letter in CORRIERAS, Le 
traité du béryl, pp. 90-92. According to Flasch, after having avoided confronting specific figures and doctrines in the 
tradition (e.g. in De Visione Dei), Cusanus in De Beryllo sees the necessity of «naming friend and foe», «Freund und Feind 
zu benennen» (FLASCH, Geschichte, p. 448). 
334 Cf. De Beryllo, 32, p. 36, 1. Corrieras points out that in De Beryllo Cusanus choose not to bring «unilateral criticism», 
but instead recognizes the merits of the thinkers he is criticizing, only showing their limitations (CORRIERAS, Le traité du 
béryl, p. 83), so that the use of doctissimi, at least in De Beryllo, is not «ironic». Furthermore, Cusanus’ conception of 
‘closeness to the truth’ seems to enclose an inherent concept of ‘progress’, implicitly tied to the way in which Cusanus treats 
his sources and ‘authorities’ in this text: see the analysis of how he quotes such ‘authorities’ in the ‘four premises’ section 
(paragraphs 4-7). For an analysis of the concept of ‘novelty’ in Cusanus, to which these aspects of his methodology in De 
Beryllo are connected, see the article by Isabelle Mandrella, I. MANDRELLA, Begriff und Funktion der Neuheit in der 
Philosophie des Nicolaus Cusanus, in Die Modernitäten des Nikolaus von Kues. Debatten und Rezeptionen, ed. T. Müller 
– M. Vollet, Bielefeld 2014, pp. 23-42. 
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could also have a more general sense: i.e. how close to the truth anybody at all comes (in a precise 
parallel with the cuiusque intellectus above).  
De Beryllo seems to be divided into two parts, corresponding to the two purpose clauses 
separated by et: one proposing the speculum et aenigma, the other analyzing the sententias et 
opiniones335. As this complex sentence suggests, the two are fundamentally ‘separable’ – however, both 
together seem to be required in order to achieve the overall goal of presenting the conceptus in a way 
that is «as clear as possible». The second part of De Beryllo, according to how it is described here336, 
does not have an inherently fixed size but could be enlarged or shrunk according to what size one would 
wish to assign to paucas, «a few»; the number of «judgments and opinions» does not seem to be in 
itself relevant, as the goal of the second part is for the reader to judge them (i.e., grammatically, the 
doctissimi, not the doctrines) using the visio intellectualis and having «applied the mirror and 
symbolism» introduced in the first part; or, indeed, in another reading, to judge anyone whatsoever as 
to how closely they approach the truth337. Highly interesting here is also the juridical language and 
imagery: the proposed method, Cusanus says, can make any person (quisque) a judge (judex – and one 
who, implicitly, would judge correctly). The parallelism of sententias (which can also mean a judge’s 
sentence) and iudex, suggests that the reader will be put in the position of ‘re-judging’ the «sentences» 
passed by previous ‘judges’, those considered to be «most learned»338. Cusanus thus promises that the 
                                                          
335 One may note again the striking parallelism of dual structures that will recur throughout the work, in which it is not too 
much to say that Cusanus shows a certain (previously unremarked upon) poetic sensibility. It is possible that Cusanus chose 
an expression such as sententias et opiniones precisely in order to parallel speculum et aenigma, the fixed expression taken 
from 1 Cor. 13:12. 
336 Also according to Cusanus’ plan for the work circa August 1454, as he says in a letter to de Waging: «Librum De Beryllo 
nondum complevi; indiget enim longa explicatione, ut videatur praxis in aliorum dictis» (VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, p. 
140). 
337 The fact that the people are the ones judged (based on the doctrines), and not the doctrines themselves, gives a particularly 
dynamic quality to ad veritatem accedat, implying that people are able to move ‘closer’ or ‘further away’ from the truth, 
and indeed that the whole process of judging is not meant to be an evaluation of abstract philosophical doctrines but a sort 
of guiding towards truth (cf. intellectus…se dirigat) for quisque – both for ourselves and others. 
338 It is highly interesting to note the juridical language and imagery, which will reoccur in De Beryllo and ties in with the 
‘political’ imagery, the main object of our analysis in Chapter 4. Cusanus was himself a jurist trained in canon law, but 
juridical language is relatively rarely found in his theoretical works: of the 189 occurrences of the word judex in the corpus, 
around half are found in his early conciliar theory treatise De Concordantia Catholica, then most of the other occurrences 
are in an explicitly theological context of the Last Judgment, mostly found in his sermons.  
We note, in connection with this image implying some kind of a ‘legal-political context’, the recurring image in De Beryllo 
of a polity (res publica) in which all the elements are the image/creation/likeness etc. of the rex. It is interesting to consider 
these in the same context, because in Cusanus rex and iudex are usually found connected: cf. the image of the regnum of 
the intelligentia in De conjecturis (135, p. 132, 1-10), where iudex also appears; cf. De quaerendo Deum (25, p. 17, 6): 
94 
 
reader will themselves become a ‘judge’ (implicitly, just like the «most learned») and pass their own 
‘sentences’ regarding (any) difficult questions. 
The last part of the clause talks about the means by which this ‘becoming a judge’ will be 
accomplished. Two means, or (grammatical) ‘instruments’, are mentioned for this purpose: applicato 
speculum et aenigmate and visione intellectuali. Both have already been mentioned in the first part of 
the sentence, i.e. the ‘first goal’ of the work. There, it was said that the intellect could ‘help’ and ‘orient 
itself’ by means of this speculum et aenigma proposed by Cusanus. Here, he puts in in different terms: 
it must be «applied» or ‘put to use’339, underlining the dynamic and ‘experiential’ aspect - only having 
done this (precisely how will be discussed later) can you become a judex. As for the second 
‘instrument’, it is again the visio intellectualis, after Cusanus said in the first sentence of the book that 
he has been (seen by the reader as) trying to reach conclusions (concludere) according to it (juxta 
visionem intellectualem). Now this is spoken about differently, not as a ‘criterion’ (possibly ‘external’) 
for evaluating conclusions (suggested by the formulation juxta + Acc.), but rather as a means or 
instrument used directly (a noun in the Ablative case), a formulation which seems to suggest that here 
the visio is supposed to be more ‘immediate’, or ‘nearer’ to its user. If this is intentional, we can identify 
                                                          
«intellectus ... judex rationum» (cf. Sermon CXXX, 5, p. 44, 14-15; Sermon CCXLIII, 18, p. 259, 5); ibid., 25, p. 18, 14: 
«regem et judicem»; cf. later, in De Ludo Globi, the image of man as regnum, having intra se regem et iudicem (58, p. 65, 
6-7); or cf. Sermon LI, 14, p. 44, 5: «rex et iudex», Sermon LXXXV, 6, p. 497, 10-11: «rex qui constitutus est iudex». 
Only in one particular passage, in the dialogue De Genesi, do we find the expression «me judice» meaning «in my opinion, 
in my view» (184, p. 128, 1), and not in a line said by Cusanus but by his interlocutor, Conrad de Warburg. 
339 The verb applicare, recurring in De Beryllo specifically in reference to applying the method (8, p. 10, 5 «applicemus 
beryllum»; 27, p. 31, 16 «applicas oculare»), usually has in Cusanus the abstract sense of ‘to apply some proposition, 
premise, conclusion, pattern of thought’, as pointed out by Senger and Bormann in an interpretive note (De Beryllo, pp. 
102-103), cf. De docta ignorantia, 34, p. 25, 1-2; 4, p. 6, 9; 66, p. 44, 15; 94, p. 62, 25; De conjecturis, 4a, p. 6, 16, 34, p. 
40, 12, 86, p. 83, 15, etc. However, in two particular passages in De Beryllo, this verb seems to be used with another possible 
connotation, deriving from medical language: ‘to apply a remedy’ (cf. e.g. WILLIAM OF SALICETO, Ars chirurgica, Venice 
1546, I, 4, p. 305: «ante localium applicationem»), a meaning with which it is also used in Idiota de staticis experimentis: 
«dosis applicationis» (164, p. 223, 8), «medelas applicare» (166, p. 224, 18). Senger and Bormann insist (De Beryllo, p. 
102) that the verb should be understood only with the ‘abstract’ meaning in the current passage we are examining; however, 
there may be a good argument to interpret it in the ‘medical’ sense, if we take into account the facts that: 1) Cusanus believed 
that stones have specific powers, virtutes (cf. Sermon CXXVI, 10, p. 25, 3ff; see our analysis in Chapter 3.1), and 2) that 
Cusanus most likely knew the virtutes of the beryllus as well, from the same lapidary he consulted for that sermon (probably 
the Liber lapidum of Marbode of Rennes, where we can read about the beryllus that it treats «infirm eyes»: «Infirmis oculis 
in qua jacet unda medetur», cf. MARBODE OF RENNES, Liber lapidum, XII, PG171, p. 1747, col. 1649). It is highly tempting, 
and fits perfectly with Cusanus’ argument, to identify a very interesting parallel: the beryllus intellectualis, applied (like a 
medical treatment) to the oculus intellectualis, i.e. the intellectus infirmus in this paragraph, has the ability (cf. the virtus of 
the regular beryllus) to cure it, like the physical beryllus cures infirm eyes. In this way, we can identify a medical ‘resonance’ 
for all the instances of applicare in our text, which is used several times with beryllus in a typical ‘technical’ usage signifying 
the application of the method: applicemus beryllus.   
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a type of ‘progression’ implicit in Cusanus’ words which fits very well with what he seems to be trying 
to describe: thus, if one were to look at the ‘other books’, Cusanus would be seen, at least in the 
perception of the reader, in a distorted way, as merely making use of the visio intellectualis as an 
external criterion, whereas in De Beryllo the reader himself gets to have ‘access’ to Cusanus’ true way 
of working (the conceptus which was not clear enough), which lets the reader make use of this visio 
directly. In this reading (and seeking, in the spirit of Cusanus own goal, to clarify as much as possible 
Cusanus’ message to the reader), we might then paraphrase the first paragraph so far as follows: ‘If you 
read my other writings, you will see that I try to reach conclusions according to visio intellectualis – 
but you might not be able to clearly understand, since in those works you are only seeing me do it but 
you do not have access to this visio yourself. Here, using what I write in De Beryllo, it will be made as 
clear as possible, so you can use this visio and become yourself a judge in difficult matters (as I did). 
This clarity will be achieved by presenting you with the method and helping you use it to judge the 
opinions of the most learned’. Such an ‘instrumentalization’ of the visio intellectualis, reflected in the 
grammatical usage, would indeed fit with the promise of a method which can be used, in principle, by 
quisque340. 
 
Et quamvis videatur libellus iste brevis, tamen dat sufficientem praxim, quomodo ex aenigmate ad 
visionem in omni altitudine possit pertingi. (De Beryllo, 1, p. 4, 9-11)  
 
The third sentence of the paragraph adds to the same structure built up by the first two sentences, 
with a focus on the role of the book De Beryllo in the Cusanian proposal of a speculum et aenigma and 
the manner of its use. Cusanus begins with an adversative clause: «Despite the fact that this little book 
                                                          
340 However, we can also ask: is the use of the speculum et aenigma absolutely necessary? It is not said that this particular 
speculum et aenigma that Cusanus offers in De Beryllo is essential (implicitly there could be others; and it remains an issue 
whether ‘some’ speculum et aenigma would be always necessary to reach the visio intellectualis), and one can even ask if 
what he offers in De Beryllo is (in any definable way) the best one to reach the visio intellectualis – as Cusanus seems to 
have chosen to provide it according to his intention to «make the conceptus as clear as possible» for the reader, and not 
necessarily because of any of its ‘objective’ merits, however one would judge those. Clearly, Cusanus himself must have 
reached the same visio intellectualis without the help of the beryllus, otherwise he could not have created it and now be 
offering it as a means for the reader. 
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(libellus341) might seem short»342, thus anticipating here an objection by the reader. The possible 
objection to his project that Cusanus considered so important and urgent that it had to be countered 
immediately, before even presenting the project in detail, is, therefore, an objection concerning the size 
of the book: namely, that it would be implausible that a book with such extensive ambitions (i.e. to 
offers some means by which anyone can solve any issue «in difficult matters») would be so small. 
Cusanus’ response to this implicit objection, encapsulated in a quamvis ... tamen adversative structure, 
is a response to an issue of misperception on the part of the reader: the book is paradoxically ‘small’ 
while the reader would expect it to be ‘large’, which in fact echoes the paradoxical nature of the 
coincidentia oppositorum used in Cusanus’ method itself, in one of his favorite formulations: a 
coincidence between maximum and minimum. Cusanus’ answer to the reader’s puzzlement that, 
contrary to their expectations, the (very) ‘small’ coincides with the (very) ‘large’, is: if the reader 
believes that the book must be bigger, they don’t yet understand that the method proposed will involve 
coincidentia oppositorum as a matter of course, which fact derives from its very simplicity. Indeed, this 
objection by the hypothetical reader seems to illustrate the essence of the objections a reader would 
have when confronted with the counterintuitiveness of the coincidentia oppositorum, which is likely 
what results (if we follow this speculative thread) in the insufficient ‘clarity’ in his other works – a big 
problem that the De Beryllo, a paradoxically small work, is meant to solve. 
                                                          
341 Regarding this diminutive, libellus, combined with brevis, Corrieras stresses «la redondance, and donc la insistence» 
(CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl, p. 13, footnote 17), and points out that it is also used in the final paragraph (72, p. 84, 1-2, 
p. 85, 10), and that it is connected with the Platonic saying cited by Cusanus at 72, p. 84, 1-2: «scientia brevissima est». 
However, Jasper Hopkins in the notes to his English translation (NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Complete philosophical and 
theological treatises of Nicholas of Cusa, pp. 792-827) argues that libellus (which Cusanus also variously uses to refers 
implicitly to De Docta Ignoratia and De Conjecturis) is probably just a sign of rhetorical modesty, thus not «redundant» at 
all (ibid., footnote 2, p. 830). The interpretation of Corrieras seems more promising though, because she seeks to preserve 
to the maximum all the possible meanings of the text, compared with the ‘reductionism’ of Hopkins, a problematic aspect 
of his methodology, as noted in Chapter 2.1 on his critique of Flasch. Accordingly, the play on the expectations of the reader 
that Cusanus invokes in this paragraph, and the implicit hint at a coincidentia oppositorum, only remain visible for us if we 
take seriously the nuances of the words Cusanus uses.     
342 On the problem of ‘brevity’ of the book and the word libellus, we can notice a possible connection, albeit rather 
speculative, with Sermon CXXVI and the discussion of the lapis clarus et lucidus and then of the calculus (by definition, a 
lapis which is very small) as an image, which we can speculatively connect to the beryllus made into a lens (which would 
certainly be small as well). In this way, we would have a recurring image of a ‘small stone’, the name of which is applied 
also to the book (named Beryllus as well, as we have seen) which is, in turn, surprisingly small—and which hides, as such, 
a coincidentia oppositorum and (speculating further) belongs, like the Christ-stone, in caput anguli. 
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The second part of the structure quamvis ... tamen says, then, that the book offers (dat) to the 
reader «sufficient practical instruction (praxim sufficientem)343 for the way in which one can reach any 
height (in omni altitudine), going from image (ex aenigmate) to vision (ad visionem)». We can remark 
here the hierarchizing metaphor of «height» (altitudo) of types of objects (or domains) of visio, 
correlated with the previous expression in ultimo scibilium (in + Ablative case, used for what appears 
to be a ‘domain’ of objects or knowledge). One could say that we have here a ‘downward’ extension  
of the domain of application of the method, which not only helps the intellect guide itself in the field 
of «the last/ultimate thing that can be known», but it works, indeed, ‘at all levels’, high and low, where 
it can make ‘vision’ possible. But what is this visio? Obviously, we have here a reference to visio 
intellectualis, already mentioned two times in the first two sentences. But instead, at the same time, we 
can interpret the visio mentioned here in a more general way: the book therefore offers «practical 
instruction» on how to proceed from aenigma to visio not only for visio intellectualis but also for  
ordinary vision, e.g. in the case of a paradigmatic geometrical example to explain the use of the method, 
such as the line-angles image that Cusanus includes in paragraph 9. The ambiguity between ordinary 
visio and visio intellectualis, parallel but conjoined in the scope of the method, defines, we can say, the 
method itself: in the same way in which we ‘see’, in the illustration in paragraph 9, that the line is the 
origin of the angle and is, in fact, the maximum and minimum angle, we can also ‘see’ through the 
                                                          
343 The word praxis is rare in Cusanus, as there are only 15 occurrences of the lemma in the entire corpus. Two are in the 
De Beryllo, here and at 2, p. 5, 8. In some places it clearly means simply ‘doing’ something, e.g. De pace fidei, 60, p. 56, 
18, Reformatio generalis, 19, p. 40, 11. But we find it in De Conjecturis with a ‘dual’ sense, always referring to something 
that Cusanus does in the book, i.e. an application of theoretical considerations (70, p. 71, 6-7: «ea, quae dixi, in praxi partim 
explicare curabo»), and even an application for the soul, almost a «spiritual practice» (4, p. 6, 16-19: «fructuosam 
applicatoriam praxim in gratissimis quibusdam resolutionibus adiciens veri famelicas animas reficere curabo»). In De 
visione Dei, Cusanus uses it in a clear way to join together the theoretical aspects and the ‘devotional’ ones (again with the 
same verb in the future tense, conabor; note that there are two possible readings in the critical edition of this passage, and 
the other is different only in word order and verb: instead of conabor,  propono; see the editors’ note, De visione Dei, p. 7): 
«primo conabor vos, amantissimos fratres,per quandam praxim in mysticam theologiam elevare» (4a, p. 7, 11-14); then at 
77, p. 61, 6: «Et hoc experior hac praxi» (sc. the love of God); then, Cusanus sends the famous image together with the De 
visione Dei so that «ne tamen deficiatis in praxi, quae sensibilem talem exigit figuram» (2, p. 5, 10-11), here in a more 
theoretical-applicational sense—but we must take into account the fact that the image is, after all, an icon of Christ.  
Senger and Bormann, in their commentary (De Beryllo, p. 103, note 7), emphasize that this word means exercitationem, 
functionem, usum seu experitiam, and either «makes use of experience», or «is itself perceptible experience in a sensible 
way», citing the passages in De visione Dei examined above. and also Cusanus’ letter to Bernard de Waging 
(VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, p. 140). Corrieras also emphasizes praxis as an essential element in Cusanus’ proposal in De 
Beryllo, at the same time theoretical research and spiritual practice (CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl, p. 116). 
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beryllus/speculum et aenigma that God is the origin of all things, being their absolute maximum and 
minimum. 
We observe here that this most fertile ambiguity introduced by Cusanus between different types 
of ‘vision’ can be also applied to the dual parallelism of the same structure quamvis..tamen, because 
the first verb is precisely videre (videatur), used in the abstract sense of ‘to seem’. At the same time, 
the aenigma (as in 1 Cor. 13:12) is a substitute, an inferior image of the original344, and (in the 
instrumental sense preferred by Cusanus in his account of his method) a means through which, in some 
way, we could access the reality behind it. Thus, the book itself, because it is ‘seen as small’, serves at 
the same time as an aenigma in the way in which it appears to the reader, and the second part of the 
quamvis…tamen features the visio itself, removing the misguided objection of the reader and recalling 
precisely the movement ‘from aenigma to vision’ that the reader has to perform in order to gain access 
to the promised visio intellectualis. 
We can find another very similar textual structure on this pattern if we return to the first sentence 
of the text, where Cusanus also uses the verb videre. It seems that here we have a possible parallelism 
as well, outlining an opposition between 1) what seems to be the case to the reader (i.e. seeing Cusanus 
in oppositorum coincidentia versatum and iuxta intellectualem visionem nisus concludere), described 
in an almost theatrical way, without implying a vision of the same things that Cusanus is seeing on the 
part of the reader, and 2) the truth of this same visio intellectualis, experienced by the reader 
him/herself. It is precisely this ‘barrier’ between ‘seeing Cusanus do it in his books’ and ‘doing it 
oneself’ that makes a help such as De Beryllo necessary. Thus, Cusanus promises in De Beryllo to make 
it possible (in a way that he has not succeeded to do before, or at least not to such an extent) for the 
reader, by making the conceptus as clear as possible, that the reader themselves will have this kind of 
visio – enabling them to go, therefore, ex aenigmate (from the image—which might also be the book 
De Beryllo itself, in its too-small appearance and its ‘theatrical’ account of Cusanus’ activities as the 
protagonist) ad visionem (to that which Cusanus is actually using in his other books, while his readers 
                                                          
344 In Cusanian terms, also a «similitudo», as we will see in the analysis paragraph 5 below. 
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are not able to go beyond appearances and understand). To make this movement possible, Cusanus says 
that the book offers praxis sufficiens – but one must still overcome the same fundamental difficulty: 
how to go beyond the ‘talk about praxis’ and reach ‘praxis itself’? As we see, Cusanus thinks he has 
found a solution, encapsulated in the fertile ambiguity of seeing and visio, and later he will try to explain 
the way to accomplish this passage, from ‘seeing’ a geometric example to the visio intellectualis of an 
object that exceeds the domain of ratio. This is the fundamental structure of his method, and the 
proposal of Cusanus in De Beryllo is based on the premise that the reading and understanding of his 
arguments must be able to give exactly this praxis: that the reader, if he is willing to put in the effort to 
follow the argument fully, will stand to gain the benefits this praxis promises. It is on this basis, as we 
will see, that the apparently extravagant promises made by Cusanus in his introduction might be 
perfectly justifiable.  
 
Erit etiam in cuiusque potestate modum qui subicitur applicandi et extendendi ad quaeque indaganda. 
(De Beryllo, 1, p. 4, 11-13) 
 
In this last sentence of the first paragraph, Cusanus formulates a comprehensive and 
generalizing conclusion. The -que generalizing suffix, as already seen twice in this paragraph, makes 
manifest the universality of his proposal: quisque for the user, quaeque for the object of application; 
but there are also new qualifications added in this sentence, important to complete the theoretical 
framework of the method as Cusanus defines it. The method that will be further introduced in the 
following paragraphs is referred to here as a modus345, an important term beside speculum et aenigma 
and visio intellectualis, a way of speaking that describes the method as something that is to be 
‘applied’346 and ‘extended’ to anything to be investigated (with ad + Accusative, the same ‘directional’ 
structure as the ad visionem just used). The verb in the future tense, the gerunds describing actions to 
                                                          
345 A term that echoes modus ratiocinandi, one of the names for his methodological proposal in De Docta Ignorantia (1, 19, 
p. 2, 7). 
346 On the word applicatio, see note 339 above on applicare. 
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accomplish in the future (applicandi, extendendi, indaganda), and the introduction of the potestas, all 
create the image of a situation not currently present and which must be actualized in practice, continuing 
implicitly the theme of praxis already introduced (cf. also the subjunctive mood of possit in the previous 
sentence). The actualization of this possibility depends therefore on the reader, but if he/she fulfils all 
the conditions (which include, at least, the reading of the book, and which are specified further in the 
second paragraph), applying the modus will be in their power, in <sua> potestate347. Here we find the 
first clear instance of what will be the recurring image of the res publica and rex348. The fact that 
Cusanus has just used an image from a general ‘political-type’ context (the judex)349 cannot be ignored, 
and it is not a large leap to connect the two images: the reader becomes judex of the ‘sentences’ of the 
doctissimi, and this ability to investigate and judge will exist in their potestas as a ‘magistrate’. But in 
this implicit image, who would be the rex/princeps? The answer to this question, which will become 
interesting especially at the end of De Beryllo, will inevitably be Christological, as we will see in the 
analysis of paragraphs 69, 70 and 72 in Chapter 5 of the thesis. 
Remarkable here is also an interesting asymmetry within this image of the reader as ‘magistrate-
in-training’: in the second proposition, the reader is referred to in the 2nd person singular (iudex fias), 
but instead here we have the third person, impersonal and universalized: in the power (potestas) of any 
person (in cuiusque potestate). Although it seems to refer to the readers of the book, one can interpret 
this last expression in a generalized way, which changes the meaning of the proposition as a whole: in 
this interpretation, it would refer to all human beings, and would almost take the character of a 
‘prophecy’, with a ‘subjunctive of wish’ translating roughly to: ‘Let it be so in the future, then, that it 
will be in the power of every human being to apply...’. This might be an overly speculative and 
ambitious interpretation, but at the same time the ambitions of Cusanus with this book, as stated by 
himself, also seem extraordinary, if we take seriously the universalizing promises already made in the 
                                                          
347 Cf. Col. 2:10 «et estis in illo repleti, qui est caput omnis principatus et potestatis». The word, at least in our context, 
clearly suggests a ‘juridical’ resonance. 
348 An image that recurs in paragraph 36, p. 40, 1-2. 
349 Cf. note 338 above. See the further analysis of the ‘juridical images’ in Chapter 4.1. 
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first paragraph. We will see immediately, in paragraph 2, that Cusanus indeed intends to put in play 
something new, in his view, relative to the tradition, as he expands on the scope of the ‘promises’ made 
to the reader. 
3.2.2 Text Analysis: Paragraph 2 (p. 4, 1 – p. 5, 12) 
 
 
Causa autem, cur tam Plato in Epistulis quam Dionysius magnus Areopagita prohibuerunt haec 
mystica his, qui elevationes intellectuales ignorant, propalari, est quia illis nihil magis risu dignum 
quam haec alta videbuntur. (De Beryllo, 2, p. 4, 1-5) 
 
After the introductory paragraph, which makes highly ambitious claims for De Beryllo, Cusanus 
chooses not to go directly into the topic of the book, but instead to include another paragraph, seemingly 
in order to clarify the relationship of his work with the intellectual tradition: here we find references to 
Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius. The mention of both the philosopher Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius, a 
(presumed) Church Father350, in a dualistic tam ... quam structure, seems to suggest in particular the 
universal philosophical-theological scope of his proposed method—and Cusanus, as we will see, puts 
in great effort to maintain this equal-status duality throughout the work.  
In this construction, Pseudo-Dionysius gets a ‘privileged’ position by being described with the 
epithet magnus351, an early signal to the reader of the importance that Pseudo-Dionysius will have in 
                                                          
350 Cusanus notably had some doubts, which he expressed to his friends, about the attribution of Pseudo-Dionysius’ texts to 
the character mentioned in Acts of the Apostles 17:34, noticing the verbatim correspondences between passages in Pseudo-
Dionysius and passages in Proclus, likely pointed out to him by Pietro Balbi, a skeptic of this attribution who translated 
works by Proclus for him; he also wondered why the other early Church Fathers did not mention him. However, like a 
number of prominent intellectuals (including Cardinal Bessarion), he did not reject this attribution despite his puzzlement 
(see e.g. W. BERSCHIN, Greek Letters and the Latin Middle Ages: From Jerome to Nicholas of Cusa, Washington DC 1988, 
pp. 276-280, and especially P. MOFFITT-WATTS, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and Three Renaissance Neoplatonists, 
Cusanus, Ficino and Pico on Mind and Cosmos, in Supplementum Festivum: Studies in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller, ed. 
J. Hankins – J. Monfasani – F. Purnell Jr, 1987, pp. 279-298). De Beryllo shows no signs of any problematic status given 
to Pseudo-Dionysius’s works. This was a topic of debate and disagreement in scholarly circles at the time, and the first 
prominent argument against the attribution published during Cusanus’ time was Lorenzo Valla’s 1457 commentary to the 
New Testament. Given all this, we will take the reasonable position, given the contents of De Beryllo and its apparent 
‘universal’ target audience, that Cusanus assumed the reader would accept Pseudo-Dionysius’s works unproblematically as 
those of the first-century saint. In any case, Pseudo-Dionysius’s works can clearly stand for the Christian tradition in the 
‘dualistic’ reading we propose. 
351 The influence of Pseudo-Dionysius on Cusanus is evident and extensive, in De Beryllo and elsewhere, representing a 
constant factor in Cusanus’ work. He refers to Pseudo-Dionysius often (and more than to any other author) using epithets 
such as magnus. An excellent account of the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius on Cusanus is found in W. BEIERWALTES, Der 
verborgene Gott: Cusanus und Dionysius, Trier 1997. See also, more recently and from a more prominently theological 
perspective, P. CASARELLA, Cusanus on Dionysius: The Turn to Speculative Theology, in «Modern Theology» 24/4 (2008), 
pp. 667-678.  
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Cusanus’ account in De Beryllo, and to the fact that in Cusanus’ appraisal, his doctrines will be seen as 
superior to those attributed to Plato. At the same time, this passage cannot be unproblematically called 
an appeal to ‘authorities’ in the tradition; instead, it seems that Cusanus mentions Plato and Pseudo-
Dionysius here just to answer an implicit objection to his project, and not, in particular, as sources 
supporting it. Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius will be, of course, among the doctissimi whose views are to 
be examined in the ‘second part’ of his proposed account. This makes Cusanus’ approach quite 
remarkable as regards his relationship to authorities in the tradition, as he seems to have pre-emptively 
asserted that no one of the doctissimi is exempt from criticism and evaluation according to his method. 
However, he does invoke authorities in support of it, in an implicit way, by his use of the words haec 
mystica, ‘these mystical matters’, which seem to refer to (some of) the contents of De Beryllo, not 
clearly specified (we do not know what the relationship – identity or inclusion – would be between the 
modus/speculum et aenigma and haec mystica). In this way, Cusanus implicitly asserts (without making 
any strong direct claim) that in fact Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius wrote about the ‘same things’ as he is 
doing now, and thus implicitly agreed, at least in general terms, with Cusanus’ own positions. 
This seems to be the main reason for this second paragraph: for Cusanus to carefully locate his 
own work within the tradition. He starts directly by addressing an objection by the reader, an implicit 
question (i.e. a ‘why’ question that causa would answer). Recall that the first implicit objection which 
                                                          
In particular, especially for De Beryllo, Cusanus studied the works of Pseudo-Dionysius (mainly De Divinis Nominibus and 
De Mystica Theologia) through Albertus Magnus’ commentaries, which he owned in Codex Cusanus 96 and for which he 
left a wealth of marginalia that are a priceless resource for studying how he interprets and makes use of Pseudo-Dionysius. 
These notes were collected by L. Baur in Cusanus-Texte III. Marginalien. 1. Nicolaus Cusanus und Ps.-Dionysius im Lichte 
der Zitaten und Randbemerkungen des Cusanus, ed. L. Baur, Heidelberg 1941 (hereafter cited as CT III.1), which includes 
also an extensive and detailed study by Baur on the citations and influence of Pseudo-Dionysius in Cusanus (CT III.1, pp. 
9-96).  
Cusanus’ other main source for De Beryllo is Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, to which he also leaves copious 
notes. These have been collected in: Cusanus-Texte III. Marginalien 2. Proclus Latinus. Die Exzerpte und Randnoten des 
Nikolaus von Kues zu den lateinischen Übersetzungen der Proclus-Schriften. 2.1 Theologia Platonis. Elementatio 
theologica, ed. H.-G. Senger, Heidelberg 1986; and Cusanus-Texte III. Marginalien 2. Proclus Latinus. Die Exzerpte und 
Randnoten des Nikolaus von Kues zu den lateinischen Übersetzungen der Proclus-Schriften. 2.2 Expositio in Parmenidem 
Platonis, ed. K. Bormann, Heidelberg 1986. I will hereafter cite these works as CT III.2.1 and CT III.2.2 respectively. 
For Proclus, a crucial resource is Steel’s editing of the Moerbeke translation of the commentary to Parmenides that Cusanus 
uses, together with Cusanus’ own marginalia: PROCLUS, Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon, Traduction de 
Guillaume de Moerbeke, ed. C. Steel, 2 voll., Leuven 1982, 1985. As a result, I will generally refer to Proclus both by the 
page number in the Cousin edition as well as by the page number in the Steel edition (which reproduces Moerbeke’s 
translation that Cusanus owned and worked on), in round brackets, as follows: (Cousin xxx, Steel p. yyy). 
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Cusanus answered in the third sentence of the first paragraph was: ‘why is this book so short (as one 
would expect it to be longer according to the nature of the subject matter)?’. Here, in the first sentence 
of the second paragraph, the implicit reader’s objection would be something like: ‘Why has no one else 
in the tradition proposed what you are now proposing, a libellus brevis with a modus that anyone could 
apply to judge any sententias et opiniones about anything that is to be investigated’? At issue here is 
again the novelty of his approach, as this is, in effect, a variation of the first objection, i.e. ‘why is this 
book unlike what I, a reader, would expect given how you have described it?’. This is an important 
objection to be addressed, as there does not seem to be any parallel, either in the Christian or the 
Neoplatonic tradition, for a small work that would aim to present a method so universal in scope. 
Cusanus’ strategy for responding to this objection is complex, as can be seen from an analysis 
of the sentence. First, Cusanus uses haec mystica, «these sacred/mystical matters»352, an expression 
which connects De Beryllo with the Neoplatonic-Christian tradition invoked by mentioning Plato and 
Pseudo-Dionysius, yet in a way that is not particularly defined and allows Cusanus a lot of freedom, 
amounting more to a sort of ‘promise’ to the reader: haec, ‘these things’, is a neuter plural pronoun not 
corresponding to any noun previously mentioned. The crucial elements mentioned so far: speculum et 
aenigma, modus, visio, have been singular nouns, and the only plurals, sententias et opiniones, have 
been feminine. Cusanus wants to communicate, without committing at the level of details, that Plato 
and Pseudo-Dionysius also wrote about ‘these mystical matters’, so that his proposals fit well in the 
context of the tradition as he interprets it. At the same time, Cusanus says that these ‘mystical things’ 
have remained hidden due to a voluntary choice on the part of both Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius: a 
choice which he is implicitly saying is not necessary (any longer). How does he describe this choice 
and the reasons for it? The two thinkers, he says, have ‘prohibited’ (prohibuerunt) the activity of 
                                                          
352 Mystica always has a theological connotation in Cusanus, and is most often used as an adjective: most often in the 
sermons in the set expression corpus mysticum (of Christ, referring to the Church), then in mystica theologia, a crucial 
recurring theme in Cusanus, particularly in the period of the writing of De Beryllo, starting around 1453 (e.g De visione 
Dei, 4a, p. 6, 13; see particularly the Letter of 14 September 1453 to the Tegernsee monks where he discusses mystica 
theologia in detail: VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, pp. 113-117). He also discusses mystica theologia in Sermon CCLVIII 




‘making known’ (propalari) these hidden things to ‘those who were ignorant of intellectual heights’. 
We see again a use of ‘juridical’ language: the two have not only written about these things, or kept 
them hidden themselves, but have ‘issued a ban’ (in effect) to other knowers, prohibiting them from 
making them known to certain people. The ‘political-juridical’ imagery of the previous paragraph 
(iudex, potestas), seems to continue here: Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius, having some type of ‘office’ 
(perhaps as ‘judges’), issued some kind of ‘decree’ (describable as a ‘sententia’) concerning this 
prohibition – and Cusanus, himself a knower of such things, is obviously choosing to disobey (while 
not, at this point, explicitly ‘overturning’ the prohibition, but rather couching his own disobedience in 
terms of explaining what the ‘causa’ was for it353). What, in this extended juridical image, would have 
to be Cusanus’ own ‘authority’ here? The terms used in the first paragraph suggest an answer: everyone 
who uses the ‘modus’ presented in this book becomes iudex and has potestas (power/authority) to 
investigate and draw conclusions concerning every sententia et opinio of the doctissimi, including such 
authorities as Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius (and who, indeed, could plausibly be described by Cusanus 
as more doctus than them?354). Therefore, a reader, when they become such a newly-minted judex, 
would have the authority to evaluate the previous sententiae of other judges and even, implicitly, judge 
them as lacking and formulate new ones. Implicit in this potestas seems to be the power to overrule 
such ‘prohibitions’ as that by Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius – at least Cusanus, obviously a judex himself 
in this image, seems to claim implicitly that he has it and is intent on using it, not abiding by the ‘ban’. 
But is this because some sententiae by both Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius are mistaken? Here, at the 
beginning of the second paragraph, Cusanus feels tasked to explain. 
The nature of the ‘prohibition’ is said to be to not distribute these ‘mystical matters’ to them 
who do not know the ‘intellectual heights’ (elevationes intellectuales). This very interesting expression 
                                                          
353 Note that causa also has a legal meaning: lawsuit, case, trial. The abundance of terms with juridical meaning in these 
first two paragraphs has not been noted before, but adds up to a remarkably coherent image. For more on the juridical 
imagery, see note 338 above. 
354 In De Beryllo these seem to emerge as the ‘first’ and ‘second’ place in the hierarchy, with Aristotle (the only plausible 
competitor) relegated to a lower rung. There is, of course, also a Christological answer to this question, as for any instance 
where one asks about a human ‘maximum’ of some type; cf. Chapter 5. 
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invokes again the intellectus and the image of ‘height’ as describing a hierarchy of things knowable, or 
of theoretical activity (cf. in omnen altitudinem in the previous paragraph). The persons who are not 
subject to the prohibition should therefore already be familiar with these ‘heights’; but if the ‘hidden 
things’ that are the subject of the prohibition include, in fact (taking up the terms of the first paragraph), 
how the intellect can guide itself in ultimo scibilium and how to reach visio (likely intellectualis) in 
omnen altitudinem, this would be, in effect, a universal prohibition against teaching anyone how to 
achieve this (if one does not know already). Cusanus does not seem to understand this ‘prohibition’ as 
having such a large scope. The key word is elevationes, plural, which can be understood not just as «the 
high [objects/domains] that are the object of the intellect», i.e. «intellectual heights»355 but instead as 
«the different heights/levels of the things that are the object of the intellect». In this interpretation, those 
who are under the prohibition are those who do not know the relative ‘height’ of things pertaining to 
the intellectus, i.e. their hierarchy, and, by implication, the exact relationship between intellectus and 
other faculties, notably ratio (cf. the first sentence of paragraph 1). That Cusanus likely means 
something like this is indicated by the second part of the proposition, which offers the actual cause for 
the ‘prohibition’: the fact that nothing would seem (videbuntur) to these people to be more laughable 
(digne risu) that these high things (haec alta). The ones who do not know these elevationes beforehand, 
therefore, will misperceive them as what they are not, i.e. ‘worthy of laughter’—thus, in our 
interpretation, will misjudge their place in the proper hierarchy of elevationes. 
We note that these ‘ignorant’ people see ‘high things’ as if they were ridiculous, thus as if they 
were actually ‘low’ – and they are, as a result, themselves laughable, as they seem (to themselves) to 
be at a different ‘level’ than the (low) one they are actually at. Laughter is implied by Cusanus to be 
associated with a perceived coincidence of high (appearance) and low (reality), which seems to be yet 
another form of the coincidence of opposites. The ‘ignorants’, not making the proper distinctions 
between the levels of elevatio, fail to correctly perceive (videre) a coincidence of opposites, in that (1) 
                                                          
355 This is Jasper Hopkins’ English translation of this term, cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Complete philosophical and theological 
treatises of Nicholas of Cusa, vol. 2, p. 792. 
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they perceive that the things that others (those who would teach them) judge as ‘high’ are actually 
‘low’, and (2) fail to understand that this ‘low appearance’ in fact coincides with the ‘high’ reality, as 
those who are not ignorant about ‘these things’ would know. Thus, the coincidentia oppositorum, the 
main problem that troubled the Tegernsee monks, comes back again as the main problem: people fail 
to correctly grasp it, and see it, as a result, as laughable. Or, in other words, they fail to understand that 
the ‘high’ and the ‘low’ ultimately coincide (and thus believe that the people who take things that appear 
‘low’ as ‘high’ are being ridiculous, while they are in fact closer to the truth of the matter, i.e. the 
coincidence of ‘high’ and ‘low’ in a principium). Cusanus’ method for using the intellectus properly 
and putting into practice the visio intellectualis must overcome this obstacle – which, he implies, Plato 
and Pseudo-Dionysius failed to do, since if they had found a solution they would not have issued the 
‘prohibition’ after all. In his apparent attempt to downplay the ‘novel’ aspect of his work and allay the 
concerns of the tradition-minded reader, Cusanus is subtly asserting this novel character even stronger. 
The way in which Cusanus cites and interprets his sources in this passage is of great interest, as 
it will be paradigmatic for the way he employs his sources in De Beryllo – a subtle and careful approach, 
often consisting in reinterpretation within his own context and always to be understood within his 
overall project in De Beryllo. It also showcases his vision of how to integrate ‘theological’ and 
‘philosophical’ issues in the context of the application of his method. In this paragraph we find two 
explicit references, to Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius, and two non-explicit but recognizable references, 
to 1 Cor. 2:14356 and the beginning of the first book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, I.1.980a22357. We will 
try to reconstitute the argument in the exact way in which Cusanus develops it for the reader, starting 
                                                          
356 1 Cor. 2:14: «animalis autem homo non percipit ea quae sunt Spiritus Dei stultitia est enim illi et non potest intellegere 
quia spiritaliter examinatur». 
357 Cusanus possessed both the William of Moerbeke and the Bessarion translation (which he appears to prefer in De Beryllo) 
of Aristotle’s Metaphysics; the Bessarion translation can be found in ARISTOTLE, Aristoteles Latine interpretibus variis, ed. 
E. Kessler, Berlin 1831, repub. Munich 1995. The passage in question here, the first sentence of the Metaphysics, reads: 
«Omnes homines natura scire desiderant» (ARISTOTLE, Aristoteles Latine, p. 481, 980a22), cf. sciendi desiderio in this 
paragraph. 
There is another similarity/reference to the beginning of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Bessarion’s translation here, which has 
not yet been remarked in the scholarship: the words causa autem, which start the second paragraph of De Beryllo, are used 
in Bessarion’s translation to start the fourth sentence: «causa autem est quod sensuum hic vel maxime nos cognoscere 
quicquam facit, multasque differentias manifestat» (ARISTOTLE, Aristoteles Latine, ibid., 980a26), where the hic refers to 
videre, the sense of sight, and the sentence gives the reason for why videre prae omnibus aliis eligimus in the previous 
sentence. Given the enormous importance of videre/visio in Cusanus’ construction, this can hardly be a coincidence. 
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with the first two references which are presented in parallel with the structure tam ... quam and 
characterized as having the same position on the problem of revealing haec mystica. Then we will see 
how Cusanus presents this position, we will look at the (apparently quite significant) differences 
between the arguments he seems to be referring to in Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius and the position as 
presented by Cusanus, and then try to analyze this position according to the words of Cusanus himself 
in order to understand his argument as to how he claims to overcome the difficulty which caused the 
‘prohibition’ which has been the main topic of this paragraph so far. 
We will start with Plato, for whom Cusanus also offers the source he is citing: the Letters. A 
reader acquainted with them can easily identify that the reference must be to a famous passage of the 
Second Letter, at 314a, where Plato358 urges the addressee of the letter, Dion II of Syracuse, to take 
care never to disclose doctrines (referred to only as ‘these things’ – neuter plural)359 to ‘the many’ i.e. 
those who are ‘not educated’ (εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἀπαιδεύτους)360. The reason offered parallels that given 
by Cusanus in our section: namely that «there are hardly any things, I believe, which sound more 
laughable (καταγελαστότερα) to the many (πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς) when they hear them than these, or, on 
the other hand, [any things that sound] more admirable and inspired to men of fine disposition (πρὸς 
τοὺς εὐφυεῖς θαυμαστότερά τε καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικώτερα)»361. The first argument seems to be that these 
things (ταῦτα, parallel with the haec alta/haec mystica of Cusanus in our section) would be seen as 
ridiculous, which would reflect upon their author – which is therefore the problem and the justification 
for not divulging them, i.e. a matter of the public reputation of philosophers. To argue this, Plato 
                                                          
358 The authenticity of the Second Letter, as that of all seven Platonic Letters, is a widely debated and contentious issue in 
modern scholarship; for a discussion and an overview, see V. WOHL, Plato Avant la Lettre: Authenticity in Plato’s Epistles, 
in «Ramus» 27/1 (1998), pp. 60-93. Cusanus, on the other hand, would have considered it authentic, as no argument against 
this had been presented in his time. 
359 It is striking that in the whole argument from 312e-314c, Plato uses exclusively the neuter plural pronoun ταῦτα, «these 
things», to refer to (what is obviously meant to be) philosophical doctrines, and never gives any matching noun to go with 
it (only verbal participles). While it is unlikely that Cusanus could read Greek at a high level (Casarella has argued 
convincingly against Cusanus’ proficiency in Greek from the lack of marginalia in Greek manuscripts he owned; quoted in 
K. HUDSON, Becoming God: The Doctrine of Theosis in Nicholas of Cusa, Washington D.C. 2007, p. 3, note 7), we note 
that he also does this in our passage. 
360 PLATO, Epistula II, in PLATO, Opera, ed. J. Burnet, Oxford 1907, vol. V, 312d-314c. 
361 εὐλαβοῦ μέντοι μή ποτε ἐκπέσῃ ταῦτα εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἀπαιδεύτους: σχεδὸν γάρ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἔστιν τούτων πρὸς 




recounts a story introduced as «to be marvelled at» (θαυμαστὸν): there are «quite a number of men», 
he says, who have heard Plato himself talk and discussed his doctrines for a long time, even 30 years, 
and their perceptions concerning the things that are «the most probable/convincing (πιστότατα)» have 
changed completely, so that things that seemed the most unlikely/not convincing (ἀπιστότατα) became 
for them the most convincing, and vice versa. So, writes Plato to Dion, «bearing these things in mind, 
take care that you do not repent of these things that you have disclosed recklessly»362. Thus the reason 
for not disclosing ‘these things’ (i.e. the doctrines which seem most convincing to a philosopher at a 
particular time) is a matter of public reputation, in the case that a philosopher does disseminate doctrines 
that not only will seem laughable to ‘the many’ (which appears to be a given in any case), but might 
seem unconvincing to the philosopher himself if he changes opinion later, which is possible even for 
those who «are able to learn» (δυνατοὶ μαθεῖν) and who are obviously meant to be understood as part 
of the «well-disposed» (εὐφυεῖς). Accordingly, the best protection against this, according to Plato, is to 
«not write [about these things], but learn [them] by heart, because there is nothing written that will not 
be disclosed»363. Next, Plato makes the famous claim that this is the reason why he has «never yet 
written anything on these subjects (περὶ τούτων – same neuter plural), and no treatise by Plato exists or 
will exist»364. Earlier in the Second Letter, before discussing «the nature of the First»365, Plato writes 
that he has written in a form such as that «one who is not a knower [already], will not know» (ὁ 
ἀναγνοὺς μὴ γνῷ) in case the letter does not reach the intended destination366. After discussing the need 
to not write doctrines, Plato urges Dion to burn the letter (314c). 
The approach of Pseudo-Dionysius to the same topic appears quite different, formulated as it is 
within a specifically Christian context. Two passages discuss the theme, in De Divinis Nominibus and 
                                                          
362 ὃ δὲ θαυμαστὸν αὐτοῦ γέγονεν, ἄκουσον. εἰσὶν γὰρ ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα ἀκηκοότες καὶ πλείους, δυνατοὶ μὲν μαθεῖν, δυνατοὶ 
δὲ μνημονεῦσαι καὶ βασανίσαντες πάντῃ πάντως κρῖναι, γέροντες ἤδη καὶ οὐκ ἐλάττω τριάκοντα ἐτῶν ἀκηκοότες, οἳ νῦν 
ἄρτι σφίσι φασὶν τὰ μὲν τότε ἀπιστότατα δόξαντα εἶναι νῦν πιστότατα καὶ ἐναργέστατα φαίνεσθαι, ἃ δὲ τότε πιστότατα, 
νῦν τοὐναντίον. πρὸς ταῦτ᾽ οὖν σκοπῶν εὐλαβοῦ μή ποτέ σοι μεταμελήσῃ τῶν νῦν ἀναξίως ἐκπεσόντων (ibid., 314a-b). 
363 μεγίστη δὲ φυλακὴ τὸ μὴ γράφειν ἀλλ᾽ ἐκμανθάνειν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν τὰ γραφέντα μὴ οὐκ ἐκπεσεῖν (ibid., 314b-c). 
364 διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πώποτ᾽ ἐγὼ περὶ τούτων γέγραφα, οὐδ᾽ ἔστιν σύγγραμμα Πλάτωνος οὐδὲν οὐδ᾽ ἔσται, τὰ δὲ νῦν 
λεγόμενα Σωκράτους ἐστὶν καλοῦ καὶ νέου γεγονότος (ibid., 314c). 
365 περὶ τῆς τοῦ πρώτου φύσεως (ibid., 312d). 
366 φραστέον δή σοι δι᾽ αἰνιγμῶν, ἵν᾽ ἄν τι ἡ δέλτος ἢ πόντου ἢ γῆς ἐν πτυχαῖς πάθῃ, ὁ ἀναγνοὺς μὴ γνῷ (ibid., 312d-e) 
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De Mystica Theologia367. As Cusanus does not indicate which in particular he would like to point the 
reader to, one has to examine both368. 
In De Divinis Nominibus, Pseudo-Dionysius, writing to his interlocutor Timothy, argues that 
‘these things’ (αύτά – again a neuter plural) should not be disclosed to the ‘uninitiated’ (τών 
άμύστων)369. The first argument is from tradition (κατά την θείαν παράδοσιν), according to which we 
must preserve these holy things (τα άγια) «from the laughter and jeers (γελώτων καί έμπαιγμών) of the 
uninitiated (τών άμύστων)», also acting to preserve them from (committing the sin of) «fighting against 
God on account of these (της έπΐ τούτω θεομαχίας άπολυτρούμενοι)». These are the only two arguments 
offered here: respecting the Christian tradition of hiding the divine mysteries (an evangelical strand370), 
and protecting ‘those who are bad’ from the sin of fighting against God – i.e. not giving the heretics 
ammunition. 
In De Mystica Theologia (1000A-B), however, the reasons for concealment appear quite 
different371. Here, Pseudo-Dionysius simply writes that one should be careful to «not reveal these things 
to the uninitiated» (Τούτων … μηδεΐς τών άμυήτων έπακούση) since «principles of the divine mysteries 
are beyond [the understanding of] these» (ύπέρ τούτους είσΐν αί θεΐαι μυσταγωγίαι). Very important, 
however, is the description of their mistakes and the way in which these errors can be overcome. 
Pseudo-Dionysius describes two categories of ‘uninitiated’: first, there are those who are «attached to 
                                                          
367 Both found in Codex Cusanus 42, in the translation of William of Moerbeke and Petrus Balbus respectively. 
368 This is another subtle rhetorical device by Cusanus, who undoubtedly knew that the reader familiar with Pseudo-
Dionysius’s works would think of both passages. The ambiguous reference is thus an implicit statement that Cusanus takes 
them to be referring to one and the same thing within the context he is building in De Beryllo. 
369 PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, De divinis nominibus, ed. B. R. Suchla, Berlin – New York 1990, I, 1, 7, 8, 9-15 (597B-C), p. 121:  
ώτα Ιερά ταΐς των Ιερών θεωνυμιών άναπτύξεσι παραθώμεθα τοις άγίοις τα άγια κατά την θείαν παράδοσιν ένιδρύοντες 
καί τών άμύστων αύτά γελώτων καί έμπαιγμών εξαιρούμενοι, μάλλον δε αυτούς έκείνους, είπερ όλως είσΐ τοιοίδε τινές 
άνθρωποι, της έπΐ τούτω θεομαχίας άπολυτρούμενοι. Σοι μεν ούν τα Οτα φυλάξαι χρεών, ώ καλέ Τιμόθεε, κατά την 
ίερωτάτην υφήγησιν καί μήτε τά μήτε εκφορά τά θεία ποιειν εις τούς άμυήτους. 
370 Cf. Matt. 7:6: «Nolite dare sanctum canibus: neque mittatis margaritas vestras ante porcos, ne forte conculcent eas 
pedibus suis, et conversi dirumpant vos». 
371 PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, De mystica theologia, in Corpus Dionysiacum, vol. II, ed. G. Heil – A. M. Ritter, Berlin – New 
York 1991, 1000A-B, p. 142, 12-16 – 143, 7: Τούτων δέ δρα, όπως μηδεΐς τών άμυήτων έπακούση" τούτους δέ φημι τους 
έν τοις ούσιν ένισχημένους και ουδέν ϋπέρ τά όντα ΰπερουσίως είναι φανταζομένους, άλλ’ οίομένους εΐδέναι τή καθ’ 
αυτούς γνώσει τόν θέμενον «σκότος άποκρυφήν αϋτοϋ». Εί δέ ύπέρ τούτους είσΐν αί θεΐαι μυσταγωγίαι, τί άν τις φαίη περί 
τών μάλλον άμύστων, όσοι την πάντων ύπερκειμένην αίτίαν και έκ των έν τοις ουσιν εσχάτων χαρακτηρίζουσιν και ουδέν 
αϋτήν ύπερέχειν φασϊ των πλαττομένων αύτοΐς άθεων και πολυειδών μορφωμάτων; Δέον έπ’ αύτη και πάσας τάς των όντων 
τιθέναι και καταφάσκειν θέσεις, ώς πάντων αιτία, και πάσας αύτάς κυριώτερον άποφάσκειν, ώς ύπέρ πάντα ύπερούση, και 
μή οΐεσθαι τάς άποφάσεις άντικειμένας είναι ταΐς καταφάσεσιν, άλλά πολύ πρότερον αϋτήν υπέρ τάς στερήσεις είναι τήν 
ύπέρ πάσαν και άφαίρεσιν και θέσιν. 
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the [various] beings (έν τοις ούσιν ένισχημένους), and who believe there is no superessential Reality 
beyond (ουδέν ϋπέρ τά όντα ΰπερουσίως είναι), and who imagine that by their own understanding they 
know (εΐδέναι τή καθ’ αυτούς γνώσει τόν θέμενον) It that has made darkness Its secret place».  
 Then, the other category of ‘uninitiated’ are «others still more uninitiated (τών μάλλον 
άμύστων), who describe the transcendental First Cause of all (την πάντων ύπερκειμένην αίτίαν) by 
characteristics drawn from the lowest order of beings, while they deny that it is in any way above (ουδέν 
αϋτήν ύπερέχειν φασϊ) the images which they fashion after various designs». Interestingly, Pseudo-
Dionysius appears to offer a way, even a ‘methodology’, to correct their error, which appears very 
amenable to a Cusanian interpretation: «they should affirm (καταφάσκειν) that, while it possesses all 
the positive attributes of all beings (πάσας τάς των όντων τιθέναι … θέσεις) (being the Cause of all), 
yet, in a more strict sense (or ‘a more powerful/important/valuable way’ – κυριώτερον), [they should] 
deny of it all things (πάσας αύτάς … άποφάσκειν), since it is above them all (ώς ύπέρ πάντα 
ύπερούση)». This crucial passage thus appears to describe a movement from ‘positive’ to ‘negative’ 
theology; however, this is not to be understood as two separate steps, but they are somehow to be 
conjoined—which Cusanus would be likely to interpret as an instance of coincidentia oppositorum—
because Pseudo-Dionysius goes on to say immediately that one should not think that «the affirmations 
and the negations are contradictories» (μή οΐεσθαι τάς άποφάσεις άντικειμένας είναι ταΐς 
καταφάσεσιν), not because they are not to be understood as affirmed together (indeed they are, 
otherwise he would not add this clause) but rather «inasmuch as it much precedes all forms of 
deprivation (πρότερον αϋτήν υπέρ τάς στερήσεις είναι), being beyond all positive and negative 
determinations alike (τήν ύπέρ πάσαν και άφαίρεσιν και θέσιν)». Thus, the problem of the ‘uninitiated’, 
Cusanus would argue here, must be that they do not grasp these arguments—which, as we will see, are 
structurally similar to the core of Cusanus’ method. 
These passages from Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius seem not to have much in common at first 
glance, but it is not hard to see how they would be interpreted as pointing to the same underlying cause 
of the ‘prohibition’, as Cusanus seems to see them. It is more difficult to bring together the arguments 
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in Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius which invoke, for the former, the reputation of the philosopher (and 
philosophy itself), and for the other the possibility of using the arguments ‘against God’. However, 
Cusanus does seem to implicitly claim that these can be brought together. 
We will analyze what Cusanus says in the continuation of the paragraph, as he is put in the 
situation of having to explain to the skeptical reader why Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius have ‘prohibited’ 
that these ‘mystical matters’ should be disclosed to the uninitiated, and why Cusanus will not respect 
their ‘prohibition’. As Cusanus says, it is because ‘those human beings’ (named with a pronoun 
connoting greater distance, illi) will see (videbuntur, with the deponent verb in the future tense, 
indicating a very likely consequence of the ‘revelation’ to them of these ‘high things’) such things as 
the most ‘worthy of laughter’. So far, Cusanus seems to follow the argument of Plato even at the 
sentence level, reproducing its fundamental structure: the indirect construction with the superlative, i.e. 
saying illi will not see ‘anything more laughable that these higher things’. The common theme tying 
together the passages referred to in Pseudo-Dionysius and Plato and Cusanus’ reinterpretation of them 
appears to be that of laughter. But why, exactly, will these things seem ‘worthy of laughter’? We can 
indeed reach an answer on this, at least in the context of Cusanus’ construction. While Cusanus does 
not himself say anything explicit about this matter (i.e. what causes laughter, on an ontological level), 
looking at the nature and characteristics of the visio intellectualis and those things pertain to the intellect 
in general in Cusanus’ vision, we can identify the key constant element as being the coincidence of 
opposites—which seems to be fundamentally connected with what causes these doctrines to appear 
‘laughable’ to some372. 
                                                          
372 Cusanus himself offers powerful confirmation that coincidentia oppositorum must indeed be the crucial element here: a 
few years earlier, in the Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae (1449, written as a defense against Johannes Wenck’s scholastic-
Aristotelian attack on De Docta Ignorantia), Cusanus gave an extended argument about this ‘need for secrecy’ that has 
striking similarities to what he offers here in De Beryllo: Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae, 7, p. 5, 16 – 6, 12: «Si quis graviores 
prisci temporis sapientes attendit, comperit magno studio praecavisse, ne mystica ad indoctorum manus pervenirent. Sic 
Hermetem Trismegistum Aesculapio atque Ariopagitam Dionysium Timotheo praecepisse legimus, quod et Christum 
nostrum docuisse scimus; inhibuit enim margaritam, quam regnum Dei figurat, ante porcos proici, in quibus non est 
intellectus. Sic Paulus ea, quae ab hoc mundo raptus in tertium intellectibile caelum vidit, dicit revelari non licere. Undique 
unica huius causa existit; nam ubi non capitur, ibi non solum non fert fructum vitae, sed vilipenditur et mortem inducit. 
Maxime autem cavendum monuerunt, ne secretum communicaretur ligatis mentibus per auctoritatem inveteratae 
consuetudinis. Nam tanta est vis longaevae observantiae, quod citius vita multorum evellitur quam consuetudo, uti 
experimur in persecutione Iudaeorum, Sarracenorum et aliorum pertinacium haereticorum, qui opinionem usu temporis 
firmatam legem asserunt, quam vitae praeponunt. Unde, cum nunc Aristotelica secta praevaleat, quae haeresim putat esse 
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It should be noted particularly that the ‘coincidence of opposites’ is the only identifiable element 
of the method that has been mentioned so far (beyond the general non-specific references to the visio 
intellectualis and speculum et aenigma, which at this point do not have definite content for a reader 
unfamiliar with his previous works). If Cusanus is aiming to offer to the reader who is ‘uninitiated’ a 
way to reach the visio intellectualis, it must be highly important that the only identifiable feature 
associated with the modus / visio / conceptus so far has been the coincidence of opposites – which 
seems to be a perfectly fitting explanation for why, in the second paragraph, the ‘high things’ are seen 
as ridiculous by some people. Indeed, the claim of an object with contradictory properties can appear 
ridiculous. According to Cusanus, however, this is ultimately a problem of ‘vision’ and of imperfect 
vision (appearances) that must be overcome, as testified by his repeated use of the verb videre in all 
senses. Cusanus is carefully building a rhetorical structure directed at every step towards persuading 
the reader of the fact, in the end, ‘anything to be investigated’ is a matter of correct visio, and Cusanus’ 
book offers the ‘lens’, or ‘eyeglass’, to help with that. 
If we can identify the theme of coincidence of opposites as the primary reason for the ridiculous 
character of haec alta, we can identify the common thread between the account of Plato and Pseudo-
Dionysius. Following this interpretive thread (suggested by Cusanus’ construction), we would say that 
in both passages by Pseudo-Dionysius, we can identify the presence of a type of coincidence of 
opposites when it comes to naming God, close to and in the same context as the passages in which 
Pseudo-Dionysius formulates the ‘prohibition’. In De Divinis Nominibus, this is part of an introductory 
argument which puts emphasis in various forms on the paradoxical nature of language covering God, 
                                                          
oppositorum coincidentiam, in cuius admissione est initium ascensus in mysticam theologiam, in ea secta nutritis haec via 
penitus insipida quasi propositi contraria ab eis procul pellitur, ut sit miraculo simile – sicuti sectae mutatio – reiecto 
Aristotele eos altius transilire»; cf. ibid., 30, p. 20, 16 – p. 21, 4. Here Cusanus (speaking as a character in the dramatic 
‘dialogue’ with the first-person narrator who is one of his disciples) gives a clear answer to the question of why to keep 
away mystica from the hands of the indocti: namely the unica causa is that their ‘minds are bound by the authority of 
inveterate habit’ on the matter of the coincidentia oppositorum: they take it to be ‘heresy’ because of the current dominance 
of the ‘Aristotelian sect’ (cum nunc Aristotelica secta praevaleat); yet ‘only in admitting [the coincidentia] is to be found 
the start of the ascent to mystical theology (ascensus in mysticam theologiam)’; but to those bound by habit to ‘Aristotelian’ 
thinking, this way appears penitus insipida. The parallels to our passage in De Beryllo are clear and obvious. However, 
Cusanus is implying here that this ‘prohibition’ is not the end-all, but that he seems to have found a way around the problem 
it is meant to address. 
113 
 
whereas in De Mystica Theologia, as we have seen, (what appears to be) the coincidence of opposites 
is made into a methodological principle in the same paragraph. It is more difficult to find in Plato’s 
Second Letter any reference to a kind of coincidence of opposites, but it would seem that Cusanus is 
seeing a sign of it in the ‘story’ reported by Plato that people capable of philosophical speculation (and 
thus not disqualified as ‘the many’) can completely change their views on which doctrines seem the 
most plausible/convincing or unconvincing. Cusanus would appear to see here a sign not that 
philosophers change their doctrines (in which case they still avoid contradiction) but rather a hint that, 
when examining the highest matters, one inevitably encounters contradictory statements, i.e. the 
coincidence of opposites. In this interpretation, Plato is indeed applying his own advice of concealing 
his true subject matter, so that he avoids mentioning the coincidentia oppositorum explicitly for exactly 
the same reason why philosophers should not write, and instead ‘talk in riddles’ (φραστέον δή σοι δι 
αἰνιγμῶν373 – the Greek word that is the root of aenigma). This interpretation, in which Plato is 
deliberately (and successfully) hiding a doctrine of the coincidence of opposites in the Second Letter, 
might seem a stretch to a modern scholar used to the ‘standard’ interpretations of Plato’s thought, but 
it fits perfectly with how Cusanus would have seen it, given his views on the nature of intellectus and 
visio intellectualis, as we will see later. It is likely that Cusanus had this type of interpretation in mind 
in quoting Plato here—which connects, by the guiding thread of the coincidentia oppositorum, Plato, 
Pseudo-Dionysius’ theological remarks, and Cusanus’ own conception. Therefore, Cusanus’ message 
is that in the past, the coincidence of opposites has made ‘these high things’/’these sacred things’ 
difficult to accept or teach, as they seemed objects of laughter to most, resulting in the ‘prohibition’ by 
both Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius on ‘disclosing’ them—and yet, Cusanus himself is also implicitly 
claiming he has found a new solution to mitigate this. 
 
Animalis homo enim haec divina non percipit, sed exercitatum habentibus in his intellectum nihil 
desiderabilius occurret. (De Beryllo, 2, p. 4, 4-6) 
                                                          




In this passage, Cusanus continues by structuring a parallelism between «animalis homo» and 
«(homo) habens intellectum exercitatum in his», following the structure of the Platonic passage 
examined with the contrast between (revealing things to) «τοὺς πολλοὺς» (‘the many’) and «τοὺς 
εὐφυεῖς» (‘the well-disposed’). We see immediately that in his choice to ‘adapt’ the parallelism in Plato, 
Cusanus seems to offer, implicitly, a clarification and even a solution to the situation presented by 
Plato: the ones who are ‘well-disposed’ according to Plato are simply those who have their intellect 
‘exercised in these things’ (again a plural, continuing the theme of haec alta, haec mystica, and indeed 
the neuter plural that we have seen both Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius use). The situation is much more 
‘optimistic’, therefore, than in Plato’s account: there is simply a need to exercise the intellect, something 
which appears to be a basic faculty that all people can be assumed to possess; as Cusanus presents it, 
the deficiency does not seem to be one of nature, or one that cannot be, in principle, solved. Evidently, 
it is no coincidence that Cusanus is promising to offer praxis. Cusanus also describes it at the same 
time as a deficiency in ‘perception’ (non percipit), which ties again together the intellectus and some 
type of perception, which brings us back to the visio intellectualis. 
 At the same time, beside all this, the first part of the sentence is quoting and adapting 1 Cor 
2:14: «animalis autem homo non percipit ea quae sunt Spiritus Dei stultitia est enim illi et non potest 
intellegere quia spiritaliter examinatur» – a passage that someone familiar with the New Testament 
would recognize. This close juxtaposition between a clearly Platonic formulation and an explicitly 
Christian one is remarkable, and highly typical, as we will see, for the synthesis Cusanus offers in this 
work between what we would call ‘philosophy’ and ‘theology’. Let us parse which elements correspond 
to which if we are to understand these references in the same context, as Cusanus intends: haec divina 
must correspond implicitly with ea quae sunt Spiritus Dei in the full Pauline quote, bringing us into the 
realm of Trinitarian theology. Then, if we go one verse further, in 1 Corinthians 2:15, we suddenly 
encounter a familiar ‘judicial’ image: spiritalis <homo> judicat autem omnia et ipse a nemine 
iudicatur. There is a highly plausible connection to be made between the second element in the Pauline 
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parallel structure between animalis homo and spiritalis homo, who iudicat omnia, and the iudex which 
the reader is supposed to become according to the first paragraph of De Beryllo. This small ‘puzzle’ 
that Cusanus seems to have left behind for anyone who was willing to examine the texts he cites makes 
a connection (indeed, a possible identification) between the Apostle’s examinare spiritaliter and the 
type of investigation of quaequae indaganda that Cusanus says is possible with the modus that De 
Beryllo offers. 
We also see that the explanation for the ‘laughable’ appearance of haec alta is put here in terms 
of the lack of perception: such a person non percipit374. This is an important specification for the model 
Cusanus is building up: the problem is not only the fact that the doctrines seem to be wrong or 
ridiculous, likely because of featuring in some way the coincidence of opposites, as we conjectured. 
Instead, here these ‘things’ are described as not being ‘perceived’ at all. How can we explain this 
apparent paradox: haec ... not percipit, but also haec ... risu dignes videtur? In light of Cusanus playing 
with duality and hinting constantly at ‘coincidences of opposites’, we should resist the temptation of 
concluding that the referent of haec must have changed375. Instead, what we have here is an account of 
an essential aspect of the method that Cusanus is proposing: the visio intellectualis as something 
experiential, a type of ‘perception’. Without this experience, certain doctrines seem ridiculous, but if 
one has this ‘perception’ (i.e. visio intellectualis), one is in the situation of the person with intellectus 
exercitatus in ‘these things’376. This experienced person, having had the (correct) perception of these 
‘divine things’, does not see ‘anything more desirable (desiderabilius)’ – but more than what exactly? 
The missing words should be ‘quam his’ (‘than these things’)—or we could look at the first part of the 
parallel structure on the assumption that the missing words would correspond with the element present 
there, which is percipit. In this second reading, the missing implied words would be «quam [haec 
                                                          
374 It seems clear that the ‘haec divina’, from Cusanus’ uses of these words together in the same context with the same 
grammatical properties, must be the meant as the same thing as haec alta and haec mystica, which is not an unimportant 
result itself. 
375 This would be a very difficult interpretive approach here, as there is no noun that is a referent for haec to begin with. 
376 his is again a plural neuter pronoun of no clear referent. It could mean here an impersonal ‘these things/matters we are 
talking about here’, but it also calls up the haec which has been recurring in this section. 
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divina] percipere» – «than perceiving these [divine/high/mystical] things». As Cusanus, as we have 
seen, emphasizes ‘perception’ of ‘these things’ and not just the «haec» themselves, the second reading 
in fact seems more likely, completing the parallelism beautifully, fitting with Cusanus’ construction 
throughout and asserting the supreme desirability not only of ‘divine things’ in general, but of the 
‘perception’ of them, for which visio intellectualis is the solution. The perception of desirability, 
however, is conditioned by this special kind of perception itself – those with their intellect not 
‘exercised in these things’ are not aware even that these things are desirable, but they see haec as 
something ridiculous, precisely because they do not perceive their true nature. Optimistically, all that 
is missing seems to be a certain ‘training’ of the intellectus. 
Therefore, we see that at the same time as Cusanus proclaims the universality of quisque who 
is able to use his method, there are very important qualifications introduced in the second paragraph 
concerning the conditions of possibility for becoming iudex and actualizing, one may say, one’s 
potestas—qualifications which do not, however, contradict the ambitious promises of the first 
paragraph. We also see here, as we have examined, in an implicit and structural manner377, the leitmotif 
of coincidentia oppositorum, Here, after two paragraphs, we have a construction some of whose details 
appear paradoxical: at the same time, one can solve all the theoretical issues (omnia indaganda), but 
the use of the intellectus, required for this, is caught in a ‘Catch-22’ type of situation, being only 
accessible to those who already have an intellect ‘experienced in these things’. And furthermore, man 
can be homo animalis, but after some specific type of exercise of the faculties the homo animalis already 
presumably has, the same man can perceive ‘divine things’. Cusanus’ anthropology, as we may expect 
from it being built according to the method he is describing, contains striking and notable paradoxes, 
but also a fundamental optimism, built on and arising from its interesting theoretical features. 
 
Si igitur tibi prima facie haec insipida deliramenta videbuntur, scias te deficere. (2, p. 4, 6-7) 
                                                          
377 E.g. in the continuation of one of the referenced passages in De Mystica Theologia, or in the various subtle ‘dual’ 




With igitur and the switch to the use of direct address to the reader in the second person, Cusanus 
signals the application of the foregoing considerations to the case of the particular reader. We should 
remember that Cusanus still has not explained and justified how he can ignore, or even ‘overrule’, the 
‘prohibition’ by Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius against revealing haec alta, his apparent goal from the 
start of the paragraph. 
What can one say about the generic reader Cusanus seems to have in mind? It seems it is 
possible that the reader is in the category of animalis homo and cannot perceive ‘divine things’, and 
doctrines advocating coincidentia oppositorum still seem ridiculous to him or her, being ignorant of the 
intellectual elevationes. We can assume this is the ‘worst case scenario’ taken into account for his 
purposes378. 
The terms and qualifications that Cusanus uses here are crucial. Keeping to the theme of ‘visio’ 
with the verb (videbuntur), also keeping the reference to ‘these things’ (haec), Cusanus includes the 
term ‘prima facie’, ‘at first glance’. There is a very important addition, because it indicates to the reader 
that it is a situation that only occurs at the beginning, implicitly changeable through a more in-depth 
study of the ‘things’ in question. 
The expression qualifying the haec is also different from before: deliramenta (‘absurdity’, 
literally ‘things produced by delirium’) with the adjective insipida (‘vapid’, literally ‘without flavor’). 
Thus, a characterization that would apply to doctrines (‘produced by delirium’) is combined with one 
relating to a type of perception, i.e. taste. We have again a conjunction of two things of apparently 
different natures: doctrines and perception, which ‘coincide’ in the act of predication; another 
structurally recurrent pattern. The interesting implication comes if we think that these two ‘conditions’ 
                                                          
378 One must not, however, forget the rhetorical (but also in an undeniable connection with Christian and monastic ethos) 
dictates of modesty that, in particular, the Tegernsee monks employ constantly in their correspondence with Cusanus. A 
typical example, from a letter by Aindorffer to Cusanus before March 18, 1454: «Quia mea scripta, quamvis inculta, vestre 
r[everendissimo] p[ater] grata fuere, dignacio permaxima est; michi vero de mea ruditate confusionis rubor» (cf. 
VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, pp. 128-129). Thus it may be the case that Cusanus assumes that any Christian reader would 
(or should) identify themselves in this ‘lowest’ category, no matter how ‘experienced’ they are in such speculations – or 
even that, in a display of Christian modesty, Cusanus would be willing to place himself there as well. 
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might be separable: even things that seem ‘delirious’ (perhaps because they manifest the coincidence 
of opposites) might not be ‘insipid’ but have ‘taste’, or even lead to visio intellectualis, when ‘seen’ by 
a person with a properly exercised intellect. The worst-case scenario is the one in which the doctrines 
seem ‘delirious’ and at the same time a certain perception is missing. 
We must also point out the parallel between the word facies in the expression «prima facies» 
and the very important passage from 1 Cor. 13:12379, the passage mentioning the «speculum et 
aenigma» to which Cusanus has already clearly referred. In the context of the visio, and particularly in 
that of the haec divina (implicitly identified, between parallelism with the passage from 1 Cor 2:14 just 
introduced, with the ‘things of the Spirit’), the ‘face’ has a significance that cannot be ignored. If 
Cusanus has thought about this implicit reference, this would be a progression from the «prima facie» 
all the way to the vision ‘facias ad faciem’, of the face of God, in the next world. But this remains a 
speculative and indirect connection. 
What does Cusanus say to the reader who happens to be in this ‘worst-case’ situation? That they 
should «know that they are deficient / that they are lacking something» - with the subjunctive of 
command combined with a subjunctive required for the subclause, in an interesting parallelism with 
the passage from the first paragraph where Cusanus addresses the reader directly in the second person 
– «ut judex fias». Cusanus does not abandon the reader who finds themselves in such a position, but 
aims to offer a solution to the reader’s problem. He has just characterized this problem as only an 
artifact of the lack of (a specific type of) intellectual exercise, so that the ‘prima facie’ situation is 
solvable. If the reader becomes aware ‘that something is missing’, following Cusanus’s instructions, 
being persuaded by the whole theoretical framework developed so far by Cusanus and his promises, 
they would find themselves implicitly on the right path. 
Et hoc si aliquantulum maximo sciendi desiderio continuaveris meditationes et praxim ab aliquo, qui 
tibi aenigma declaret, acceperis, eo pervenies quod nihil huic luci antepones et intellectualem 
thesaurum repperisse gaudebis; et hoc paucissimis diebus experieris. (De Beryllo, 2, p. 4, 7 – p. 5, 11) 
                                                          
379 1 Cor. 13:12: «Videmus nunc per speculum in ænigmate: tunc autem facie ad faciem. Nunc cognosco ex parte: tunc 




This sentence continues with the ‘remedy’ proposed by Cusanus for the ‘worst case’ condition 
of the hypothetical reader. He is offering the steps that the ‘bad’ reader should follow, in a conditional 
structure (si + Subjunctive imperfect + future).  
Cusanus’ ‘prescription’ is twofold: first, to «continue ones’ meditationes380 in this thing (hoc) 
for some more time (aliquantulum)», with «the greatest desire to know (maximo sciendi desiderio)». 
Here, Cusanus includes something that may be an allusion to the beginning of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 
which will play an important role later in De Beryllo, namely the first words: Omnes homines natura 
scire desiderant381.  
Second, the reader should «accept praxis from another, who would explain to you an aenigma». 
The most obvious interpretation of this passage is that Cusanus is referring, by ‘another’, to himself 
offering the book to the reader; thus, he would be referring to himself in the third person by an indefinite 
pronoun. We can see a clear and highly interesting parallel with an important passage in the 1453 
Sermon CXXVI (Tu es Petrus), which we previously examined above (Chapter 3.1.d). There, Cusanus 
constructed the image of Christ as a small stone, «transparent and clear», possessing all the powers of 
all particular stones382, and which, as its power would not be known (non foret cognita), it would be 
«deemed as nothing» (pro nihil haberetur) and «would be spurned as a stumbling stone»383 (cf. 1 Pet. 
2), unless «if someone were to believe (quis crederet) some great and most learned teacher (alicui 
magno et doctissimo magistro), who showed the stone (ostenderet calculum) and announced its power 
(annuntiaret virtutem eius), [the one who believed him], after he (ille) believed, would see that [the 
                                                          
380 meditatio is a rare term in Cusanus, used only 36 times in the whole corpus, with over half of these uses found in the 
sermons. In its use in his speculative works, it is applied both to intellectual exercise in specifically religious contexts, and 
as meaning ‘intellectual examination’ of a philosophical problem. Senger/Bormann, in their note ad locum, offer references 
to HUGH OF ST. VICTOR, De modo dicendi et meditandi, 8, PL 176, 879A: «Meditatio est assidua ac sagax retractatio 
cogitationis, aliquid obscurum explicare nitens, vel scrutans penetrare occultum», and RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR, Beniamin 
maior, I, 4, PL 196, 67D: «meditatio vero est studiosa mentis intentio circa aliquid investigandum diligenter insistens, vel 
sic: Meditatio est providens animi obtutus in veritatis inquisitione vehementer occupatus», which support the contention 
that the term means simply ‘strenuous intellectual effort’. 
381 ARISTOTLE, Aristoteles Latine, p. 481 (980a22). 
382 Sermon CXXVI, 11, p. 26, 1-4: «Considera igitur, si foret calculus parvus candidus seu lucidus, qui haberet in se 
complicite omnem omnium lapidum pretiosorum virtutem». 




stone] is indeed such (reperiret ita esse), and would place it above all the stones (super omnes lapides), 
in Zion»384. The parallel fits to a high degree, which leads to an interesting interpretation, as in the 
sermon Cusanus constructs the image in explicitly Christological terms. The aenigma (which is likely 
meant to be the beryllus, the main aenigma of the book) matches, fittingly, with the Christological 
lapis, while the magister magnus and doctissimus would have to be Cusanus himself385. While he would 
certainly not describe himself directly in such terms, it would be an apt description of him according to 
the argument he outlines. 
We will now analyze the second part of the conditional structure, describing the result the reader 
can expect. From the recurring structure of the second paragraph, we can expect that Cusanus will 
provide two elements, one that broadly stands for the ‘philosophical’ and one for the ‘theological’ 
aspect—and indeed the pattern is found as expected. First, the clause itself is composed of two parts, 
and the first, «eo pervenies quod», has the role of introducing the second. Let us analyze this structure 
chosen by Cusanus. The result is described as if it were a ‘place’, i.e. ‘you will reach this point’; 
therefore, a ‘movement’ of some sort will need to happen for the reader. This suggests that the 
meditationes and praxis have as their purpose this ‘movement’ by the reader to the point at which the 
two ‘results’ will be achieved. Implicitly we have a description of a ‘place’ where one must ‘arrive’, in 
a way that conditions the results and which must be connected to the overall visio paradigm. This is 
confirmed by the first of the two ‘results’, which not only uses the image of light, lux, but at the same 
time places it in a context of a ‘geometric’ image of vision: ‘you will not put anything in front of this 
light’—in a literal sense suggesting that the ‘light’ might be blocked by other things in front of it, and 
that the reader must ‘move to’ a particular point of vantage. 
                                                          
384 Sermon CXXVI, 11, p. 26, 6-11: «Sed si quis crederet alicui magno et doctissimo magistro, qui ostenderet calculum et 
annuntiaret virtutem eius, ille postquam crederet, reperiret ita esse. Talis poneret lapidem illum super omnes lapides in 
Sion». Cf. Rm. 9:33, I Pt. 2:6. 
385 Or it could be Pseudo-Dionysius, who was just described as magnus and is certainly among the doctissimi. One could 
reasonably interpret it as ‘whichever teacher’ who would show the reader an aenigma (which does not necessarily have to 
be the beryllus). 
121 
 
In this subtle and complex image, there are a number of fertile ambiguities in the words chosen 
by Cusanus—particularly in the meaning of the verb antepones. The verb means, in its primary and 
etymological sense, ‘to put (something) before (something else)’ (ante + ponere). At the same time, it 
has a secondary meaning of ‘valuing something more than something else’—which seems to be the 
primary meaning in play here386. Both meanings work perfectly in the context: neither will the reader 
‘put something in front of this light’ (blocking his vision), nor will he ‘value anything more that this 
light’—another piece of evidence for the complexity and subtlety of his approach to the construction 
of the text. 
What is ‘this light’ though? hic lux is a new and surprising term, given the pervasive use of the 
neuter plural haec in the paragraph. Of course, light as knowledge is an important image for the 
Neoplatonic tradition, which Cusanus uses extensively387, and we expect it to serve as the counterpart 
to visio intellectualis. Rhetorically, the sudden appearance of ‘this light’ in the paragraph, never 
introduced but treated grammatically as if it had already been introduced (huic), evokes a surprising, 
unpredictable manifestation—not a mere static object for visio. This hints at a fundamental aspect of 
the epistemological-theological construction which will later become clearer: namely, that such a visio 
is only made possible by the active participation of its object, God.  
 
intellectualem thesaurum reperisse gaudebis (De Beryllo, 2, p. 5, 10) 
 
Let us examine the Biblical sources this expression calls on. Two passages appear to be 
particularly salient388: one of them is Matt. 13:44, a highly recognizable occurrence of ‘gaudium’ in 
                                                          
386 Other meanings include ‘to put something in front of someone’ (e.g. as an object of attention). 
387 See e.g. Katrin Platzer’s excellent and thorough account of Cusanus’ light symbolism and light metaphysics, involving 
both the theoretical and the optical tradition: PLATZER, Symbolica venatio, pp. 127-194. 
388 There are other recurring themes in the New Testament involving thesaurus: thesaurus in caelis and thesaurus in vasis 
fictilibus, which, however, do not seem particularly relevant here. 
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conjunction with ‘thesaurus’, and another, Col. 2:3, for the association of thesaurus and knowledge 
(Col. 2:3)389. 
Matt 13:44: Simile est regnum cælorum thesauro abscondito in agro: quem qui invenit homo, abscondit, 
et præ gaudio illius vadit, et vendit universa quæ habet, et emit agrum illum. 
 
Cusanus clearly wants us to think of this parable, where Christ assimilates the regnum 
caelorum390 to a «treasure hidden in a field». This treasure, hidden and buried, is discovered by someone 
who then hides again, and «for joy» sells everything he has (universa quae habet) and buys that field. 
The situation described has highly interesting characteristics. For example, the one who find the 
treasure hides it again (as presumably it could not be taken away from the field) and takes advantage 
of the fact that he knows that the field is much more valuable than it seems, containing the hidden 
treasure. Seeing an opportunity, one might say, for a great deal, and assessing the relative value of his 
possessions and the risk involved (thus not forgetting to ‘hide’ the treasure again), he sells all his 
possessions and buys the field, thus gaining a lot more for his investment. This parable has an interesting 
aspect in the fact that the basic assumption is that the treasure is finite and exclusive, and only one 
person can have it and enjoy it; the landowner is unaware, and thus the main character must convince 
the landowner to sell the land at a lower price than its real value, taking advantage of the landowner’s 
ignorance of the treasure to get the land and the treasure for himself. This is obviously not the type of 
‘treasure’ that the parable is ultimately trying to point to. For instance, if the treasure were not a finite, 
exhaustible, exclusive resource (take, for instance, a life-giving spring), the ending of the parable would 
be very different: the finder would not have to hide it, but could give everyone the ‘good news’ about 
the treasure and where it was.  
This parable is particularly interesting because the problem of ‘hiding the treasure’ is clearly 
similar to the problem of ‘hiding’ the haec alta/mystica in Cusanus’ second paragraph. What can this 
                                                          
389 Corrieras also notes this connection, cf. CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl, Tome 2, p. 14. 
390 The ‘kingdom of heaven’, a fundamental theme describing Christian salvation, is an expression Cusanus uses often but 
almost exclusively in the sermons. 
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choice by Cusanus to refer to this parable mean, in the context of an implicit parallel, as we have seen, 
with Plato’s Second Letter? 
One aspect is clear: Cusanus implicitly has found the thesaurus391 himself (otherwise he would 
not be instructing the reader about it), and has chosen not to hide it but reveal it to others. He is willing 
to give directions for the reader to «get there», eo pervenire, even if the reader at the beginning is 
skeptical about the possibility of finding such a treasure and unable to do so himself. It is clear that this 
‘treasure’ must be not an exhaustible resource but something that can be shared without diminishing. 
Let us analyze the second Biblical passage which Cusanus’ ‘solution’ seems to point to, i.e. 
certain verses of Paul’s Epistle to the Colossians, where we find together a number of key terms that 
Cusanus has just invoked: intellectus, thesaurus, mysterium and related terms: absconditum, divitia.  
Col. 2:2 ut consolentur corda ipsorum, instructi in caritate, et in omnes divitias plenitudinis intellectus, 
in agnitionem mysterii Dei Patris et Christi Jesu 
Col. 2:3 in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiæ et scientiæ absconditi. 
 
In these gospel passages we find thesaurus used in the plural, qualified with a genitive: ‘of 
wisdom’ and ‘of knowledge’, and described as hidden either in Christ himself, or in the mysterium of 
God the Father and Christ. The image of ‘hidden treasures’ suggests a deliberate parallel with Matt. 
13:44, where the ‘thesaurus’ was the regnum caelorum392. But the most interesting part for the reader 
of paragraph 2 of De Beryllo must be the fact that we find here the word intellectus used in an interesting 
way: Paul writes that he would want the Colossians to be «instructed in all the riches of the fullness of 
intellectus», which is paralleled (as if it was one of two similar things, or indeed it meant the same 
                                                          
391 The word thesaurus is used quite often by Cusanus (198 occurences in the corpus), mostly in direct reference to the New 
Testament passages. In De Beryllo it occurs only twice, here and in 53, p. 61, 17-18, where it fits well with our interpretation 
here: «sicut plus gaudet, qui reperit thesaurum vitae suae innumerabilem et inexhauribilem quam numerabilem et 
consumptibilem» - thus, Cusanus does seem to have in mind an interpretation based on the notion of an infinite treasure.  
There is also an interesting occurrence of thesaurum in De Visione Dei which clearly refers to the Matthew parable as well, 
here connecting the (knowledge of one’s) ignorance of God’s magnitude as pascentia desiderabilissima for the intellectus, 
and this ignorantia is in fact the ‘treasure’ which he posseses ‘in his field’: De visione Dei, 67, p. 56, 12-15: «Hinc haec 
sacratissima ignorantia magnitudinis tuae est pascentia intellectus mei desiderabilissima, maxime quando talem reperio 
thesaurum in meo agro, ita quod thesaurus sit meus». 
392 This thematic connection might be interpreted as a reference to the Incarnation, where agrum and thesaurus would refer 
to the two natures of Christ, or in a more general way, the spirit and the body, or human being, also cf. 2 Cor. 4:7: «Habemus 
autem Thesaurum istum in vasis fictilibus». However, this is a highly speculative reading without additional evidence to 
back it up. We only note that it would be consonant with Cusanus’ emerging Christology in De Beryllo and with the ‘dual 
nature’ of the beryllus stone in the tradition as we have examined it, etc. 
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thing) with the agnitio mysterii of God the Father and Christ393. In the context of how Cusanus uses 
intellectus as a special term, interpreting this passage with this meaning fits perfectly within Cusanus’ 
argument, and thus appears to back up Cusanus’ view, as well as assert a fundamental connection, if 
not identity, of the ‘richness of the intellect’ with the ‘knowledge of the mysteries’ of the persons of 
the Trinity. By this textual connection, Cusanus implicitly casts himself, like Paul, in an evangelizing 
role—something that, again, Cusanus does not admit to in explicit terms, but which is there for the 
reader to find when one parses the hints he leaves in his subtle referenes to his sources. 
In the next verse, Paul writes that omnes thesauri sapientiæ et scientiæ are ‘hidden’ (absconditi) 
in this – in quo – which is an ambiguous reference that can be interpreted to mean either ‘in Christ’ (the 
most likely, as it is the last noun that would fit), or ‘in the mysteries’, or indeed ‘in the intellectus’, in 
a conscious parallel by Paul to the parable of the ‘treasure hidden in a field’ that we have analyzed. We 
will note that all three readings would work for Cusanus’ purpose (as the intellectus is the means, the 
mysterii is its field, and Christ is the ultimate object), while in mysterii would in fact fit best with his 
focus on the method employing aenigmata.  
In these two Biblical passages about thesaurus that a reader would look at in connection with 
this passage, we notice that the thesaurus is an important and recurring image (certainly used 
purposefully by Paul), describing something ‘hidden’ and with great importance for salvation: regnum 
caelorum in Mt. 13:44, connected with the mysterii of God/Christ in Col. 2:2. For the theological 
framework of De Beryllo, it is crucial that Cusanus appends to it the adjective intellectualis, implicitly 
relying on Col. 2:2 to back him up in asserting the centrality of intellectus and visio intellectualis in a 
theological context. It is important to underline that, although Cusanus’ method seems to be intended 
to work for both theological and philosophical questions, without distinction, he is much more ‘open’ 
about touting its universal benefits in a general/philosophical sense (quaequae indaganda), and refuses 
to outright say that it would be beneficial e.g. to a Christian for salvation. The implications are clearly 
                                                          
393 It is beyond the scope of this argument to deal with the question of how Paul should be interpreted here, especially as 
this (e.g. the meaning of intellectus as a faculty) differs across traditions. We can point out, however, that this interpretation 
would fit well within Cusanus’ construction.   
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there though, left for the reader to read between the lines of how he casually hints at crucial 
soteriologically-themed Biblical passages in the context of his method, and will be further analyzed in 
Chapter 5. 
The verb Cusanus uses to refer to the ‘intellectual treasure’ in our paragraph is reperire, another 
word with a visual connotation, implicitly hinting again to the theme of vision, and at a speculative 
identification of the suddenly-introduced lux with the ‘thesaurus intellectualis’ (as, after all, they are 
two parts of describing the same condition of the successful reader). This verb shows that at stake is 
not a ‘possession’ of the treasure, but instead its discovery—one will ‘find the field’ where it is buried, 
in terms of the Matthew passage. Putting together the two parts of the description of the reader’s 
success, we can conclude that this lux/thesaurus will be appreciated as the most important/valuable 
thing by the reader who is now (one could say) one of the ‘initiated’. This is a crucial updating of 
Cusanus’ ‘promise’ in the first paragraph. The method does not only offer a way to solve ‘anything to 
be investigated’, but rather more than that: it literally can offer access to something the reader would 
consider the most imporant (nihil antepones), and the visio intellectualis, as hinted by the reference to 
the Biblical Colossians passage, could in fact serve for salvation in an explicitly Christian context. We 
are thus not only being introduced to a method for solving philosophical questions, but to something 
more: De Beryllo might even be described as a ‘Gospel according to Cusanus’. As we will examine 
further in Chapter 5, there is good reason to think that the ultimate object of the treatise, the beryllus, 
is fundamentally a Christological image, and there is solid textual evidence (for instance, the reference 
to Sermon CXXVI) that this was clearly Cusanus’ intention. However, it is also clear that he avoids 
entering into any of these matters explicitly, and leaves the reader to draw their own conclusions 
through allusion rather than make any strong claim directly in this regard. Cusanus is, one might say, 
perhaps too succesful in this—as not one single in-depth scholarly reading of De Beryllo published so 
far acknowledges this Christological dimension, as we have seen in Chapter 1. One of the goals of this 
work is to emphasize this ‘missing aspect’ of De Beryllo, which becomes very easy to see when 
analyzing the text closely, together with its subtle use of sources. 
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Now that Cusanus has formulated his proposal in more detail, we will go back to the issue which 
opens the paragraph: why does Cusanus think these ‘high things’ shoud now be disclosed after all (and 
that Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius, in his interpretation of them, are ultimately wrong to ‘prohibit’ this)? 
What is the new way (i.e. conceptum) he has found to make possible the reader’s ‘initiation’?  
 
et hoc paucissimis diebus experieris. (De Beryllo, 2, p. 5, 10-11) 
 
The small final clause, a tiny coda to the large and elaborately-structured sentence, adds an even 
more striking claim: that the method and praxis that will be given in this book, if continued following 
the conditions already examined, will make it possible (even for the reader who was already described 
as in the worst-case condition of homo animalis) to find the intellectualis thesaurus in ‘very few days’ 
(paucissimes dies). This claim must again be assumed to be striking and surprising for Cusanus’ likely 
reader, on the same pattern as the objection regarding the book being too small (however, Cusanus 
chooses to not answer any objection on this matter but proceed straight to the method itself). Not only 
is there no comparable proposal in the tradition, but Cusanus has just referenced Plato’s Second Letter, 
where, in the same paragraph to which Cusanus has just made reference, Plato appears to paint a very 
different picture: there doesn’t seem to be any obvious way of bridging the gap between the 
‘uneducated’ and the ‘well-disposed’, and in fact Plato suggests that even for those who happen to be 
‘capable to learn’ (δυνατοὶ … μαθεῖν), many years of study in examining doctrines might be expected, 
particularly in order to change their opinions (οὐκ ἐλάττω τριάκοντα ἐτῶν ἀκηκοότες)394. Cusanus’ 
proposal, however, asserts that with the praxis offered, with meditationes and maximum sciendi 
desiderium, even someone who is homo animalis but knows that he or she is ‘deficient’ will manage to 
reach the level of ‘initiated’ (to paraphrase Pseudo-Dionysius, also referenced by Cusanus) in ‘very few 
days’—indeed, literally, in ‘the fewest number of days’. 
                                                          
394 PLATO, Epistula II, 314a. 
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At the same time, this effect is carefully qualified: one will ‘find’ this thesaurus intellectualis, 
which may mean only being aware of its existence – unlike, perhaps, what comes after, i.e. obtaining 
it, or ‘buying the field’ in the Matthew parable, which might indeed take years of ‘praxis’ after all. It is 
not made clear whether Cusanus promises that everyone can become ‘iudex’ of the opinions of the 
doctissimi, or access the ‘visio intellectualis’ to the fullest, in these ‘very few days’: everything 
promised in this second paragraph is formulated with reference to ‘haec’, ‘these things’, the relationship 
of which to the modus / aenigma / judex of the first paragraph is not entirely clear. This promise by 
Cusanus may not be as extravagant as it seems in the beginning. At the same time, it remains striking 
that Cusanus proposes that one can change their status from (in Plato’s Second Letter account) being 
among ‘the many’ to being among those who are δυνατοὶ … μαθεῖν. 
Moreover, it is possible to think about the terminological differences between the first and 
second paragraph (modus / aenigma / visio vs. haec) as being perhaps due to being written at different 
times – perhaps the second being added towards the end of the writing of the book, when Cusanus, 
aware of the wide terminological variety he has ended up using, refers to multiple things (haec - ‘these 
things’) given the diversity of the included material. At the same time, this interpretation, while 
possible, does not invalidate the ‘theoretical’ one, according to which this was a choice by Cusanus for 
theoretical and rhetorical purposes for the benefit of the attentive reader. 
 
Nunc ad rem descendens primum exponam, cur imposui libello nomen Beryllus et quid intendam. (De 
Beryllo, 2, p. 11-12) 
 
Here Cusanus signals that the introduction is over, and he will not answer any more reader’s 
objections (for instance, any objection referring to the striking promise he just made regarding ‘very 
few days’). We should examine why he believes that he has already responded sufficiently to the reader 
regarding the implicit objection with which he started the paragraph: why did Plato and Pseudo-
Dionysius formulate a ‘ban’ to revealing haec mystica, and why does Cusanus consider it justified to 
propose another alternative? In the end, he seems to end the argument by promising something even 
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more ambitious: that a reader, even starting from the position of homo animalis, can have acces to the 
haec mystica / lux / thesaurus in only ‘very few days’. It seems Cusanus’ ultimate argument against the 
skeptical objections of the reader is that the reader can simply try to follow what Cusanus is offering, 
and that the proof of the method cannot be given otherwise than in the application of the method itself.  
The expression ad rem descendens is itself interesting, invoking again the notion of ‘height’ to 
classify objects or levels of intellectual activity (cf. haec alta). It may seem counterintuitive that 
Cusanus sees the beginning of his argument as a ‘descent’ and not the beginning of an ascent from the 
initial level; however, in context the ‘movement’ makes sense. The last elements just mentioned were 
the lux and thesaurus intellectualis, the situation of the ‘succesful reader’ – thus, proceeding to the level 
of discussing the physical beryllus in the next paragraph is indeed a ‘descent’, only to be followed by 
an ascent further on. 
In a more speculative way, we can also remark on the ambiguity of the word primum, which 
could be an adverb meaning ‘before / in the first place / firstly’ (the interpretation which seems to have 
been chosen by all translators), but also, possibly, an adjective, ‘first’ (part of, for instance, primum 
principiùm), which in this context would be in the accusative case, object of the verb ‘exponam’ - so 
the translation would be ‘show the First’ (sc. principle) - something that Cusanus will indeed proceed 
to discuss some lines later (in 4, p. 6, 1, also using primum as an adverb in the same structure).  
We must also note that in this passage, Cusanus says that he has named the book beryllus, and 
not De Beryllo, which confirms the ambiguity of the title (cf. our analysis in Chapter 3.1) and should 
be kept in mind for the following passages, suggesting possible structural similarities between De 
Beryllo itself and its central image.  
One particular word choice will recur later in an important sense: the verb intendere, ‘to intend, 
to mean’ with the very particular sense of ‘what the author of a book has in mind’, an image that will 
reoccur later in two distinct senses: in the question of the quidditas of all things as intentio conditoris 
in paragraph 54 (cf. our analysis in Chapter 4.1.4), and in the Christological construction of ostensio of 
the divine intellectus in paragraphs 69-70 (cf. our analysis in Chapters 5.4.1-5.4.2). As we will see, this 
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will occasion interesting reflections on the status of De Beryllo in the anthropological, gnoseological 
and soteriological framework that Cusanus is building. 
Finally, as a final remark on the nature of Cusanus’ two-paragraph ‘Introduction’, we can 
conjecture that Cusanus is aiming to suggest that the constructions and images he has built up and used 
within these two paragraphs—visio intellectualis, speculum et aenigma, modus, haec alta/mystica, lux, 
thesaurus intellectualis—are also themselves to be understood as elements of the praxis he is offering, 
and that, if the reader puts the effort into understand the framework being built up, he/she will have 
already made use of the intellectus and therefore progressed, in the sense of elevationes, towards the 
visio intellectualis to which the method must lead. In this way, the praxim ab aliquo, qui tibi aenigma 
declaret refers to the aenigmata Cusanus has already introduced, and «to accept it» means (up to this 
point) simply to understand these initial arguments. This highly plausible interpretation, in light of what 
we find out later about the method itself, points again to how carefully structured and complex De 
Beryllo truly is.  
3.3 The ‘Methodological’ section (paragraphs 3-8) 
3.3.1 Paragraph 3 – Introduction of the beryllus (p. 5, 1 – p. 6, 7) 
 
Beryllus lapis est lucidus, albus et transparens. Cui datur forma concava pariter et convexa, et per 
ipsum videns attingit prius invisibile. Intellectualibus oculis si intellectualis beryllus, qui formam 
habeat maximam pariter et minimam, adaptatur, per eius medium attingitur indivisibile omnium 
principium. (De Beryllo, 3, p. 5, 1 – p. 6, 5). 
  
Cusanus starts with the description of the physical beryl: a stone that is bright, clear and 
transparent, which is fashioned as a magnifying lens, with a form that is both concave and convex395 
(but not at the same time in the same respect—thus we do not have here an instance of coincidentia 
                                                          
395 See Chapter 3.1.b for the full investigation of the sources behind this. The closest sources to which Cusanus had access 
seem to have been ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Mineralium libri V, II.II, vol. 5, cap. 2, p. 32: «Beryllus autem est lapis coloris 
pallidi, lucidi, transparentis», and Marbode of Rennes’ De lapidibus, in MARBODE OF RENNES, De lapidibus, ed. J.-M. 
Riddle, p. 123: «Beryllus lapis magnum et lucidus est». Cf. Senger and Bormann’s commentary in De Beryllo, p. 89. Glas 
and Schwaetzer believe Cusanus’ source was Albert: GLAS - SCHWAETZER, Beryll, Diamant, Karfunkel. Edelsteine im Werk 
des Nicolaus Cusanus, p. 83. Cf. also Sermon CXXVI, 11, p. 26, 1-2: «calculus parvus candidus seu lucidus» (there a 
Christological image). 
For some short remarks on this image and an illustration of the shape (similar to modern convex-concave lenses), see R. F. 
GLEI, Konkav und konvex: Die Spielkugel in Nikolaus’ von Kues De ludo globi, in «Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge 
der Cusanus-Gesellschaft» 29 (2005), pp. 261-286, esp. pp. 263-264.  
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oppositorum, but rather a situation similar to that of an angle that is considered as acute or obtuse by 
reference to a line), and «looking through it» (per ipsum videns) one manages to reach (attingit) 
something that was previously invisible (prius invisible). Cusanus, at the same time, constructs a 
parallel structure, transferring the properties of the physical beryl to the intellectual realm—and this is 
the first application of the method itself, which does not receive a ‘formal’ definition but is defined by 
a form of praxis: one needs to use it, in other words, in order to understand Cusanus’ definition of it. 
The adjective intellectualis, as in the introductory paragraphs above, marks the ontological level to 
which we are supposed to move: an intellectualis beryllus must be fitted to (adaptatur) the intellectual 
eyes (intellectualibus oculis396 – plural and impersonal, as there is no mention in this paragraph of the 
grammatical agent; thus, one might interpret it as generally referring to ‘anyone’s eyes’), and, by means 
of using it as a medium, one can see, in some way implicitly similar to using the physical beryl, 
something that must have been invisible to the oculus intellectualis: indivisibile omnium principium397. 
Note the parallelism between prius invisible, for the physical object seen through the physical beryl, 
and ‘principium omnium .. indivisible’. This parallel structure is meant to represent the manner of 
operation of Cusanus’ method: in essence, one compares a regular, finite image to a specially modified, 
‘infinitized’ version of it398, and uses the resulting relationships to characterize, for instance, the 
relationship between the principium and any finite object in a way which was not available before: this 
might be precisely what it means to ‘reach’ the principium, which is the object of the method itself. 
Cusanus is attempting a structure in which, in effect, analyzing the argument about what the method is 
leads the reader (even if unaware) to actually make use of it.  
                                                          
396 Cf. the note Cusanus makes in his copy of Albert’s commentary to Pseudo-Dionysius’ De Mystica Theologia, Cod. 
Cusanus 96, fol. 231va: «mens est oculus anime: a meciendo dicitur», and the note in his copy of Proclus’ Theologia Platonis 
in Codex Cusanus 185, fol. 39r: oculi anime (cf. CT III.2.1, p. 66, marginalia 101). This notion originates ultimately in Plato 
(PLATO, Republica, VII, 532d2; Sophistes, 254a10). It recurs repeatedly in De Beryllo, 3, p. 5, 3; 8, p. 10, 5, 11, p. 13, 4-5; 
53, p. 60, 12. 
397 Cf. PROCLUS, In Parmenidem, III (Cousin 785, Steel p. 135, 44) and Nicholas’s note to the passage in Cod. Cusanus 186, 
fol. 37v (CT III.2.2, marginalia 186): «ex se subsistens impartibile, et racio huius». 
398 This is Katrin Platzer’s useful term, cf. PLATZER, Symbolica venatio, p. 52. ‘Infinitization’ is nothing else than the 
creation of an object (for a criterion X) that is both a maximum and a minimum according to X (and thus has ‘infinite X’), 
corresponding to ‘step 2’ of the three-step method; see the further explanation and sources in Chapter 2.3. 
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Accordingly, here we move from seeing some physical object which was ‘previously invisible’ 
to the ‘principle of all things’. The ‘invisible-indivisible’ parallelism shows itself as very interesting, 
because with this play on words Cusanus suggests to the reader to consider the fundamental problem: 
what is the relationship between the invisibility of a finite thing, visible only by means of another finite 
object, a lens, and the indivisibility of the principium? Evidently, in the first case it must be something 
too small to be perceived by (a particular person’s) physical eye: the lens enlarges it and makes it appear 
to our eyes as bigger, thus adapted to the limits of our visual abilities. But what does the beryllus 
intellectualis do with the indivisibile principium? It must somehow, in a similar way, show it in a way 
more fitting for the abilities of our intellectualis oculus, which is implicitly weak and imperfect (cf. 
infirmus intellectus in paragraph 1) just like a physical eye. But how does this take place? The physical 
object is too small, so the physical lens enlarges it; but the principium cannot have a particular finite 
‘size’, so the beryllus intellectualis will not in fact change it—or rather, following the method’s 
prescription for ‘infinitizing’ the finite initial image, it will ‘magnify’ the principium both maximally 
and minimally, while the principium is already itself maximal and minimal with respect to any criterion 
we choose (we can ‘obtain’ it by infinitizing the regular physical object in the finite image). Therefore, 
this beryllus intellectualis does nothing more than show the principium as it is: as the both-maximum-
and-minimum version of the physical object that was described as prius invisibile with respect to size. 
Thus we can express the relationships by means of the B-notation (see Chapter 2.3) as follows: 
B[*res prius invisibile, *magnitudo] -> omnium principium 
This structure applies in a parallel way to the beryllus compared to the intellectualis beryllus: 
B[beryllus, *magnitudo] -> beryllus intellectualis 
The beryllus intellectualis, here a name for the ‘infinitizing’ method, is itself an infinitized 
version of the physical beryllus, which is why one will be able to use it as a medium in order to more 
clearly see the first B-structure, which connects finite objects to the principium. Clearly, applying the 
beryllus intellectualis does not require employing always the same criterion, i.e. size: it can apply in a 
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similar way, as Cusanus will show, to any finite property, given the fact that all coincide, in their 
maximum and minimum degree, in the principium.  
In this paragraph, Cusanus has taken the reader only up to ‘step 2’ of the method, i.e. the 
application of finite properties to the infinite object, without passing to ‘step 3’, which would connect 
two B-structures (and would develop for example, ways of talking about the principium from the ways 
in which we speak about the finite beryl in relation to the beryllus intellectualis). Taking up again the 
question of the relationship between invisibilis and indivisibilis, we can conclude that Cusanis implicitly 
intends to communicate that it is precisely ‘divisibility’ which describes in the most fundamental way 
the difference between principium and the (finite) things of which it is the principle and cause399. 
 
Quomodo autem hoc fiat, propono quanto clarius possum enodare praemissis quibusdam ad hoc 
opportunis. (De Beryllo 3, p. 6, 5-7). 
 
In this final sentence, Cusanus shows that he knows very well that the reader will need further 
explanation of the implicit argument we have sketched to understand quomodo hoc fiat; furthermore, 
he has only hinted, but not explicitly said, that the construction he gave could be applied to develop 
‘names for God’ (e.g. from finite objects considered according to divisibilitas, one could construct a B-
structure to ‘see’ their indivisibile principium). The reader might be somewhat confused at this point, 
so he reiterates his plan to make clear quomodo in the most clear way that he can (quanto clarius possum 
enodare). For this specific purpose, he adds ‘some premises’ or indeed ‘preliminary considerations’, 
which are ‘suitable’ or ‘favorable’ at this particular point. This passage serves as an introduction to the 
famous ‘four premises’ in the next four paragraphs, to which Flasch gives a structural-systematic role 
in his explanation of Cusanian thought400, calling them  «Axiome» and «Hauptsatze» and structuring 
his account on the thought of Cusanus in a way that takes them as ‘fundamental principles’ of his 
                                                          
399 We must note here, however, that the method itself does not ‘privilege’ any such particular criterion, but can be applied 
indifferently to any criterion chosen by its user. Cusanus, however, assumes an underlying (and independent of the method 
as such) Proclean metaphysics of simplicitas, which determines his choices of terms and criteria to make use of the method—
see the analysis in Chapter 4.  
400 Cf. FLASCH, Geschichte einer Entwicklung, pp. 449-456. 
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thought401, In this he is also followed by Corrieras402. On the other hand, it is important to note the 
aspects that suggest a less (arguably somewhat anachronistically) ‘systematic’ approach by Cusanus to 
these four ‘premises’: not as what we would call ‘fundamental philosophical principles’ for his method, 
but instead as paradigmatic examples and fundamental ways of applying the method itself403, which, in 
its fundamental form, does not seem to depend on any particular ‘fundamental axioms’ as we would 
expect in a modern sense. Thus, the words quibusdam and ad hoc opportunis do not suggest a set of 
general axioms, systematically developed in order to deduce, based on them, a full account of the 
method. Instead, we have some preliminary considerations, useful ad hoc—which might be interpreted 
as meaning the argument he outlined in this paragraph, i.e. the applications of the beryllus to the 
indivisibilis principium omnium and beryllus intellectualis, offering a still-unclear parallel between 
prius invisibile and principium indivisibile. Indeed, Cusanus will have as one of his goals to make the 
reader understand precisely the connection between these aspects and how this is a paradigmatic 
application of the ‘infinitizing’ method of the beryllus. 
3.3.2 Paragraph 4 – ‘Premise 1’ (p. 6, 1 – p. 7, 9) 
 
Oportet te primum attendere unum esse primum principium, et id nominatur secundum Anaxagoram 
intellectus, a quo omnia in esse prodeunt, ut se ipsum manifestet. (De Beryllo 4, p. 6, 1-3).  
 
In paragraph 4, the first paragraph of the ‘four premises’ section, Cusanus begins his work of 
explaining the topic already introduced in the previous paragraph, which links and compares, in a yet-
unclear way for the ‘uninitiated’ reader, the ordinary vision of objects which are too small and thus 
require the help of a beryl stone, and the visio intellectualis, which has to do with the omnium 
principium—for which it is helped by the beryllus intellectualis, the object of the book. As one would 
                                                          
401 FLASCH, Nicolaus Cusanus, pp. 32-88: the first part of his book is structured around these four ‘principles’. 
402 CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl, pp. 35-47: her chapter is entitled «Quatre premisses indispensables a la conaissance». 
403 A similar interpretation has been proposed by MOFFITT-WATTS, Nicholas of Cusa - A Fifteenth-Century Vision of Man, 
pp. 186-187. Enrico Peroli has a rather similar take: NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Opere filosofiche, teologiche e matematiche, p. 




expect, Cusanus turns first of all to the intellectus and to clarifying the unclear connection between 
intellectus and principium. 
The way in which Cusanus explains this connection is highly interesting. The first sentence is 
composed of two parts, connected by et. In the first part, Cusanus says directly to the reader that ‘it 
would be useful’ to ‘you’ at this point404 that you should first of all405 pay attention to the fact that406 
the primum principium is one (or, in another possible reading, that ‘there is a one which is the first 
principle’ - a consonant reading). This is a typical Neoplatonic principle, that Cusanus read and 
annotated earlier in the same period in Proclus’ works407, yet there is no mention at this point of Plato, 
Proclus or any other ‘authoritative’ source, nor any demonstration or argumentation of the unicity of 
the first principle408. According to Cusanus, the reader must ‘keep this in mind’ - but what if the reader 
is skeptical about this point, or is not entirely convinced? The theme of multiplicity, correlated with 
indivisibilitas which was assigned to the principium in paragraph 3, is not dealt with at this point, but 
is in fact treated later, in paragraph 8, when the argument in paragraph 3 is taken up again and resolved. 
The skeptical reader will have to wait and follow the whole of Cusanus’ explanation of the ‘premises’, 
on the topic of paragraph 3, with the implicit promise that the theme of multiplicity/divisibility of the 
first principle would become clear at a later stage. The method itself, in its application, is aimed at 
connecting a single object to a multiplicity of objects on a different ontological level; therefore, a logical 
demonstration of the existence of a first principle is (implicitly) not required in this praxis focused 
                                                          
404 Again, there is little to suggest in Cusanus’ actual textual formulations that he is introducing anything like fundamental 
axioms (as opposed to informative considerations, illustrative examples or useful applications). 
405 primum with an ambiguous meaning, continuing a play on words begun in paragraph 2 above: De Beryllo, 2, p. 5, 11. 
406 Attendere, a verb that suggests that the reader should pay attention to a fact already known, uncontroversial, that does 
not require its own proof. 
407 Cf. Codex Cusanus 186, fol 19v (i.e. Proclus’ Theologia Platonis): «Itaque quod unum quidem principium omnium et 
causa prima»; cf. PROCLUS, Theologia Platonis (Procli Successoris Platonici in Platonis Theologiam Libri Sex), ed. E. 
Portus, Hamburg 1618 (reed. Frankfurt am Main 1960), II, 4, p. 90; cf. PROCLUS, Théologie platonicienne, ed. H. D. Saffrey, 
tr. by L. G. Westerink, 6 voll., Paris 1968-1997, II, 31.2. For simplicity, hereafter both editions of the Theologia Platonis 
will be cited together, where appropriate, as follows: PROCLUS, Theologia Platonis, [for the Portus edition] ed. Portus, book 
(Roman numerals), chapter (Arab numerals), page (Arab numerals) [and/or] [for the Saffrey-Westerink edition] S-W 
volume (Roman numerals), page.line (arab numerals). 
See also PROCLUS, In Parmenidem, II (Cousin 726, Steel p. 88), where Cusanus writes: «non posse esse multa principia» 
(CT III.2.2, p. 20, marginalia 47).  
408 Which one finds, for instance, in a work Cusanus worked on in the same period as the writing of De Beryllo, De Principio, 
6, p. 5, 1 – p. 6, 13, which begins with an attempt at a demonstration of the existence and oneness of the principium. Cf. De 
Docta Ignorantia, I, 2, 5, p. 7, 1 – 6, p. 7, 25. 
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approach, where Cusanus is first and foremost interested in getting the reader to use the beryllus, whose 
implicit characteristics always make it possible to examine a single first principle of all things409. 
Cusanus’ approach (aimed, as he said, at presenting the conceptus as clear as possible) shows clear 
signs of a ‘practical turn’, i.e. literally a turn towards praxis, which in Cusanus’ approach seems to be, 
first and foremost, using the method itself, and getting the reader accustomed to the ultimate notion of 
employing it for the purpose of evaluating sententias et opiniones. To direct the reader in this ‘practical’ 
direction, Cusanus offers, as he promised, a praxis that is also present in his direct instructions here: 
‘attendere’, ‘pay attention’ to primum principium being unum. 
The second part of the sentence contains an explicit reference to a source, but a rather surprising 
one if one was expecting an appeal to authority: Anaxagoras, according to whom the primum 
principium was named intellectus410. It is interesting, however, to examine Cusanus’ sources for this 
doctrine: one seems to be Plato’s Phaedo411, but another412 is in fact Aristotle’s Metaphysics413 in the 
new translation by Bessarion that Cusanus had been studying during the writing of De Beryllo. This is 
the second implicit reference to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, a book which clearly had a great influence on 
him during this period, an influence not limited to the extended criticism he makes of it in later passages 
but also visible, in subtle ways, in these introductory paragraphs. At the same time, however, Cusanus’ 
                                                          
409 Corrieras, trying to avoid the anachronism of reducing metaphysics to ‘method’ that Flasch also warns against, remarks 
on the necessity of ‘belief’ here (CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl, p. 31). I can only agree in a qualified way: of course, as 
Corrieras argues, Cusanus addresses «how we obtain knowledge» assuming that «knowledge is possible», but there is little 
in these paragraphs that must be taken on faith; the method seems to be based on a common structure that is being applied, 
and other metaphysical premises are, in the end, parallel to it; see the analysis in Chapter 4.2-3 for these premises. 
410 For Anaxagoras’ doctrine, see Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, ed. H. Diels - W. Kranz, 3 voll., Berlin 1951-1952, fr. 
12-14.  
411 Cf. PLATO, Phaedon, 97b. Cf. the note in Cusanus’ copy of his translation of Plato’s Phaedo (at paragraph 97b), in Cod. 
Cusanus 177, fol. 19r: «anaxagoras. mentem omnium causam». 
412 Another possible source, or likely influence, is Meister Eckhart, as Klaus Reinhardt suggests in his article REINHARDT, 
Der Intellekt als Prinzip des Seins in De Beryllo und Sermo CLXXXVII Spiritus autem Paraclitus, p. 5. See e.g. MEISTER 
ECKHART, Quaestio Parisiensis I (Utrum in deo sit idem esse et intelligere), in ID., Lateinische Werke, V, 27-83. Another 
place where Eckhart’s influence seems to be visible is in Sermon CXXVI regarding the notion of nomen est notitia: see note 
296 above. 
413 See the note in his copy of Bessarion’s translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (at 984b, 15-18), in Cod. Cusanus 184, fol. 
4r: «anaxagoras. et laudat anaxagoram qui dixit in naturam intellectum esse» (the Aristotelian passage is found at 
ARISTOTLE, Aristoteles Latine, p. 483). 
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assertion of intellectus as the ontological principium, and the comprehensive uses he makes of this 
name according to the beryllus, are strikingly innovative414. 
The two relative clauses after the reference to Anaxagoras, on the other hand, present a doctrine 
that clearly cannot be attributed to Anaxagoras: an ontological/cosmological clause, a quo omnia in 
esse prodeunt, and a teleological clause: ut se ipsum manifestet. These are typical Cusanian 
formulations415, and Cusanus has a good reason for including them here: they connect intellectus and 
principium, and are in fact another example of praxis, as they are easy to derive from the application 
of the method to the finite and infinite intellectus – which is what Cusanus seems to do immediately 
afterwards. Let us examine his argument, constituting the second application of his method: 
Intellectus enim lucem suae intelligentiae delectatur ostendere et communicare. Conditor igitur 
intellectus, quia se finem facit suorum operum, ut scilicet gloria sua manifestetur, creat cognoscitivas 
substantias, quae veritatem ipsius videre possint, et illis se praebet ipse conditor modo quo capere 
possunt visibilem. (De Beryllo, 4, p. 6, 2 – p. 7, 9). 
 
 We start with the (regular, finite) intellect: according to Cusanus, it delights in showing and 
communicating (thus, to other intellects) the ‘light’416 of its ‘intelligence’. Let us therefore examine the 
scenario for a finite intellect: it is a simple observation to the effect that (at least sometimes) a finite 
intellect finds pleasure in showing and communicating, to other finite intellects, the ‘light’ of its 
intelligence (understood in the most general way, as some kind of creation or unmistakable sign of the 
intellect that produced it). In preparing to apply the method, we take note of all the elements of the 
                                                          
414 Klaus Reinhardt, in particular, calls this Cusanian doctrine «astounding» («eine erstaunliche Aussage», cf. REINHARDT, 
Der Intellekt als Prinzip des Seins in De Beryllo und Sermo CLXXXVII Spiritus autem Paraclitus, p. 5). 
415 Cf. De Beryllo, 54, p. 62, 15-16; 64, p. 75, 16-17. For the theme of the divine intellect creating the world for the purpose 
of manifesting itself and creating other intellects in order to know it, see De conjecturis, I, 1, 5, p. 8, 10-13; De dato patris 
luminum, II, 103, p. 77, 1-6. A theme that is particularly prominent and recurring in Cusanus’ sermons; see K. REINHARDT, 
L’intellect come principe de tout, in Intellect, sujet, image chez Eckhart et Nicolas de Cues, ed. M. A. Vannier, Paris 2014, 
pp. 164-168. Cf. also the structurally similar and very interesting explicitly Christological formulation in Sermon XXII (an 
early work, written around 1440), in Sermones XVI/4, 32, p. 351, 2-10: «Deus creavit omnia propter se ipsum, et non 
maxime et perfectissima, nisi universa ad ipsum, sed nec ipsa ad ipsum uniri potuerunt, cum finiti ad infinitum nulla sit 
proportio. Sunt igitur omnia in fine, in Deo, per Christum. Nam nisi Deus assumpsisset humanam naturam, cum illa sit in 
se ut medium alias complicans, totum universum nec perfectum, immo nec esset». 
There does not seem to be any clear antecedent for Cusanus’ formulations in other sources; from the passage in De 
conjecturis, it appears that Cusanus developed this theme on the basis of Prov. 16:4: «Universa propter semetipsum operatus 
est deus». 
416 Cf. De Beryllo, 21, p. 25, 5; De Dato Patris Luminum, 4, 108, p. 79, 1 – p. 80, 11; Sermon CIL («Hic est verus propheta», 
1454) in Sermones XVIII/2, 9, p. 140, 1 – p. 141, 35. For the image of intelligible light, see PROCLUS, In Theologiam 
Platonicam, ed. Portus, V, 12, p. 268 (cf. Cod. Cusanus 185, fol. 172v-173r), and ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Super de Divinis 
Nominibus, 4, 61ff., cf. Cod. Cusanus 96, fol. 129va, where Cusanus adds the note: «De lumine». 
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finite situation: a finite intellect, at least one other finite intellect, the ‘light’, i.e. something that indicates 
the presence/activity of the first intellect, and the pleasure (delectatio) which the first intellect gets by 
showing the other finite intellect its manifestations, or creations, i.e. the ‘light’. The finite intellect is 
thus considered as creative and relational. 
At the ‘second stage’ of the method; one needs to ‘infinitize’ (some elements of) the situation 
of the finite intellect just examined—and this is precisely what Cusanus appears to be doing in the 
following sentence. In the next sentence—introduced by igitur—we no longer have a situation featuring 
the finite intellect or the finite domain, but rather an ‘infinitized’ setup, exactly as expected.  
To see how this is done, we will analyze Cusanus’ complex grammatical construction, full of 
subclauses, one subclause at a time, not in the order of the text but in the most ‘logical’ order: 
creat...que...et illis...quia...ut scilicet.  
a) [Conditor igitur intellectus] creat cognoscitivas substantias, quae veritatem ipsius videre possint 
(De Beryllo, 4, p. 7, 1-2) 
The ‘infinitized’ intellect is named from the beginning as intellectus conditor417 (implicit 
parallel: just as the finite intellectus is creator of the things it communicates, i.e. its ‘light’, an infinite 
intellectus will be the creator of all things). It creates ‘knowing substances’, parallel to the ‘light’ of the 
finite intellectus. But why do they need to be cognoscitivas? Let us analyze the finite situation: a finite 
intellect shows its ‘creation’ to another finite intellect. In the ‘infinite’ picture, instead, there is only the 
intellectus conditor; after all, the principium is one, and it is not clear how two distinct infinite intellects 
could possibly exist. We see here an evident possibility of constructing a Christological and Trinitarian 
argument in order to solve this issue, but Cusanus evidently chooses not to pursue such an argument 
here (he will do so later – see the analysis of the argument in Chapter 3.4.4). At this point, he is pursuing 
                                                          
417 Cf. nous demiourgikos: PROCLUS, In Parmenidem III (Cousin 807, Steel p. 151), VI (Cousin 1096, Steel p. 381), with 
marginal notes by Cusanus, cf. CT III.2.2 p. 49, marginalia 166; p. 118, marginalia 474: «conditor deus»; PROCLUS, 
Theologia Platonis, ed. Portus, V, 17, p. 281, 19, p. 288; VI, 3, p. 346, with Cusanus’ marginal notes, cf. CT III.2.1, 
marginalia 358, 366, 372, 386-388, all mentioning conditor/deus conditor. Cf. also De Principio, 21, p. 29, 7 – p. 30, 17 for 
a similar construction. 
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the clarification of the relationship between finite intellects and the principium, and the way in which 
this relation explains the fundamental framework of the possibility of using the beryllus intellectualis 
that he outlined in paragraph 3. As a result, Cusanus chooses to place other intellects, which are (part 
of) the intellectus conditor’s creation, in the role that other finite intellects played in the scenario of the 
finite intellect. These created intellects, indeed, are part of the ‘light’ created by the intellectus conditor, 
but their main role in the parallel construction is that of ‘recipients’ for said light. 
According to their role, the following relative clause (quae…) is certainly to be expected, but 
the terminological choice communicates even more: these ‘cognitive substances’ can ‘see’ the veritas 
of the intellectus conditor. Let us compare this construction to the finite intellects in the initial, finite 
image: they certainly must be able to appreciate the lux intelligentiae of a finite intellect when such an 
intellect shows it. In the ‘infinite image’, the «knowing substances» (which, implicitly, must have some 
resemblance to the intellectus conditor, that is, they need to be intellects themselves in order for the 
image parallelism to be preserved), they can (possint – and here Cusanus introduces, with the 
subjunctive, the element of uncertainty, i.e. the possibility that they may fail to do so; indeed, this 
possibility makes the beryllus possible and necessary) see (and here we connect to the lux as a metaphor 
used in the ‘finite’ construction, involving here an implicit visio intellectualis) the veritas of the creator 
intellect, in a structural parallel with the lux intelligentiae suae in the finite image, which gives us an 
implicit identification of’ ‘veritas + Genitive’ with a type of lux418. We observe that the substances are 
cognoscitivae, so they are defined as having the ability to know, but their role is formulated in terms of 
videre, correlated with the lux of the finite image: here Cusanus has given us another striking illustration 
of the visio intellectualis, and introduced a place for the beryllus (the uncertainty implied in possint). 
b) et illis se praebet ipse conditor modo quo capere possunt visibilem (De Beryllo, 4, p. 7, 7-8) 
At first sight, it may seem that this sub-clause adds nothing new, because it is all implicit already 
in the parallelism between the ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ images already examined. But instead, Cusanus 
                                                          
418 On this theme, cf. notes 387, 416 above. 
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adds very important specifications: first of all, this creator (ipse conditor419) «appears [as] visible» to 
them. This construction makes use of the adjective visibilis and predicates it of ipse conditor, connected 
to the accusative pronoun se. It is a crucially important passage with a strong hint of (possibly) the 
Incarnation: Cusanus avoids further specifications, and he does not say, for example, ‘in a visible way’, 
but simply says, literally, «the creator offers [himself] visible»420. We can also remark that the voluntary 
act of the finite intellect, in the finite image, offering its ‘light’ to others seems to be parallel to the 
active act of the intellectus conditor of presenting itself ‘visible’, according to the specification «in the 
way in which they can grasp [it]». It seems to be a necessary condition for the creator intellect to be 
‘visible’ in order for the created intellects to be able to grasp it. There are interesting features of 
Cusanus’ grammatical construction: visibilem could also be read as the direct object of capere, which 
would mean ‘in the way in which they can grasp something visible’, a reading that is less plausible but 
available for the reader who is troubled by an association between intellectus and visibilis. The question 
of how precisely the creator intellect ‘offers’ itself, what it would mean for it to be ‘visible’, and what 
is the role of a beryllus intellectualis is in the end left unresolved here. 
c) quia se finem facit suorum operum (De Beryllo, 4, p. 6, 5) 
This clause, despite appearing before the others, is actually, in the logical order of the 
construction, an explanation of the image presented in the ‘main part’ that we have already examined. 
It clearly serves to introduce a teleological justification and explanation, which establishes the 
importance of the visio of the veritas of the conditor, or of the capere of the same: this conditor makes 
himself the final purpose of the creator’s ‘works’ (which obviously includes the substantias 
cognoscitivas)421 and introduces at the same time a very important problematic: if the conditor is the 
‘goal’, finis, does this imply that he is to be known modo quo possint by the cognitive substances? And 
                                                          
419 An interesting choice of words: no longer named intellectus but rather identified with a pronoun. This is likely in order 
to maintain a (literal) separation at the clause level between intellectus and visibilis, two words that Cusanus seems to be 
specifically avoiding using next to each other here, even though they are grammatically connected. 
420 Cf. also deus visibilis as a name for the visible world, a view later quoted as being that of David of Dinant in De Non 
Aliud, 17, 81, p. 42, 27.   
421 Cf. PROCLUS, In Parmenidem VI (Cousin 1115, Steel p. 396), which interestingly references the image of the ‘First’ in 
Plato’s Second Letter, cf. PLATO, Epistula II, 312e1-3. 
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what does it mean that the conditor is said to perform a positive action (se fecit) in this regard422? It is 
clear that there is some very important (but yet unspecified) relationship between the finis of a human 
being and the visio intellectualis of the conditor, which hints, as in the second paragraph, at the 
extraordinary importance of the beryllus. 
d) ut scilicet gloria sua manifestetur (De Beryllo, 4, p. 6, 5 – p. 7, 6) 
Here we encounter again the ‘dual’ structure already used repeatedly by Cusanus in the second 
paragraph: after a ‘philosophical’ clause (with implicit reference to a page in Proclus), we find one 
identified as on the same level of importance (with the help of the scilicet), explicitly using biblical 
language: in this case, recognizable as a recurring theme in the Old Testament, particularly in Isaiah423.  
Hoc scire est primum, in quo complicite omnia dicenda continentur. (De Beryllo, 4, p. 7, 8-9) 
To understand this final sentence of the ‘first premise’ (paragraph 4), we must consider what 
has actually been presented. We have come across a complex image concerning the finite intellects and 
the conditor (implicitly identified with the principium), now named and intellectus, through another 
paradigmatic application of (the first two steps of) the beryllus method, making a transition from a 
finite image (finite intellects which communicate their lux to each other) to an infinite one (where the 
communicating finite intellect becomes the intellectus conditor, correlated with the principium 
omnium, and the ‘receiving’ intellects are his creations). Cusanus has taken great care to explain the 
connection between intellectus and principium and clarify the framework of the visio intellectualis: its 
role, its importance and its ultimate object, i.e. the principium/conditor itself, which ‘makes itself’ the 
finis of all finite things424. 
                                                          
422 This suggests a Christological meaning is being hinted at, as the conditor seems to take an extra active step (as otherwise, 
presumably, he would have been the finis by the very act of having created the finite intellects, without a need to ‘make 
himself’ that). Cf. the analysis of the Christological/Incarnational meaning of ostensio in Chapter 5.  
423 Cf. Is. 35:2: «germinans germinabit et exultabit laetabunda et laudans gloria Libani data est ei decor Carmeli et Saron 
ipsi videbunt gloriam Domini et decorem Dei nostri»; Is. 40:5: «et revelabitur gloria Domini et videbit omnis caro pariter 
quod os Domini locutum est»; Is. 60:2: «quia ecce tenebrae operient terram et caligo populos super te autem orietur Dominus 
et gloria eius in te videbitur»; 1 Macc. 15.9: «cum autem obtinuerimus regnum nostrum glorificabimus te et gentem tuam 
et templum gloria magna ita ut manifestetur gloria vestra in universa terra.» 
424 Yet, at this point, such a finis remains unattainable due to the ontological, unbridgeable difference between the infinite 
intellectus conditor and finite created intellects. Only with the introduction of the novel Christological construction in 
paragraphs 69-70 will the finis be made attainable and the image made complete. See the analysis in Chapter 5. 
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All this has been achieved by means of a finite-infinite construction typical of Cusanus’ method, 
notably without directly invoking any traditional authority or even introducing premises that need to  
be accepted without justification. The starting point was the image of a finite intellect that 
communicates with other finite intellects; the rest can be constructed by ‘infinitizing’ various aspects 
of the image introduced, and thus ‘justifying’, in the end, the various Proclean and biblical notions 
introduced throughout within the framework of an application of the method itself. A skeptical reader 
might ask whether such a method, which leaves so much liberty for its user to construct arguments 
based on an (ultimately arbitrarily chosen) finite starting image, would not make it possible to construct 
arguments, particularly about the principium/conditor, that are problematic, or even heretical. This 
structural problem remains in the background of the text, and we will examine later (Chapter 4.4) the 
extra ontological presuppositions that Cusanus holds to, independent of the method itself, which 
‘censor’ any unacceptable results. 
In this way, we can understand more precisely Cusanus’ statement that ‘everything that will be 
said is contained in this implicitly’ (complicite425). First of all, we must point out a possible reading that 
intepreters and translators usually ignore: the recurring wordplay using the word primum426, which can 
be an adverb but also a reference to the recurring primum principium, which makes a truly impressive 
reading of this passage possible: «This [the Creator] is what is necessary to know, in which all that is 
to be said/must be said is contained implicitly (complicite)» – a fully acceptable reading in Cusanus’ 
                                                          
425 The terms complicatio and explicatio (approximately, ‘enfolding’ and ‘unfolding’) are important for Cusanus, providing 
another way to describe the basic relationship of similitudo between image and original which is at the core of the beryllus 
method: the original ‘enfolds’ (complicat - complicatio) the image, i.e. contains it in a superior ontological sense, and gives 
it being by ‘unfolding’ it (explicat – explicatio) from itself. Cusanus holds that this can be applied to God for a thoroughly 
orthodox account of creation, since the two ontological levels are strongly maintained, even as these relationships hold true, 
so that these are not to be understood in any way implying pantheism. For a more general account of how these terms 
function in Cusanus, see e.g. T. LEINKAUF, Cusanus, Ficino, Patrizi – Formen platonischen Denkens in der Renaissance, 
Berlin 2014, pp. 25-59; K. ALFSVAG, Explicatio and Complicatio: On the Understanding of the Relationship between God 
and the World in the Work of Nicholas Cusanus, in «International Journal of Systematic Theology» 14/3 (2012), pp. 295-
309. They are a point of influence from the tradition of Thierry of Chartres; for an account of this tradition and its reception 
by Cusanus, see ALBERTSON, Mathematical Theologies, pp. 119-139, 185-186. Cf. THIERRY OF CHARTRES, Lectiones in 
Boethii librum de Trinitate, in THIERRY OF CHARTRES, Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School, 
ed. by N. M. Häring, Toronto 1971, II, 4-5, p. 155ff. For similarities in Cusanus’ main sources, cf. PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, De 
divinis nominibus, ed. Suchla, V, 7, p. 185, 12-15; PROCLUS, In Parmenidem VI (Cousin 1069, 1074, 1087, Steel p. 362, 5; 
365, 12ff; 374, 79ff). 
426 De Beryllo, 2, p. 5, 11; 4, p. 6, 1. 
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terms, which would put emphasis on the need to know the principium, in which all ‘that is to be said’ 
is contained. 
But even with the more commonly-employed reading, which interprets hoc as referring to ‘what 
was just said’, the interpretation remains similar, because all the applications of the method are 
implicitly linked to the status of its user (a substantia cognoscitiva) in relation to the principium, or 
conditor. The framework offered is of universal application, but not because of the application of any 
‘first principles’ more geometrico, but instead due to the application of a method which has as its 
implicit precondition the epistemological and ontological situation of the user. 
Particularly visible in this paragraph is the great difference between a more ‘systematic’ 
approach (as found, for example, in the De Principio, on which Cusanus is working, at least partially, 
during the same period) and a praxis-focused approach, which has as its intention to familiarize the 
reader with the method by applying it repeatedly to derive new explanations and justifications for 
principles that are already likely accepted by the reader from tradition (whether ‘philosophical’ or 
‘theological’). Thus, this paragraph can be seen simply as a collection of ‘premises’ generally accepted 
in the tradition, which Cusanus puts together in an impressive construction, showcasing the 
possibilities, and the general character, of his promised method. 
To understand the role of the next paragraph (paragraph 5) in the series of praemissae ad hoc 
oportunae, we must always keep in mind the current stage of the overall argument, particularly from 
the point of view of the reader not yet familiar with Cusanus’s thought, for which (as he already 
indicated in the introductory paragraph) Cusanus maintains a particular concern. The most significant 
problem still remaining from the ‘first premise’ argument above is that of the relationship between the 
‘finite image’ (finite intellects communicating) and the ‘infinite image’, particularly concerning the 
intellectus: what is the relationship between the intellectus conditor and a finite intellect, particularly 
in relation to knowledge (and to how knowledge of the conditor would be possible)? We recall that 
Cusanus used the term substantia cognitiva and refrained from referring to finite intellectus or 
intelligentiae in the same image as the conditor, at the same time that, in the discussion of the finite 
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intellect in the ‘finite image’, the other intellect who must be the ‘receiver’ was only mentioned in an 
implicit way (ostendere and communicare—but to whom exactly?). This choice seems to be related to 
the progression of Cusanus’ argument, from an ‘epistemological-teleological’ side (paragraph 4) to an 
initial explanation of the ontological structure revealed by the method itself and which underlies these 
yet unexplained relationships (e.g. conditor – intellectus). An explanation of this topic would have 
probably complicated the complex sentence construction in paragraph 4 even more. 
3.3.3 Paragraph 5 – ‘Premise 2’ (p. 7, 1 – p. 8, 13) 
 
In paragraph 5, Cusanus has to explain, first of all, why he has only used substantia cognoscitiva 
so far and has not explicitly characterized the creations of the intellectus conditor as themselves 
intellects (which a reader would fully expect that he, in the end, will do, because of all the outstanding 
parallelisms he has constructed so far). Cusanus will thus have to explain also how different modes of 
knowledge operate (e.g. visibilis), and to reveal in closer detail the ontological-hierarchical structures 
that can be obtained through the application of the beryllus (which he has been using so far only up to 
‘step 2’ of the full method, not yet attempting any of the comparative ‘divine-name-producing’ 
structures like he will build later on). 
Paragraph 5 is clearly divided, in logical order, into two fundamentally distinct parts: the part 
regarding similitudo / verosimilis, and the part regarding ‘cognitive modes’. The conclusions of these 
two parts are finally put together only in paragraph 6, and serve as intermediate results to complete the 
ontological-epistemological image introduced schematically in paragraph 4, in order to eventually 
reach a fully detailed image of all the main problems, ontological, epistemological and teleological, of 
the argument developed in a schematic way in paragraph 3 and which justifies the role of the beryllus 
intellectualis. We will approach these parts in their order. 
Secundo scias, quomodo id, quod non est verum neque verisimile, non est. Omne autem quod est 
aliter est in alio quam in se. Est enim in se ut in suo vero esse, in alio autem ut in suo esse verisimili, 
ut calidum in se est ut in suo vero esse et in calefacto est per similitudinem suae caliditatis. (De Beryllo, 
5, p. 7, 1-5). 
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The first part of the paragraph begins, therefore, with an instruction directed at the reader, scias: 
‘know, be aware of the fact that’. Examining the argument, we find that this also does not seem to be 
merely a statement of a fundamental principle or ‘axiom’, but rather the result of an application of the 
method to the image of heat (calidus), with what is essentially ‘step 3’ of the method (which transfers 
the relationship constructed between ‘finite’ and ’infinitized’ elements in the image to another, usually 
more general image) presented before the other steps (a form of rhetorical inversion that Cusanus uses 
very often); ut [calidum] marks the connection between the two images (which we have proposed to 
represent as ‘B-structures’ below) that full the application of the method consists in:  
B[calefacta, *gradus] -> calidus 
 -calidus est in calefacto per similitudinem suae caliditatis 
            -calidus est in se ut in suo vero esse  
UT 
B[alia, *gradus] -> omne 
 -omne est in alio ut in suo esse verisimili 
 -omne est in se ut in suo vero esse 
 -omne est aliter in alio quam in se 
This rigorously represents the structure of the argument, in a form that is highly standard for 
Cusanus in De Beryllo (while, arguably, similar ones underlie his development of ‘divine names’ 
generally). In his praxis-based approach, Cusanus is showing how principles such as these are in fact 
derivable from the application of the method, and here he introduces various ways of talking about the 
objects examined which will become very useful when transferred to other similar structures later. 
These are: in se / in alio and similis / similitudo (verisimilis being a particular type of similis). First, 
Cusanus makes a connection between truth and similitude: something either is verum, or is verisimile 
(therefore, similar to the verum)427; he clarifies that all things have their own in suo vero esse, or «as 
                                                          
427 Cf. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, 993b30-31: «διὸ τὰς τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων ἀρχὰς ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀληθεστάτας (οὐ γάρ ποτε 
ἀληθεῖς, οὐδ ἐκείναις αἴτιόν τί ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι, ἀλλ ἐκεῖναι τοῖς ἄλλοις), Ὥσθ ἕκαστον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ τῆς 
ἀληθείας». In Bessarion’s translation used by Cusanus, this is rendered as: «propter quod principia semper existentium 
necesse est verissima esse. nec enim aliquando vera, nec illis ut sint aliquid aliud causa est, sed illa ceteris. quare ut 
secundum esse unumquodque se habet, ita etiam secundum veritatem» (ARISTOTLE, Aristoteles Latine, p. 487). A passage 
closely examined by Cusanus, who writes in the margin of his copy in Cod. Cusanus 184, fol. 11r: «ut secundum esse 
quodque se habet, sic etiam secundum veritatem». On this fundamental connection between truth and being, cf. also De 
Venatione Sapientiae, 36, 106, p. 100, 5-10. 
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they are in themselves/their true being»428, contrasted with in alio esse, aliter, ut in suo esse verisimili. 
Thus, any object that exists is (1) more or less similar with the verum itself (sc. absolutum), and (2) 
exists both ‘in itself’ and in alio, that is, in its various similarities in other objects similar to it in any 
way, in the same way in which it is similar in some way with the verum itself, and in the same way in 
which this verum itself, therefore, exists in alio in another way (aliter), all other objects being, therefore, 
its various similarities. 
Let us follow the application of the method to the image provided at the end, seeing how 
Cusanus believes he can prove this ‘fundamental principle’ by moving from calidum - calefactum to 
verum - verosimile429. Following the argument in its logical order, we have as a starting point the 
calidum and the calefacta, warm things or ‘made to be warm’430. An (ontological) difference is pointed 
out between warm things and heat itself; the latter is something different, present (one can say) in warm 
things in various ways, but ‘in itself’ different from them. However, because of this difference, one can 
argue that calidum is at the same time both the maximum and the minimum warmth (as one can say it 
is, itself, ‘outside the spectrum’ of cold-warm as such). Thus, we have identified a type of relationship 
between calidus and calefacta, where the former can be said to be an ‘infinitized’ form of the latter, 
and we can transfer the relationships we can identify between them to the pair verum (i.e. absolutum) - 
verisimiles. If, in the plausible example of warmth and warm objects, we can speak of warmth as 
existing in itself in suo vero esse and in warm things per similitudinem suae caliditatis, it means that, 
due to the parallel B-structures, we can transfer these modes of speaking to the verum, and we obtain a 
number of new possible formulations, i.e. ways of speaking of the verum in relation to the 
                                                          
428 This construction recurs in Cusanus; cf. De Conjecturis, I, 11, 54, p. 55, 6-7; De Filiatione Dei, 1, 54, p. 42, 21-22; De 
Dato Patris Luminum, 2, 99, p. 74, 9-14; De principio, 28, p. 40, 4-5. 
429 Interestingly, the connection between heat and truth is made by Aristotle in an example offered immediately before the 
passage examined just above (see note 427): ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, 993b24-27: «ἕκαστον δὲ μάλιστα αὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων 
καθ᾽ ὃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει τὸ συνώνυμον (οἷον τὸ πῦρ θερμότατον: καὶ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ αἴτιον τοῦτο τῆς θερμότητος) 
: ὥστε καὶ ἀληθέστατον τὸ τοῖς ὑστέροις αἴτιον τοῦ ἀληθέσιν εἶναι», which is translated by Bessarion as: «unumquodque 
vero id ipsum maxime aliorum est, secundum quod aliis univocatio inest, ut puta ignis calidissimum: etenim ceteris hic est 
caliditatis causa. quare verissimum etiam est id quod posterioribus, ut vera sint, causa est» (ARISTOTLE, Aristoteles Latine, 
p. 487). It seems that this paragraph in De Beryllo is heavily influenced by Aristotle; however, Cusanus avoids, in particular, 
Aristotle’s arguments in support of this thesis, presenting its result within the context of the application of his own method. 
430 This is a recurring image in De Beryllo in particular: De Beryllo 27, p. 30, 10- p. 31, 12; 41, p. 47, 4; 46, p. 53, 7-13. Cf. 
De Venatione Sapientiae, 8, 19, p. 20, 10-13. 
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corresponding objects it is being put in relation to: here, for example (applying the relationship transfer 
principle between the structures), to its similitudines, that is to things verisimiles. For instance, we are 
perfectly justified, applying the method, in saying: *verus est in verisimile per similitudinem suae 
veritatis, an assertion perfectly consonant with the Cusanian argument and derivable directly from its 
structure, but not explicitly made by Cusanus.  
We must make some remarks at this point on the subject of the ‘implicit statements’ in the 
Cusanian arguments based on the beryllus method. Usually, Cusanus avoids making explicit all the 
specific steps and all the possible terms derivable from an application of the method, particularly when 
the applicability of these is evident from the context, or their explanation would be too repetitive. Al 
the ‘implicit statements’ that are distinctly identifiable in De Beryllo will always be marked with an 
asterisk (*) to denote them as such (cf. the description of the notation in Chapter 2.3). 
Sunt autem tres modi cognoscitivi, scilicet sensibilis, intellectualis et intelligentialis, qui dicuntur caeli 
secundum Augustinum. Sensibile in sensu est per suam sensibilem speciem sive similitudinem, et sensus 
in sensibili per suam sensitivam speciem. Sic intelligibile in intellectu per suam intelligibilem 
similitudinem, et intellectus in intelligibili per suam intellectivam similitudinem. Ita intelligentiale in 
intelligentia et e converso. Illi termini te non turbent, quia aliquando intelligentiale nominatur 
|intellectibile. Ego autem nomino sic propter intelligentias. (De Beryllo, 5, p. 7, 5 – p. 8, 13) 
 
In the second part of the paragraph, Cusanus develops the ‘ontological’ distinction already 
presented, which establishes an implicitly hierarchical order, between verus and verisimile and 
generally between being ‘in itself’ and ‘in another’ in an epistemological context, explaining in greater 
detail what substantia cognoscitiva in the previous paragraph means, and ordering all the objects 
according to their relationship with the faculties of knowledge. This double hierarchy, both ontological 
(all things are images of the infinite God) and epistemological (all things, considered in the way they 
are known, are, in a different way, images of the faculties of knowledge, which faculties are themselves, 
ultimately, images of God and are in a hierarchical relation between them), represents in fact two 
different applications of the same method we have been examining that have been joined together, an 
ontological structure characteristic of Cusanus’ thought in De Beryllo. Furthermore, Cusanus implicitly 
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refers to the already established pattern, implicitly linking the modi cognoscitivi with the substantiae 
cognitivae of the previous paragraph, which is further evidence that he is pursuing one unitary argument 
overall.  
 The reference to Augustine is peculiar, as it seems to introduce a term, caeli, which Cusanus 
never uses again. We can note that, in each of the ‘four premises’ (paragraphs 4-7), Cusanus cites 
explicitly exactly one other thinker. In this paragraph, he invokes Augustine, certainly someone one 
could invoke as an authority (unlike Anaximander in the previous paragraph)–but he does so only to 
mention a terminological choice, not particularly relevant to the argument: the fact that Augustine gives 
the names of caeli to the three cognitive modes431. But this apparently ‘trivial’ reference does a lot of 
work for Cusanus in establishing the philosophical-theological legitimacy of his project. First of all, 
that reference claims, by itself, that his distinction into three cognitive modes is one accepted in the 
tradition, and furthermore, for the reader who is familiar with Augustine’s De Genesi, that they are 
linked to an explicitly theological aspect: the ‘heavens’ of Genesis. With this reference, therefore, 
Cusanus strongly links his construction to the Augustinian tradition. At the same time, he could have 
gotten the notion (also) from Proclus432. 
Developing a Proclean threefold division of knowledge modi433, Cusanus introduces recurring 
terminological patterns: in + Ablative, and the suffixes -ivus and -ibilis (and -alis). The result is the 
                                                          
431 AUGUSTINE, De Genesi ad litteram, in Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticum Latinorum, ed. J. Zycha, vol. XXVIII, Vienna 
1898, I, 9, p. 12, 8-10: «ut coeli nomine intelligatur spiritualis iam facta et formata creatura, tamquam coelum coeli huius»; 
I, 17 (p. 24, 6-9); XII, 26 (p. 419, 12-13), 29-31 (p. 430, 12 - 432, 9). Cf. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Summa de creaturis, in 
ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Opera Omnia, ed. Borgnet, vol. XXXIV, I, 3, 14, p. 431a: «Dicendum, quod tres coeli dicuntur ibi 
tres modi visionis secundum Augustinus, scilicet sensibilis, imaginariae et intellectualis: et dicunt caeli, quia celant aliquid». 
432 Cf. PROCLUS, Theologia Platonis, IV, 5, S-W 18.23 – 22.8, and Cusanus’ note in Cod. Cusanus 185, fol. 122r (CT III.2.1, 
p. 91, marginalia 263): «nota intelligibile celum est regnum iouis». 
433 Cf. PROCLUS, Theologia Platonis, V, 16, ed. Portus, p. 278, and Cusanus’ note in Cod. Cusanus 185, fol. 179v (CT 
III.2.1, p. 103, marginalia 348) which repeats Proclus’ words: «tripliciter est universum aut intelligibiliter aut intellectualiter 
aut sensualiter»; PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, ed. E. R. Dodds, Oxford 1933 (2nd ed., 1963), pp. 108, 33 – 110, 1, prop. 
123; PROCLUS, In Parmenidem VII, ed. Cousin, p. 1158, where Cusanus notes in Cod. Cusanus 186, fol. 122v (CT III.2.2, 
p. 135, marginalia 552): «…in intellectu intellectualiter, in anima animealiter, corporaliter et partibiliter in sensibilibus». 
For Proclus’ own sources in the Platonic tradition (Plotinus, Iamblichus), see PROCLUS, Theologia Platonis, V, 16, S-W 
21.14ff and Saffrey’s note to 21, 5-6 (S-W p. 128). 
Similar distinctions occur throughout Cusanus’ works, usually in groups of three from a subset of four basic ‘modes’, cf. 
De Conjecturis, I, 4, 15, p. 20, 1-3: «Omnia autem in deo deus, in intelligentia intellectus, in anima anima, in corpore corpus. 
Quod aliud non est quam mentem omnia complecti vel divine vel intellectualiter vel animaliter aut corporaliter»; cf. I, 9, 
41, p. 45, 1ff, esp. the illustration. Often Cusanus divides the intellectus/intellectualiter into two and omits the sensus to 
create his triads: cf. De Conjecturis, II, 13, 137, p. 135, 11-13 (intellectibilis, intelligibilis, rationalis); De Ludo Globi, II, 
104, p. 130, 10 – 131, 14 (rationalem, intelligentialem, intellectibilem); Idiota de mente 14, 151, p. 206, 1 - 152, p. 207, 12 
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following table (where I have marked, as always, the parts that are present only implicitly with an 
asterisk): 
modus sensibilis                             sensibile       in sensu              per suam sensibilem speciem sive similitudinem 
                                                        sensus          in sensibili            per suam sensitivam speciem (sive similitudinem)* 
modus intellectualis                    intelligibile   in intellectu                       per suam intelligibilem (speciem sive)* similitudinem 
                                                     intellectus     in intelligibili                     per suam intellectivam (speciem sive)* similitudinem 
modus intelligentialis             - intelligentiale in intelligentia                  (per suam intelligentialem speciem sive similtudinem)* 
                                                 - intelligentia   in intelligentiale                 (per suam intelligentivam speciem sive similtudinem)*      
                                                    (intellectibile)   (intellectibile) 
This division offers a clarification of the relationship between sensible things and the sensus 
and intelligible things and the intellectus, in a direct application of the pattern already established above 
(with the help of the method) between veritas and verisimile. Very interesting is the introduction of 
species, a very important concept for Cusanus’ ontology-cosmology, and which will have a privileged 
place later the discussion of Aristotle434. As we see here, Cusanus means species as some kind of 
image/similarity of the original435, a general application of his argument regarding veritas, correlated 
with in suo vero esse/in suo esse verosimili, establishing here the term per [X]i similitudinem for each 
object, tying it to an ontologically higher level in this type of hierarchy. 
Let us examine the particular uses that Cusanus wants to make of these suffixes: we can 
generally say that -ivus means an ‘active’ directional relationship, and -ibilis a ‘passive’ one. The ‘in + 
Ablative’ structure identifies the relationship between two objects at different levels in a typical 
                                                          
(ratio, intelligentia, intellectibilitas). Compare De Quaerendo Deum, I, 24-26 (sensus, ratio, intellectus; sensibilia, 
rationabilia, intelligibilia). Here in De Beryllo he presents an unusual form of the ‘triad’, which now omits the ratio mode 
and replaces it with the sensus—arguably because of the structure of the beryllus method itself, which often proceeds from 
sensible images directly to constructing an object featuring coincidentia oppositorum, which is no longer in the realm of 
ratio: in effect, the method could be said to ‘skip over’ the modus of the ratio altogether (although, of course, ratio is 
inevitably involved, for instance, in determining the properties of geometrical objects). 
434 See the analysis in Chapter 3.4.7; cf. e.g. VOLKMANN-SCHLUCK, Die Lehre des Nicolaus von Cues von der species, and 
CORRIERAS, Identité e difference dans le De Beryl. 
435 As Peroli notes in his commentary, species should be understood here not as forms according to the Aristotelian 
conception of perception, but rather as the object presented in the form of a message («la cosa in forma di messaggio»), a 
«medium» between the object and the sense organ: NICOLAUS CUSANUS Opere filosofiche, teologiche e matematiche, p. 
2710, note 22. This revision of the Aristotelian conception also lies at the core of his own general concept of species as 
particular form (see Chapter 3.4.7). It should be noted here that these two senses of species (in visual perception and in a 
metaphysical account of forms) are usually distinguished, but they need not be in Cusanus: in his construction, due to the 
use of the beryllus and the similar type of veritas-similitudo relationships constructed in each of these cases, species can be 
taken as having one unitary meaning in all of these contexts.  
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application of the method. It should be noted, looking at the table above, that Cusanus seems to avoid 
speaking (at least explicitly) of intellectual species. The most peculiar part, however, is the modus 
intelligentialis, whose meaning is ultimately debatable, together with that of the sentence added by 
Cusanus where he explains that he named this level «because of the intelligentias» (i.e. the angels?)436. 
However, if we try to apply the same pattern as for the other modi, we would encounter a term such as 
intelligentivus, non-existent in Cusanus. This is likely the reason why Cusanus instructs the reader 
directly to ‘not to be disturbed’ by the terms, pointing out that intellectibile is another term for 
intelligentialis, which would better respect the pattern of the suffix –ibile, but which has a root already 
used in the modus intellectualis. Clearly, it would be problematic to speak in the same context of the 
modus intellectualis and modus intelligentialis because of possible confusions - and it is not surprising 
that Cusanus never does so in De Beryllo. In fact, he never speaks again in De Beryllo about this modus 
intelligentiale, and only once does he mention that there is, above the human intellectus and below God, 
a level of intelligentiae, i.e. angels437. Corrieras has proposed a different interpretation of this passage, 
where modus intelligentialis does not refer to the angels, but rather to the realm of a supra-intellectual 
vision, the visio intellectualis itself438. 
                                                          
436 This is the way in which most of the commentators and translators interpret this passage: see e.g. Hopkins’ note in 
NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Complete philosophical and theological treatises of Nicholas of Cusa, p. 831 note 16. Cf. Senger’s 
translation, NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Über den Beryll, p. 7: «Intelligenzen», or Peroli’s translation, NICOLAUS CUSANUS Opere 
filosofiche, teologiche e matematiche, p. 1161: «intelligenze [angeliche]».  
437 In the final passage summarizing the structures built throughout the book, De Beryllo, 71, p. 83, 10-13: «ita sursum ad 
intelligentias ascendendo, quae habent simplicitatem formae subtiliorem et omnia vident etiam sine eo, quod eis in 
phantasmate praesententur».  
There are serious structural reasons why Cusanus does not talk about this ‘level of the angels’: it seems to be inaccessible 
using the beryllus method. The method is addressed to the intellectus, and works fundamentally by establishing relationships 
between sensible objects, intelligible objects (i.e. the ‘infinitized’ objects) and the infinity of the principium/conditor. 
Arguably, due to the structure of the method, there is no obvious way to construct a ‘berillic’ structure and apply it to an 
‘intermediary’ level, above the human intellectus and ‘below’ God. Accordingly, everything Cusanus says in this passage 
in paragraph 71 seems to have no content involving an actual application of the method, and seems to rely entirely on 
Cusanus’ own underlying metaphysical framework of simplicitas (see the analysis in Chapter 4.3), which is here ‘more 
subtilis’, and on a rather contentless notion of videre without what is presented in phantasma. The notion of phantasma 
occurs only once more in the book, in paragraph 54, p. 61, 5-11: «Sic cum per sensus species sensibiles haurimus, illas 
quantum fieri potest simplificamus, ut quiditatem rei videamus cum intellectu. Simplificare autem species est abicere 
accidentia corruptibilia, quae non possunt esse quiditas, ut in subtilioribus phantasmatibus discurrendo quasi in sermone seu 
scriptura ad intentionem conditoris intellectus perveniamus». This description of the process of simplificare seems to imply 
that phantasma pertains fundamentally to the senses. Thus, what could videre without phantasma mean, as in the case of 
the angels? Cusanus does not say explicitly, but we might conjecture a connection to the visio intellectualis, the main focus 
of De Beryllo, which is the only type of visio which appears to not involve the senses. It is possible, then, that Cusanus 
would say that the angels (insofar as we can know anything about them, not being able to apply the beryllus method) might 
use the visio intellectualis like human beings use their regular, sensible visio. 
438 CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl, Tome 2, pp. 40-41. 
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In the end, the ‘second premise’ (paragraph 5) defines some of the fundamental relationships 
for the ontological-epistemological construction characteristic of Cusanus’s thought in De Beryllo, 
identifying a parallel relationship between the cognitive faculties and their objects and between the 
absolute veritas (a name for God) and his creations. Interestingly, Cusanus again presents premises he 
knows from the tradition (the Proclean threefold division into modi, the Augustinian-Aristotelian 
connection of truth and being), but uses them, implicitly, as showcases for precisely the type of structure 
that his beryllus method offers. 
3.3.4 Paragraph 6 – ‘Premise 3’ (p. 8, 1 – 8) 
 
Tertio notabis dictum Protagorae hominem esse rerum mensuram. Nam cum sensu mensurat sensibilia, 
cum intellectu intelligibilia, et quae sunt supra intelligibilia in excessu attingit. Et hoc facit ex 
praemissis. Nam dum scit animam cognoscitivam esse finem cognoscibilium, scit ex potentia sensitiva 
sensibilia sic esse debere, sicut sentiri possunt; ita de intelligibilibus, ut intelligi possunt, excedentia 
autem ita, ut excedant. Unde in se homo reperit quasi in rationemensurante omnia creata. (De Beryllo, 
6, p. 8, 1-8). 
 
This is ‘Premise 3’ of the ‘four premise section’ (paragraphs 4-7). In the first two numbered 
paragraphs of this section (paragraphs 4 and 5), we have seen how Cusanus introduced and justified the 
basic double hierarchical structure for his ontological-gnoseological construction, all on the basis of (or 
at least, demonstrated with the help of) a simple method applicable to any object to be examined, as he 
promised in his two introductory paragraphs. What does Cusanus still need to accomplish in this 
section? The ‘teleological’ aspect introduced in paragraph 4 (‘Premise 1’) still remains unexplained, a 
fundamental aspect for the significance of the beryllus method, since it claims to offer access to the 
principiùm. It is still not clear, therefore, how to go from the notion of similarity to an original to the 
original being its finis, and how we can use this image to draw conclusions about particular objects, 
which seem to be at the same time a kind of similitudo of the principium and a(nother) kind of similitudo 
of the sensus or intellectus, i.e. the faculty by which we know them. These problems come together in 
the gnoseological problem of the mensura, a very important theme for Cusanus439. He introduces this 
                                                          
439 The theme of homo mensura rerum is taken up again later, in De Beryllo, 65-68, p. 75, 1 – 80, 20. It is recurrent in 
Cusanus, and particularly prominent in Idiota de Mente, IX, 117, p. 172, 5; 123, p. 177, 5 – 124, p. 177, 9; cf. also De 
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terminology here, and it does not seem to be new on the structural level, but instead an application of 
the things already said, ex praemissis, i.e. ‘Premise 1’ (paragraph 4) and ‘Premise 2’ (paragraph 5). 
According to the pattern already seen in the previous two paragraphs, Cusanus again cites one 
particular thinker for a term used: now it is Protagoras, cited as the source of the dictum that homo 
mensura rerum est440. Cusanus uses this Pythagorean dictum to introduce his notion of mensura by 
taking up the distinction between the ‘three regions’ already made in the previous paragraph, but with 
a surprising and significant terminological novelty. The terminology given here is the following: 
homo  cum sensu         mensurat sensibilia 
    homo cum intellectu    mensurat intelligibilia 
                         homo in excessu          attingit qua sunt supra intelligibilia 
 Obviously, the third line does not follow the pattern, and is very dissimilar to the terminology 
of the previous paragraph. According to the latter, the last line should rather be something like: 
                         homo/intelligentia*(?) cum intelligentia   mensurat intellectibilia* 
 Or, following the exact pattern of the terms given in the previous two lines in this paragraph: 
homo cum intelligentia*  mensurat intellectibilia* 
                                                          
Venatione Sapientiae, XXVII, 82, p. 79, 13-15. On the role of this notion in Cusanus, see e.g. C. TRINKAUS, Protagoras in 
the Renaissance: An Exploration, in Philosophy and Humanism. Renaissance Essays in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller, 
Leiden 1976, pp. 190-213, esp. p.199ff. 
440 Again, Cusanus’ source seems to be Aristotle’s Metaphysics: ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, X, 1, 1053a35-b3; XI, 6, 
1062b12ff.; IV, 5, 1009a6ff.  For the Protagoras fragment, see Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, ed. H. Diels - W. Kranz, 
3 voll., Berlin 1951-1952, 80B1. Interestingly, two of the manuscripts of De Beryllo (Cod. Cus. 219 and Codex 166 
Magdeburg) have «picthagore»/«pithagore», reflecting a common type of scribal error in copying Greek names which also 
affected Cusanus’ sources: both of his translations of the Metaphysics mixed up Pythagoras and Protagoras in the cited 
passages (Cod Cusanus 182, fol. 47rb, 54ra: «Pythagoras»; Cod. Cusanus 183, fol. 31rb: «Pytagoras», fol. 35va: 
«Protagoras»; Cod. Harl. 4241, fol. 50r: «Protagoras», fol. 64r: «Pytagoras»; Cod. Cusanus 184, fol. 62v: «protagoras», fol. 
71r: «a pythagora dictum est». This last locus has a note by Nicholas: «credo dici debere protagoras»). This resulted in all 
the pre-modern printed editions of De Beryllo featuring an erroneous attribution to Pythagoras here. However, Cusanus 
most likely never thought Pythagoras was the correct attribution here, and his original manuscript most likely had the correct 
reading Protagoras. See the argument of Senger and Bormann (against L. Baur’s opposite theory) in De Beryllo, pp. 104-
105. 
Giovanni Santinello has formulated an interesting theory according to which Cusanus learned of this quote from Leon 
Battista Alberti: see G. SANTINELLO, Nicolò Cusano e Leon Battista Alberti: pensieri sul bello e sull’arte, in Nicolò da 
Cusa. Relazioni tenute al Convegno Interuniversitario di Bressanone nel 1960, a c. di G. Flores d’Arcais, Firenze 1962, 





Instead, Cusanus proposes a break in terminology, right after first introducing it, which certainly 
is bound to surprise the reader. To understand why he wants to introduce this change, we must analyze 
in detail the new proposed terminology. 
First, we can observe that at the stage of supra intelligibilia it is no longer a question of 
mensurare, but of attingere. This is evidently a reintroduction of the attingere ... prius invisiblem and 
attingitur… omnium principium of paragraph 3, the initial introduction of the method, which the current 
‘four premises’ (paragraphs 4-7) are intended to explain. Here, this attingere, which in paragraph 3 was 
correlated with visio, seems to be implicitly distinguished from mensurare, and the reason for this 
becomes clear if we consider that this attingere was, in paragraph 3, correlated with the primum 
principium, which Cusanus would certainly say is not ‘measurable’, according to the fundamental 
doctrine of the incommensurability of the infinite441. Very much in accordance with the problematic 
nature of our knowledge of objects in this realm, Cusanus explicitly refuses to introduce a specific term 
for quae sunt supra intelligibilia—a strikingly ‘negative’ formulation, leaving the place open for the 
namelessness of the principium. In this same structure, in place of the ‘faculty’ (sensus, intellectus), 
Cusanus introduces in excessu (a term he seems to have taken from Pseudo-Dionysius442). It seems that 
Cusanus, in his classification, wants to point to the possibility of a type of knowledge that ‘goes beyond’ 
the (definable) faculties and types of knownedge enumerated. This seems to correspond to the scope of 
the visio intellectualis, which does not seem to be directed towards sensible objects, nor towards the 
intelligibilia which are the regular objects of the realm of the intellectus. That the visio intellectualis 
                                                          
441 Cf. e.g.  De Beryllo, 71, p. 84, 18-20: «mensura est simplicior quam mensurabilia»; De Docta Ignorantia, I, 1, 3, p. 6, 2-
3: «infinitum ut infinitum, cum omnem proportionem aufugiat, ignotum est»; De Theologicis Complementis, 11, p. 55, 10-
11: «Infinitum non est mensurabile, quia infinitum et interminum»; De Apice Theoriae, 11, p. 125, 4-5: «infinitum, maius 
omni mensurabili seu comprehensibili». 
442 Cf. PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, De Divinis Nominibus, VII, I, pp. 193, 5 – 195, 2 (865B – 868B); cf. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Super 
De Divinis Nominibus, VII, 7, 13 (p. 341, 53-74; 347, 60-61); a notion also found in BONAVENTURA, Itinerarium mentis in 
Deo, ed. D. Hattrup, Paderborn 2008, I, 1, p. 14, 12-13 («Dionysius in libro de Mystica Theologia, volens nos instruere ad 
excessus mentales»); I, 1, p. 16, 4 («ad supermentalem excessum»); IV, 3, p. 78, 20; IV, 6, p. 84, 10-12; IV, 7, p. 86, 9. 
Cf. De Beryllo 53, p. 60, 15: «videntes in excessu». Cf. De Docta Ignorantia I, 4, 11, p. 10, 10-12 «excedit… omnem 
intellectum»; Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae, 13, p. 10, 18-20: «Itaque divina oportet ut intelligamus non humano more, sed 
toti integre a nobisipsis excedentes atque prorsus in Deum transeuntes» (citing Pseudo-Dionysius’ De Divinis Nominibus in 
the Traversari translation which Cusanus owned in Cod. Cusanus 43); De Venatione Sapientiae, 112, p. 105, 12-13: «video 
deum in excessu super omnia». 
As Senger emphasizes in his note ad locum (NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Über den Beryll, p. 94), this is not merely the ekstasis or 
mania of the Platonic tradition; Cusanus is referring to it in the context of a method of gaining positive knowledge. 
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would be something ‘above’ the account of the regular faculties makes sense when looking at the 
construction in paragraph 3 as an ‘infinitizing’ of the image of the use of the physical, finite beryllus: 
not only is the object (primum principium) infinite and incommensurable, but the ‘faculty’ used to ‘see’ 
it (an ‘infinitized’ version of regular sight) will have (in some way) the same characteristics. Yet, even 
if Cusanus declines to name the faculty by which one can ‘reach’ these mysterious objects in excessus, 
this is nonetheless affirmed to be possible; in some way, therefore, the intellectus (with its visio 
intellectualis) must be able to go ‘beyond’ its own realm of intelligibilia—while at the same time, as 
we know, the intellect is infirmus, and needs a beryllus intellectualis, a weakness parallel (as in the 
construction in paragraph 3) with that of the limited sensus. This ‘amendment’ to the structure of the 
‘three regions’ introduced in the previous paragraph seems to be the most important theoretical step 
performed by Cusanus in ‘Premise 3’. 
If man is to be the measure of all things, are the supra intelligibilia measurable? In the second 
part of the paragraph, Cusanus develops the scheme in more detail, after having asserted that everything 
is merely an application of what has been mentioned already: ex praemissis, so that we should pay 
careful attention to the terms and structures he has already introduced. Here, he seems to be proposing 
the following scheme: 
anima cognoscitiva est finis cognoscibilium 
                       scit  ex potentia sensitiva          sensibilia sic esse debere, sicut sentiri possunt   
                       scit  ex potentia intellectiva*    intelligibilia sic esse debere, sicut intelligeri possunt*   
                       scit  ex potentia excedentiva*   excedentia sic esse debere, sicut excedant   
 We see that the teleological aspect, finis, left unresolved in paragraph 3, has now returned. 
Again, we have a symmetrical pattern that ‘breaks’ at the final level, where Cusanus changes the terms: 
if we follow the previously established pattern, there would have to be an implicit (and never 
mentioned) *potentia excedentiva, while the anima cognoscitiva (a new term, cf. substantia 
cognoscitiva in ‘Premise 1’, paragraph 4) is able to know that the excedentia (a striking term, never 
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used later, for quae sunt supra intelligibilis) must be in such a way that ‘they go above’, excedant, 
which appears to be something of a tautology. 
We will analyze the structure of this complex implicit argument underlying the terminological 
scheme. According to Cusanus, we can say from the fact that the ‘cognitive soul’ is the finis of the 
cognoscibilia that, given that there is sensus (with its potentia sensitiva, using again the ‘-iva’ suffix), 
sensibilia must be so that they can be perceived with the senses, i.e. sentiri possunt: up to now, this is 
simply an extension of the application of the method in the previous paragraph, where the ‘beryllic’443 
relationship (of an image, similitude) between sensus and sensibilia (through the medium of species) 
has been explained. But how does this tie to the new term introduced at the beginning of the argument, 
as its apparent premise, invoking finis: another term denoting a type of relationship between ‘original’ 
and ‘image’, as we have seen (in paragraph 4)? 
Importantly, we note that Cusanus has introduced here a type of ‘ethical’ language (or even, in 
the end, eschatological): sic esse debere, parallel to the finis for the animae cognoscitivae, and 
suggesting, by the parallel with the intellectus conditor being the finis for the substantiae cognoscitivae, 
that they also ‘must be in such a way’ (not yet defined) in relation to their conditor. This will have to 
be explained further, and it is partly the aim of paragraph 7 which follows. 
The image we are left with at this point is of a complex structure built up of relationships of the 
type ‘original’-’similitude’ (the basic type of image that the beryllus method uses most of all), which 
support the ‘premises’ Cusanus is drawing from the tradition and explain them in a new way by using 
(so far, not explicitly), the beryllus method. We can also note that the excessus is also, in a general way, 
a perfect illustration of the beryllus method itself. Always, when using the beryllus, one is identifying 
(1) some objects at a certain ‘level’ (2) something that is considered to be supra, and thus in excessu 
relative to the first ones. So we can interpret this mysterious ‘third level’ of the two ternary structures 
presented by Cusanus in this paragraph, with its peculiar terminology, not as an attempt to conceptualize 
                                                          
443 I will use the term ‘beryllic’, for convenience, to denote a construction that involves the beryllus method (or a B-
construction) in a clear way; e.g. beryllic relationship, beryllic structure, etc.  
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a third distinct cognitive region, but instead as (1) a general pattern for how the other two applications 
of the same conceptual scheme (sensibilia - sensus and intelligibilia - intellectus) are to be understood, 
and (2) as a dynamically defined description of the method itself. In different way, we can interpret the 
couple excedentia - excessus as a general expression of the one-multiple problem, the former referring 
potentially to any plurality, and the last referring to the ultimate principle associated with it, which is 
always ‘exceeding’ relative to any definitional criteriun. Thus we have an attempted introduction of a 
dynamic terminology, under the form of the substantivized excessus/excedentia, defined exactly as 
transcendent in relation to any particular thing knowable. 
Unde in se homo reperit quasi in ratione mensurante omnia creata. (De Beryllo, 6, p. 8, 7-8).  
This last sentence, formulated as a conclusion (unde), reaches an important anthropological 
result444, combining the parts of the argument presented so far. However, the formulation can appear 
highly problematic: can ratio ‘measure’ intelligibilia?445 The ambiguity is emphasized by the fact that 
Cusanus has left ratio out of the threefold structure he has been developing (sensus, intellectus, 
intelligentia). While it is true that in these passages Cusanus does not appear to strictly distinguish the 
domains of ratio and intellectus446, one is still faced with an interpretive problem. The crucial issue is 
how to interpret quasi in ratione mensurante. Beside the readings already proposed447, there is one that 
would seem to fit precisely with Cusanus’ construction: interpreting it as a subclause with an implicit 
missing term, namely: quasi in ratione mensurante [reperit omnia mensurata], or [reperit omnia 
mensurabilia], which are in the end very similar. This would preserve a perfect parallelism between 
                                                          
444 A corollary of the homo mensura rerum principle; cf. the posited etymological connection between mens and mensura: 
Idiota de mente, I, 57, p. 90, 5-6 «mentem quidem a mensurare dici conicio»; cf. ibid., 3.71.7-9, 9.116.2-9, 123-125. Cf. De 
Conjecturis, I, 10, 52, p. 53, 7-12; De Venatione Sapientiae 27, 82, p. 79, 14-15: «mens mensurat notionaliter cuncta» (in 
ref. to Idiota de mente); Sermon XCV («Eadem mensura», 1451), in Sermones XVII/6, 2, p. 516, 1: «mensurare venit ex 
ratione». For mensura generally, see note 439. 
445 Cusanus seems to rule this out in De Conjecturis, I, 10, 52, p. 53, 7-12: «Sed haec non est vera simpliciter, sed rationaliter 
vera mensura. Rationalium vero praecisio intellectus est, qui est vera mensura». 
446 This is an argument made by Hopkins: HOPKINS, Complete philosophical and theological treatises of Nicholas of Cusa, 
p. 831, note 16. 
447 Translators and interpreters have proposed many different solutions for this passage. Hopkins’ solution for this passage, 
HOPKINS, ibid., p. 794, cf. note 22, is to render ratio as «measuring scale», which seems a rather artificial solution. Senger 
translates «Wesensgrund» (NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Über den Beryll, p. 7). Peroli translates «fondamento» (NICOLAUS 




structures: mensurans / mensurabilia would be built on the same pattern as sensus / sensibilia and 
intellectus / intelligibilia, and the human being would be able to find in se all these categories of objects 
at each particular level because the human being has all these faculties: sensus, ratio, intellectus, and 
what corresponds to in excessu (arguably the visio intelelctualis), and one can build, with the help of 
the method, ‘image-original’ relationships between each of these faculties and its object. Understood 
in this way, the paragraph culminates in a proof of the special status for the human being because of 
having the sum of all these faculties, fully justfying the unde conjunction and furthering Cusanus’ 
project of offering praxis for the method itself. 
As we have seen, this conclusion is limited to omnia creata, which does not exhaust, of course, 
omnia as such (as it does not include the creator). Man ‘finds’ (reperit, again a visual verb, related to 
the visio) in his faculties (ie, in a parallel relation with that of ‘image/original’) all things created—and, 
crucially, he sees them as created, thus in relation to something not created, the creator. Anticipating, 
we can already see that the relationship ‘creator - created things’ is parallel to the relationship ‘human 
faculties - their objects’, a fundamental feature of the way in which Cusanus conceptualizes his method. 
But at this point Cusanus stops here, and the reader remains to anticipate ‘Premise 4’ (paragraph 7) in 
which this final connection, this relationship between creator/creation, is made explicit. This is exactly 
what Cusanus does below. 
3.3.5 Paragraph 7 – ‘Premise 4’ (p. 9, 1 – p. 10, 13) 
 
Quarto adverte Hermetem Trismegistum dicere hominem esse secundum deum. Nam sicut deus est 
creator entium realium et naturalium formarum, ita homo rationalium entium et formarum 
artificialium, quae non sunt nisi sui intellectus similitudines sicut creaturae dei divini intellectus 
similitudines. Ideo homo habet intellectum, qui est similitudo divini intellectus in creando. Hinc creat 
similitudines similitudinum divini intellectus, sicut sunt extrinsecae artificiales figurae similitudines 
intrinsecae naturalis formae. Unde mensurat suum intellectum per potentiam operum suorum et ex hoc 
mensurat divinum intellectum, sicut veritas mensuratur per imaginem. Et haec est aenigmatica scientia. 
Habet autem visum subtilissimum, per quem videt aenigma esse veritatis aenigma, ut sciat hanc esse 
veritatem, quae non est figurabilis in aliquo aenigmate. (De Beryllo, 7, p. 9, 1 – 10, 13). 
 
 Recall that the problem left open at the end of the previous paragraph was precisely that of the 
relationship between creator and creatures, and how this can be determined in relation to the 
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relationship between man and the objects of his faculties. So, for the attentive reader, the progression 
to the subject matter of ‘Premise 4’ is a perfectly logical one. 
Given this context, Cusanus again invokes one author explicitly, inviting the reader in the most 
direct way so far (2nd pers. imperative) to ‘turn his attention to’ (advertere) the fact that Hermes 
Trismegistus said (in the Asclepius) that man is (a) secundus deus448. From the outset, this expression 
presents itself as a play on words, implicitly exploited by Cusanus for the structure of this paragraph: 
secundum (the Acc. of secundus) could in fact be not an adjective but a preposition, signifying ‘in the 
same way as, on the model of, in accordance with’, which is a meaning the reader might ponder, 
although because of the direct reference to the Asclepius, we must ultimately read it primarily as 
«another God, a second God». This is a rhetorically striking formulation, which, in joining together 
homo with the notion of a ‘second’ God, evokes explicitly Christological themes449. It also seems to be 
a paradigmatic application of the coincidence of opposites (if we assume that God cannot be multiple) 
to the case of the human being, as we will see later. 
                                                          
448 Cusanus studied the Asclepius extensively, as shown by his numerous notes in his manuscript (now found in Brussels, 
Bibliotheque Royale Albert 1er, 10054-56). The notes have been published in P. ARFE, Cusanus-Texte, III. Marginalien. 5. 
Apuleius. Hermes Trismegistus, Heidelberg 2004, pp. 103-160. The text itself can be found in HERMES TRISMEGISTUS, 
Corpus Hermeticum, ed. A. D. Nock, tr. by A.-J. Festugière, Paris 1945, vol. II. 
The passages Cusanus is referring the reader to are: «magnum miraculum est homo, animal adorandum atque honorandum. 
hoc enim in naturam dei transit, quasi ipse sit deus ... diis cognata divinitate coniunctus est» (ibid., Asclepius, 6); «dominus 
et omnium conformator, quem recte dicimus deum, quom a se secundum fecerit, qui videri et sentiri possit... voluit alium 
qui illum, quem ex se fecerat, intueri potuisset, simulque et rationis imitatorem et diligentiae facit hominem» (ibid., 8); 
«aeternitatis dominus deus primus est, secundus est mundus, homo est tertius» (ibid., 10). See also the note Cusanus left in 
his manuscript at fol. 20v: «nota quomodo homo est deus de deo» (cf. Senger and Bormann’s note, De Beryllo, p. 106). 
The image of secundus deus recurs in De Conjecturis, II, 14, 143, p. 143, 7-8: «homo enim deus est, sed non absolute, 
quoniam homo; humanus est igitur deus»; ibid., 12: «Potest igitur homo esse humanus deus»; ibid., 144, p. 144, 3-4: 
«quoniam [homo] humanus est deus». 
For the notion of homo secundus deus in Cusanus and his interpretation of the Asclepius, see K. BORMANN, Nikolaus von 
Kues: «Der Mensch als zweiter Gott», Trier 1999; M. THURNER, Explikation der Welt und mystische Verinnerlichung. Die 
hermetische Definition des Menschen als “secundus deus” bei Cusanus, in La tradizione ermetica dal mondo tardo-antico 
all’Umanesimo, ed. P. Lucentini – I. Parri – V. Perrone Compagni, Turnhout 2003, pp. 245-260; and P. ARFE, Alberto 
Magno e Nicola Cusano interpreti dell’Asclepius, in Nicolaus Cusanus zwischen Deutschland und Italien, ed. M. Thurner, 
Berlin 2002, pp. 129-151, for Cusanus see esp. p. 146ff. 
449 This might be intentional on the part of Cusanus. One very interesting fact of the reception by Cusanus of this text is that 
Cusanus was aware of (and quoted approvingly) Lactantius’ (erroneous) interpretation of the passage from Asclepius 8, i.e. 
«secundum [deum] qui videri e sentiri possit» (which, in the context of the Asclepius, can only be mundus), as referring to 
Christ: see LACTANTIUS, Divinae Institutiones, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, vol. XIX/1, ed. S. Brandt, 
Vienna/Leipzig 1890, IV, 6, 4, pp. 286, 14 – 288, 4. Cusanus cites this approvingly in his earliest collected sermon, Sermon 
I, in Sermones XVI/1, 11, p. 10, 9ff. It is thus entirely possible that Cusanus continued to interpret this passage in this way, 
i.e. the secundus deus as a Christological image, which we should keep in mind when reading this passage.  
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The proposition identified as coming from Hermes Trismegistus is immediately explained with 
a direct and full application of the method (the first full one so far), with the comparative structure sicut 
... ita, completed with a hinc ... sicut at the end, which ‘descends’ again to the finite level, showing how 
the terms derived from using the method can be applied, in the end, to anything – thus implicitly 
justifying the ad quaequae indaganda of the first paragraph. We can also remark that the use of the 
method on the dictum of Hermes is a paradigmatic formulation of the process proposed in the 
introductory paragraph: iudex fias, quantum quisque propinquius ad veritatem accedat—a formulation 
that directly addressed the reader in the second person, just like the first sentence of this paragraph. 
We can formalize the use of the method using the B-notation as follows: 
SICUT 
B[entia realia et formae naturales] ->  deus 
                                    - deus est creator entium realium et naturalium formarum 
                                    - creaturae sunt intellectus dei divini similitudines 
                                    - intellectus *hominis est similitudo divini intellectus in creando 
                                                           creat similitudines similitudinum divini intellectus 
ITA 
B[entia rationalia et formae artificiales] -> homo 
                                           - deus est creator entium r. et formarum a. 
                                           - entia r. et formae a. sunt hominis intellectus similitudines  
                                           - *intellectus hominis creat similitudines suae formae naturalis 
                                                                        extrinsecas artificiales figuras 
SICUT 
B[extrinsecae artificiales figurae] -> intrinsecae naturalis formae 




This structure is based on two fundamental relations of ‘similitude’, between God and the two 
categories of entia realia and formae naturales (joined under the name of creaturae), and, in turn, homo 
(a term apparently interchangeable with intellectus hominis, exactly as the intellectus dei seems to be 
identified with deus) and the entia rationalia and formae artificiales which are seen as his creations, 
and therefore similitudines. At the same time, homo is also, of course, a member of entia realia and 
therefore is himself a similitudo, his own creations (similitudines) being therefore, implicitly, 
similitudines similitudinum in relation to the creator God. Cusanus, in the end, explains and generalizes 
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this relationship for all finite objects, with the couple intrinsecum-extrinsecum derived from Proclus450, 
which is added to naturalis-artificialis and realis-rationalis to signify the ontological difference 
between original and image/similitude, i.e. the fundamental distinction on which each application of 
the method is constructed. 
In an ontological-cosmological context, we remark the (probably wilfully) ambiguous 
formulation of the ‘duality’ of entia realia and formae naturales, joined under the term creaturae, 
which naturally leads the reader to wonder what the relationship is between entia and forma – which is 
precisely the problematic around which the criticism of Aristotle will develop in later passages. 
Another problem left open until this point is the problem of the human faculties, because at this 
level we have only the intellectus, which seems to be in the position of creator of all human ‘creations’ 
(entia rationalia, formae artificiales)—but what is the relationship between intellectus and the sensus 
in the previous paragraphs, and between the two and the (surreptitiously introduced at the end of the 
last paragraph) ratio? As we can already guess from the recurrent structures Cusanus is using, it must 
ultimately be a relationship of similarity (image-original) conceived in a ‘hierarchical’ way, i.e. the 
ratio will likely be an image of the intellectus, and also the sensus in some way (predictably, the three 
will be ranked by symmetrical relationships between them), and then, similarly, their ‘creations’ (or 
indeed their objects, because there is the same type of ontological distinction between the faculties and 
their objects) will be similitudines similitudinum of the intellectus, which is in turn an image of the 
creator. Cusanus will go on to clarify this hierarchy of the faculties later in paragraphs 10-13. 
Unde mensurat suum intellectum per potentiam operum suorum et ex hoc mensurat divinum 
intellectum, sicut veritas mensuratur per imaginem. Et haec est aenigmatica scientia. (De Beryllo, 7, 
p. 9, 8-11) 
We have reached a very important step, where Cusanus offers an explicit definition of 
aenigmatica scientia451, referring back to speculum et aenigma and one of the main ways of talking 
                                                          
450 PROCLUS, In Parmenidem, IV, ed. Steel, p. 178, 99ff, where Cusanus writes in the margin: «natura intrinsecus informat 
ars extrinsecus» (ibid., p. 539; cf. CT III.2.2, marginalia 226); cf. ibid., p. 214, 67 – 71. 
451 The term aenigmatica scientia appears to be inspired from a few passages in Proclus: PROCLUS, In Parmenidem, I (Cousin 
713, Steel p. 77, 95-96): «[primus] enigmaticus autem et propter hoc secretum» (to the passage in the Parmenides at 128c2-
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about his method452, together with visio intellectualis. At this point, having developed the ‘ontological’ 
hierarchical structure through the use of the method, Cusanus can link to the conclusions reached in 
paragraph 6 (‘Premise 3’) on the mensura type of relationship. But he does not do it exactly in the way 
that we would expect: the argument that God is the mensura of his creations just like man is the mensura 
of all the things he knows is present only implicitly. Cusanus wants to talk about a different, active 
relationship, a way in which the human being not only uses his intellectus to ‘measure’ his objects, but 
‘measures’ himself in relation to God453. This structure seems problematic, because according to the 
construction in this paragraph relating to the hierarchy of faculties it seems that the human being would 
need another faculty at this point, one beyond the intellectus. 
                                                          
6); V (Cousin 1027, Steel p. 330, 94-95): «Symbolicus ergo et insinuatiuus erit et enigmaticus doctrine modus et decens 
maxime mistica dogmata». 
Cf. PROCLUS, Theologia Platonis, ed. Portus, III, 7, p. 132, S-W 29.25-26: «in epistula ad Dionysium per enigmata 
procedens», where Cusanus notes in his manuscript: «enigmata» (CT III.2.1, p. 82, marginalia 200). Another source is 
Albert’s commentary on De Divinis Nominibus: ALBERTUS, De Divinis Nominibus, 8, 3, p. 366, 34-35: «cognitio 
aenigmatica est de non-apparentibus».  
Ιn Cusanus, the terms symbolice (investigare) and aenigma recur often in similar roles as signaling the use of a type of 
specific method; as Katrin Platzer has shown, symbolum and associated words are much less used after De Visione Dei, and 
aenigma/scientia aenigmatica takes their place: PLATZER, Symbolica venatio und scientia aenigmatica, pp. 93-95, 102, 195-
211. Cf. De Docta Ignorantia, I, 12, 33 p. 24, 15: «symbolice investigare», 24-25 «in enigmate laborantibus»; De 
Conjecturis, I, 2, 9, p. 14 ,5-9: «symbolice»; Idiota de Sapientia, 2, 47, p. 79, 2-4: «ut intuearis omnia in simplicissima 
rectitudine verissime, praecisissime, inconfuse et perfectissime, licet medio aenigmatico, sine quo in hoc mundo dei visio 
esse nequit», Idiota de Mente, 9, 125, p. 178, 8: «mensurat etiam symbolice comparationis modo»; De Possest 31, p. 37, 2 
«in aenigmate [videri deus]», 43, p. 53, 20 «ex aenigmate et speculo»; 44, p. 54, 1-2 «[mathematica est] aenigma ad 
venationem operum dei»; 60, p. 71, 1: «mathematice aenigmatizando»; 61, p. 73, 10-11: «ad theologiam aenigma 
propinquius fieri posse arbitror». Interestingly, later in De Possest Cusanus will change the form of the term and use 
«enigmatice» in an adverbial way: cf. ibid., 19, p. 25, 26; 25, p. 31, 8; 26, p. 32, 2; 27, p. 32, 3. 
See also Cusanus’ later 1463 Letter to Nicolaus Bononiensem (Albergati), in Cusanus-Texte: IV. Briefwechsel des Nikolaus 
von Kues: Dritte Sammlung: Das Vermächtnis des Nikolaus von Kues. Der Brief an Nikolaus Albergati nebst der Predigt 
in Montoliveto (1463), ed. G. von Bredow, Heidelberg 1955, 3, 48, pp. 46, 23-26: (in an explicitly Christological context, 
after just having mentioned the Eucharist): «Primo autem, fili mi, advertas nos in hoc mundo ambulare per similitudines et 
aenigmata, quoniam spiritus veritatis non est de hoc mundo neque per ipsum capi potest, nisi parabolice et per symbola 
nobis nota ad incognitum rapiamur». 
452 Cusanus’ formulation at this point regarding mensura is similar to a passage in Aristotle’s Metaphysics X, 1053a31-33, 
which in the Bessarion translation says: «at scientiam quoque et sensum mensuram rerum dicimus esse, propterea quia per 
ea aliquid cognoscimus. atqui mensurantur magis quam mensurent. sed accidit nobis ac si alio nos mensurante 
cognosceremus quantinam sumus, eo quod toties nobis cubitalis mensura admota est. Protagoras autem hominem ait 
mensuram esse cunctorum, perinde ac si scientem aut sentientem diceret» (ARISTOTLE, Aristoteles Latine, pp. 515-516). 
Here, in his manuscript, Cusanus writes in the margin: «scienciam et sensum mensuram rerum dicimus». 
453 Cusanus’ formulation recalls the note he left on a page of Albert’s commentary to De Divinis Nominibus, ALBERTUS 
MAGNUS, Super De Divinis Nominibus, VII, 7. p. 341, 55-59: «quando volumus mensurare ea que supra nos per 
proporcionem nostre sapiecie erramus» (Cod. Cusanus 96, fol. 187rb, cf. CT III.1, marginalia 531). We note the active verb, 
mensurare, used for human activity which gains some kind of knowledge.This statement does not exclude the possibility of 
some kind of ‘measuring’ of things supra nos, but excludes only that we can do it per proportionem nostre sapiencie – 
which is not problematic if we identify infinite things as supra nos and remember that there can be no ‘measurement’ 
between finite and infinite (see above, note 441). This note, on the other hand, only indicates that we need to do this in a 
completely different way, cf. the in excessus of our text and the visus subtilissimus in this paragraph, as we examine below. 
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This is a very important point, because it seems that this is precisely Cusanus’ aim in this book, 
according to the opening paragraph. We will analyze the structure of the argument here proposed, which 
seems to be a new application of the method within the framework already established: 
SICUT 
B[imago] -> veritas 
          - veritas mensuratur per imaginem 
B[operae intellectus] -> intellectus 
          - intellectum se mensurat per potentia operum suorum 
EX HOC 
B[*operae intellectus divini] -> intellectus divinus 
          - mensurat intellectum divinum *per potentia operum suorum  
 
This appears perfectly consonant with the structures built up in the previous paragraphs, with a 
very important difference. The verb mensurare is now used in a different way than in the previous 
paragraph: there, the mensura relation was limited to things ‘measurable’ by the ratio, or omnia creata, 
thus proceeding ‘downwards’ from the ontological-hierarchical point of view (from the measure to 
what is measured). Here, however, ‘measuring’ is clearly an active, direct action to be taken by the 
human being, and it is applied in the case of the intellectus divinus (which Cusanus would obviously 
never identify as a created thing): it is an ‘upwards’ type of measurement, and no longer just a simple 
(passive) ‘image-original’ relationship as in the previous paragraph. 
Here, therefore, Cusanus is changing the characteristics of the verb mensurare, which takes a 
particular subject (homo) and is a direct activity. In fact, it seems to be usable as a general term for ‘the 
activity of using the method’ (to determine relationships between objects), shifting our attention from 
the relationships determined in this way (i.e. image-original, etc.) to the homo which is formulating the 
argument and examining it. But what is the faculty by which the human being can do this? Obviously, 
it cannot be any (common) use of the intellectus: this special type of mensurare cannot be the regular 
activity of ‘creation’ by the intellectus of some entia rationalia or formae artificiales, because the object 
of the activity in question is now explicitly outside the domain of the structure where these have been 
described (although, of course, the structures we have examined until now in the text could obviously 
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be characterized themselves as entia rationalia or formae artificiales; but it is equally clear that the 
application of the method cannot be reduced to only this type of creation of similitudines). Exactly 
where is the human being in this structural schem when they are applying the method to determine such 
structures and relationships (as Cusanus has done in the past few paragraphs)? 
Cusanus adds the final clarification to address this very issue: 
Habet autem visum subtilissimum, per quem videt aenigma esse veritatis aenigma, ut sciat hanc  esse 
veritatem, quae non est figurabilis in aliquo aenigmate. (De Beryllo, 7, p. 9, 11 – p. 10, 13). 
 Here, then, is the faculty with which the human being can perform the act of ‘measuring the 
intellectus’: a visus subtilissimus, a very specific term which strongly hints that it is none other than the 
faculty which corresponds to the visio intellectualis, just as we implicitly find an identification between 
the visio intellectualis and the use of the beryllus method itself. It is only with such an ‘extra faculty’, 
the visus subtilissimus, that the human being can use the method, because one of its fundamental and 
crucial aspects is being able to understand that an aenigma is a veritatis aenigma, a distinction which 
recalls the beginning of ‘Premise 2’ (paragraph 5): things are either veritas or verisimiles (i.e. aenigmata 
veritatis). Here we have the link to the aenigmata of the Pauline formulation (1 Cor. 13:12) that Cusanus 
takes up the introductory paragraph: therefore, the second ‘part’ of per speculum et aenigmate, i.e. the 
aenigmas/symbolisms, must be understood, in generic terms, as ‘created things seen as a similitude of 
the Creator’. At the same time, the notion of speculum will be examined (with the same general 
meaning) later, in paragraph 14, thus completing Cusanus’ reinterpretation of the gospel passage to fit 
the method he is developing. 
Obviously, this special ‘faculty’ of the visus subtilissimus is assimilated, on a structural level 
(or even implicitly identified) with the ‘third faculty’ in ‘Premise 3’ above, the in excessu and the 
speculative *potentia excedentalis. We observe that in all the cases in which this particular faculty 
appears, it is explicitly distinguished from the intellectus (but at the same time connected to the visio 
intellectualis); it is always a ‘nameless faculty’, without any specific name of its own, always referred 
to by the names of other facultiess + adjectives (visus subtilissimus), by approximate and allusive 
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expressions (quae sunt supra, in excessu), or indeed ‘empty gaps’ left in a pattern for deriving terms, 
i.e. words that could be constructed to describe it (e.g. *potentia excendentalis) but which Cusanus 
never wants to use. This problem of the ‘nameless faculty’ and its relation to the intellectus and the 
other faculties is one of the most interesting issues in De Beryllo, and we will analyze it in more detail 
when we reach the discussion of hierarchy in Chapter 4.  
Let us analyze then what Cusanus says here about this visus subtilissimus. It is the first time that 
Cusanus uses this term, and it appears to be original to him, not identifiable in his sources454. The 
adjective used, subtilissimus, superlative of the word with the meaning ‘fine, delicate’455, and, in a 
metaphorical sense, particularly characterizing arguments, ‘inteligent, subtle’456, and also sometimes 
paired with intelligentialis457. Later, as we will see, subtilis will also represent a key term for 
                                                          
454 One of the few terminological parallels is found in De Docta Ignorantia, 118, p. 76, 25 – 77, 27: «Subtili intellectu ista 
altissima clare comprehenduntur, quomodo Deus est absque diversitate in omnibus, quia quodlibet in quolibet, et omnia in 
Deo, quia omnia in omnibus», where we have intellectus subtilis (which might not, however, name a faculty as such). We 
find something similar in Sermon XXII (1440), in Sermones XVI/4, 14, p. 341, 1-5: «Iam vides, si subtilissimo intellectu te 
elevaveris, quo omnem oppositionem supergreditur per infinitum». Cf. also Sermon XXV, in Sermones XVI/2, p. 448, 19-
22: «Tanto enim altior est intellegentia subtilissima Cherub scientia nostra humana, quanto ignis acuties ac igneus 
flammeusque gladius pulvere terrae» - cf. the debate about the meaning of intelligentiale (i.e. whether it involves the angels) 
in paragraph 6 above.  
In his later works, the same faculty seems to be named in De Possest, 57, p. 68, 13-14: «magnum mihi praebet haec 
aenigmatica visio fidei orthodoxae argumentum», and in 17, p. 21, 6-7 as «quamcumque subtilissimam phantasiam» (the 
character speaking is Bernardus, not Cusanus himself), explicitly superior to the intellectus: «Simplex enim et quod non 
possit esse maius aut minus vel mediari aut duplicaries nul lo sensu nec etiam per quamcumque subtilissimam attingitur 
phantasiam. Nec altissimus intellectus concipere potest infinitum interminum»; the other personage beside Cusanus himself, 
Iohannes, concludes that «opportere ... suum intellectum transcendere», and Cusanus as a character immediately praises 
their speech at 17, p. 22, 20-21. This passage is perhaps the clearest place where we identify the hierarchy between this 
‘faculty without name’ (again named provisionally) and the others. 
Then, we find the same faculty discussed in the later work Compendium, 1, p. 2; 24, p. 19, 1 – p. 20, 16, with the same 
characteristics, as «visus mentalis». At the end of the Compendium we also find an interesting expression, with visus and 
subtilius as adverbs: «mundiores acutiorisque visus subtilius contemplantes» (ibid., 47, p. 36, 9). In the De Possest we also 
find videre subtilius (on the saints in the context of the Trinity): «quia subtilius sancti hoc viderunt quam nos» (49, p. 61, 
25-26). 
The intellect is described as subtilis naturae in De Conjecturis, 168, p. 170, 1. We also note an application of subtilis to 
intellectus in De Venatione Sapientiae, 15, p. 16, 3-5, in the context of a distinction between intellectus and visus: «Sic et 
intellectus lucidior est visu. Discernit enim subtilissime quae invisibilia sunt, puta intelligibilia to visibilibus abstracta». A 
parallel with De Ludo Globi, 92, p. 115, 11-12, «vis subtilissima animae rationalis», is also possible. In Idiota de Sapientia 
we find an interesting instance of subtilis applied to ratio: «subtili ratione quaesitum attingeres» (170, p. 226, 18). 
From these passages, we can speculatively point to a recurring doctrine of a ‘fourth faculty’ or ‘faculty without name’ which 
appears explicitly distinguished from the intellectus in Cusanus’s later works beginning at least with De Beryllo. 
455 The opposite of grossum in De Conjecturis, 45, p. 49, 5; 103, p. 100, 15; in Sermon IX, in Sermones XVI/2, 36, p. 199, 
4-5; in Sermon CLXXIV, in Sermones XVIII/3, 2, p. 263, 6-7. Later the opposite of crassus throughout De Venatione 
Sapientiae. 
456 Cusanus uses it in this sense often (particularly in adverbial form with the verb considerare, cf. e.g. De Docta Ignorantia, 
71, p. 46, 1, 80, p. 51, 8; De Filiatione Dei, 6, 84, p. 60, 4; De Genesi, 148, p. 108, 1-2; De Principio, 7, p. 6, 5, cf. 33, p. 
45, 1-3). He uses it in De Beryllo in this sense at 46, p. 53, 5; 50, p. 57, 1; 61, p. 59, 1. 
457 Cf. De Conjecturis, 31, p. 38, 8: «subtiles theologicas atque intelligentiales formas». 
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hierarchization according to ‘simplicity’458: we can also identify in our passage here a similar use, with 
connotations of ‘superiority’ in the hierarchy relative to the ordinary visus (and likely to the intellectus), 
which is clear from the context. Then, the double meaning of subtilis, both physical (‘fine, delicate’) 
and intellectual (‘intelligent’), converge in an optimal way to describe the properties of this ‘faculty’—
especially if we look back to the wording in paragraph 3, where in the image of the physical beryllus, 
with which one attingit prius invisibilem (we can add: which was invisible, in the physical realm, 
because of its too great subtilitas). In the context of that image, one can speculate that a visus 
subtilissimus, considered as an ‘infinitization’ of the image of regular sight with the regular beryllus, 
would indeed not need a beryllus after all, if it was indeed infinitely subtilis. But, just as our intellectus 
is infirmus, our visus is not (infinitely) subtilissimus, and thus needs (at least sometimes, when the 
object is too subtilis for us) a beryllus. 
The small final clause of paragraph 7 links the visus of the first part of the sentence with the 
verb scire, and seems intended to clarify the particular type of knowledge related to the use of this visus 
subtilissimus: i.e. knowledge that veritas is the particular thing that is not representable (figurabilis) in 
any aenigma459. We have a conjunction of two clauses, one with videt and one with sciat, which seem 
paradoxically to contradict each other: at the same time, the human being ‘sees’, by means of the visus 
subtilissimus, (one) aenigma (in particular) as being the aenigma veritatis, and also ‘knows’ that veritas 
is not actually representable in any aenigma. This distinction between videt per visum and sciat seems 
very deliberate, and intended to clarify the paradox: it appears that according to the visus subtilissimus 
we can see the relationship between aenigma and veritas, and at the same time we ‘know’ (although 
we don’t ‘see’ – what we see is the aenigma) that veritas is not representable (in this way, or in any 
                                                          
458 De Beryllo 54, p. 61, 8-9, 63, p. 72, 3-4, 71, p. 83, 12. The opposite of obtusus (in a hierarchical sense, applied to 
knowledge) in De Conjecturis 140, p. 140, 1: «ab obtusioribus ad subtiliores». Accordingly, often with the sense of an 
‘ontological superiority marker’, when in the comparative: cf. De Conjecturis, 169, p. 171, 4-5; cf. Sermon IX (in Sermones 
XVI/2, 13, p. 182, 24-26): «quanto substantia subtilior, tanto plus habet de forma et activitate». Cf. Idiota de Mente, 102, p. 
153, 5; Sermon CCXLIII (1458), in Sermones XIX/7, 3, p. 255, 14-15: «subtiliores sensus habent propinquiorem unionem 
cum intellectu», Sermon CCLXXXVIII, in Sermones XIX/7, 5, p. 648, 5: «potentia subtilior» (of ratio vs. imaginatio). 
459 The ‘non-representability’ of God is a recurring theme in Cusanus’ works, representing one of the constants in his 
thought: see e.g. De Docta Ignorantia, I, 12, 33, p. 24, 21-25; De Quaerendo Deum, I, 18, p. 14, 2-5; De Genesi, 2, 159, p. 
115, 7-8; Idiota de Sapientia, I, 9, p. 15, 4 – p. 16, 18; Compendium 8, 24, p. 19, 1 – p. 20, 7. 
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way at all). This last conclusion does not mean that the relations and terms developed between the 
various aenigmata are not valid, but instead that their final object remains, at the same time, beyond all 
these relationships (hence beyond the name of veritas, and, we can say speculatively, ‘beyond itself’ in 
any way we try to define it, at the same time that it does not cease to be itself;  any definition must 
maintain this fundamental ‘instability’, or dynamism). A fundamental tension still remains, therefore, 
between the thing we ‘see’ and the (negative) thing we ‘know’: e.g. we ‘see’ a paradoxically ‘positive’ 
relationship that makes it possible to talk about God, and at the same time we ‘know’ that God cannot 
be spoken of. This paradox seems to be the particular object of the visus subtilissimus, which should 
make possible our visio of precisely the type of relationship with which the beryllus works, at the same 
time without, in a certain sense, claiming that they are ‘true’, or ‘appropriate’. The result is scientia but 
at the same time aenigmatica, something paradoxical that, implicitly, is itself only an image of a true, 
absolute/infinite scientia. If we can keep these fundamental tensions in mind, we are conceiving this 
visus subtilissimus in a (more) correct manner. 
We can also note that veritas mensuratum per imaginem seems to be another way of describing 
the method itself in its application to any object, since the expression invokes the fundamental 
ontological separation, in the form of veritas-imago, on which each application of the method is 
constructed. The fundamental turn, therefore, achieved in ‘Premise 4’ is from this relationship as a 
‘passive’ one to one which is actively pursued by the human being: which is arguably the essence of 
the beryllus method. The human being enters the picture, and the relationship are no longer simply 
‘facts’ to be stated or acknowledged, but rather structures to be built and developed in an active way, 
through the application of the visus subtilissimus (i.e., here, through the beryllus method). This 
‘constructive’, active character is one of the most important features of the method Cusanus is 
proposing, and a fitting end for the ‘four premise section’ (paragraphs 4-7) which has built up a 
comprehensive overall image of what the method is, how it can be used and what can be achieved by 
means of it. 
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3.3.6 Paragraph 8 – First explicit application of the beryllus (p. 10, 1 – p. 11, 17) 
 
Ad rem igitur his paucis praemissis descendentes incipiamus a primo principio. Deridebat enim 
eos Indus ille, quem Socrates interrogabat, qui sine deo aliquid conabantur intelligere, cum sit omnium 
causa et auctor. Volumus autem ipsum ut principium indivisibile videre. (De Beryllo 8, p. 10, 1-5) 
 
Paragraph 8 begins with a repetition of the words ad rem descendens of the end of the 
‘introduction section’ (paragraph 2), with a very important change: instead of descendens, correlated 
with the verb exponam (hence with a singular subject, who is Cusanus himself), we have here 
descendentes and the verb incipiamus: the subject has become the plural ‘we’ instead of the singular 
‘I’. This choice by Cusanus is meant to say something about the reader’s involvement: after the ‘four 
premise’ section of the paucis praemissis, the reader can now effectively accompany him in the 
‘descent’ ad rem, even if perhaps he was not able to before, as he has presumably gotten some more 
praxis and a better understanding of the method. We recall also that in the same last sentence of 
paragraph 2, Cusanus expressed his intentions (in the subjunctive mood, pers. 1 sg.) to explain why he 
gave the name Beryllus to the book and «what [his] intention [was]/what [he] means [by that]», and we 
can say that substantially he has succeeded in giving a more or less complete (albeit very dense) 
explanation in the context of the ‘four premises’, making it possible, if the reader was careful enough, 
to understand how the beryllus works. At this point Cusanus can say incipiamus, ‘let us begin’, with 
the aim of the primum principium (implicitly identified as the ‘proper’ object of vision using the 
intellectual beryllus in paragraph 3). 
The repetition of the ‘descent’ here and at the end of paragraph 2 is interesting, and while it 
could simply be an artifact of the ‘not well organized’ (minus bene digestus) state of the book according 
to Cusanus460, it would have been something easy to correct by Cusanus. What could he have wanted 
to say with this ‘double descent’ (paragraph 2 and here) ad rem? We can say that the res of the first 
formula might be the beryllus itself, a perfectly natural reference in the context, and that now the res 
means an effective practical application of it. The fact that the application to primum principium is 
                                                          
460 De Beryllo, 72, p. 85, 10. 
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achieved with a ‘descent’ may seem paradoxical, but we can see this choice as perfectly justified by 
Cusanus, as we see immediately below. 
Deridebat enim eos Indus ille, quem Socrates interrogabat, qui sine deo aliquid conabantur intelligere, 
cum sit omnium causa et auctor. (De Beryllo, 8, p. 10, 2-4) 
 
 The «Indian whom Socrates questioned» refers to a story in Eusebius’ Preparatione 
Evangelica461. The figure of the Indian is a paradigmatic exponent of someone whom a likely reader of 
Cusanus would consider an ‘outsider’: implicitly pagan, likely unfamiliar with both the Christian and 
the philosophical tradition, yet one who still recognizes that God is omnium causa et auctor, asserting 
the universality of human knowledge concerning a single creator principle. If we take this into account, 
the apparent paradoxical nature of a descensio ad rem with which we arrive at the primum principiùm 
is clarified: even if we make a ‘descent’ to the lowest possible starting point (without any help from 
any tradition familiar to the reader), we still cannot even attempt to understand (conabantur intelligere) 
anything without the primum principium. While at this point it is not clear how this is the case (i.e. what 
sine means (‘without knowledge of it’?, or ‘without at the same time considering the principium’?, or 
perhaps ‘without being aware of the principium in general terms’?), it argues for the need to take the 
principium as an object from the start. At the same time, we note that Cusanus chooses to start by 
emphasizing ‘those’, eos, who erred on this point, indicating that they exist (and implicitly that, likely, 
there are many of them), and we note the verb deridebat, which recalls the risu dignum of the second 
paragraph, therefore suggesting that ‘these’ (eos) mentioned here are probably the same with the his, 
qui elevationes intellectuales ignorant from the second paragraph. Cusanus is thus constructing a 
powerful rhetorical inversion: in paragraph 2, these ‘ignorant ones’ were seeing haec alta as a laughing 
matter, and now the Indian (who, Cusanus is implying by this parallel, is not himself ignorant of the 
elevationes intellectuales, although he can be assumed to be ignorant of the Christian and philosophical 
                                                          
461 EUSEBIUS OF CAESAREA, Werke, ed. K. Mras, Berlin 1954-56, XI, 3, 8, p. 9, a work Cusanus possessed in 1454, cf. 
VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, p. 120. Found in Cod. Cusanus 41, fol. 1ra-203rb, where Cusanus leaves a note next to the 
passage about the Indian, fol. 147rb: «notandum de Indo». 
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tradition – an important point) laughs at them instead, and is fully endorsed by Cusanus in doing so. 
Implicitly, Cusanus is suggesting a progression on the reader’s part, from the initial ‘knowing that one 
is lacking’ to the point at which he can be considered a companion of Cusanus in the application of the 
method (incipiamus and the use of first person plural verbs in this paragraph), and in laughing at the 
(possibly many) ‘ignorant ones’. 
Volumus autem ipsum ut principium indivisibile videre. Applicemus beryllum mentalibus oculis et 
videamus per maximum, quo nihil maius esse potest, pariter et minimum, quo nihil minus esse potest, 
et videmus principiùm ante omne magnum et parvum, penitus simplex et indivisibile omni modo 
divisionis, quo quaecumque magna et parva sunt divisibilia. (De Beryllo, 8, p. 10, 4 – p. 11, 9) 
 
At this point, after the multiple (and not explicitly signaled) applications of the beryllus within 
the ‘four premises’ section, Cusanus presents the first explicit, ‘pre-announced’ application of the 
method, introduced with the phrase applicemus beryllum mentalibus oculis (later recurring in various 
variations). The verb, as expected, is videre. Explicitly, the method is described as having the primum 
principium as its ‘natural’ object, but always seen in a particularly defined way, with a particular 
criterion which allows the conception of a ‘maximum’ and ‘minimum’ for the purpose of allowing us 
to ‘see’ the primum principium ‘beyond’ the ontological realm of application of the chosen ordering 
criterion, in a relationship of ontological distinction between two domains (or ‘levels’) which 
characterizes each application of the method. 
This first explicit application of the method is highly abstract, dense, and presents complex 
interpretive problems, taking up the criterion of ‘dimension’ in the most general sense (magna, parva) 
which is implicitly identified with the *divisibilitas of the divisibilia. Yet Cusanus urges us to examine 
the maximum and minimum conceivable in terms of *magnitudo (i.e. magnus-parvus, and not in terms 
of divisibilitas or divisio as we would have expected if the object was to see the principle as 
indivisibilis), and we are to identify the principium as ante magnum et parvum (ante, ‘before’, a highly 
recurring technical term which describes the ‘infinitized’ object in relation to the greater-lesser 
opposition based on the criterion used), penitus simplex (suggesting that the criterion could also be 
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interpreted as simplicitas, with simplex instead of magnus, which still remains within the same 
conceptual realm of divisibilitas and magnitude), and also ‘indivisible in any mode of division’ (omni 
modo divisioni), which again invokes divisibilitas. 
Unpacking this complex structure, and distinguishing the three criteria carefully, we arrive at 3 
distinct applications of the method that Cusanus chose to join into one: 
B[magna et parva, *magnitudo] -> primum principium 
                   - primum principium est ante magnum et parvum 
B[*omnia, *simplicitas] -> primum principium 
                   - primum principium est penitus simplex 
B[divisibilia, *divisibilitas] -> primum principium 
                   - primum principium est indivisibile omni modo divisionis  
 
We see that this passage is rather complex to interpret, and that Cusanus did not choose a simple 
and easy example to inaugurate the clearly ‘pre-announced’ uses of the method, but instead launched 
directly into rather high-level speculations, combining in a single sentence multiple uses of the method 
to join different ‘divine names’ freely. The great difference in difficulty between this example and the 
comparatively simple presentation of the calamus and linea-angulus geometrical example in the 
following paragraphs must have been obvious to Cusanus, and is evidently an intentional choice on his 
part as to the order the text. For the purpose of the praxis promised from the beginning, it looks like 
Cusanus has made the choice to present some particularly difficult exercises in this paragraph 8, and 
then solve the reader’s growing perplexity with a very simple geometrical image in the following 
paragraphs. Had the reader simply started with the ‘easy’ linea-angulus geometrical image, arguably 
they would not have had in front of their eyes the final goal: i.e. to ‘see’ the primum principium in 
various ways. But in this way, Cusanus offers the geometrical illustrations for a better understanding 
of these ‘advanced’ applications that are already introduced in this paragraph, and which give a preview 
of his ultimate goal in the application of the method. 
Ac si per beryllum intueamur inaequalitatem, erit aequalitas indivisibilis obiectum, et perabsolutam 
similitudinem videbimus principium indivisibile omni modo divisionis, quo similitudo est divisibilis seu 
variabilis, scilicet veritatem. Nam nullum est aliud obiectum illius visionis nisi veritas, quae videtur 
per omnem similitudinem maximam pariter et minimam absolutum primum principium omnis suae 




After the difficult passage just examined, Cusanus chooses to raise again the level of difficulty, 
presenting two additional applications of the method, the second with some puzzling terminology, 
connected in the same sentence. Keeping the theme of *divisibilitas (while also invoking an implicit 
*variabilitas) as a constant to link these two applications, Cusanus again applies the method using the 
criterion of inaequalitas (by examining the principle as aequalitas), then uses an implicit criterion of 
similitudo by examining it as veritas462. New terms are also introduced: the verb intuere, used like 
videre with per beryllum to indicate the application of the method, and then obiectum (illius visionis) 
as the direct object of the ‘B-structure’, i.e. what we examine in a particular application of the method. 
We can also remark that Cusanus speaks of the ordering criterion examined in an application of the 
method as the grammatical object (in the accusative case) of videre / intuere, while the class of objects 
to which it applies is usually left as presupposed (if there is nothing to distinguish the class of objects 
in any way, we will mark it as an undefined, most general *res). 
Here is the B-notation of the two applications in this sentence: 
B[*res, inaequalitas] -> principium 
                              - aequalitas  
B[omnes similitudines, *similitudo] -> principium 
                                    - absoluta similitudo 
                                    - indivisibili omni modo divisionis quo similitudo est divisibilis seu variabilis 
                                    - veritas 
                                    - absolutum primum principium omnis suae similitudinis 
 
The per absolutam similitudinem is particularly problematic to interpret463. The problem is that 
Cusanus commonly uses absolutus to refer to infinite objects, usually final objects of an application of 
the method, and uses per to refer to a medium, such as the beryllus itself; therefore, it is normal for him 
to say «per + [accusative noun] + videatur Y absolutum» and not «per X absolutum videatur Y». 
                                                          
462 Cf. also the construction veritas-verisimilis in paragraph 2 (Chapter 3.2.2) above. 
463 The interpretive difficulty is also seen from the fact that the passage has been amended in both the first two printed 
editions (Paris and Berlin) to per absoluti similitudinem «by a similitude of the first principle», which is much easier to 
interpret, while the Tegernsee manuscript Codex Monacensis 18621 has perabsolutam, which may have been intended as a 
modification in the same direction, eliminating the ‘per’ and predicating everything of ‘principium’. Cf. the apparatus ad 
locum in De Beryllo, p. 11. 
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However, the manuscript evidence indicates that this was there in the original. Why does Cusanus use 
this formulation here? As for a number of other problematic passages, the connotation for this 
paradoxical-seeming formulation is strikingly Christological: similitudo absoluta, a term Cusanus 
never uses again in the text, evokes (and is here in close proximity to) aequalitas [absoluta], a common 
term in Cusanus for Christ. If one keeps in mind that in the previous paragraph homo was identified as 
a similitudo of God (not only by being one of the entia realia, but particularly as having intellectus), 
then, reading this passage Christologically, this clause would mean ‘through the likeness-of-God that 
is also absolute’ (i.e. ‘through what is both God and man’), and the meaning would be perfectly 
consonant in Cusanus’ overall framework (see the analysis in Chapters 5.3-5.5).   
In this final argument, Cusanus more clearly formalizes the use of the method for the similtudo-
veritas relationship already established and used in paragraph 5, and offers a general formula, one that 
can serve as a paradigm for the application of the method in general, given the fact that it applies ‘for 
omnes similitudines’, for which the most probable reading is ‘for all types (i.e., any particular type) of 
similarity’, which formula could cover any conceivable use of the method as long as the ultimate 
objectum is the veritas / primum principium. 
Sic si per beryllum videmus divisionem, erit obiectum conexio indivisibilis; ita de proportione et 
habitudine et pulchritudine et talibus. (De Beryllo, 8, p. 11, 15-17) 
 
Cusanus ends paragraph 8 (and the ‘Methodological section’ of the book) by offering a list of 
applications, which can be extended and generalized, as promised in the first paragraph; obviously, the 
reader is presumed to already be able to apply the method already explained in any similar cases: ita de 
talibus. We observe that the list of selected examples, and the list of applications already investigated 
as examples in this paragraph, was chosen with great care: we have in fact examined the principium as 
‘simple / indivisible / before multiplicity’, then as aequalitas, generalized to veritas-similitudo, and 
now the first example proposed is to examine it through divisio, which Cusanus says will show the 
principium as conexio indivisibilis: we thus have here the triad unitas-aequalitas-nexus, the preferred 
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Trinitological expression in De Beryllo which is developed at length later. Thus, Cusanus offers here a 
subtle introduction to Cusanian Trinitology (and to what will be its main argumentative modus operandi 
in De Beryllo: the combination of terms derived from different applications of the beryllus for 
describing the divine persons)464. 
For the other examples, proportio, habitus, pulchritudo and et talibus, one wonders what the 
extension of talibus, ‘things of this sort’, would be. We observe that for this clause, the grammatical 
form of introducing the elements of the application of the method has changed: while in the first part 
of this paragraph it was made explicit what the criterion was (e.g. what one will see the principium as 
a maximum and minimum of, e.g. divisio) as well as the obiectum (e.g. conexio, the main ‘divine name’ 
which is to be derived) for each application of the method, here Cusanus does not offer the obiectum 
for proportio, etc. This is something like an ‘exercise left for the reader,’ not difficult to solve, because 
it is apparent that proportio, habitus, pulchritudo (all with the qualifier absolutus) can each of them be 
the obiectum for any particular relationship associated with them. Proportio is a very general term, 
denoting in Cusanus more or less any definable relationship between finites, and habitus seems 
similarly general465; thus, it seems that talis would include, in effect, any conceivable relationship 
between objects. Cusanus is offering here the blueprint for a truly exhaustive methodology. 
But the use of the method so far has been restricted to the abstract derivation of a single ‘divine 
name’ (aequalitas, veritas, etc.), without much in terms of ‘name transfer’ between different images. 
There is also the crucial possibility of using the method not with the primum principium as the object, 
but with a finite object (considered in relation to what can be seen as its own particular principium: e.g. 
angle and line), and then linking two instances of the method, as we have seen, to ‘transfer’ the 
relationships found between one and another, making them ‘divine names’ within the principium-
                                                          
464 On the ‘beryllic’ construction of Trinitological arguments, see the analysis in Chapter 3.4.4. 
465 In connection with habitus, Senger and Bormann (De Beryllo, p. 72, note to paragraph 63 line 2) point to a passage in 
Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate, where habitus and proportio are connected and similarly 
‘universal’ in scope: THOMAS AQUINAS, Expositio secundum librum Boethii De Trinitate, q. 1, a. 2 ad 3, in Studien und 
Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, ed. J. Koch, Leiden 1955, vol. IV, p. 67, 10-12: «proportion nihil aliud est 
quam habitudo duorum ad invicem convenientium in aliquo, secundum hoc quod conveniunt aut differunt». 
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directed applications of the beryllus. Cusanus uses the geometrical images that follow to illustrate this 
point, as well as offer, as is his declared goal, more praxis for the reader’s intellect. 
3.4 Mathematical and geometrical images used in the application of the beryllus 
 
 We will proceed to the examination of the four main geometrical constructions that Cusanus 
employs as images for the beryllus/scientia aenigmatica method he has introduced in the 
‘methodological section’ of paragraphs 1-8. As we read at the end of paragraph 8, Cusanus believes he 
has already given the reader everything they need in order to apply the beryllus to, in effect, any 
criterion or relationship between objects (8, p. 11, 15: et talibus – the only implicit requirement is that 
it should be possible to define a ‘more’ or ‘less’, a magnus and parvus for the relationship, so that one 
could conceivably construct a maximum pariter et minimum)466. He believes he has accomplished the 
first part of the promise he made in paragraph 1: to propose a speculum et aenigma through which 
anyone’s intellectus, being infirmus, could assist itself and guide itself «in the highest realm of things 
knowable», in ultimo scibilium467. What is left is the second part of his plan for the work: to propose 
sententias et opiniones so that the reader may become a judge of ‘how close’ they get to veritas. This 
describes the rest of the book until paragraph 71. However, a reader will note that Cusanus has not yet 
talked about any criterion for ‘how close an opinion gets’ to veritas (although veritas has been identified 
with the primum principium). Yet this is at the core of what the reader is supposed to be able to do in 
this ‘second part’ of the book. Cusanus must believe that ‘how to rank sententias et opiniones’ must be 
implicit in the method itself, and that it is only a matter of applying it correctly. His four geometrical 
illustrations show precisely how this is to be done and why Cusanus believes this. (Although, in the 
end, his notion of how to do this implies not just the method itself but also a certain separate 
                                                          
466 See the explanation of the fundamental structure in Chapter 2.3. 
467 De Beryllo, 1, p. 3, 5-7. Note here that the term scibilium introduced in the first paragraph has found its correlate with 
the introduction of the aenigmatica scientia. Scibilia is clearly a different realm from sensibilia or intelligibilia (though it 
likely includes them plus something ‘extra’: the ultimo, for which we again note the possible Christological interpretation), 
and it appears to be yet another name for the realm corresponding to visus subtilissimus, visio intellectualis, quae sunt 
supra/excedant, in excessu. Cusanus’ chief goal is, then, to help the reader use their intellectus to access this realm, because 
the intellectus is, at least for this purpose (precisely because scibilia is ultimately wider than intelligibilia) infirmus. 
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‘hierarchical principle’ of simplicitas as an ‘input’ that governs the choice of images used and structures 
to be built wih the method—see our analysis of the notion of hierarchy in Chapter 4.2-3).  
3.4.1 The calamus image (linea - angulus) – De Beryllo, 9, p. 11, 1 – 10, p. 13, 22 
 
 This is the first image offered by Cusanus, and he introduces it by a direct instruction, with the 
verb videre: «see an aenigma of this art (ars) of ours». Ars is another new name for the method, 
suggesting a ‘craft’ that requires practice468, and which will crucially recur at the end of the book in an 
explicitly Christological image469. The first person plural possessive pronoun underlies the ‘closeness’ 
to the reader that Cusanus has emphasized in paragraph 8, since the ‘art’ of the method ‘belongs’ now 
to the reader as well. 
 Interestingly, Cusanus doesn’t introduce the image as a ‘geometrical’ construction at all – 
rather, he instructs the reader to take a reed (calamus) and fold it in the middle; a little later, he switches 
to talking about the abstract line in his geometrical illustration: esto igitur quod calamus sit ut linea… 
(p. 12, 3-4). He starts from a physical object and an instruction for the reader to physically follow, 
trying to counterbalance the ‘abstractness’ of the previous paragraph with praxis470. 
 First of all, he introduces a fundamental principle, namely that a line is the principium of a 
surface and of angles on the surface471—however, this is meant to help the reader, and is not strictly 
required for his argument; it is rather an explanation of how principium works in this context, 
                                                          
468 Flasch remarks that Cusanus intends ars in a Lullian sense, which requires not only learning but practical instruction, cf. 
FLASCH, Nikolaus Cusanus, p. 41.  
469 De Beryllo, 70, p. 81, 2-6: «apprehensio eiusdem artis… sic intellectus divinus ars est omnipotentis…  se nude ostendet 
in illa die», all in an explicitly eschatological context and with a Christological referent. See my analysis of this in Chapter 
5. 
470 Cf. FLASCH, Nikolaus Cusanus, pp. 39-40. 
471 Cf. ARISTOTLE, Metaphyisca, V, 8, 1017b19-22. In the Bessarion translation (ID., Aristoteles Latine, 1017b17-23, p. 
498): «quaecunque particulae insitae sint in talibus, definientes et quod quid significantes, quibus peremptis totum perimitur, 
ut superficie corpus, ut quidam aiunt, et linea superficies. et universaliter numerus videtur quibusdam talis esse (eo etenim 
perempto nihil esse) et omnia terminare». The quidam who say this are the Platonists and Pythagoreans, and the argument 
is that if the line is removed (as a principle), all (the surface) is removed, an identical argument to the one for numerus. 
These geometrical and mathematical principles are very familiar to a reader of Cusanus, as he employs them at length in De 
Docta Ignorantia, I, 13-15, 35-37, pp. 25, 17-8, 26, 21-22, 27, 16-17, 28, 11-23; 39, p. 29, 4. Furthermore, we must note 
that he adds anguli superficiales which is not present in his sources, so that one cannot accurately say that Cusanus is simply 
relying on this view from the tradition. 
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identifying it as the coincidence of the maximum and minimum472 which the reader can easily see in 
the geometrical image Cusanus offers: 
 
 Here is the B-notation of the full application of the beryllus to this image in paragraph 9:  
   B[formabiles anguli, acutus-obtusus] -> continua linea CB cum CA 
      - in eo motu CB cum CA causat omnes formabiles angulos 
      - numquam erit aliquis [angulus] ita acutus, quin possit esse acutior 
      - numquam erit aliquis [angulus] ita obtusus, quin possit esse obtusior 
   B[angulus, acutus-obtusus] -> principium angulorum 
      - principium non est aliquid angulus 
      - principium est simplex linea 
      - principium superficialium angulorum est indivisibile omni modo divisionis, quo anguli 
sunt divisibiles 
   SICUTI-ITA 
   B[*res, maius-minus] -> absolutum primum principium 
  
 Accordingly, we have the basic image of a relationship found between two types of objects (a 
line and the angles it forms), when one is defined in terms of a coincidentia oppositorum of the other, 
and thus its principium and simplex, indivisibilis (in relation to it), etc. The beryllus allows us to ‘see’ 
these relationships, and then (this is the crucial part) to ‘transfer’ them (i.e., the ways of speaking about 
these objects in relation) to another use of the beryllus. Cusanus emphasizes very carefully where this 
step takes place, and the way it will be accomplished throughout De Beryllo, by means of a sicuti…ita 
structure: sicuti igitur hoc vides, ita per speculum et aenigmate videas absolutum primum principium 
(9, p. 12, 13-14).  
 Cusanus admonishes the reader to pay attention that the object they are ‘seeing’ in the 
application of the beryllus to the elements in the image is, in fact, a coincidentia oppositorum: the 
maximum and minimum in relation to the chosen property must not be duo, but rather coincide in the 
same one object, which is the crucial requirement for the method to work (10, p. 12, 1-4). He clarifies 
                                                          
472 In our account of the principles underlying the ‘B-notation’ in Chapter 2.3, this can be referred to as seeing the Level I 
object as the principium of Level II objects; this is only one particular relationship, but it has fundamental importance for 
Cusanus, as we see him define the beryllus method as implicitly aimed at the principium in paragraph 3 and paragraph 8.  
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by adding an element to the previously static image of the angle: the reader must ‘make’ the angle-
building line CD ‘movable’ (mobilis) – (10, p. 12, 1 – p. 13, 5): 
 
 This lets the reader build all possible angles while keeping the line-angle relationship (of 
principium and principatum) constant, in order to illustrate, most generally, how one constructs a 
coincidentia oppositorum when considering a particular criterion (which in our image is the size of the 
angle): the goal is to ‘see’ (the verb used constantly and repeatedly here) how the maximum and 
minimum appear as one, and their duality disappears (dualitas debet cessare): in this way, one has 
identified a principium for the purpose of the method. Cusanus introduces a great wealth of terms and 
expressions describing the relationship between the line and angles as principium and principiata—
which, crucially, can be ‘transferred’ from this particular image to any other similarly constructed 
(‘berillic’) structure, including ones which take as their object the absolutum principium. Thus, all the 
relationships describable in this linea-anguli structure become ways of speaking about God. 
 Accordingly, here is the B-notation for the ‘updated’ image used in paragraph 10. Note how 
Cusanus switches from the linea-anguli image to the principium and back (by the word puta), and then 
back again in the last sentence introduced with sic: 
   B[omnia, maius-minus] -> principium 
       -*principium indivisibile 
       -*maximum et minimum non duo 
   HOC CLARE VIDEBIS SI 
   B[ACD-BCD anguli, maius-minus] -> angulus maximum pariter et minimum  
       - quamdiu CD unum angulum cum CA et alium cum CB constituit, nullus est maximus aut 
minimus 
       - angulus semper maior potest esse, in tantum maior, quantum alius exsistit  
       - [angulus] non est prius unus maximus quam alius minimus 
       - [maximus vel minimus] hoc esse non potest, quamdiu sunt duo anguli 
       - si dualitas cessare debet angulorum, non [*esset] nisi CD super lineam AB et nullum 
angulum 
       - [angulus] post simplicem lineam 
       - angulus maximum pariter et minimum est ante duo angulos 
       - angulus maximum pariter et minimum non est signabilis 
   IGITUR 
   B[principiata, maius-minus] -> principium 
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       - principium est maximum pariter et minimum 
       - omne principiatum non possit esse nisi similitudo principii 
       - omne principiatum nec maius nec minus principio esse possit 
   PUTA 
   B[anguli, maius-minus] -> principium angulorum 
       - nullus possit esse angulus adeo acutus, quin suam acutiem habeat a principio 
       - nec possit esse aliquis ita obtusus, quin esse ipsum tale habeat a suo principio 
       - necesse est quod omni acuto dabili, cum possit esse acutior, in virtute principii sit creare 
acutiorem 
       - *necesse est quod omni obtuso dabili, cum possit esse obtusior, in virtute principii sit 
creare obtusiorem 
   SIC  
   B[principiata, maius-minus] -> principium 
       - principium est aeternum et inevacuabile per omnia principiata 
 
 To reiterate, these relationships gained from each ‘B-structure’ (and transferable to any other) 
are the heart of how Cusanus’ method works, as they are ‘gained’ as transferable expressions for talking 
about any other object of a beryllus structure, including the principium as such, i.e. God. Thus, we are 
presented with a productive method for constructing ‘divine names’, without taking anything away 
from the fundamental unknowability and innominability of the principium itself.  
 What Cusanus does next is very interesting: he interrupts his account of the linea-anguli image 
in order to offer an interpretation of ‘the great’ Pseudo-Dionysius’ De Divinis Nominibus473, with 
explicit citations, asserting that «he said these same things (ista) in a pithy (compendiose) [and elegant 
                                                          
473 He is quoting from the Ambrogio Traversari translation he (proudly) owns, cf. his mention of owning the «novissima 
Ambrosii Camaldulensis translatione» in Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae, 2, 13, p. 10, 16-17. This translation is found in Cod. 
Cusanus 43. Cusanus is quoting from three distinct places from what is chapter VIII in his translation, but which correspond 
to chapter V, 7, 8 and 10 in the critical edition edited by Beate Regina Suchla, as follows: 
PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, De Divinis Nominibus, V, 7, p. 185, 16-25 (821B): «Ούδέν ούν άτοπον έξ άμυδρών εΙκόνων έπΐ τό 
πάντων αίτιον άναβάντας ύπερκοσμίοις όφθαλμοϊς θεωρήσαι πάντα έν τω πάντων αίτίω καί τά άλλήλοις έναντία μονοειδώς 
καί ήνωμένως, άρχή γάρ έστι τών όντων, άφ’ ής καί αύτό τό εΤναι καί πάντα τά όπωσούν όντα, πδσα άρχή, πάν πέρας [*], 
πάσα ζωή, πάσα άθανασία, πάσα σοφία, πάσα τάξις, πάσα άρμονία, πάσα δύναμις, πάσα φρουρά, πάσα ϊδρυσις, πάσα 
διανομή, πάσα νόησις, πάς λόγος, πάσα αϊσθησις, πάσα Ιξις, πάσα στάσις, πάσα κίνησις, πάσα ενωσις, πάσα κράσις, πάσα 
φιλία, πάσα έφαρμογή, πάσα διάκρισις, πάς όρος [*] καί τά άλλα, όσα τω είναι όντα τά όντα πάντα χαρακτηρίζει». (The 
passage enclosed between [*] [*] is skipped over by Cusanus in his citation). Cf. De Beryllo, 11, p. 13, 3 – 14, 9: «Nihil 
itaque alienum a nostro instituto facimus, si per exiles imagines, ad auctorem omnium ascendentes purgatissimis et mundo 
superioribus oculis inspiciamus omnia in omnium causa et invicem contraria uniformiter et coniuncte. Est enim principium 
rerum, ex quo est ipsum esse et omnia, quae quomodolibet sunt, omne initium et omnis finis. Et post pauca subiungit: et 
alia quaeque ipso esse cum sint quae sunt, omnia exculpunt»; 
Ibid., V, 8, p. 187, 6-8 (821D): «Ταύτα γαρ πάντα τοις θεοπρεπώς ύμνοΰσι τό κατά πασαν αύτόν έπίνοιαν ύπερουσίως είναι 
σημαίνει καί των πανταχώς όντων αίτιον»; cf. De Beryllo, 11, p. 14, 11-13: «Dicit enim omnia «exemplaria rerum in una 
supersubstantiali coniunctione in sui et omnium causa ante subsistere concedendum»; 
Ibid., V, 10, p. 189, 8-9 (825B): «καί πέρας πάντων καί άπειρία πάσης άπειρίας»; 12-13: «καί έστώς καί κινούμενος καί 
ούτε έστώς ούτε κινούμενος»; cf. De Beryllo, 11, p. 14, 9-11: «Idem de eodem principio affirmat quod sit «finis» et 
«infinitus, stans et» progrediens et quod «neque» sit «stans neque se movens»». 
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(eleganter)] way». At the end, he tells the reader to «see how clear (lucide) that divine man affirmed 
the things before (quae praemissi) in this place and in other places474». But why does Cusanus add this 
paragraph here, in the middle of his geometrical demonstration, when he could have invoked Pseudo-
Dionysius explicitly, for instance in the ‘four premises’ section (and to which, in fact, the word 
praemissi in this paragraph might be taken to obliquely refer)? The answer lies in the fact that Cusanus 
has just developed his own way of constructing ‘divine names’, and instead of citing Pseudo-Dionysius 
as a mere ‘authority’, he is implying that all the particular names for God cited in the passages he 
chooses can be arrived at by using the beryllus in the manner just indicated in the linea-anguli 
example—and he assumes that, just like the ‘list’ at the end of paragraph 8, he assumes the reader can 
already see how these can all be derived using his beryllus method. 
 Interpreting Cusanus’ intention this way, we can identify all the ‘names’ he cites as if they were 
derived using the beryllus regarding the principium, which would result, for example, in speculative B-
structures such as the following possibility (in which one would ‘look at’ the opposition between a 
(finite) auctor and his res creata, and derive precisely the relationships that are predicated by Pseudo-
Dionysius of God): 
B[*res creata ab auctore, *gradus] -> *auctor  
       - *auctor 
       - *causa    
B[*omnia, *gradus] -> principium  
       - principium est auctor omnium 
       - principium est omnium causa; omnia in omnium causa *sunt 
       - contraria uniformiter conjuncte [sunt in auctore] 
       - principium rerum ex quo est ipsum esse et omnia, quae quomodolibet sunt  
       - principium est omne initium et omnis finis 
       - alia quaeque ipso esse cum sint quae sunt, omnia exculpunt 
       - omnia exemplaria rerum in una supersubstantiali coniunctione in sui et omnium causa ante 
subsistere concedendum 
 
B[*principiata, *gradus] -> principium 
       - principium est finis et infinitus 
B[*principiata, *motus] -> principium 
       - principium est stans et progrediens 
       - principium neque sit stans neque se movens 
 
                                                          
474 Similar formulations (i.e. a long list of negations of both pairs of opposites about God) are found in PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, 
De Mystica Theologia, V, pp. 149-150 (1045D-1048B). 
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 The two B-structures at the end would be entirely similar to the ‘independent’ structures in 
paragraph 8 (cf. principium indivisible). As is obvious, there are many other possibilities of deriving 
Pseudo-Dionysius’ language using the beryllus (the example I have given above tries to group most of 
them under one image, i.e. the auctor and his works), for each particular ‘divine name’, and Cusanus 
says nothing about which particular ‘beryllic’ structures he has in mind. However, he includes Pseudo-
Dionysius’ list of ‘divine names’ at this point because he wants the reader to interpret them as being 
derivable by the same beryllus-employing comparative structure, even if not using the linea-anguli 
image of paragraphs 10-11. In this way, Cusanus avoids, in particular, the question of the differences 
between his views and those of Pseudo-Dionysius: in particular, the question of why Pseudo-Dionysius, 
accordin to Cusanus, held that haec alta should be hidden from the ‘uninitiated’ (paragraph 2), while 
Cusanus seems to disagree. 
 In paragraph 12, right after the paragraph dedicated to Pseudo-Dionysius, in keeping with the 
overall dual symmetry between the ‘theological’ and ‘philosophical’ strands of the tradition that we 
have seen manifested numerous times in De Beryllo, Cusanus turns immediately to Proclus, and uses 
the linea-anguli image in order to prove three ‘Proclean’ theses: mensura as a ‘divine name’475 (a notion 
that he introduced in paragraph 6, but about homo); the notion of complicatio/complicare that he also 
introduced previously476; and the unnameability of God, seizing on the observation that the nomini 
angulorum (acute, right, obtuse) do not apply to the line477. This allows him to explicitly refer to 
Proclus’ commentary on the Parmenides for these three notions478, while emphasizing, at the same time, 
(1) Proclus’ fundamental agreement with Plato on this issue; (2) the fundamental agreement in this 
                                                          
475 See Chapter 3.3 and the analysis of paragraph 6 (‘Premise 3’) for the notion of mensura, particularly notes 439, 444 an 
452. 
476 See note 425 on the terms complicatio/explicatio.  
477 See also Chapter 4.1.1, the analysis of paragraph 13.  
478 Cf. PROCLUS, In Parmenidem, VI (Cousin 1069, 1074, 1087, Steel p. 362, 5; p. 365, 12ff; p. 374, 79ff) and Cusanus’ 
own marginal notes (CT III.2.2, marginalia 422: «omnia negantur ab uno deo deorum», 434: «nota quomodo negations in 
diuinis preferuntur affirmationibus», 456: «que sunt assequentia enti ut tali in secunda ypotesi ponuntur et secundum primam 
ypotesim ab uno negantur», found also in the Steel edition, pp. 546-547); cf. also PROCLUS, Theologia Platonis, II, 5, ed. 
Portus, p. 93, S-W II, p. 37.12-19; ibid., IV, 11, ed. Portus, p. 197, S-W IV, p. 37.8-10; ibid., V, 16, ed. Portus, p. 277, with 
Cusanus’ own notes ad locum: cf. CT III.2.1, marginalia 163: «de deo Plato aliquando per analogiam ad secunda loquitur 
aliquando per abnegaciones», 275: «ad dionysium» (with the correction in the hand of Nicholas: «et incognoscibilem in 
intellectualibus per negationes hanc Plato mystice ostendit»), 343: «primus deus supra patris denominationem. ineffabilis 
neque unum neque bonum proprie dicitur».   
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regard with Dionysius noster479; (3) the identification of theologia negativa and theologia affirmativa, 
particularly in Pseudo-Dionysius, as each fitting with particular aspects of using the beryllus (in the 
linea-anguli image), implying at the same time that his method is not reducible to either of these and is 
in fact aimed at overcoming their limitations480. 
 Here is the B-notation describing the full application of the beryllus in paragraph 12: 
   B[angulus, maior-minor*] -> angulus maximum pariter et minimus 
       - a. m. est actus omnis formabilis anguli 
       - a. m. est nec maior, nec minor, ante omnem quantitatem 
       - a. m. est simplicissimus 
       - a. m. in se omnes formabiles sive magnos sive parvos complica[t] nec maiorem nec 
minorem quocumque dabili 
       - [anguli maximo] non plus nomen unius quam omnium angulorum atque nullius convenit 
       - nec acutus nec rectus nec obtusus angulus [maximus] nominari potest, cum non sit aliquis 
talis, sed simplicissima omnium causa 
   IAM QUOMODO  
   B[omnia*, maior-minor] -> primum omnium mensuram 
        - primum omnium mensura est omnia complicite quae esse possunt 
 
3.4.2 The linea veritatis and the punctus – superficies images – De Beryllo, 19, p. 22, 1 – 23, p. 26, 
15 
 
 As Cusanus says in paragraph 18 when introducing this new geometrical image (18, p. 21, 1-
3), ‘what the beryllus and aenigma show you’ is the ultimate criterion for judging all positions that will 
be examined, in full concord with the description of this part of De Beryllo in 1, p.1, 10-13. He gives 
another formulation for what, precisely, the beryllus shows, with scilicet: that veritas gives being (esse 
tribuere) to all things per suam similitudinem481. He identifies this with Albert the Great’s thesis to the 
effect that «it must be said in some way (aliquot modo)» that «from the First, one Form flows into all 
things. This Form is the likeness of the essence of the First, and through it all things partake of being 
                                                          
479 Cf. PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, De Mystica Theologia, I, 3, p. 143-144 (1000C-D); PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, De Divinis Nominibus, 
XIII, 4, pp. 230-231 (981C-984A). Cf. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Super Dionysii Mysticam Theologiam, in ALBERTUS MAGNUS, 
Opera Omnia, ed. P. Simon, vol. XXXVII/2, p. 454, 78-84; p. 465, 65 – 466, 19, p. 471, 8ff. 
480 On how Cusanus aims to develop (in agreement with his view of Pseudo-Dionysius) the ‘third step’, cf. BOND, Nicolaus 
Cusanus: Selected Spiritual Works, p. 33 (affirmative, negative, coincident theology); MILLER, Reading Cusanus: Metaphor 
and Dialectic in a Conjectural Universe, pp. 19-26 (affirmation, negation, hyper-negation/eminence). Cf. the analysis in 
Chapter 2.3 and the other sources found in note 193. 
481 Cf. De Beryllo, 8, p. 11, 10-11: per suam absolutam similitudinem; note the possible Christological resonances there, 




that is derived from the First»482. Furthermore, Cusanus adds that veritas, which ‘is all it can be’ (id 
quod esse potest – a proof derived in paragraph 12), cannot be partaken of (imparticipabilis) but is 
instead communicabilis in its similitudo, in which «it can be received in greater or lesser degree in 
accordance with the disposition of the receiver». This is a further terminological refinement of the 
similitudo-veritas basic ontological pattern introduced in ‘Premise 1’ (paragraph 4), which Cusanus 
intends to explain and prove by means of the beryllus. But he is concerned, even more importantly, to 
establish hierarchical relationships between different ‘levels’ of being, which he has not shown how to 
do before: accordingly, he quotes Avicebron’s Fons Vitae, which establishes a hierarchy between 
‘being’ and ‘intellect’ by the notion of reflexiones: «that various reflexive turnings of being cause 
differences among beings, since one reflexive turning adds life to being, and two reflexive turnings add 
intellect»483, resulting in an ontological structure of esse – vivere – intelligere, one that Cusanus himself 
uses extensively484. The question is «how this can be understood in an aenigma»; here, Cusanus seems 
to imply that the reader has a lot of freedom: «you may (velis) envision in the way that follows», 
implying that there are other aenigmata that could also work for the same purpose. 
 This is the context for the image Cusanus proposes in paragraph 19, for which he gives these 
three illustrations:  
                                
 While this appears similar to the linea-angulum structure in paragraphs 9-12, it is introduced in 
a very different way: Cusanus identifies immediately how the parallel two ‘berillic’ structures should 
                                                          
482 De Beryllo, 18, p. 21, 4 – p. 22, 6, tr. Hopkins. (Wherever it is not directly specified, the translations are my own). Cf. 
ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Super De Divinis Nominibus, V, 32, p. 322, 14-17. 
483 SOLOMON IBN GABIROL, Fons vitae, ed. C. Bäumker, Munich 1895, III, 54, p. 199; V, 17-19, pp. 250-252. In their 
commentary, Senger and Bormann (De Beryllo, p. 107) identify the source of this passage in Cusanus as Albert’s 
commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius: ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Super De Divinis Nominibus, V, 32, p. 315, 62-79. 
484 Cf. De non aliud, IX, 32, p. 18, 3ff; De venatione sapientiae, XXXI, 93, p. 89, 8ff: «Et totus hic mundus est ex 
intellectualibus, ex vitalibus et existentibus»; De apice theoriae, 5, p. 120, 1-5. Cf. PROCLUS, In Parmenidem, VI (Cousin 
1098, Steel p. 383, 69-77), and Cusanus’ note: «unum maxime comprehensivum extra quod nihil, et post hoc ens, deinde 
vita, post intellectus» (CT III.2.2, p. 119, marginalia 478). See also the further discussion and sources regarding the ‘three 
modi’ in note 433 above. 
182 
 
work—from the beginning, line AB is said to be meant as an image of veritas which «falls in-between 
veritas and nothing» (which it does, of course, by the very fact that it is a similitudo). Most crucially 
for how Cusanus wants to present a ‘hierarchical’ image of being, the line is said explicitly at the 
beginning to represent veritas at one end, A, and nihil at the other end, B. It is not, therefore, a simple 
one-dimensional line like in the calamus image before, from which angles can be formed, so to speak, 
in any ‘direction’, so that an acute angle might be described at the same time as an obtuse angle. This 
is a completely different illustration: the line is, in fact, an axis on which one can move closer or farther 
away from veritas. Accordingly, as one can easily predict, the angles formed on it will have some extra 
properties, and will be able to be ordered: their magnitudo will now correspond, in fact, with the 
distance on the line from A, i.e. the distance from absolute Truth (veritas). Furthermore, we know from 
paragraph 12 that Cusanus has at his disposal names for anguli, i.e. acutus, rectus and obtusus, which 
were there used in a ‘negative’ way to prove God’s unnameability, as the line was, so to speak, an 
‘unordered’ image for the principium. Now, however, they can obviously be used to define an 
ontological structure of ‘closeness’ to veritas (cf. also minus, magis, maxime, useful comparative 
adverbs that Cusanus will use).  
 Accordingly, here is the B-structure for Cusanus’ construction in paragraph 19: 
    B[linea AB, gradus*] -> linea AC 
          - linea AB est fixa, ut egreditur a principio ut est AC, et mobilis, ut movetur super c 
complicatorie versus principium 
    B[angulum, motus obtusus-acutus] -> linea AC 
          - in hoc motu CB cum CA causat varios angulos et CB est per motum differentias 
similitudinis explicans 
          - primo in  similitudine minus formali obtusum angulum causat ipsius esse, deinde magis 
formali ipsius vivere, deinde maxime formali et acuto ipsius intelligere 
          - acutus angulus plus de activitate anguli et simplicitate participat et similior primo 
principio. Et est in aliis angulis, scilicet vitali et ipsius esse; sic vitalis in angulo ipsius esse 
    B[angulum, motus obtusus-acutus] -> AB  
          -  omnia in se continet, quae possunt explicari, et per motum fit explicatio  
    SIC/QUOMODO 
    B[omnia, *gradus] -> *principium 
          - motus ubi simplex elementum de se explicat elementatum 





We note that there was in fact no need for Cusanus to identify the line as similitudo veritatis in 
the beginning; he could have simply described a finite line that ‘folds back’ onto itself, determined the 
properties of the angles formed with the beryllus, and transferred everything to a beryllus structure with 
principium as its object, which he does in any case using sic and quomodo, precisely as he did in the 
calamus image.  Calling the line similitudo veritatis from the beginning seems to be simply a device 
for the reader to better understand Cusanus’ construction and its ‘oriented’ nature. However, this early, 
‘preemptive’ identification of exactly what the line will be the image of has a crucial purpose for 
Cusanus’ overall construction, which must be underlined carefully: the fact that the directionality (A = 
veritas, B = nihil) is assumed from the start. The method itself, combining two ‘B-structures’ in parallel, 
can in fact transfer any relationship that obtains between Level I and Level II objects in the first image 
to those in the second image, and has no constraints beyond that: from an image such as the angle ACB 
built in paragraph 19, one could (if one wanted to) identify the notion of ‘closeness to A’ in a completely 
different way when moving to the beryllus structure that involves the principium; indeed, one could 
identify B as standing for veritas and A for nihil, and completely reverse the acutus-[in magis formalis 
similitudo]485-obtusus ontological hierarchy triad as a result. Cusanus’ solution to this ‘subversive’ 
possibility is simple and straightforward: assert from the beginning (before the image is actually 
deployed) how exactly it must be used, i.e. what the directionality of the relationships will be. This is a 
crucial issue for the notion of hierarchy that Cusanus is trying to construct, and will be analyzed further 
in Chapter 4.3. 
We note that Cusanus here manages to create a structure compatible with Albert’s dictum in 
paragraph 18, with the linea being an intermediate level, an image of something that remains 
incommunicable (veritas), yet itself communicable to the angles formed. But he still needs to build the 
structure in Avicebron’s account, with a threefold sequence of esse – vivere – intelligere. This is 
precisely what does in paragraph 20, changing the image by adding the mathematicus to the image, i.e. 
                                                          




a mathematician who is drawing a line (1) and ‘folding’ it into a triangle (2); this arguably changes the 
image on a fundamental level, as it switches from a ‘line-angles’ structure to a ‘mathematician-figure’ 
fundamental opposition (i.e. the mathematician is the principium and the line is the principiatum, and 
in turn the line is the principium and the triangle is the principiatum)—which is precisely what Cusanus 
intends: he thus introduces an ‘intermediate’ level of being, that of the mathematicus, between veritas 
and the linea; the line is a creation and thus a similitudo of the mathematician, resulting in an implicit 
threefold hierarchical structure: mathematicus-linea-trianguli, which corresponds to intellectus 
conditor (incommunicabilis veritas) - communicabilis veritas - omnia vera (20, p. 24, 4-7). This 
structure is achieved by a superposition of applications of the beryllus, each ‘stage’ being seen as the 
image of the ontologically superior one: 
    B[vera, *gradus veritatis] -> intellectus conditor 
         - sic movet [CB/similitudinem suam], exemplaria, quae in se habet, explicat in sua 
similitudine 
   *SICUT 
   *B[angulus, obtusus-acutus] -> linea AB 
         - sic movet CB, exemplaria [angulorum], quae in se habet, explicat in sua similitudine 
    SICUT  
    B[triangulum, gradus explicationis*] -> mathematicus 
         - dum lineam plicat in triangulum, ipsum triangulum explicat motu complicationis, quem 
intra se habet in mente 
 
    B[AB, gradus in figuris*] -> mathematicus 
         - AB communicabilem veritatem [mathematici] incommunicabilis veritatis [mathematici] 
similitudo 
    UNDE DEBE IMAGINARI  
    B[veritas communicabilis, *gradus] -> veritas absoluta 
    B[omnnia vera, *gradus veritatis] -> veritas absoluta 
         - veritas communicabilis per quam omnia vera sunt vera, et non absoluta ut veritas, sed 
est in veris 
    B[omnia vera, *gradus potentiae] -> absoluta simplicitas omnipotens 
 
In this way, Cusanus manages to define a trinus gradus, a threefold division into things that 
sunt, vivunt and intelligunt, in a hierarchy based on simplicitas, and which is fully compatible with (and 
thus a ‘proof’ of) Avicebron’s reflexiones model, which also has the same three ‘levels’. The three 
levels are defined, in this image, by defining three ‘types’ of angles relative to their size (acutus, [magis 
in formali similitudine], obtusus), where the second one is interestingly left unnamed (we would expect 
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rectus). He has not yet managed to show, for example, that the beings in the hierarchy have a particular 
relationship (i.e. participation) among those at different ‘levels’. But he has constructed the model for 
how to build a pattern of levels where each is an image of the former, on the pattern of the sequence 
mathematicus-linea-triangulus. Notably, though, he avoids saying that the mathematician himself is an 
image of the intellectus conditor, which would make this a four-level construction. He undertakes to 
explicitly build such a four-level construction in the next paragraphs. 
 In the next few paragraphs (21-23), using what is introduced explicitly as a separate image (alia 
aenigma – 21, p. 25, 1), Cusanus undertakes to develop yet another multi-level ontological construction 
by successive applications of the beryllus at each stage, on the notion of the successive relationships of 
similitudo between veritas – unum/monas – punctus –  linea – superficies – corpus (correlated with 
longum, latum, profundum), with the criterion of indivisibilitas and then simplicitas. The argument in 
paragraph 21 proceeds as follows: 
    B[omnia*, simplicitas/indivisibilitas] -> veritas  
         - veritas est indivisibilis et incommunicabilis 
         - veritas se vult ostendere et communicare per suam similitudinem 
    SIT UT 
    B[punctus, simplicitas] -> unum/monas 
         - punctus est similitudo indivisibilitatis ipsius unius 
         - unum se vult ostendere et communicare per suam similitudinem 
         - punctus est communicabilis indivisibilitas in continuo  
         - punctus non sit unum 
 
 Interestingly, Cusanus starts the sequence of beryllus structures from the already familiar 
argument about veritas communicating itself (in paragraphs 19-20), and using it here to construct the 
relationship between punctus and unum. The crucial step which needs to be justified is at 21, p. 25, 3-
4, namely the principle that the indivisibility of the point486 is a similitudo of the indivisibility of the 
unum, which enables the chain of ‘downward extension’ by means of successive 
similitudo/indivisibilitas. Paragraph 22 introduces the three modi essendi and three modi dimensionis 
(which appear to overlap): 
 
                                                          
486 Cf. PROCLUS, In Parmenidem, VI (Cousin 1105, Steel p. 388, 45-47) and Nicholas’ note: «punctum non habet partes 
dimensionales, sed non simpliciter impartibile, tanquam nulla habens partem» (ibid., Steel p. 549).  
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    B[corpus, indivisibilitas] -> punctus 
         - punctus communicatus modo quo communicabilis est corpus 
         - punctus indivisibilis omni modo essendi continui et dimensionis [i.e. linea, superficies, 
corpus, longum, latum, profundum] 
 
 In paragraph 23, by the criterion of indivisibilitas, these are fashioned into a hierarchical 
structure similar to the hierarchy of angles (acutus, * , obtusus) in paragraphs 19-20: 
 
    B[linea, divisibilitas] -> punctus 
         - linea participat indivisibilitatem puncti, quia est linealiter indivisibilis 
         - linea in non lineam partiri nequit nec est divisibilis secundum latum et profundum. 
 
    B[superficies, divisibilitas] -> punctus 
         - superficies participat indvisibilitatem puncti, quia in non superficiem impartibilis 
    B[corpus, divisibilitas] -> punctus 
         - corpus, quia in non corpus secari nequit, [non est] secundum profundum divisibilis 
         - omne quod reperitur in corpore, non est nisi punctus 
    B[corpus/omne quod reperitur, divisibilitas] -> unus 
         - omne igitur, quod reperitur in corpore, non est nisi similitudo ipsius unius 
    B[punctus-linea-superficie-corpus, simplicitas] -> punctus    
         - in indivisibilitate puncti complicantur omnes illae indivisibilitates 
         - non reperitur punctus absolutus a corpore vel superficie aut linea 
         - punctus est principium intrinsecum dans indivisibilitatem 
    DE HAC TE ELEVA AD 
   *B[similitudines, *gradus] -> universum/veritas 
 
 The end result is having corpus, linea and superficie in the relationship of being images of the 
punctus (although this is not also said to hold, for instance, between any two of them), which is itself 
an image of the unum/monas, which is an image of veritas. Cusanus has constructed four ontological 
levels, descending in a hierarchy of similitudo/indivisibilitas (compare paragraphs 19-20 where he built 
a three-level structure: mathematicus – linea – triangulus). At the end (23, p. 26, 12-14), he tells the 
reader that from this argument they should «elevate [themselves] unto a likeness of [veritas] and of the 
universe; and by means of [this] quite clear symbolism [of a point] make a conjecture (conjectura)487 
about what has been said». 
 What is the point, one might ask, of building a three-level ontological structure and then building 
a four-level structure? (In addition, we recall that the initial image in paragraphs 9-12 had only two 
                                                          
487 This is the only occurrence in De Beryllo of the term conjectura, a highly prominent term in the earlier Cusanus (cf. e.g. 
De conjecturis, I, 11, 57, p. 58, 1-17); as such, this acts both as a link to Cusanus’ earlier conceptualizations of the 




ontological levels: linea and angulus) A reader might ask themselves: which one is supposed to be the 
actually ‘true’ one? Cusanus’ ultimate point seems to be that this is, in the end, a misguided question: 
the method he proposes can help in constructing such ‘models’, which can be built from simple images, 
with the beryllus method, whenever one needs to examine, for instance, a dictum by Pseudo-Dionysius, 
Proclus, Albert or Avicebron (featuring two-level, three-level, or four-level structures, etc.). Indeed, in 
these passages the beryllus has always been used to show ‘how these opinions are true’, and not, for 
instance, to refute any of them. 
3.4.3 The anguli – naturae congnoscitivae image – De Beryllo, 32, p. 36, 13 – 19 
 
Tu igitur si volueris aeternam sapientiam sive principium cognoscitivum videre, posito beryllo ipsum 
videas per maximum pariter et minimum cognoscibile. Et in aenigmate quemadmodum de angulis 
inquire acutas, formales, simplices et penetrativas naturas cognoscitivas uti angulos acutos, alias 
obtusiores et demum obtusissimas uti obtusos angulos. Et omnes gradus venari poteris possibiles, et 
quemadmodum de hoc sic dixi, ita de quibuscumque sic se habentibus. (32, p. 36, 13-19) 
  
This is a very important ‘methodological’ passage, in which Cusanus seems to give a brief 
description of using the beryllus method, in direct address to the reader. He says this a few lines after 
the extraordinary statement that «all of the foregoing writers, along with all the others I have seen, have 
lacked the beryl» (beryllo caruerunt)488, which contextualizes Cusanus’ views hinted at in the first and 
second paragraph of De Beryllo: the beryllus as a method is of such extraordinary utility (and novelty), 
that it can accomplish something unprecedented, such as (in paragraph 2) to ‘initiate’ a reader into haec 
alta/mystica in only a few days. This must be, finally, the reason why both Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius 
prohibited revealing ‘these things’ to those ignorant of the intellectuales elevationes: they simply did 
not have the beryllus, which Cusanus does—and which the reader, the tu of the direct address, now also 
does489. The reader is therefore in an extraordinarily privileged position vis-à-vis the entire tradition 
(even when these past authors, such as Dionysius noster, happened to be correct). 
                                                          
488 De Beryllo, 31, p. 35, 1: «Hi omnes et quotquot vidi scribentes caruerunt beryllo». 
489 It is important to note that Cusanus says that everyone, omnes, lacked the beryllus, including Pseudo-Dionysius, even 
though in the very next sentence he says that one particular way in which interpreters have erred due to lacking the beryllus 
has been in reading Pseudo-Dionysius when it comes to the ‘conjunction of opposites’: textum magistri divini disjunctive 
interpretantur (32, p. 35, 5-6). However, Pseudo-Dionysius, even if he did not suffer from that particular flaw (cf. magnum 
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What are the contents of Cusanus’ ‘instructions’ to the reader as a user of the beryllus method? 
The stated goal, to see aeterna sapientia and principium cognoscitivum, seems to be the same as that 
posited from the beginning (paragraphs 3 and 8), i.e. the principium (i.e. God). The mode of operation—
per maximum partier et minimum cognoscibile—is also essentially familiar since paragraph 3. 
However, Cusanus offers a more detailed account here. The quemadmodum indicates that the aenigma 
de angulis is not necessarily the only, or even the best one to use (as Cusanus, indeed, has been using 
many others), but it serves as a paradigmatic example. Here Cusanus recalls the veritas-linea-anguli 
structure built up in paragraph 19, where the types of angles, acutus-[acutior]-obtusus, are now mapped 
onto naturae: thus, there are naturas actuas, formales, simplices et penetrativas («acute, formal, simple, 
and penetrative cognitive natures») and those that are ‘more obtuse’ and ‘the most obtuse’; and (in a 
similar way) one will be able to ‘hunt for’ (venari)490 every possible degree/gradation (omnes gradus 
possibiles). Cusanus ends with a strong generalizing sentence about this holding regarding ‘all other 
things that are in such relations’ (ita de quibuscumque sic se habentibus)491. The core of this 
‘methodological’ statement is the suggestion that gradus (a general term for ‘gradation’, ‘degree’) can 
be investigated by employing a similar structure as that built in paragraph 19: thus, one involving a 
motus of explicatio across a continuum, with a particular predefined direction (verus – nihil). 
3.4.4 The image of angulus rectus for nexus – De Beryllo, 41, p. 47, 10 – 12 
 
 
Unde sicut angulus minime acutus et minime obtusus est simplex angulus rectus, in quo minima 
contrariorum angulorum coincidunt, antequam acutus et obtusus sint duo anguli, ita est de principio 
conexionis, in quo simpliciter coincidunt minima contrariorum. (De Beryllo 41, p. 47, 10-12). 
 
                                                          
est posse se stabiliter in conjunction figere oppositorum – where magnus is the constant epithet for Dionysius himself), also 
lacked the beryllus—which may be exactly, according to Cusanus’ account, what led him to formulate the ‘prohibition’ in 
paragraph 2.  
490 The ‘hunt’, venatio, is a Platonic metaphor for the search for knowledge (cf. PLATO, Republica, IV, 432b-d) very dear to 
Cusanus; he will name one of his most important later works, which recapitulates his previous philosophical endeavors, De 
Venatione Sapientiae (cf. De venatione sapientiae, I, 1, p. 4, 20). 
491 Crucially, however, Trinitological relations are not meant to be included here; they must be dealt with not in the manner 
of finite gradus but coincidentally, as Cusanus later shows in paragraph 33; see Chapter 3.4.4 below. 
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 In this paragraph, Cusanus formulates a quick application of the beryllus for the purpose of 
illustrating Cusanus’ claimed solution to Aristotle’s problem of the ‘third principle’, privatio492, by 
means of nexus, i.e. the third person of the Trinity. The problem, as Cusanus presents it, is that Aristotle 
was unable, due to his reliance on the principle of non-contradiction, to accept that contraries can 
coincide in the third principle493. To solve this, Cusanus builds a new image that finally invokes the 
angulus rectus, the right angle, which was conspicuously missing in the construction in paragraph 19-
20 (discussed in Chapter 3.4.3 above, note 485) and in the ‘methodological’ image in paragraph 32 
(Chapter 3.4.4 above), which left an empty terminological place in the triad acutus - * - obtusus. Here, 
the same geometrical image is viewed differently: the least acute angle is said to coincide with the least 
obtuse angle, so that there is a coincidence of the minimums of these two opposites: minima 
contrariorum coincidunt. This new image comes as an illustration of his broader claim at the beginning 
of the paragraph (41, p. 47, 1-2), that «Our beryl makes us see more acutely [than Aristotle], so that, in 
the connecting principium, we see opposites prior to duality, i.e., before they are two contradictories». 
This corresponds to the angulus rectus being seen as the principium of the other angles, due to being 
the more simplex (according to the recurring external ontological criterion of simplicitas – see Chapter 
4.3), because, in this image, the others are created by its ‘movement’ in one direction or the other; 
acutus and obtusus are thus reconceptualized as meaning something like ‘deviation from the mean’. In 
effect, this simply means rotating the image of the angle-generating line in paragraph 19 by 90 degrees, 
                                                          
492 Cf. De Beryllo, 40, p. 46, 1-3; ARISTOTLE, Metaphyisca, IV, 2, 1004b27-1005a4; XII, 2, 1069b32-34. Cusanus’ criticism 
of Aristotle in De Beryllo is the most well-researched topic in the literature on De Beryllo; one can find a cogent exposition 
of all the particulars of the issue involved in, e.g., CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl. Tome 2, pp. 88-112; FLASCH, Geschichte 
einer Entwicklung, pp, 468-477, ID., Nicolaus Cusanus, pp. 112-122; RUSCONI, La Critica a Aristoteles en De Beryllo de 
Nicolas de Cusa, pp. 203-218; ID., Annäherung an die cusanische ‘Scientia aenigmatica’ im Licht aus seiner Lektüre des 
Aristoteles in De beryllo, pp. 315-324; ARROCHE, Acerca de las críticas a Platón y Aristóteles en el De beryllo, pp. 41-58. 
For the most in-depth and comprehensive account of Aristotle’s and Nicholas’ differing ontological-epistemologica 
conceptions and the fundamentals behind Nicholas’ criticism, see the recent work J. MAASSEN, Metaphysik und 
Möglichkeitsbegriff bei Aristoteles und Nikolaus von Kues. Eine historisch-systematische Untersuchung, Berlin – Boston 
2015.  
493 Cf. De Beryllo, 40, p. 46, 1-10. For the coincidence of contraries in Proclus as Cusanus’ source, see PROCLUS, Theologia 
Platonis, IV, 30, p. 105, 17-19, and Nicholas’ note: «de coincidentia contrariorum in uno»; PROCLUS, In Parmenidem, II 
(Cousin 725ff, Steel p. 87, 66ff), to which Cusanus notes: «et contradictoria secundum idem coincidere»; ALBERTUS 
MAGNUS, Super De Divinis Nominibus, V, 29, p. 320, 1-3, and Nicholas’ note: «nota si raciones contrariorum possunt esse 
simul in anima quia non sunt contrarie forcius in deo». On the coincidentia oppositorum, see also notes 14 (for this theme 
in Cusanus generally), 193 (as cornerstone of Cusanus’ method), 306 (in Cusanus’ previous works). 
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since the principle that the line is generating the angles remains the same. By this change in how we 
look at the same basic image, Cusanus constructs precisely the structure he needs in order to use the 
beryllus to examine contraria and solve Aristotle’s problem according to his coincidental method. 
3.4.5 The image of angulus for the Trinity – De Beryllo, 33, p. 36, 1 – 34, p. 38, 9 
 
 Immediately after the passage above, Cusanus believes he needs to address a particular problem: 
that is, if the reader is not sure (dubitas) in what way the principium can be seen as unitrinum; this is a 
crucial question, as Trinitological reflection494 cannot be simply reduced to a matter of gradus, i.e. the 
degrees of differences in finite things. Cusanus formulates the argument himself introducing it with a 
strong verb form: respondeo. His solution is, in the main, that we consider the principium by means of 
the beryllus as both indivisibilitas (cf. 8, p. 10, 5), aequalitas (cf. 8, p. 11, 10) and nexus (cf. conexio, 
8, p. 11, 15-17), which he has already shown how to do. Having these names for God at our disposal, 
we can combine them in various relationships in order to derive the appropriate trinitary construction. 
However, the crucial difficulty is considering which of these names we should use: Cusanus’ first 
example invokes a unitas that has not been derived before, and Cusanus’ chosen relationships for 
describing intra-Τrinitary features (unitas est fons indivisibilitatis, aequalitas est indivisibilitas unitatis, 
nexus est indivisibilitas unitatis et aequalitatis) are not at all obvious; why couldn’t one ‘mix up’ these 
predications in different ways? What is required is (as seems to be the pattern for any difficult 
relationship) a geometrical image. Thus, Cusanus takes an aenigma (33, p. 37, 8-15) based on the linea 
veritatis of paragraph 19:  
 
 Again, we have a line AB with a point C in the middle; AC remains fixed and CB is moved in 
order to generate angles. However, Cusanus changes the interpretation of the linea veritatis radically, 
                                                          
494 For an excellent account of Cusanus’ rich (and orthodox) Trinitarian speculation, see e.g. R. HAUBST, Streifzüge in die 
cusanische Theologie, Münster 1991, pp. 255-302. 
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as he considers not the line AB, or CA, or CB, but the point C as the primum principium anguli, while 
lines CA and CB are considered secundum principium. The introduction of the punctus, combining, in 
fact, the constructions at paragraph 19 and 21-23, is an important change to the ontological structure: 
now the linea is no longer considered, as it was explicitly in the linea veritatis construction (19), as an 
image of veritas, but instead seems to stand alone as a geometric illustration. Instead of considering the 
line as a principium, Cusanus instructs us, basically, to ‘change perspective’ and interpret the same 
geometrical construction as originated from point C, which is the principium of both line CA and CB; 
at the same time, the lines CA and CB are still the principia of the angle, which are, in fact, one (non-
plural) principium (exactly like we previously considered line AB in the image from paragraph 9). 
Cusanus’ point is that all three are principia, which are in fact one (non-plural, coincident) principium, 
i.e. they coincide in the ‘folded’ line AB (cf. paragraph 9). We have three principia for the angle, one 
fixed, one moving, and one which connects them, which are at the same time one principium, the line 
AB: a perfect illustration of the Trinity. 
 Cusanus thus explains, in a practical way, how to ‘see’ with the beryllus paradoxical 
coincidental relationships such as the ones involved in Trinitological speculation. It seems that the 
beryllus makes it particularly easy to do this, for an obvious reason: from the ‘perspective’ of what we 
have called Level II objects in a beryllus construction, their particular determinations can always be 
said to coincide in the Level I object which is their counterpart, i.e. the object featuring coincidentia 
oppositorum identified for the purpose of the particular ‘beryllic’ structure495. In other words, the 
process of ‘infinitization’ of Level II objects will identify the Level I object as having a number of their 
properties (namely, those that we choose to focus on when identifying relationships in the act of 
applying the beryllus), maximally and minimally, and thus infinitely, etc., and also coincidentally496. 
                                                          
495 For a more in-depth explanation of how the method works according to ontological levels, see Chapter 2.3. 
496 This is in accordance with the process of transferre to figuras infinitas described in De Docta Ignorantia for geometrical 
images: De docta ignorantia, I, 12, 33, p. 24, 10-25: «Verum quoniam ex antehabitis constat maximum simpliciter nihil 
horum esse posse, quae per nos sciuntur aut concipiuntur, hinc, cum ipsum symbolice investigare proponimus, simplicem 
similitudinem transilire necesse est. Nam cum omnia mathematicalia sint finita et aliter etiam imaginari nequeant: si finitis 
uti pro exemplo voluerimus ad maximum simpliciter ascendendi, primo necesse est figuras mathematicas finitas considerare 
cum suis passionibus et rationibus, et ipsas rationes correspondenter ad infinitas tales figuras transferre, post haec tertio 
adhuc altius ipsas rationes infinitarum figurarum transsumere ad infinitum simplex absolutissimum etiam ab omni figura. 
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Thus, one can easily construct Cusanus’ preferred Trinitarian model with the help of the beryllus if one 
chooses the starting image correctly (i.e. the object has to have three distinct properties that stand in the 
desired relation, such as the point C and the two lines which make up the angle in Cusanus’ example). 
This type of proof, however, while it certainly establishes that the principium is unitrinum, does not by 
itself stop one from identifying any number of other coincidental properties; no proof is given here (and 
the method cannot by itself give one) that God is three-and-one and not also four-and-one, five-and-
one, etc497. The issue is how to determine which ‘divine names’ are better than other, or ‘proper’ and 
less so – coming back to the question of hierarchies, which we analyze in Chapter 4. For his purposes, 
Cusanus knows he has chosen the ‘correct’ image here498, so he can proceed to define the relationships 
between unitas, aequalitas and nexus in terms of emanatio in paragraph 34 (34, p. 37, 1 – p. 38, 9). 
3.4.6 An ontological principle: punctus a puncto non dividitur – De Beryllo, 44, p. 50, 3 – 7 
 
Ideo dum dividitur corpus, non dividitur substantia, quia non dividitur in non corpus aut in partes 
substantiales, scilicet formam, materiam et nexum, quae proprius dicuntur principia quam partes, quia 
esset dividere indivisibile ab indivisibili sicut punctum a puncto, quod non est possibile. (De Beryllo, 
44, p. 50, 3 – 7) 
 
 After having introduced forma, materia and nexus499 as the three principia which are meant to 
solve the problem he identified in Aristotle’s account, Cusanus here reprises something established by 
                                                          
Et tunc nostra ignorantia incomprehensibiliter docebitur, quomodo de altissimo rectius et verius sit nobis in aenigmate 
laborantibus sentiendum». 
497 Cusanus attempts to prove that such proofs would be improper in De docta ignorantia, I, 20, 59, p. 39, 25 – 62, p. 42, 4, 
dedicating an entire chapter to trying to show that non sit possibilis quaternitas et ultra in divinis, arguing in particular that 
the triangle is the proper princpium for surface figures; but from the point of view of the method itself, one can simply 
change the starting image to something else in order to obtain some form of quaternitas – for instance, Cusanus provides a 
tetrad that could be a perfect candidate as part of this very argument, at De docta ignorantia, I, 20, 60, p. 41, 3 – 20, namely 
linea simplex – triangulus simplex – circulus simplex – sphaera simplex (where simplex appears equivalent to infinitus). 
Cusanus is apparently using an ‘external’ criterion in order to conclude that such ‘fourness’ cannot be properly predicated 
of God: namely simplicitas, cf. «[quaternitas, etc.] repugnaret simplicitati et perfectioni maximi» (ibid., I, 20, 60, p. 41, 16-
17), which happens to be the same criterion used implicitly throughout De Beryllo; see Chapter 4.3. 
498 Which is perhaps the reason for his uncharacteristically direct respondeo: «I answer this [here]» at 33, p. 36, 1-2. He also 
does not say at this point (as he usualy does, implicitly or explicitly) that there could be other aenigmata which the reader 
could use to investigate this particular question.  
499 Regarding this triad of forma, materia and nexus, Cusanus’ source is likely Ramon Llull; cf. a fragment which he copied 
into Codex Cusanus 83 (which he thought was) by Ramon Llull (but, as we know now, this is not an authentic work), at fol. 
100r-v, entitled «Scientiam inquisitivem veri et boni in omni materia», where we find written: «quia mundus est unus, per 
unitatem dei creates habet unam formam constitutam ex primis principiis ex –tivis eorum et materiam ex –bilibus et per 
agere generabilia sunt coniuncta»; cf. E. COLOMER, Nikolaus von Kues und Raimund Llull, in Quellen und Studien zur 
Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. P. Wilpert, vol. II, Berlin 1961, p. 179, note 119, and p. 101ff regarding the «materia, forma, 
coniunctio» triad. Furthermore, in Codex Cusanus 85, Cusanus adds the following marginal note to a passage from Llull’s 
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means of the image in paragraphs 21-23, namely the punctus-corpus relationship. Accordingly, forma, 
materia and nexus are principia for corpus, similarly to how punctus is a principium for corpus. Things 
can only be ‘divided into’ other things on the same ontological level; this is a principle we have seen 
since the first linea-angulus image in paragraphs 9-12, as one of the first derived ‘names for God’ was 
indivisibile omni modo divisionis. This is nothing else than a structural requirement for the method 
itself, as it relies on identifying, for a certain set of objects (what we have called Level II), a coincidentia 
oppositorum, which implies that the criterion used (that we have called X) must allow for a maximum 
and a minimum, and thus for variation, which implies divisio. Fundamentally, the Level I object can 
only have both maximum and minimum X-ness, and thus is indivisibilis in this respect. Due to this 
structural feature, it is easy to see through the beryllus that at the level of corpus, division proceeds 
only according to its specific characteristics, and certainly does not apply to the ‘higher’ level among 
the principia. The crucial point is that this derives from the structure of the method, and does not imply 
(as it might appear to) any underlying metaphysical framework. 
3.4.7 The triangulus - species structure – De Beryllo, 58-62, pp. 65, 1 – 72, 21 
 
 Here, Cusanus introduces an element that was previously missing in all his geometrical 
illustrations so far: the triangle, for the specific purpose of illustrating his notion of species, i.e. specific 
forms (and genera), which is in fact a type of superficies, or surface figure. Cusanus starts (as he did in 
illustrating the Trinity) by stating what is to be shown from the beginning: given that they «are neither 
made nor corrupted except accidentally» (i.e. in the objects where they are found) and are «incorruptible 
                                                          
Arte amative boni: «ita forma sustentatur in materia … et actus intrinsecus est proprietas formam et materiam coniungens 
in tali esse sine qua coniunccione forma non informaret nec materia informaretur» (fol. 55v; cf. De Beryllo, p. 111, adnot. 
16). 
The fragments from works by Ramon Llull that Cusanus collected in his Codex Cusanus 83 have been edited as part of the 
Cusanus-Texte collection: Cusanus-Texte III. 4. Raimundus Lullus. Die Exzerptensammlung aus Schriften des Raimundus 
Lullus im Codex Cusanus 83, ed. U. Roth, Heidelberg 1999 (hereafter referred to as CT III.4). This volume also features a 
useful introduction by Roth which gives a broader overview of the known influences by Llull on Cusanus: CT III.4, pp. 7-
22, esp. 19-20. Other parallels with Llull include the ‘superlative degree’, superlativus, as a means to construct ‘names for 
God’ (corresponding closely with Cusanus’ ‘infinitization’, or construction of a coincidentia oppositorum via a maximum 
and minimum for a specific criterion; see Chapter 2.3), and also the use of suffixes such as –ibilis and –ivus as technical 
terms, cf. the passage quoted above compared with Cusanus’ own constructions in paragraphs 5 and 6 (‘Premise 2’ and 
‘Premise 3’) above—see Chapters 3.3.3 and 3.3.4. Overall, the question of the influence of Llull on Cusanus in De Beryllo 
has been little studied so far, and shows itself as potentially promising for further study. 
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likenesses of the divine, infinite Intellect», what needs to be shown is that «the Divine Intellect shines 
forth in every specific form (in omni specie resplendere)». From the beginning, one may conclude that 
resplendere, a word not used before in De Beryllo500, describes a similar relationship of similitudo that, 
as we have seen, is the basic type of relationship determined with the help of the beryllus—this, 
however, will not be entirely accurate. Interestingly, Cusanus seems to exclude one particular type of 
image: «[this shining forth does] not [occur] in the way in which a single face [appears] in many mirrors 
but, rather, as a single infinite magnitude [appears] in different finite magnitudes»501. We remark that 
the ‘face-mirror’ model being excluded as inappropriate has both of its elements finite, which seems to 
be what the problem is502. Instead, the infinita magnitudo structure suggests a standard beryllus 
formulation. Cusanus proceeds to construct precisely such a structure, introducing it, interestingly, in 
an unusual way: «I acknowledge that I conceive of this [as such]», dico sic me concipere, identifying 
the following argument (in a way he was not willing to specifically do before) as ‘his own’. Thus, he 
says the basic comparative structure will be between every finite species (implicitly in relation to their 
particular objects] and a triangle with respect to (quoad) surface magnitudes. It is clear that magnitudo 
will be the main criterion used for identifying the ‘berillic’ structures here. As to why Cusanus chooses 
not to offer a geometric figure to illustrate this particular geometric construction until paragraph 60, 
this is because he starts with a ‘conceptual’ argument, of a similar nature to the punctus-corpus image 
at 21-23, which also did not have an illustration, for rather clear reasons: how does one represent the 
corpus on the page? Cusanus limits himself, accordingly, to two-dimensional illustrations. 
 He starts with the maximus et minimus angulus (58, p, 66, 10) – which is interestingly not 
identified with the linea as it was in the linea-angulus image of paragraphs 9-12. This maximus angulus 
                                                          
500 It is used in De Conjecturis with what appears to be similar meaning: De Conjecturis, II, 1, 71, p. 72, 3-5: «Ipsum vero, 
cuius participatio est omnium pariter et singulorum esse, in omnibus et in quolibet suo quidem modo resplendent».  
501 De Beryllo, 58, p. 66, 4-6: «[…] ipsum intellectum in omni specie resplendere, non enim modo quo una facies in multis 
speculis, sed ut una infinita magnitudo in variis finitis magnitudinibus et in qualibet totaliter». 
502 Cf. the image of vivum speculum – speculum veritatis in De Filiatione Dei, 67, p. 49, 1 – p. 50, 16. The theme of the 
mirror, speculum, is also important in De Visione Dei: see the discussion and sources in notes 277, 279-281 above. 
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is not only the principle of angles, but also the principle of the triangle, and thus, with two simple 
beryllus constructions, Cusanus introduces the term resplendere: 
    B[angulus, magnitudo] -> infinitus angulus 
                       - infinitus angulus est principium infinitum angulorum  
    B[triangulus, magnitudo] -> infinitus angulus 
                       - infinitus angulus resplendet in omni triangulo ex integro 
 
 Interestingly, Cusanus establishes here a complex hierarchy, as both the angulus and triangulus 
have the same principium; and he also emphasizes the fact that two right angles (which are equal to the 
maximus angulus) are equal to the sum of the angles of the triangle. This aspect, in particular, makes 
the infinite angle ‘shine forth as a whole’ in the triangle—thus, resplendentia, if we are to distinguish 
it from the regular relationship of similitude, i.e. between angles and the infinite angle, will have to 
mean something like ‘shows itself in an object in a different, special/unforseen/extra way’, just like the 
maximum angle shows itself in the triangle not (only) in its regular form (which is what the beryllus 
stucture shows) but also in a ‘novel’ form (that the beryllus structure does not by itself show) of three 
angles whose sum is equal to it (and which can, each of them, vary indefinitely in relation to each other, 
while keeping the sum constant). It seems that resplendentia names a very interesting ‘extra’ aspect of 
the relationship of ‘being an image of’ found a normal ‘beryllic’ structure: if we use carefully 
constructed geometrical objects, we can determine, beside the ‘standard’ coincidentia oppositorum-
based identification of a principium, also other types of relationships, describable in geometric terms, 
which can be added to the basic beryllus structure in order to develop completely novel relationships—
which are, in turn, ‘transferable’ to other beryllus structures, and thus amenable to becoming ‘names of 
God’—even if they are not directly derivable from the ‘beryllic’ structure itself but come up as an 
‘extra’ way in which the principium shows itself in the principiata.  
 Accordingly, Cusanus develops the argument further in paragraph 59, where he can show (just 
like in paragraph 44) that, by the fact of being a principium in the beryllus-based structure, the triangle 
is (regarding the modi divisionis of the things it is a principle of) incorruptibilis and non resolubilis, 
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and thus stands as an image of species and prima substantia503. This is based on it being identified as a 
principium of finite superficies, i.e. of two-dimensional geometrical figures, as it is the prima superficie 
terminate, ‘first fully formed figure’504. Therefore, the various types of triangles, which all fit this 
conceptual argument, help Cusanus illustrate the different kinds of species. 
 Finally, in paragraphs 60-61, Cusanus gives a full geometrical illustration of the argument, using 
lines, angles and triangles and the wealth of possible relationships that can be derived from various 
combinations of these elements when examined, in various ways, through the beryllus, and including, 
as well, the Trinitarian angle-based imagery he developed in paragraphs 33-34 and the notion of 
complicatio from paragraph 12. He offers the illustration, he says, so that the reader will «make [for 
themselves] a clear conceptualization»: clarum conceptum (60, p. 67, 1), which recall the words he 
used in paragraph 1, ut quam clare conceptum depromam. In a number of ways, this geometrical 
construction, involving all the elements of the previous ones, is itself the ‘pinnacle achievement’ of De 
Beryllo, a concise image of ontology and cosmology (which Cusanus might even be referring to, in the 
end, as the conceptus in paragraph 1). Undoubtedly, as we have seen, Cusanus’ project has been to use 
geometrical images of greater and greater ontological (in terms of levels) and relational complexity. 
 
 The objectum of the beryllus is now principium triangulorum, which will again be the line, the 
principium of all the other figures illustrated, but now of both angles and triangles. The illustration is 
different from those we have seen in paragraphs 9-10 and 19-20, as now the line does not simply fold 
                                                          
503 Cf. ARISTOTLE, Metaphyisca, VII, 7, 1032b1-2, where Aristotle defines species as eidos, unlike his conception in the 
Categories. To this passage, Nicholas adds the following note, agreeing with the definition of species as ‘forms’: «speciem 
autem dico ipsum quod erat esse uniuscuiusque et primam substanciam». 
504 Cf. BOETHIUS, De institutione arithmeticae, ed. G. Friedlein, Leipzig 1867, II, 6, p. 92, 6-9: «princeps est latitudinis, ut 
ceterae omnes superficies in hanc resolvantur»  
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in the middle; there is a completely different line, CD, which goes out from C, and connects from D to 
both A and B. However, unlike in the previous calamus image with angles (paragraph 9), the notion of 
what the ‘maximum triangle’ could be is not obvious at all, as the areas of both triangles decreases 
when line CD moves towards AB. However, it is obvious what is the minimum of triangles: the line 
AB. We have encountered precisely such a construction, where we could obtain the principium by 
means of the minimum, in paragraph 41 with the image of the right angle. Although Cusanus does not 
say this explicitly, this would be one way to conceptualize how line AB is in fact also the ‘greatest 
possible triangle’, as that would necessarily have to coincide with the minimum. Cusanus seems to 
hedge on the issue of how to use the beryllus with the objectum as principium triangulorum according 
to magnitudo; he instead says explicitly that one should do it for angles (video per maximum partier et 
minimum angulum – which is obvious), and then adds et cum (‘and since [the principle] is’) the 
maximum and minimum triangle (which is not obvious, and cannot be seen from the image at all)505. 
This is apparently why Cusanus needed to prove this separately in paragraph 58, without using any 
images. Because it is the principle of angles (which has already been shown in paragraph 33 to be ‘one 
and three’), it is by this fact a principium unitrinum (60, p. 68, 16). Even more, Cusanus now can make 
use of his newly developed term resplendentia, as the principium unus et trinus now can be said 
(because of the fact that it is trinitary) to ‘shine forth’, i.e. show itself in a relationship not reducible to 
mere similitudo or ‘being the principium’, presumably in the ‘threeness’ of the triangle’s angles and 
sides (in addition to the fact that the three angles add up to a maximum angle, a form of resplendentia 
which we have just examined before). 
 Then, Cusanus adds a dynamic element to the construction: movement, motus, like he did to the 
linea-angulus construction in paragraph 12, and thus befigures the notion of complicatio506—but now 
                                                          
505 De Beryllo, 60, p. 68, 11-15: «In hoc igitur principio, quod video per maximum pariter et minimum angulum et cum hoc 
maximum pariter et minimum triangulum, et est principium unitrinum, video omnes angulos pariter et triangulos 
complicari». 
At issue is not as much the correctness of his conclusions (as there cannot be any doubt, in the end, that all infinite figures, 
like all infinite things generally, will have to coincide), but rather how he reaches them. One possible argument here, 
although Cusanus does not make it explicitly, would be that if we know the infinite angle, the infinite triangle (which will 
have three infinite angles, which will coincide with all its other elements) has to coincide with it. 
506 For the notion of complicatio/explicatio, see note 425. 
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aimed at developing not angles but triangles, to fit with the ex complicatione of the species. 
Accordingly, Cusanus folds CB over CD and then BD over DA to create a triangle507, maintaining line 
AB as the principium. The triangle thus ingeniously constructed stands for a species, and is itself the 
principle (implicitly) for other two-dimensional figures. 
 In paragraph 61, Cusanus again takes up the image of a triangle to lead the reader (manuducens) 
to the concept (conceptum) of species. But he introduces it as a separate aenigma, and he proceeds very 
differently from the way he has just developed it in the image. Accordingly, a triangle is equal to any 
other triangle in the fact that it has the following properties of all triangles: the threeness (trinitas) of 
the angles508, and that the sum of its three angles is equal. In the same way, every species is equal to 
every other ‘in magnitude’ (or, as we might say, ‘in terms of ontologic level’ at the level of the B-
structure). How does this aenigma work, and where is the beryllus actually used? What appears 
‘concealed’ is in fact a step in which we find the principium of all triangles, which has all the properties 
of triangles but is ‘infinitized’: this is in fact the respect in which the triangles are ‘equal’ to each other. 
The same relationship holds for species and their own principium, and thus Cusanus transfers it to the 
relationship between the ‘subjects’ which have the respective forms (in subiecto, cuius est species) and 
their respective species, which act like local principia. Cusanus builds this multiple-level hierarchy in 
order to define the ‘intermediate level’, in the hierarchy of similitudines, of the species: thus to reach a 
justification through the beryllus of his proposal for substantia/quod erat esse which would solve 
Aristotle’s difficulties509. His final result is that a triangle (and thus all things) receive their properties 
per speciem, which ‘gives it its being’ (dat hoc esse). 
                                                          
507 The two reflexiones recall Avicebron’s Fons Vitae in paragraph 18, i.e. the triad esse – vivere – intelligere, which Cusanus 
used the triad angulus obtusus - * - angulus acutus to befigure in his construction at 19-20. Could this ‘double folding’ in 
this image be another image for Avicebron’s reflexio? It does not seem to work in the context of Cusanus’ comparative 
structure here; if this folding represented the generation of all things, presumably those that correspond to esse and vivere 
would have no species. This is, therefore, something of a ‘loose end’ in Cusanus’ argument (i.e. how he could have illustrated 
Avicebron with this image of reflexiones). 
508 This trinitas hints back to the resplendentia in the previous paragraph: even while we are not actually examining it as an 
image of the principium unus et trinus, we can still notice the ‘extra hint’ of the threeness of its angles (and sides). 
509 See Chapter 3.4.6 above and the sources in note 492.  
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 The problem left is how to understand the differences between forms, and how to incorporate 
Aristotle’s definition of species as specificatio generis per differentiam510. Cusanus deals with this in 
the next paragraph (62, p. 70, 1ff), within the same overall aenigma, making use, again, of the different 
names for different types of triangles. How can he prove that there are ‘different’ species, for instance, 
for a right angle triangle or for one that is acute or obtuse? This is a problem because the beryllus allows 
to easily construct, for instance, a ‘principium of right triangles’ or ‘of obtuse triangles’, etc; however, 
distinguishing these from each other is a problem, because infinite objects seen using the beryllus, by 
default, tend to coincide. But Cusanus has a solution: he believes he can take Aristotle’s terminology 
and show that specificatio, i.e. the determination of species, is identical to the (Trinitarian) nexus, and 
can connect forms with their specific differentia511. How does he achieve this? Like in the previous 
paragraph, there is an implicit application of the beryllus involved: the specificatio is in fact being 
implicitly infinitized, together with its object (a species) and a differentia, in a ‘trinitary’ connective 
structure in which *specificatio absoluta coincides straightforwardly with nexus. Thus, any 
determination of a species is an ‘image’ of this with finite terms, and this fact makes it comprehensible 
if we use the beryllus: applying all the relationships we have derived, every subjectus will have its own 
species, which we can say is specificata from a genus and a differentia. It is crucial to underline the 
peculiar character of Cusanus’ solution: although these statements can all be clearly shown to be true 
with the beryllus, any or all of these terms (species, genus, etc.) might be infinite, unknowable, 
incomprehensible, or indeed all of the above (involving at various points instances of coincidentia 
oppositorum). We do not know from the start whether such statements have any non-paradoxical 
content that can be readily expressed in ordinary language; however, we know that if we build the 
appropriate beryllus structures, we will be able to show that such statements are true (no matter what 
                                                          
510 ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, X, 1057b7. 
511 De Beryllo, 62, p. 70, 1 – 71, 8: «Et attende quomodo non dat solum esse triangulare generale, sed esse triangulare 
orthogonicum aut oxygonicum sive amblygonicum sive aliter differentiatum ex illis. Et ita species est specificatio generis 
per differentiam. Specificatio est nexus, qui nectit differentiam generi, et ita totum esse rei dat species. Unde species, quae 
est alia et alia, non est alia a subiecto, sed in se habet sua principia essentialia, per quae determinatur substantialiter, sicut 
figura suis continetur terminis». The notion that a geometric figure contains its boundaries is found in ALBERTUS MAGNUS, 
Super De Divinis Nominibus, V, 29, p. 320, 8-9. 
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that ‘means’ in regular, finite, non-paradoxical language that does not involve any coincidentia 
oppositorum). This is the most important characteristic of the knowledge obtained using the scientia 
aenigmatica, i.e. the beryllus method512. 
Cusanus then clarifies how to ‘see’ specificatio through the beryllus by connecting this to a 
completely different ‘beryllic’ image, that of harmonia513 (61, p. 71, 8-17), understood in general terms 
as depending on harmonica habitudo and proportio: i.e. orderly relationships between (different types 
of) things514, reunited into one concept, harmonia, which—an important result—is itself a species; 
indeed, it shares all the properties of one, being indivisible and identifiable (implicitly) as a principium 
of a particular instance of harmony by means of the beryllus. 
Cusanus ends the paragraph by applying again the concept of resplendere/resplendentia, the 
relationship he has just implicitly defined above (in the form of resplendere in + Abl.) as both ‘being 
an image of’ and ‘showing some characteristic of the original, in addition to being an image’ (62, p. 71, 
18 – p. 72, 21). This ‘extra’ aspect is underlined as present in harmonia in addition to the similitudo of 
the ‘eternal ratio’ or (interestingly, these terms seem to be used interchangeably) the divine creator 
intellectus—and this we experience directly (experimur) when that proportio is «delightful and pleasing 
to each of the senses whenever it is perceived»515. 
These geometrical illustrations that we have examined underpin all of the main ontological-
epistemological structures that Cusanus develops in De Beryllo, up to and including his Trinitarian 
                                                          
512 It is thus necessary to always qualify carefully remarks such as Flasch’s regarding the ‘new type of physics’ proposed 
by Cusanus in De Beryllo (FLASCH, Nicolaus Cusanus, p. 105: «neue Physik»). While it is clear that Cusanus wanted to 
propose an ontological framework that would replace the one constructed by Aristotle in his Physics asnd Metaphysics, 
Cusanus’ proposal has even less to do with anything we understand as ‘physics’, which is the fruit of very different 
intellectual developments (which also happened to involve the rejection of the Aristotelian framework). In our modern 
division of academic disciplines and fields of knowledge, Cusanus’ beryllus proposal would be located in the field of 
‘(applied) non-classical logic’ (outside the bounds of ‘regular’ philosophy or metaphysics, not to mention anything to do 
with our notions of the ‘physical world’). On the issue of the conflict between Aristotelian and Cusanian physike, and the 
possible role played by Aristotle’s discussion of the infinite in inspiring Cusanus’ coincidentia-based approach, see A. 
MORITZ, Aristotelische Physik und Cusanische Koinzidenz. Mittelalterliche Rezeptionen der aristotelischen 
Unendlichkeitsdiskussion als Vorgeschichte der cusanischen Koinzidenzlehre, in «Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der 
Cusanus-Gesellschaft» 29 (2005), pp. 161-182. 
513 This notion is heavily informed by the importance Albert assigns to pulchritudo, cf. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Super De 
Divinis Nominibus, IV, 73, p. 184, 2-10; 75-78, pp. 185-187. 
514 For habitus and proportio as general terms, see note 465. 




thought. They provide a quasi-complete blueprint of how to apply the method to various theoretical 
questions, depending on the task (i.e. according to what kind of structure we are aiming to construct, 
with what features, and with how many ontological ‘levels’). The opiniones Cusanus examines from 
the tradition serve as showcases for different use cases, and—a constant undertone—as praxis for the 
benefit of the reader. 
There is, however, another class of aenigmata used prominently in De Beryllo that are not 
reducible to the geometrical ones: the ‘political’ images (res publica - rex, princeps, imperator), which 
end up playing a crucial structural role in the book, up to and including providing the context for the 
final Christological explanation of the finis of created things and the way of attaining it; a finis that is, 
in the end, the rex/imperator himself (as we will see in Chapter 5, identified with the ostensio of God 
in Christ). The next chapter will investigate the crucial question of the nature of hierarchy on the basis 
of an extended examination of the passages in which Cusanus uses this extraordinarily versatile and 
important set of ‘political images’, with the apparent overall aim of combining the two ‘strands’ 
(geometrical aenigmata and political aenigmata) into a new synthesis at the end, in a fascinating 
parallel with the ‘philosophy’ – ‘theology’ duality which informs, as we have seen, De Beryllo at a 





CHAPTER 4 – Hierarchy in De Beryllo 
  
Given the characteristics of a method such as that of the beryllus, a natural question is how it 
could be compatible with a ‘hierarchical’ medieval-type ontology (and why ‘modernizing’ interpreters 
of Cusanus, such as Cassirer, are in fact wrong when they assign to him a ‘modern’, non-hierarchial 
philosophical outlook516). At its core, the method appears to be classifying its objects into two stark 
ontological categories: the object manifesting coincidentia oppositorum and the non-coincident objects, 
i.e. the principium and the principiata. In each application of the method, an object is either one or the 
other, and there appears to be no room for any intermediary position. Cusanus, indeed, uses this feature 
of the method to attack Plato’s (non-coincidentally conceived) triad of first cause, intellectus and anima 
mundi, as we will analyze in Chapter 4.1.3 below. Aspects of Cusanus’ methodology have led scholars 
such as Flasch to identify a type of ‘dehierarchization’ in Cusanus’ thought517, while at the same time 
he continues to cite authors clearly in support of a hierarchical ontological conception518, and build, as 
we have seen so far, structures that are strikingly ‘hierarchy-like’. While Cusanus’ positions regarding 
the main issues connected with hierarchy, such as the notion of species, have been thoroughly examined 
in the literature519, the question has not been addressed in the particular context of Cusanus’ method, 
its structure and its applications520.  
Accordingly, in the first part of this chapter, I will analyze the recurrence of a crucial beryllus-
based image, paradigmatic for the notion of hierarchy (and, connected with this, as we will see, for 
Cusanus’ criticism of Plato): the ‘political’ image (res publica – rex/imperator). Then, I will analyze 
                                                          
516 For a summary of the most important such interpretations, and a refutation, see the article by Jasper Hopkins: HOPKINS, 
Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464): First Modern Philosopher?. 
517 «Ent-Hierarchisierung des Kosmos» (FLASCH, Geschichte einer Entwicklung, p. 100). According to Flasch, Cusanus 
manifests this tendency from De Docta Ignorantia II onwards. He moderates this claim further, however, in FLASCH, 
Nicolaus Cusanus, p. 58, describing both a ‘deconstruction’ of hierarchies (abbauen) and an attempt to found them anew 
(neu zu begruenden). 
518 E.g. De Beryllo, 18, p. 21, 1 – p. 22, 12, where Cusanus cites (approvingly) the hierarchical ontological doctrines of 
Albert the Great and Avicebron. 
519 Cf. e.g. VOLKMANN-SCHLUCK, Die Lehre des Nicolaus von Cues von der species; CORRIERAS, Identité e difference dans 
le De Beryllo. 
520 CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl, Tome 2, pp. 64-67, approaches this issue but all too briefly; similarly, Flasch devotes 
only a few pages to it: FLASCH, Nicolaus Cusanus, pp. 57-61. 
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the explicit criteria Cusanus gives for two types of hierarchy will be discussed: the hierarchy of ‘divine 
names’ (i.e. the relationships determined with the beryllus as they apply to the principium), and finally 
the ontological hierarchical principle of simplicitas (of Neoplatonic type) that Cusanus endorses in a 
number of passages (which, while independent of the method itself, crucially informs his choices as to 
how to apply it). 
4.1 The recurring political images in De Beryllo – a study in the nature of hierarchy constructed 
via the beryllus 
  
 One of the less-remarked-upon aspects in the research on De Beryllo is just how prominent and 
recurring the ‘political imagery’ is in the role of images for constructing beryllus structures. The number 
of these images is surprisingly large: six separate explicit uses, rivaling the eight for the mathematical 
and geometrical images (analyzed in Chapter 3.4). Yet the main commentators on De Beryllo have 
given comparatively much less attention to this recurring theme. Kurt Flasch dedicates only two pages 
to this particular type of imagery521; in Corrieras, in turn, we find only a little more522. We will attempt 
to analyze all these six passages from the perspective of using the method of the beryllus, and inventory 
the significance and uses yielded by this image. As one might expect, this will yield a fruitful 
examination of how Cusanus conceives of hierarchy in relation to his method. 
4.1.1 The first image of rex – paragraphs 16-17 (De Beryllo, 16, p. 19, 1 – 17, p. 21, 13) 
 
 The first interesting question that comes up at the beginning of paragraph 16 is why Cusanus 
switches suddenly from analyzing the linea-angulus image developed in paragraphs 9-12 and used 
further in paragraphs 13-15 to recounting what other authors have said about rex as a divine name. We 
note that these two paragraphs, 16 and 17, are located between the first geometrical image of the linea-
angulus and the second, the image of the linea as a ‘directional’ likeness of veritas (paragraphs 18-20). 
The first sentence of paragraph 18 is highly telling about how we are to interpret these two paragraphs 
featuring political imagery (18, p. 21, 1-3): «All those statements which Plato or Aristotle or someone 
                                                          
521 FLASCH, Nicolaus Cusanus, pp. 56-57.  
522 CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl, Tome 2, pp. 48-50. 
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else makes are not other than the beryl and the symbolism (aenigma) show to you: viz., that truth 
[veritas]—by means of a likeness to itself—bestows being on all things» (per suam similitudinem 
omnibus tribuit esse). It seems clear that Cusanus is explaining here how to interpret these two 
paragraphs placed ‘in the middle’ of his larger development of geometrical images—that is, we should 
understand them by applying the beryllus on the model of what has already been shown (the first linea-
angulus image), looking also towards what Cusanus develops right afterwards, arguably in response to 
the new doctrines (the veritas-linea image). 
 In this interpretation, Cusanus is engaged in precisely the same activity as before (as we saw, in 
the case of Pseudo-Dionysius, in paragraph 10-11, and for Proclus in paragraph 12): applying the 
beryllus, within the framework of an image that was already introduced, in order to ‘demonstrate’ 
various doctrines belonging to other authors, whom he is citing by name. In paragraph 16, we have 
Plato’s Second Letter (to which Cusanus also referred at the beginning of paragraph 2) and Proclus, 
who give the primum principium the name rex, and Aristotle, who uses princeps. Cusanus thus 
conveniently groups these ‘political’ images together. Implicitly, the purpose is that the reader should 
try to understand them by applying the beryllus, as Cusanus has just shown. 
 Accordingly, if we make use of the linea-angulus construction that has been used by Cusanus 
until now, and assume an implicit comparison with the relationship between rex and everything else in 
res publica, it is clear that the argument works on a fundamental level only as long as one makes a 
crucial assumption without which one cannot construct a beryllus structure centered on the rex – omnia 
in re publica relationship: the rex has to be assumed to be an instance of coincidentia oppositorum of 
some sort, relative to some kind of ordering relation among the objects considered (those in re publica). 
If the rex is not such a coincidentia, the argument does not work; thus, in order to use this image, 
Cusanus must be claiming that such an ‘ontological gap’ exists between rex and everything else in the 
res publica that the beryllus can be applied. In the terms we used in Chapter 2.3 to describe the structure 
of the beryllus method, the king must be at a different ontological level than any other element in the 
res publica. This was not, of course, a requirement for the authors Cusanus is quoting, as they did not 
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propose that there is a method based on the coincidentia oppositorum by which their statements could 
be derived. However, this is a requirement for Cusanus, so we have to pay close attention to what, in 
fact, he is presupposing. 
 First of all, he quotes Plato’s Second Letter: «all things exist with the King of all and that they 
all exist for his sake and that he is the Cause of all good things»523; then he adds that «a few [lines] later 
[he says]: The human mind desires to understand what kind of things those are. It views the kinds of 
things with which it is kindred, none of which are perfect; but in the King himself there is no such 
[characteristic]»524 (in rege ipso nihil tale). He adds a rather cryptic remark: «Assuredly, Plato there 
wisely writes that this [teaching] is to be held secret», which is a clear reference to the discussion of 
‘secrecy’ for the haec alta that we analyzed for paragraph 2 of the text, where Cusanus refers to the 
same Second Letter (Chapter 3.2). As we saw there, the question was both why Plato ‘prohibited’ the 
revealing of such matters to the uninitiated and why Cusanus thought the prohibition should no longer 
apply. How does what he says here answer that? Clearly, the context is again that of Cusanus himself 
‘revealing’ all these doctrines, and the way to examine and prove them (the beryllus) to the reader; thus, 
there is an implicit contrast, inevitably, between the ibi where Plato bene scribit that the doctrines must 
be kept secret, and the context of Cusanus’ own book, which is obviously now revealing them (and we 
can assume Cusanus thinks that he himself bene scribit here). 
 Cusanus then emphasizes that Plato did not use such a name for the primum principium omnium 
without reason (absque causa525). He builds the image of a res publica in a ‘beryllic’ structure, with 
the rex being the principium526. In the middle of this structure, Cusanus suddenly identifies a paraphrase 
                                                          
523 Although he owned the Letters in the Bruni translation, here he seems to be quoting from Proclus’ commentary to the 
Parmenides: PROCLUS, In Parmenidem VI (Cousin 1115, Steel p. 396, 3-4), with the text Cusanus quotes, and his marginal 
note (CT III.2.2, marginalia 502, p. 124): «nota exposicionem epistule platonis circa omnium regem omnia esse»; cf. also 
PROCLUS, In Parmenidem VII (Cousin 1150, Steel p. 424, 32): «Platone clamante et illud causam esse omnium bonorum», 
with Cusanus’ note «primum vere omnium rex et ipsum bonum» (CT III.2.2, marginalia 476, p. 118). Cf. also De Principio, 
24, p. 34, 3-4: «Causam dicit ipsum unum, regem scilicet omnium sive deum deorum». 
524 Hopkins’ translation; cf. PLATO, Letters II, 312e4-313a2.  
525 Cf. also the first word of paragraph 2, and the interesting (though speculative) ‘juridical’ meaning it might have – see 
Ch. 3.2 and note 338. Notably, Cusanus is being quite bold here: he is saying ‘Plato did not say this without good reason’ 
before introducing a beryllus structure to show it; implicitly, without the beryllus it would seem to be an open question 
whether Plato had good reasons for writing it. 
526 This is an image he is highly interested in, as we see, for examples, from his notes on his copy of Proclus’ Theologia 
Platonis. In PROCLUS, Theologia Platonis, V, 20, ed. Portus, p. 288-289, Proclus writes: «Porro et corporum ipse conditor 
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of a passage in Proclus527, while he departs in his interpretation from Proclus’ original text, which says 
that the various elements in the ‘political’ image are coexisting in mente politici, not in ipso [rege] as 
Cusanus willfully paraphrases to fit within the beryllus structure, clearly aiming to transfer the image 
to the principium528. This is the B-structure he is building: 
    B[omnia in re publica, *gradus] -> rex 
         - res publica per regem et ad ipsum ordinata et per ipsum regitur et exsistit 
         - quae igitur in re publica reperiuntur distincta, prioriter et coniuncte in [rege] sunt ipse et 
vita 
         - duces, comites, milites, iudices, leges, mensurae, pondera et quaeque talia omnia sunt in 
rege ut in publica persona 
         - omnia, quae possunt esse in re publica, [in rege] actu exsistunt ipse 
         - lex [regis] in pellibus scripta est in [rege] lex viva 
         - [omnium] rex auctor est,  
         - ab [rege] omnia habent, quae habent tam esse quam nomen in re publica  
 
 In all this, there appears to be an implicit comparative structure of the standard beryllus type, 
with a transfer of properties, between this and the structure of primum principium seen in relation to 
omnia. This can be seen next, when Cusanus quotes Aristotle, who is said to have named the same 
(principium) as princeps in similar respects: in simili ipsum principem nominavit (16, p. 20, 15-16). In 
the reference to Aristotle529, the principium is named princeps «to whom the whole army is ordained, 
as to an end (quam ad finem), and from whom the army has whatever it is». Cusanus ends with an 
explicit comparative sicut…sic structure, signaling a relationship transfer between in principe and in 
primo (16, p. 20, 17-19), focused on the ‘in + Ablative’ relationship, i.e. of the general (recurring) form 
                                                          
est. ipse perfectiuus his optimis proportionibus omnia connectens et eorum potencias et moles et numeros optimis nexibus 
coaptans», Cusanus notes (and marks in red): «nota totum de conditorio intellectu. Quem dicit unigenitum et simulacrum 
perfecti dei / regem universi et regem regum» (CT III.2.1, p. 105-106, marginalia 366). A little further, at ibid., p. 289, 
where Proclus writes: «[conditor] totam denique in mundo ut sic dicatur rem publicam instituit», Cusanus adds the note: 
«totam in mundo rem publicam instituit», marked in red and with a red mark added (CT III.2.1, p. 106, marginalia 371). 
These notes show his great interest in the image of rex / res publica for the principium, for which Proclus is his apparent 
source, but which he develops, as we will see, in his own unique manner. 
527 PROCLUS, In Parmenidem, III (Cousin 814, Steel p. 156, 51 – p. 157, 55): «Etenim in mente politici omnia sunt 
ennoematice, miles, rhetor, ordinis princeps, popularius, et ennoematum ad inuicem parua quaedam est differentia – omnia 
enim sunt uitalia et simul coexistentia in mente politici –, sed exterius plurima differentia militis et popularii».  
528 Cf . Cusanus’ marginal note to this passage: «nota exemplum quomodo uti in mente politici sunt omnia, sic et in mente 
dei siue in diuino intellectu» (CT III.2.2, marginalia 177; PROCLUS, ibid., ed. Steel, p. 537). 
529 ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, XII, 10, 1075a11-15, esp 14-16: «ὥσπερ στράτευμα; καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τάξει τὸ εὖ καὶ ὁ στρατηγός, 
καὶ μᾶλλον οὗτος: οὐ γὰρ οὗτος διὰ τὴν τάξιν ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν»; cf. ID., Aristoteles Latine, p. 527: 
«quemadmodum exercitus: etenim bene esse eius in ordine; et dux ipse est, ac magis ipse: non enim ipsem propter ordinem, 
verum ordo propter ipsum est». 
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‘all principiata in principio are the principium.’ Furthermore, several small ‘single-term’ applications 
of the beryllus (similar to those in paragraph 3) are present, for vita, tempus and creatura-creator, which 
are all ‘caught up’ inside the sic structure. Here is the B-notation for this structure: 
B[exercitus, *gradus] -> princeps 
         - ad [principem] exercitus est ordinatus tamquam ad finem 
         - a [principe] habet exercitus quidquid est.  
         - lex scripta in pellibus mortuis est lex viva in principe 
SICUT-SIC 
*B[omnia, *gradus vitae] -> vita 
SIC          
*B[tempus, *gradus temporalitatis] -> aeternitas 
SIC          
*B[creatura, *gradus creaturae] -> creator 
 
 In total, there are no less than six ‘beryllic’ structures present in this paragraph: res publica-rex, 
exercitus-princeps, omnia-vita, tempus-aeternitas, creatura-creator, and the main focus, omnia-
principium omnium, to which all are connected in similar comparative structures. The crucial principle 
is that all the relationships found in each of these can be transferred immediately to another, by use of 
a ‘marker’ such as sicut, sic, etc., or even implicitly, as Cusanus does often.  
 Furthermore, it must be taken into account that the omnia-principium omnium structure already 
comes ‘filled in’ from the previous paragraphs, i.e. by transfers of properties from the linea-angulus 
structure built up ever since paragraph 9. All the relationships identified within a beryllus structure (and 
thus the ‘divine names’ discovered/gained) are essentially cumulative, and may be used again within 
any other beryllus structure with any other object (as long as, of course, one applies them to the 
particular type of objects with which the new structure is built). The beryllus that Cusanus is showcasing 
is a mode of thought with extraordinary power and versatility, which can be applied, furthermore, 
anywhere a coincidentia oppositorum may be identified (or constructed, e.g. in the geometrical images). 
 In consequence, there is effectively no relationship of ‘priority’ between the six beryllus 
structures explicitly invoked in this paragraph. The beryllus method is a fundamentally different mode 
of investigation from, say, deduction from first principles. One can effectively start anywhere, from 
any particular structure, and one has the full freedom, for instance, to choose images precisely according 
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to the problem one wants to solve or the doctrine one wants to examine (as we have seen in Chapter 
3.4 with the geometrical images). Whichever particular object is examined through the beryllus, the 
relationships discovered between it and its ‘infinitized version’, or principium, will be easily 
transferable to a ‘default’/’most general’ beryllus structure omnia-principium omnium, by means of an 
explicit (cf. Cusanus’ sicut) or implicit comparison of the two structures. 
 One interesting question this paragraph raises is thus shown to be, in the context of the method, 
misguided: namely whether Cusanus is actually proposing here a political theory based on the omnia 
in re publica – rex construction, for which, of course, all the relationships discovered with the beryllus 
for omnia-principium omnium would hold: everything in the state would be literally an 
image/manifestation/copy etc. of the king. The question of Cusanus’ ‘political theory’ misunderstands 
the context: once one has formulated the ‘beryllic’ construction of omnia in res publica – rex, all these 
relationships can directly be transferred either from omnia-principium or from any other beryllus 
structure we choose to involve (such as linea-angulus). Cusanus is not ‘committing’ here to any theory 
of the state; he is simply creating a (theoretical) construction in which omnia in res publica and rex can 
be viewed by means of the beryllus. For instance, this does not commit him to saying that such a res 
publica and rex have ever existed, or even could possibly exist, in the real world530, especially not 
among the regular, finite, human kings and states. It must be noted that Plato, Proclus and Aristotle, in 
the passages Cusanus is referring to in this paragraph, all applied this language (in Cusanus’ 
interpretation) to the principium directly. It should also be emphasized that using the beryllus offers no 
‘ontological guarantee’: the object identified as manifesting the coincidentia oppositorum (such as the 
rex here) might be infinite, paradoxical, unknowable, etc. Furthermore, one cannot escape the 
Christological connotations inherent in discussing a possible rex that is also the principium – and 
Cusanus seems to highlight the theological possibilities with two of the beryllus structures in this 
                                                          
530 However, Cusanus does seem to hold to something like a ‘coincidental’ view of political, and particularly ecclesiastical, 
hierarchies, particularly in his first treatise, De concordantia Catholica: for similarities with this passage, see e.g. De 
concordantia catholica, III, 12, 376, p. 375, 1ff; III, 4, 331, p. 348, 7-11; cf. also De conjecturis, II, 16, 156, p. 155, 22-23; 
158, p. 158, 4-5: «ut virtus ducalis aut comitalis in rege regia est». 
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paragraph: omnia-vita (in primo omnia sunt vita – cf. John 1:4: In [verbo] vita erat), and creatura-
creator.   
 In paragraph 17, Cusanus continues with an even greater wealth of authors he feels at liberty to 
cite, as he has now shown the reader how one can use the beryllus to examine their doctrines. Here, he 
is focused on the problem of forms in the tradition: formae, ideae, rationes, exemplaria. He is obviously 
inspired to formulate a solution here by the image of res publica – rex in the previous paragraph: as we 
have seen in his interpretation of the second passage from Proclus there531, he believes he has found a 
way of conceptualizing how objects seen in a beryllus structure are ‘in’ their principium (in + Abl.), 
which is precisely the grammatical construction that the doctrines he quotes in this passage are centered 
on. Accordingly, he takes aim at the disagreement between Plato and Aristotle regarding the forms, 
quoting commentators: Averroes on Aristotle532, quoted as saying that formae are actu in primo motore, 
and that Aristotle rejected Plato’s ideas on this basis533, which Albert also is said to have agreed with 
in his commentary on De Divinis Nominibus534. The main issue, according to how Cusanus presents it, 
is the multiplicity of these formae/ideae, and Aristotle (according, again, to Albert’s account535), admits 
a certain type of ‘multiplicity’ in the prima causa, as it is tricausalis, tricausal, namely efficient, formal 
and final536, and «Aristotle does not find fault with Plato for this understanding». Cusanus identifies, 
crucially, formalis with exemplaris, then rationes with exemplaria537. And, finally (invoking, as usual, 
                                                          
531 See his note: «nota exemplum quomodo uti in mente politici sunt omnia, sic et in mente dei siue in diuino intellectu» 
(CT III.2.2, marginalia 177, cf. Steel p. 537), to PROCLUS, In Parmenidem, III (Cousin 814, Steel p. 156, 51 – p. 157, 55). 
See note 526-528 above. 
532 AVERROES, Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentaris, vol. VIII: Metaphysica, Venice 1562 (reprinted Frankfurt am 
Main, 1962), commentary 18, fol. 305va (I): «Et ideo dicitur quod omnes proportiones et formae sunt in potential in prima 
materia et in actu in ipso motore». Cf. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Super De Divinis Nominibus, 2, 45, p. 73, 60-61 and Cusanus’ 
note: «omnes formae sunt in actu in primo motore et in potentia primae materiae» (CT III.1, marginalia 224). 
533 AVERROES, ibid., commentary 18 (fol. 303rb, to E): «dicit [Aristoteles], quod manifestum est quod nihil cogit nos dicere 
formas Platonis»; cf. fol. 303va (H-I), 303vb (K, L), 305rb (E).  
534 Cf. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Super De Divinis Nominibus, V, 37, p. 325, 11-23, to which Cusanus notes: «deus operatur per 
exemplaria. contra aristotelem, qui tamen raciones causatorum apud primam causam admittit», showing the main pattern of 
the criticism in this passage, but which is here presented in a more favorable way towards Aristotle.  
535 Cf. also ibid., II, 45, p. 73, 41-45: «Sequimur opinionem Aristotelis, quae magis videtur catholica. Dicit enim in XI 
Metaphysicae quod primum se habet in habitudine triplicis causae ad res, scil. Formalis, exemplaris, efficientis et finalis». 
Cf.  ibid., I, 33, p. 18, 47-67; IV, 86, p. 192, 71ff). 
536 Cf. ARISTOTLE, Metaphyisca XII, 4, 1070b30-35; Physica II, 7, 198a24-25; cf. Averroes’ commentary, AVERROES, 
Metaphysica XII, comm. 24 (fol. 309rb, E). 
537 An identification made by Augustine, who placed the Platonic ideas in the divine mind as rationes. Cf. AUGUSTINE, De 
Diversis Quaestionibus, in Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, vol. XLIV/A, LXXXIII, q. 46, 2, p. 71, 22-30. Cf. 
PROCLUS, In Parmenidem, III (Cousin 798, Steel p. 144, 67ff): «in se ipsum ergo aspiciens et se ipsum cognoscens novit, 
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both of the ‘philosophical’ and ‘theological’ strands explicitly together), the ‘theologians’ (i.e. Pseudo-
Dionysius) are said to identify the exemplaria with God’s will (voluntas)538, which is the term Cusanus 
needs in order to tie in to the res publica – rex image, and thus provide a beryllus-based solution for 
the contentious theoretical problem of the forms/exemplars. On the ‘theological’ side, he ties in to a 
recurring theme in the Old Testament, «the Prophet says that God created as He willed to» (cf. Psalm 
134:6)539. This identification of God’s voluntas and the exemplaria marks a crucial development in 
Cusanus’ thought in De Beryllo540. It is based on the property of the beryllus method which easily 
allows the transfer of relationships between beryllus structures, which all imply, on a structural level, 
that the determinations of the Level II objects will be ‘infinitized’, and coincide, in the Level I object: 
accordingly, if we have developed a way of speaking of God’s will through a beryllus structure (here 
the res publica – rex structure), and, in parallel, of the causes of all things as coinciding in the 
principium (as with the application of the linea-angulus image in paragraph 12), it follows that these 
elements can be identified with each other in the principium. As we will see, this identification, a highly 
valuable result, lies at the core of how Cusanus proposes his own solution to the Aristotelian question 
of quid erat esse / substantia / quidditas. We can also notice that this notion, and the image of rex, is 
tied implicitly to how Cusanus chooses to ‘update’ his geometrical image in paragraphs 19-20, with the 
introduction of the mathematicus who creates the line which is the image of veritas, and who does the 
                                                          
quae post ipsum. Rationibus ergo et speciebus immaterialibus novit mundiales rationes et species ex quibus omne. Et est in 
ipso omne ut in causa sine materia». Cusanus leaves a long note here reconstructing this argument (ibid., ed. Steel, p. 536; 
CT III.2.2, marginalia 147, p. 44-45). 
538 PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, De Divinis Nominibus, V, 8, ; cf. Albert’s commentary, ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Super De Divinis 
Nominibus, V, 36-37, p. 325, 57-61: «Deinde ostendit, quomodo scriptura nominat ista exemplaria, et dicit, quod vocat ea 
praediffinitiones vel praedestinationes, sicut habet ALIA TRANSLATIO, et etiam voluntates divinas vel voluntates bonas, 
secundum quas omnia deus praediffinivit et etiam esse fecit», to which Cusanus writes the note: «nota exemplaris vocantur 
voluntates divine».  
539 Psalms 113:3: «omnia quecumque voluit fecit; Psalms 134:6: «omnia quecumque voluit dominus fecit»; Jonah 1:14: 
«quia tu, Domine, sicut voluisti, fecisti»; cf. Wisdom 12:12. 
540 As Davide Monaco noted in D. MONACO, Cusano e la pace della fede, Rome 2013, p. 56, 60, note 63. In Monaco’s view 
of the development of Cusanus’ thought, this notion and the emphasis on God’s absolute freedom are one of the crucial and 
characteristic developments in Cusanus’ late thought, which can thus be described as a passage from the unknowability of 
God to God’s freedom (cf. MONACO, Deus Trinitas, pp. 284, 328, esp. pp. 290-296; ID., Dio come libertà nell’ultimo 
Cusano, in «Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft» 33 (2011), pp. 213-227. 
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active geometrical construction, folding the line (which involves, of course, his voluntas) in the 
illustration of explicatio541. 
 On the same model as our analysis of these passages, we will examine the other occurrences of 
the ‘political image’. 
4.1.2. The rex/imperator image – paragraph 25 (De Beryllo 25, p. 28, 1-12) 
 
 In this paragraph, Cusanus continues his investigation of the human being started in paragraph 
24, immediately after the principium – unus – punctus – corpus image developed in paragraphs 21-23 
(which we analyzed in Chapter 3.4.4). If we take into account the anthropological construction started 
in paragraphs 6 and 7 (i.e. sensus – intellectus – in excessu), it is clear what Cusanus is trying to do, 
namely put his anthropology on a sound beryllus-based footing by putting to use his just-developed 
multi-level ‘beryllic’ structures: the esse – vivere – intelligere of paragraphs 19-20, as well as his four-
level structure in paragraphs 21-23, and thus reformulating in a more comprehensive way his argument 
as to homo mensura rerum already made in paragraph 6. Thus, he claims to offer the reader here a 
veraciorem conceptus, notably not ‘of the human being’ but indeed ‘from’ (ex), signaling that this is 
not meant to be a new investigation aimed at the human being in particular, but rather an updating and 
re-use of the anthropology he has already basically formulated in the last two ‘premises’ in paragraphs 
6 and 7 (see the analysis in Chapter 3.3). We note again the recurring notion of one overall conceptus 
that Cusanus appears to be trying to build up in De Beryllo. 
 Accordingly, Cusanus starts immediately by laying out the ‘ontological levels’ that he will 
consider: intellectus – anima – natura – corpus, which seems to introduce the extra levels of anima – 
natura – corpus where sensus used to be in the simpler previous construction in paragraph 6. There is 
again no mention of ratio, which is, as before, rather surprising542. Anima is the level of the faculty of 
                                                          
541 De Beryllo, 20, p. 24, 1-2. Cf. our analysis in chapter 3.4.3. For complicatio/explicatio see note 425.  
542 Especially if we look, for example, at Cusanus’ marginal note to ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Super De Divinis Nominibus, I, 
54, p. 34, 9-12, where Albert’s text says: «per mentem significat intellectum, qui est supremum rationis, quia infimum 
intellectus est supremum rationis, cuius infimum est supremum sensus, et sic per ordinem de aliis potentiis et de naturis» 
and Cusanus writes: «mens est intellectus, cuius infimum est supremum racionis. Et infimum racionis est supremum 
sensus». The reason why ratio is dropped from the hierarchies in De Beryllo up to this point is a legitimate question.  
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cognitio sensitiva, providing a map as to how to fit together the structures in paragraph 6-7 and those 
presented here. An ‘update’ of the cognition model is being offered, as now all of these faculties are 
put in a relationship of descending communicatio, based, as Cusanus has just shown in his previous 
geometrical examples, in several ‘nested’ applications of the beryllus. But in paragraph 25, he takes 
this principle further than before: anima, natura and corpus are both images of the intellectus and 
respective images of each other, in a complex dance of interlinked implicit beryllus structures, a leap 
in complexity from what Cusanus has attempted before. One only needs to examine the B-structure 
notation for this whole paragraph543 to see the symmetry and beauty of how Cusanus is deploying his 
method here: 
    B[*omnia in homo, *gradus] -> intellectus 
         - intellectus est supremitas rationis, cuius esse est a corpore separatum et per se verum 
         - intellectus est non communicabilis aut participabilis propter suam simplicem 
universalitatem et indivisibilitatem 
     B[anima, *gradus] -> intellectus 
         - intellectus in sua similitudine communicabilem se reddit, scilicet in anima 
         - anima in eo quod similitudo intellectus sentit libere 
         - anima per se sentit [sicut intellectus] 
         - cognitio sensitiva animae ostendit se similitudinem intellectus esse 
     B[natura, *gradus] -> intellectus 
         - per animam intellectus se communicat naturae      
     B[natura, *gradus] -> anima 
         - anima per naturam animat 
         - anima in eo quod est unita naturae animat 
     B[corpus, *gradus] -> intellectus 
         - intellectus per naturam se communicat corpori 
     B[corpus, *gradus] -> natura 
     B[corpus, *gradus] -> anima 
         - anima operatur in corpore medio naturae, contracte 
     SICUT 
     B[organum cognoscitivus, *gradus contractionis] -> anima cognoscitiva 
         - anima cognoscitiva operatum in organo contracte secundum organum 
 
                                                          
543 De Beryllo, 24, p. 27, 1 – 28, 13: «Recipias veraciorem conceptum ex homine, qui omnia mensurat. In homine est 
intellectus supremitas rationis, cuius esse est a corpore separatum et per se verum, deinde est anima, deinde natura ac ultimo 
corpus. Animam dico quae animat et dat esse animale. Intellectus, qui non est communicabilis aut participabilis propter 
suam simplicem universalitatem et indivisibilitatem, se in sua similitudine communicabilem reddit, scilicet in anima. 
Cognitio enim sensitiva animae ostendit se similitudinem intellectus esse. Per animam intellectus se communicat naturae et 
per naturam corpori. Anima in eo quod similitudo intellectus sentit libere, in eo quod est unita naturae animat. Ideo per 
naturam animat, per se sentit. Quae igitur anima operatur in corpore medio naturae, illa contracte operatur, sicut cognoscitiva 
in organo contracte secundum organum». 
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 The last structure introduced by sicut is Cusanus tying back to the structure he built in paragraph 
6 for the same notion of anima cognoscitiva (6, p. 8, 4-7). At each stage of the building of this complex 
structure, the basic relationship between each of the two elements considered (one being a similitudo 
of the other, one being a principium of the other) is the same, and the relationships and modes of 
speaking of these objects can be transferred from one level to another, as the repeated adding of new 
beryllus structures allows. This image is a paradigmatic illustration of the type of hierarchy which can 
be developed by using the beryllus method, which can incorporate whichever elements Cusanus 
chooses from the tradition Cusanus places himself in (by his citations of particular authors), as he has 
done explicitly in paragraphs 11-13 and 16-18, but does so on its own terms: a method based on 
constructing images of sufficient complexity by the repeated application of the simple relationship 
between two (types of) objects which is fundamental to a beryllus structure, joining together a number 
of these structures in order to reach a final complex structure which ‘maps onto’ the structure of the 
opinio/sententia being considered.  
 The complex multi-level anthropological construction of paragraph 24 the context for the 
introduction of the rex/imperator in paragraph 25. It is apparent that Cusanus has something very 
similar in mind as when he first introduced the res publica – rex image in paragraph 16 in order to apply 
it to the Aristotle-Plato controversy regarding the formae: i.e. to use it as a solution to what is, 
ultimately, an instance of the one-many problem. In that context, the plurality of the formae, and their 
being in the principium, was what was at stake, and the rex image demonstrated how many different 
things can be seen at the same time to be in rege, and thus in principio, by using the beryllus to build 
its characteristic structures and transfer properties between them. Thus, the reintroduction of this image 
in paragraph 25 serves to reemphasize for the reader that even though we have described a complex 
hierarchy of faculties in the human being in the conceptus presented in paragraph 24, the unity of the 
whole must now be emphasized and maintained, at every single level of all those just introduced, «so 
that there is one man», or rather ‘so that man is one’ (sit unus homo – 25, p. 28, 2). Cusanus starts by 
employing the rex image explicitly, applying this to the body (corpus) and its parts (membra formalia), 
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which each have their own ‘law’ (lex) or ‘nature’ (natura), power, operation (operatio – a notion just 
introduced in paragraph 24) and order (ordo); he also adds two other images of the principium, 
apparently in order to create a triad: causa, auctor, rex, which match the three Aristotelian causes that 
he invokes next: ut in causa efficiente, formali et finali, and the three sentences which follow, creating 
a threefold structure overall544, as follows: 
omnia sunt 
in causa                         in causa efficiens             anterioriter in potentia effectiva             imperator         
in auctor                        in causa formali               formaliter in ipso qui omnia format 
in rege                           in causa finali                   finaliter in eo [cuius] gratia sint                  rex 
 
 These, as one can easily see, correspond to three distinct beryllus structures in the paragraph, in 
a beautiful construction that appropriates the Aristotelian causes. Two of them, the first and the third, 
are res publica – imperator and omnia – rex. Interestingly, although the imperator structure seems to 
be entirely similar to the previous rex image in paragraphs 16-17 (i.e. intended to demonstrate 
multiplicity in unity), the omnia – rex does not seem to be a ‘political’ image anymore, but is rather the 
general omnia – principium structure, employing the rex as a name for the principium (a name which 
has been transferred, apparently, from the res publica – rex structure). Here we have a reprise of the 
words from Plato’s Second Letter in 16, p. 19, 2: illius gratia omnia545, and an interesting element 
which a reader might have been waiting for ever since paragraph 4: namely, a development regarding 
how the creator intellect se finem facit operum suorum (4, p. 6, 5). Accordingly, this is elucidated here 
in the context of the image of the human body, but the result is rather peculiar in this context: «all the 
[body’s] members seek (appetunt) nothing except inseparable union (unionem inseparabilem) with the 
intellect, as with their beginning (principio), ultimate good (bono ultimo), and everlasting life» (25, p. 
                                                          
544 De Beryllo, 25, p. 28, 1 – 12: «Respiciamus ergo ad corpus et omnia eius membra formalia et ad cuiuslibet legem sive 
naturam, virtutem, operationem et ordinem, ut sit unus homo; et quidquid reperimus explicite, illa reperimus in intellectu ut 
in causa, auctore et rege, in quo omnia sunt ut in causa efficiente, formali et finali. Omnia enim anterioriter in potentia 
effectiva sunt, sicut in potentia imperatoris sunt dignitates et official rei publicae. Omnia sunt formaliter in ipso, qui omnia 
format, ut formata in tantum sint, in quantum sunt suo conceptui conformia. Finaliter sunt omnia in eo, cum eius gratia sint, 
cum ipse sit finis et desiderium omnium. Nihil enim omnia membra appetunt nisi unionem inseparabilem cum ipso tamquam 
cum suo principio et bono ultimo et vita perenni». 
545 Cf. PROCLUS, In Parmenidem, VI (Cousin 1097, Steel p. 392, 50-51), and Cusanus’ note ad locum repeating the 
expression (ibid., ed. Steel, p. 549). 
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28, 10-12). These words strongly suggest that much more is involved here than the mere image of 
bodily parts in relation to the whole of the human body. Cusanus seems to be making an unmistakable 
theological reference, to Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthinans (1 Cor. 12:12ff) and the image of the 
Church as the corpus Christi.546 The whole paragraph can be read in both ways: in the ‘philosophical’ 
way of discussing the relationship between parts and the whole in the human being (i.e. in continuation 
of the argument of the previous paragraph), or in a ‘theological’ way, with the corpus being the Church, 
the body of Christ, and all the relationships within the argument reinterpreted in a new light. This is a 
striking example of fertile ambiguity on the part of Cusanus, refusing to exclude any of the two 
readings, while using an image that he uses in a recurrent manner in his works, both in ‘philosophical’ 
and ‘theological’ contexts (but usually clearly marked as either one or the other)547. He continues with 
the ‘philosophical’ strand of the argument in paragraph 26, as we would expect, stressing the unity of 
the faculties/levels that he has constructed by means of the complex web of beryllus structures in 
paragraph 24, and after corpus focusing on anima and natura, in a general beryllus structure of omnia 
- conditor intellectus (on the criterion of similitudo) (26, p. 29, 8-9), compared with an entirely standard 
beryllus structure of omne visibile - visus (which recalls, again, the similitudo relationship between 
objects of the senses and the senses established already in paragraph 6). This paragraph marks the end 
of the current argument, as Cusanus continues with a discussion of the varie aenigmata of the sancti et 
philosophi (27, p. 30, 1 – and we can note here again the ever-recurring duality between ‘philosophy’ 
and ‘theology’ as a running theme). 
4.1.3 The image of the imperius (exsecutore imperii, intentio imperantis) – De Beryllo, 35-38, p. 
38, 1 – p. 44, 10.  
 In paragraphs 35-38, Cusanus formulates clearly his criticism of Plato’s ontology of the three 
modi essendi, using the tool of the image of the principium unitrinum which he has just developed in 
                                                          
546 1 Cor 12:12ff: «Sicut enim corpus unum est, et membra habet multa, omnia autem membra corporis cum sint multa, 
unum tamen corpus sunt: ita et Christus.» 
547 For ‘philosophical’ uses of the image of membra – corpus, see De docta Ignorantia, II, 5, 121, p. 78, 7-18; De conjecturis, 
II, 10, 125, p. 120, 4-6; De venatione sapientiae, XXX, 91, p. 87, 1-13. For clearly ‘theological’ uses, see De Docta 
Ignorantia, III, 12, 256, p. 158, 19-21ff (ecclesia); Sermon CCLXXIV (1457), in Sermones XIX/6, 26, p. 531, 12-14: 
«Unum est corpus Christi mysticum, et omnia membra eius per ipsum omnia faciunt» 
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paragraphs 33-34 (cf. our analysis in Chapter 3.4.4). From his first foray into ‘reconciling’ Plato and 
Aristotle in paragraph 16, we can already predict what the issue at stake will be: the problem of the 
coincidence of one and many, i.e. how can (many) things be in principio principium, since these are 
the terms in which he presented his own solution there. Here, the fact that Plato (and Aristotle) 
caruerunt beryllo (32, p. 35, 1) will be prominently on display, as Cusanus is, overall, accusing them 
of two things: 1) trying to interpret the trinitas that they also «saw to be present» in the principium 
(which they did manage to see, viderunt, by «ascending from caused to Cause»548 - 35, p. 38, 1-2) in 
the same way in which the interpreters of Pseudo-Dionysius erred549: i.e. in a disjunctive manner, 
disjunctive (i.e. not accepting the coincidentia oppositorum), because, just as those interpreters, they 
tried to see the principium through ratio550. This is precisely the problem Cusanus identifies with Plato’s 
account of the three modi essendi (36, p. 40, 1-6)551. As our focus is on Cusanus’ method and the notion 
of hierarchy in relation to it, we will note the fundamental issue at play in these paragraphs with regard 
to the matter of interpreting the triune nature of the principium, a characteristic which Cusanus regards 
as clearly proven and available also to the philosophi—evidently not by means of his beryllus-using 
argument in paragraphs 33-34 with the image of punctus-linea-angulus (as, indeed, they could not have 
formulated such an argument as they were ‘lacking the beryl’), but by the fact that there are three 
causes: efficient, formal and final (35, p. 39, 11). Namely, the problem is simple: Plato applied a finite 
model of hierarchy to the triune principium, without infinitizing it, i.e. without viewing it 
                                                          
548 This is, one might remark, also a perfectly suitable description for Cusanus’ own method. The difference, however, is 
that he, broadly speaking, reaches the cause by ‘infinitizing’ the object being investigated, and does not see it as a problem 
if the resulting object has contradictory properties (such as being one and three, which is at the core of the argument here). 
Even if the objects being considered are paradoxical and completely incomprehensible (as, at the ultimate level, the 
unnameable, infinite God must be), Cusanus has still managed to identify relations which hold between these objects 
(however incomprehensible they are), and can transfer them to similar beryllus-based structures at will. 
549 De Beryllo, 32, p. 35, 6. 
550 De Beryllo, 35, p. 39, 8: «per rationem reperire». Cf. ibid., 32, p. 35, 9-10: «ad discursum rationis revertimur … [visione 
certissima] super omnem ratione … cadimus de divina ad humana». 
551 Based on an interpretation of the Timaeus (29a-37c), viewed through the interpretive lens of Proclus. The main 
interpreters of De Beryllo have given comparatively little space to the criticism of Plato by Cusanus in these passages: cf. 
FLASCH, Geschichte einer Entwicklung, p. 466-468; ID., Nicolaus Cusanus, pp. 80-83; CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl. Tome 
2, pp. 85-86. ARROCHE, Acerca de las críticas a Platón y Aristóteles en el De beryllo, pp. 44-47 has a somewhat more 
developed, but also schematic account. 
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coincidentally, as the beryllus allows. Accordingly, Cusanus says that Plato called552 the principium 
intellectus conditor; he conceived of its ‘father’ as causa cunctorum, and defined the relationship 
between them as quasi filius a pater; and, third, he saw a spiritus or motus «diffused throughout the 
universe» (35, p. 39, 11 – p. 40, 19). The only problem Cusanus has with any of these relationships 
(which he can interpret using the beryllus in a correct, coincidental way) is that Plato saw these 
erroneously as distinct and not coincident in the one principium. Accordingly, when compared with 
how Cusanus’ beryllus method works with regard to the principium, requiring a coincidentia 
oppositorum in order to be formulated, Plato failed to properly investigate the principium—in particular 
as regards the problem of participation553. This is a paradigmatic illustration by Cusanus of Plato’s 
claimed methodological failure: since Plato saw that primus deus is imparticipabilis, and 
incommunicable, he concluded that, in order for being to be partaken of, there had to be a 
communicabilis intellectus, distinct from it and thus created by it, the anima mundi. The fundamental 
problem is that he was not willing to accept a coincidentia oppositorum with respect to the criterion of 
participation (a finite criterion like any other), while, on the pattern of Cusanus’ previous applications, 
the beryllus can show the principium as a coincidentia formulated on this criterion as well. Interestingly, 
Cusanus avoids going into the specifics of this possible argument and says merely that an intellectus 
creatus or an anima mundi are not necessary (37, p. 42, 12); a possible argument would be that, since 
participatio is a finite degree of some kind (like esse), the principium has both the maximum and 
minimum in regard to it (thus, in some way, both fully participating in being and not participating at 
all). What is crucial is that the intellectus creatus, not having these paradoxical properties, is simply 
not the principium at all.  
                                                          
552 Cf. PROCLUS, In Parmenidem, IV (Cousin 902, Steel p. 228, 12-13) and Cusanus’ note (CT III.2.2, p. 80, marginalia 301, 
cf. PROCLUS, ibid., ed. Steel, p. 542), and ibid., VI (Cousin 1096, Steel p. 381, 20-28) with Cusanus’ note (CT III.2.2, p. 
118, cf. PROCLUS, ibid., ed. Steel, p. 548). 
553 De Beryllo, 37, p. 41, 1 – 42, 9: «Plato autem considerans multitudinem intelligentiarum vidit intellectum, cuius 
participatione omnes intelligentiae sunt intelligentiae. Et quia vidit primum deum absolutum, simplicissimum, 
imparticipabile et incommunicabile principium, ideo communicabilem intellectum in deis multis seu intelligentiis varie 
participatum et communicatum arbitrabatur primam creaturam. Ita etiam animam mundi, quae in omnibus animabus 





 This last argument lies in the background of Cusanus’ indications that a principium contractum 
would not be the actual principium (37, p. 43, 1-3), as it would ‘operate out of necessity’ (ex necessitate 
operatur), contrasted with the principium ipsius naturae, which would be liberum, and which created 
all things by voluntas, free will554. What underlies this argument is the crucial point that any kind of 
necessity is simply not compatible with a coincidentia oppositorum: by its nature, necessity is in a 
certain way and it cannot be in another, and is not quod esse posset (14, p. 17, 5), and cannot be 
conceived without maius nec minus (14, p. 17, 3), etc. Necessity seems to be a type of determination 
that is of the same kind as the examples Cusanus offers in paragraph 8, like divisibilitas and 
inaequalitas: it can only be conceived in finite terms by its very definition, and thus using the beryllus 
in relation to it will result in seeing the principium as its negation, libertas, which is not determined in 
such a way. Any natura which is working ex necessitate will not be the principium but will have its 
own principium, i.e. principium ipsius naturae (37, p. 43, 17), which can be seen by means of a 
coincidentia with the help of the beryllus—and which is, as a result, not subject to necessitas but free.  
 Furthermore, a crucial result is that all finite determinations, including everything pertaining to 
finite hierarchies of any sort, are to be seen coincidentally in the principium with the help of the 
beryllus. The type of hierarchy that Plato conceived is misguided (or rather it is not about the principium 
at all), but it can describe the principium when properly ‘infinitized’ according to Cusanus’ method. At 
the same time, it is still possible, as Cusanus has shown, to build up hierarchies and different ‘levels’ 
of being, as he shows, as we have seen, in paragraph 24 (and the previous geometrical examples in 
paragraphs 21-23, as well as 18-20), by repeated uses of the beryllus at every single step in order to 
create something like a ‘ladder of coincidentia’ to solve any particular ontological problem. 
 The use of the recurring ‘political image’ of the imperium in these four paragraphs illustrates 
Cusanus’ point perfectly and paradigmatically. It is a running theme of the argument, chosen by 
Cusanus as a sign of both Plato’s failure to conceive of the primum principium correctly and of 
                                                          
554 Cf. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Super De Divinis Nominibus, I, 41, p. 23, 51-57; cf. Cusanus’ note ad locum, CT III.1, 
marginalia 154: «Deus voluntate creat quae est et virtus naturalis». 
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Cusanus’ successful beryllus-based solution. Thus, in paragraphs 35 (p. 40, 17), the intellectus 
incorrectly identified by Plato as creatus executes the command (imperium), or intention (intention), of 
the Father; accordingly, in the second modus essendi, all things are said to be «in the most wise 
Executor» of the imperium (in exsecutore imperii sapientissimo), and the third modus shows all as being 
in instrumento exsecutoris (36, p. 40, 3-5). In the ‘political’ image (similar in all discernible ways to 
the res publica – rex image we have seen before), this is the mistake in this interpretation: if the 
‘executor’ does not coincide with the rex, he is simply not a principium but part of the omnia in re 
publica which are in a relationship of similitudo with the rex and are in rege: a mere ‘executor’ will not 
have all the powers of the king himself, and neither, of course, will an ‘instrument of execution’. For 
Cusanus, elements such as these (whether they exist or not) are not the principium, which is what his 
method is interested in. In the political image properly used according to the beryllus, one must look 
rather at what is ‘in’ the king himself. Accordingly, when investigating the principium, all things will 
not be said to be created by some exsecutor who is himself created (and thus irrelevant to the argument), 
but rather they will be considered in relation to the rex (i.e. either coincident with him or created by 
him), and thus omnia can be described as voluntate fiunt (37, p. 43, 18-20). Furthermore, applying the 
coincidental argument Cusanus made in paragraphs 16-17 about the exemplaria and the voluntas 
(which all coincide in the principium), one also reaches a crucial result: the form (forma) of any 
particular thing is (identical with) the ‘intention of the ruler’ (intentio imperantis); by successive 
applications of the beryllus, this can be made to be the ‘intermediate’ level which solves the problem 
of participation (on basic the model of mathematicus – linea from paragraphs 19-20, or indeed 
principium – unus – punctus – linea from paragraphs 21-23, as Cusanus will develop this later, with 
the triangle images and the concept of species – cf. Chapter 3.4.7). In general, every created thing is 
the intentio voluntatis omnipotentis (37, p. 43, 21-22), in which all coincide (voluntas, intentio, as well 
as the other two persons of the Trinity properly conceived). 
 Thus, in paragraph 38 it becomes clear why Cusanus chose imperium as the name for his 
‘political’ image here: imperium can also mean order or command, and thus is a perfect illustration of 
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the wrongness of saying that the intellectus conditor does anything ex necessitate (38, p. 43, 1-2): 
because, in a clever wordplay, that would mean acting necessitatum per superioris imperium: there 
would be a ‘higher level’ of imperium, i.e. one seen via the coincidentia, and thus the true principium, 
in which all coincide, and thus also voluntas, among other things, coincides with the true 
principle/king’s essentia (38, p. 44, 8). Cusanus then quotes Aristotle on precisely this point (omnia in 
principio primo sunt ipsum)555, but says that Aristotle did not pay attention to the coincidence of 
voluntas, ratio and essentia (and, impliclty, all the other things: intentio, exemplaria, etc.). Every error 
of Plato and Aristotle, Cusanus says, follow from this: ex hoc omnis eorum error secutus est (38, p. 43, 
2), i.e. in the end, the lack of a proper, coincidentia-based method for investigating the principium, of 
the type which Cusanus is now proposing as the beryllus. 
But why is, for instance, necessitas absoluta, for instance (as opposed to libertas), not 
appropriate as a name for the conditor? Being built using a coincidentia, the principium will be, in 
effect, at the same time maximum and minimum necessitas as well as libertas (taking them as opposita), 
and it could be called necessitas absoluta as well, fulfilling the conditions of the ‘beryllic’ construction. 
However, the two names are obviously not ‘equal’ in Cusanus’ usage (as is the case with all pairs of 
opposites), even though for the purposes of the method they work in the same way, as long as a 
coincidentia is properly identified. This points to a crucial issue for hierarchy in De Beryllo, namely 
the hierarchy of relations/’divine names’ identified by means of the method, which will be treated in 
Chapter 4.2. 
4.1.4 Princeps, quiditas voluntas creatoris – paragraph 51 (De Beryllo, 51, p. 57, 1 – p. 58, 19) 
 
 In order to solve the problem of substantia/quod erat esse that Aristotle had doubts about (49, 
p. 56, 1-2, as well as Socrates ‘both young and old’, according to Proclus – 50, p. 57, 1-2) Cusanus 
                                                          
555 Cf. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, XII, 7, 1072b 20-23; 9, 1074b 18-22, and Cusanus’ note to 1072b28-30: «nota quid deus 
est id quod ei inest ipse est». But the more direct reference seems to be to a passage in Albert: ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Super 
De Divinis Nominibus, IV, 9, p. 118, 20-25: «Et ideo agere secundum essentiam in ipso est agere secundum suam voluntatem 
et secundum suam sapientiam … quia suum est suum intelligere et sua actio et sua substantia, ut dicit Philosophus in XI 
Metaphysicae»; cf. ibid., IV, 8, p. 117, 46-48. 
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applies the same image as above (res publica, princeps – 51, p. 57, 5), and builds the same implicit 
argument, namely the argument he developed in paragraphs 16-17 regarding the coincidence of 
exemplaria and voluntas in the principium. Accordingly, in the image, the princeps can establish an 
(arbitrary) measure such as the sextarius without need for further justification, as well as other things, 
citing Ulpian’s Institutiones as illustration to the effect that «what has pleased the Prince has the force 
of law»556. Precisely because voluntas coincides with intellectus and ratio (51, 16, p. 58), voluntas 
creatoris is the ultimate ratio essendi, and there is no further (knowable) reason that can be investigated 
about the substantia of anything. Due to the coincidental nature of the imperator, his ratio, manifested 
in the lex, appears to us as voluntas (51, p. 58, 19), precisely because it is not further 
determinable/comprehensible beside these coincidental relationships that the beryllus shows. 
4.1.5 Ducali dignitas in regia dignitatem – paragraph 57 (De Beryllo, 57, p. 64, 1 – 65, 9) 
 
 Paragraph 57 is part of a very important argument for questions relating to hierarchy: namely 
to the effect that «those things which cannot be made by our art exist more truly (verius sunt) in 
perceptible objects than in our intellect»557. Verius is the key term at issue, and it is clear that Cusanus 
is trying to better delineate the image he constructed of the sensible faculties in paragraph 6, in which, 
as we saw, basically the same type of relationship (via implicit beryllus structures) was established 
between (1) objects of sense/intellect and sensus/intellectus; and (2) the same objects and intellectus 
conditor. Cusanus is here trying to determine a criterion to ‘rank’ these two relationships ontologically. 
In itself this is not a difficult question, if we consider ‘Premise 2’ and ‘Premise 3’ in paragraph 6 and 
7, as we have analyzed them (Chapter 3.3): what was implicit there was the notion of multiple layers 
of similitudo, as the intellectus was an image of the principium, the objects of the intellectus were seen 
as images of it, and at the same time they were images of the principium. Here558 Cusanus is arguing, 
                                                          
556 Cf. ULPIAN, Institutiones, ed. T. Mommsen – P. Krueger, Berlin 1908, vol. 1, p. 35.  
557 Cf. De Beryllo, 56, p. 63, 1-10, on the image of the house, domus, in relation to the mentalis figurae. 
558 De Beryllo, 57, p. 64, 1 – 65, 9: «Sic vides quomodo ea, quae per artem nostram fieri non possunt, verius sunt in 
sensibilibus quam in nostro intellectu, ut ignis verius esse habet in sensibili substantia sua quam in nostro intellectu, ubi est 
in confuso conceptu sine naturali veritate; ita de omnibus. Sed verius esse habet ignis in suo conditore, ubi est in sua 
adaequata causa et ratione. Et licet non sit in divino intellectu cum sensibilibus qualitatibus, quas nos in ipso sentimus, 
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using the beryllus (with the image of drawn circle vs. circle in intellectu), that things created are ‘in a 
truer way’, verius, in the creator, like fire is in suo conditore … in sua adaequata causa et ratione (as 
opposed to how it is in our intellectus – 57, p. 65, 1-4). The image of the dignitas ducali and dignitas 
regia comes up again in the context of emphasizing the unity of a multiplicity in one in the principium, 
and that things are vera in the divinus intellectus, even as they do not have the sensible qualities (cum 
sensibilibus qualitatibus) that they have as objects of the senses. But there is a crucial innovation here, 
namely the appearance of an ‘intermediary rank’, that of dux, in the implicit image of the res publica, 
which exists in a more true manner, verius, in the rex. This is all in preparation for Cusanus’ argument 
as to species in the following paragraphs, 59-62, based on the linea-triangulus image, which again 
constructs a multiple-layered beryllus structure. The crucial principle for seeing species as part of an 
ontological hierarchy is the argument in this paragraph regarding ‘being more truly in’ (verius in), i.e. 
multiple layers of intermediate principia make the similitudo ‘less true’, and each is ‘truer’ in a more 
‘superior’ level, while at the same time, they are ‘more true’ in the intellectus conditor, in the ‘original’ 
beryllus structure without the intermediate levels. The concept of verius is thus a fundamental structural 
principle of multiple-level beryllus constructions, and allows Cusanus to construct hierarchies. 
4.1.6 Imperator gloriosus – paragraph 68 (De Beryllo, 68, p. 79, 15 – 80, 20) 
 
In paragraph 68, Cusanus starts by repeating his claim about the error of the philosophers: the 
«wrong presupposition», malus praesuppositus, because of which «they imposed necessity on the First 
Cause» (68, p. 78, 1-2). This, as we have seen, is a methodological error, as they did not investigate the 
prima causa coincidentally (which would have shown them that their conception was not that of the 
principium at all)—by which they could have seen (reperissent) a solution for «all perplexities», in any 
investigation (in omni inquisitione) (68, p. 78, 2-4). Thus, Cusanus is claiming that he has fully fulfilled 
the purpose set out in paragraph 1, of providing a method for solving quaequae indaganda. In this 
context, Cusanus returns to the image in ‘Premise 1’ (paragraph 4), where he showed (by an implicit 
                                                          




beryllus structure) that the intellectus conditor wishes to manifest itself in the form of his creations. He 
can now deploy all his constructed hierarchical structures (both the hierarchy of faculties at 24-27, 
‘updated’ with the verius theorem in paragraph 57, and the hierarchy of species built on the linea-
triangulus-superficies image in paragraphs 58-62) in order to fill out the ontological structure. He thus 
develops an image of the conditor manifesting himself with different levels of ‘clarity’ (68, p. 79, 13: 
clariori modo se ostendit), starting from a rose and moving from the rose as a physical object (corpus, 
cf. sensus) through the vita vegetabilis (cf. natura) and vita intellectiva (cf. anima), i.e. the hierarchy 
developed in paragraphs 24-27 (68, p. 78, 5 – 79, 15). Interestingly, he not only uses an ambiguous 
(and possibly theological) in verbo suo (68, p. 79, 8) but relies crucially on the interesting notion of 
resplendentia, which he has introduced a few paragraphs in previous (62, p. 71, 18 – 72, 21 – cf. Chapter 
3.4.8), and which seems to have the special meaning of ‘(somehow) showing the nature of its 
principium even beyond the fact of its being an image’ – as with the notion of harmonia, this 
resplendentia has particularly strong effects on human nature: «with a movement of joy and with a 
most pleasing harmony that gladdens a man’s entire nature» (cum motu laetitiae et dulcissima harmonia 
omnem naturam hominis exhilarescente – 68, p. 79, 11-12). Apparently this ‘shining forth’ effect 
increases with the ontological level, as it shows itself ‘clearer’ at the level of the intellect: «adhuc 
clariori resplendentia in vita intellectiva» (68, p. 79, 14). This is the level at which Cusanus introduces 
the gloriosus imperator image559, a standard reiteration of the res publica – rex construction, although 
now also featuring the just-developed conception of species (68, p. 79, 17). What is different here is 
the ‘theological’ adjective gloriosus560, recalling the ut gloriam suam manifestetur of paragraph 4 (4, 
p. 6, 5-6), which is also crucially tied to the resplendentia: when one is using the beryllus, therefore, 
one can experience this ‘extra’ aspect of the object examined, which leads one to derive pleasure from 
seeing the physical rose, and (implicitly) even more so by examining the ‘beryllic’ image of the 
                                                          
559 De Beryllo, 68, p. 79, 15 – 80, 20: «quam gloriosus sit ille imperator, qui per naturam tamquam legem omnibus imperat, 
omnia conservat in specie incorruptibili supra tempus et in individuis temporaliter, et quomodo omnia hac lege na|turae 
oriuntur, moventur et operantur ea, quae lex naturae imperat, in qua lege non nisi intellectus ille viget ut omnium auctor». 
560 Cf. Dan. 3:56: «Benedictus es in firmamento cæli: et laudabilis et gloriosus in sæcula». 
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imperator as an image of the principium. This all ties in to the epithet admirandus, ‘marvellous, to be 
admired’, given to the conditor (68, p. 71, 7). It is to be emphasized that resplendentia seems to be 
something properly ‘outside’ the beryllus structures, just as we have it in this case, where the application 
of a beryllus-based image causes pleasure and admiration in the one who applies it. Thus, Cusanus 
seems to be implicitly acknowledging that the beryllus structure itself has fundamental limitations, or 
rather that there is something ‘beyond’ it—as we will examine in Chapter 5 on the question of Christ 
(introduced explicitly in paragraph 69).  
4.2 The hierarchy of ‘divine names’  
 
If God is to be «named by the names of all things and by none of all these names» (13, p. 16, 
10 – 17, 1), this seems to imply a certain ‘indifference’ in determining names. Indeed, as we have seen, 
the method can be used from any starting image and does not itself ‘discriminate’ between all its 
possible results. In order to address the difficulties noted above regarding how to choose the images, 
and which of the innumerabiles modi (27, p. 31, 13) one should use, Cusanus uses certain implicit 
premises that are unconnected to the beryllus method as such, and essentially independent from it. 
These concern the question of which objects one should choose when applying the beryllus, and which 
relations one should choose to transfer between different ‘beryllic’ structures (in order to obtain, for 
instance, ‘names for God’, if one transfers such relations to the omnia – primum principium structure). 
As regards these, Cusanus briefly approaches this theme in paragraph 13 (p. 16, 1 – 17, 12), in 
particular in the first sentence, which says that the name unus «seems to befit God (deo magis 
convenire) better than does any other name», citing Parmenides and Anaxagoras’ «melius unum quam 
omnia simul»561. He then goes on at length to describe that this is not the unus numeralis, the ‘number 
one’, or the monad (monas), but unus understood, in accordance with the method, as having two 
fundamental aspects: indivisibilitas (omni modo divisionis – 13, p. 16, 5), and simplicitas (sine omni 
                                                          
561 Cf. ARISTOTLE, Metaphyisca, XII, 2, 1069b20-21. 
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dualitate intelligitur, lacking in duality, which translates further below to the adjective of simplex – 13, 
p. 16, 9). 
To ‘evaluate’ the modi, Cusanus often seems to use adjectives such as propinquus (63, p. 72, 1) 
or gratus, which do not give much information about how to choose them. There is only one other 
passage in which Cusanus refers to a criterion for choosing images, in paragraph 63: 
Et quanto quantitas discreta est simplicior quantitate continua, tanto species melius in 
aenigmate quantitatis discretae videtur quam continuae. (63, p. 72, 3-6) Simplicior autem est 
magnitudo discreta quam continua et spiritualior atque speciei, quae penitus simplex est, similior, licet 
utique speciei simplicitas, quae est quiditas, sit ante simplicitatem illius discretae magnitudinis. (63, p. 
72, 8-11). 
The criterion used to rank the aenigmata here is simplex/simplicitas (connected, interestingly, 
with spiritualis). Cusanus’ point, coming in the context of the discussion of the newly developed 
concept of species (with the help of the linea-triangulus image in paragraphs 58-62), is that the species, 
being themselves ‘thoroughly simple’ (penitus simplex), can be seen better (melius videtur) in images 
featuring discrete quantities than continuous quantities, as the former are ‘simpler’. There seems to be 
an implicit methodological premise here: one should generally choose aenigmata at a similar level of 
simplicitas (for example, with the same number of ‘ontologic levels’) as the object which one is trying 
to investigate (by means of comparison of beryllus structures). Indeed, Cusanus appears to follow 
precisely this advice in his ‘hierarchical’ constructions overall, and appears to be guided throughout the 
book by a project to offer more and more complex constructions, at which each particular ‘ontological 
level’ is comparably simple to the object to be investigated (e.g. his most complex construction, the 
linea-triangulus image for species at 58-62). However, that is not all there is to the notion of simplicitas, 
as it appears to have a clear Proclean lineage and to involve an ordered ontological framework, based 
on Cusanus’ studies of Proclus during this period, particularly of the Elementatio Theologica, as we 
will examine below. 




 In eight passages562 in De Beryllo, Cusanus refers explicitly to this fundamental ‘ontological 
premise’ of an order of simplex/simplicitas, which, although independent of the method as such, goes 
a long way towards explaining why he chooses to build the structures he does, and why he chooses 
certain passages and not others from the authors he is quoting. This is what underlies the term simplex 
applied to names that we have identified above, as well as the widely-used term subtilis (see the 
extended discussion and sources in note 454 above). And in one particular passage, Cusanus seems 
intent to extend the same fundamental conception to new terms, using four different new terms for it at 
once: principalius, nobilius, altius, incorruptibilius.563 
 The source of this hierarchical conception of simplex can be seen, particularly, in Proclus, one 
of Cusanus’ main sources and a major influence in this book564. For instance, in the Elementatio 
Theologica, a book studied carefully by Cusanus, we read, e.g., at proposition 61:565 
«Omnis potentia impartibilis manens maior est, partita autem minor. - Qua enim partitur procedit in 
multitudinem. Si autem hoc, remotius fit ab uno. Si autem hoc, pauciora poterit, ab uno et continente 
ipsum distans et imperfecta, siquidem uniuscuiusque bonum existit secundum unio» 
  
 At proposition 95566, we read: 
«Omnis potentia unitior existens est infinitior quam plurificata. - Nam a prima infinitas uni 
propinquior, et potentiarum quae uni magis eminentius est infinita distante ab ilio. Plurificata enim 
perdit unitalitatem, manens habebat excellentiam ad alias, contenta propter impartibilitatem. 
partibilibus potentiae collectae quidem multiplicantur, partitae autem debilitantur» 
 
 We can already recognize a theme that has informed many of the Proclean passages that we 
have encountered so far, together with their annotations by Cusanus himself. Accordingly, we see how 
a conception of ‘greater/lesser’ in an ontological sense (whether referred to by simplicitas, subtilis, etc.) 
informs Cusanus’ choices regarding the order and manner of use of his aenigmata, and it appears to be 
                                                          
562 De Beryllo, 19, p. 24, 18-22; 20, p. 24, 7-13; 23, p. 26, 11-13; 44, p. 51, 13-15; 63, p. 72, 3-6; 63, p. 72, 8-11; 65, p. 76, 
11; 71, p. 83, 8 - 84, 19. See Annex I for a full list of these passages. 
563 «Est autem principalius cognoscere et nobilius, quia habet altiorem et incorruptibiliorem finem» (De Beryllo, 65, p. 76, 
11). 
564 On this, see particularly D’AMICO, Nikolaus Cusanus als leser von Proklos; cf. FLASCH, Nicolaus Cusanus, pp. 123-125. 
565 Cf. PROCLUS, Elements of Theology, p. 58, 16-21 (Dodds). Cf. Liber de Causis, XVI, 138: «Omnis virtus unita plus est 
infinita quam virtus multiplicata». 
566 Cf. PROCLUS, ibid., p. 84, 28ff, prop. 95. 
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a hierarchical notion ultimately going back to the theme of the One-multiple relationship. This happens 
to map precisely onto a standard ‘B-structure’ (see Chapter 2.3). Cusanus’ innovation is to take this 
fundamental Neoplatonic ontological structure and apply it to an abstract method constructed on the 
notion of coincidentia oppositorum, resulting in a simple structure for identifying principia in any type 
of object applied. While the method itself is indifferent to what particular objects and what particular 
‘ontological levels’ (in the terms we have used in Chapter 2.3) are being chosen for a particular 
application, as long as the coincidentia oppositorum is properly formulated, the overarching notion of 
simplicitas helps him always establish ontological ‘directionality’, as he does so explicitly, for instance, 
in Chapter 3.4.2 with the linea similitudo veritatis image, which is oriented from the start (outside the 
requirements of the method itself) as representing veritas at one particular and nihil at the other. 
 It is Cusanus’ overall contention that this way of interpreting this aspect of the tradition is in 
fact in basic conformity with the meaning of both Proclus (and Plato viewed through his lens) and 
Pseudo-Dionysius (in his interpretation) and the ‘theological’ part of the tradition. Thus, Cusanus’ idea, 
which lies behind De Beryllo and the beryllus method, is that he can bring together Pseudo-Dionysius’ 
coincidental names with Proclus’ hierarchical structure, and ‘reconstruct’ said structure, and the rest of 
the tradition relying on it (cf. e.g. Albert, Avicebron in paragraph 18), by using his innovative method 
for building multi-level complex hierarchies which can be ‘translated’, ultimately, into different levels 
of simplicitas. At the same time, it remains true that someone might choose to use the beryllus method 
with completely different ‘external criteria’ and construct completely different ontological 
structures/hierarchies based on the coincidentiae oppositorum identified at each step. This should lead 
us to think carefully about the notion of praxis that Cusanus claims to offer: this does not only include 
training in the use of the beryllus method, but also training in the employment of the correct ‘external 
criteria’ by which to guide it—cf., for instance, the crucial ‘methodological’ passage we have analyzed 
in Chapter 3.4.3. At stake is not only the ‘correctness’ of one’s conclusions/constructions, but, in the 




CHAPTER 5 – Christ and the beryllus: De Beryllo as a Christological work 
 
 This chapter will examine an important and interesting question in the context of our discussion 
of the characteristics of the method: where would Christ fit in, according to Cusanus’ understanding? 
While commentators so far have not recognized the importance of the theme of Christology in De 
Beryllo567, the last few paragraphs make explicitly Christological arguments (69-70), which do not 
seem readily understandable in terms of the beryllus method as we have analyzed it so far. They require, 
therefore, special attention in the analysis. Furthermore, in the background of Cusanus’ writing De 
Beryllo are always the sermons he is preaching during this period, some of which go into ontological 
and epistemological themes, together with explicitly Christological ones. And, as we have seen in 
Chapter 3.1, there is strong evidence, particularly in Sermon CXXVI (1453), that Cusanus would have 
conceived of the beryllus as far more than a mere metaphor for a lens—indeed, that he thought of it 
also in terms of a particularly fitting image of Christ. We will analyze all these aspects in turn below. 
5.1 Sermon CXXVI - Christ as a stone (lapis) 
 
 We have analyzed this sermon, preached on June 29, 1453 in Brixen, in Chapter 3.1.d. We will 
summarize here the most important conclusions of that analysis, especially as concerns Christology. 
Thus, in paragraphs 10, 11, and 12, Cusanus develops a very interesting image: that of a small stone 
(lapis/calculus, used interchangeably) as an image of Christ (tying together, in particular, the lapis 
angularis of 1 Pet. 2:4-6 and the calculus of Rev. 2:17). In paragraph 10, he notes that stones have 
virtutes, i.e. (what we would call supernatural) powers; in paragraph 11, he proposes the image of a 
«small, bright but clear stone»568 that would possess all the powers of all the stones complicite—an 
indication that this is meant to be, in a standard beryllus-like structure (similar to those we have just 
examined in De Beryllo), a type of principium of the stones. Then, Cusanus describes how despite 
                                                          
567 Paradigmatic for this is, for instance, the account of FLASCH, Nicolaus Cusanus, pp. 138-140. 
568 Sermon CXXVI, in Sermones XVIII/1, 11, p. 26, 1-4: «Considera igitur, si foret calculus parvus candidus seu lucidus, 
qui haberet in se complicite omnem omnium lapidum pretiosorum virtutem». 
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having all the virtutes of all the stones, it would be ignored and deemed ‘as nothing’ (pro nihilo 
haberetur – implicitly, by people judging it by its appearance alone), but «if someone were to believe 
some great and erudite teacher (magno et doctissimo magistro), who showed the stone and announced 
its power (virtutem eius), [the one who believed], after he believed, would see that [the stone] is indeed 
such (reperiret ita esse), and would place it above all the stones (super omnes lapides), in Zion»569. 
Cusanus explicitly identifies this stone as an image of Christ570. In paragraph 12, Cusanus uses the same 
image of the stone to build up an image of the Incarnation, as a combination of materia and ratio 
aeterna571. In this way, Cusanus says, «you can befigure body, soul and divinity in the best way in the 
small stone»572. This Christological image of the calculus parvus candidus seu lucidus has a clear 
resonance with the introduction of the beryllus stone in De Beryllo (lapis lucidus, albus et transparens 
– 3, p. 5, 1), and needs to be considered from the start as a background to Cusanus’ writing of the text. 
As we will see further below, there is much to argue for the fact that the same Christological conception 
underlies, to an important extent, Cusanus’ use of the beryllus. 
5.2 The philosophical-theological-epistemological problem – how can God be known? A reading 
of Sermon CLXXXVIII (1455) 
 
 The question of how a Christian would be able to ‘see God’ is central to Christian theology, as 
this notion (i.e. the visio beatifica) is a fundamentally important image for salvation—yet, the biblical 
sources appear to offer paradoxically conflicting statements about whether this is possible and how573. 
                                                          
569 Ibid., 6-11: «Sed si quis crederet alicui magno et doctissimo magistro, qui ostenderet calculum et annuntiaret virtutem 
eius, ille postquam crederet, reperiret ita esse. Talis poneret lapidem illum super omnes lapides in Sion». Cf. Rm 9:33, 1 Pt. 
2:6. 
570 Ibid., 15: «Sic dicitur Christus per similitudinem lapis». He then identifies the magister as John the Baptist (line 15), and 
«post hoc», the Apostle Peter (lines 18-19). 
571 Ibid., 12, p. 26, 1 – p. 27: 17: «Unde attende, quod sicut lapis candidus ex purissimis guttulis elementaribus in terra 
virtute caelesti coagulatur ita, quod lapis pretiosus incomparabiliter excedit matrem et non habet alium patrem quam 
virtutem caelestem, sic Christus ex purissimis guttulis virginis gloriosae compactus virtute Altissimi exsistit. Et habet 
calculus ille materiam ex terra virginea, candorem seu animam lucidam seu rationalem, quia lux ratio, de caelo lucidissimo. 
Caelum lucidissimum est sapientia seu ratio aeterna, per quam omnia facta. Nihil enim enim est, cuius ratio, ut esset, non 
exsistit. Habet virtutem, quia candor ille animae rationalis est in luce originis suae, et ita suppositatur in virtute, quae est 
causa omnis virtutis, et ita est virtus divina».    
572 Ibid., 12, p. 27, 18-19: «Et sic habes corpus, animam et deitatem optime figurari in calculo». 
573 Cf., for Old Testament sources, Exodus 33:20 vs. Genesis 32:30, Isaiah 6:5; for the New Testament, John 1:18, 6:46, 1 
John 4:12, Matthew 11:27, 1 Timothy 6:16 vs. 1 Cor. 13:12, 2 Cor. 3:18, 1 John 3:2. 
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As a result of attempts at working out a consistent theological interpretation of the visio beatifica, two 
strands of interpretation developed within the Western tradition on this question, which can also be 
framed in terms of: exactly how unknowable/incomprehensible is God to finite beings (and even to 
Himself) in the end? The first strand followed the interpretation of Augustine574 to the effect that, at 
least in the next life, a visio of God is fundamentally possible. The second strand, however, of a clear 
Eastern Christian lineage (together with some influence from the Neoplatonic tradition) and including 
influential figures such as Gregory of Nyssa575, Pseudo-Dionysius576 and Eriugena577, denied that any 
true vision of God was possible, whether in this life or the next, due (ultimately) to the radical 
ontological separation between the infinite and finite and the Creator and creation; while each of these 
authors developed particular theoretical solutions so that salvation was not rendered impossible after 
all, the radically ‘inaccessible’ character of God remained a fundamental feature578. In the Augustinian 
strand of the tradition, we later find thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas579; in the second, ‘apophatic’ 
tradition, we find Albert the Great580, then Meister Eckhart581, and, later on, Cusanus himself. As we 
                                                          
574 Cf. AUGUSTINE, Epistula 92, 5-6, in PL 33, col. 320; ID. Enarrationes in Psalmos, 26, 2, 11, in PL 36, col. 203; ID. De 
civitate Dei, 22, 30, in PL 33, col. 804; ID., De trinitate, 8, 9, 13, in PL 42, col. 960. 
575 Cf. GREGORY OF NYSSA, De beatitudinibus, Oratio VI, in PG 44, col. 1263-78, esp. 1272B. For a more general account 
of the more ‘apophatic’ character of the interpretation of the visio beatifica by the Fathers of the Eastern Church, see V. 
LOSSKY, The Vision of God, tr. by A. Morehouse, London 1963, esp. pp. 77-79, 112-114. 
576 Cf. PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, De Mystica Theologia, I, 3, p. 144 (1000D-1001A); II, p. 145 (1025B); on this ‘non-seeing 
seeing’ (theoria) (cf. 1 Timothy 6:16) see also ID., De Divinis Nominibus, IV, 11, p. 156 (708D); I, 4, 5, p. 114-115 (592C). 
577 Cf. ERIUGENA, Periphyseon, in PL 122, I, col. 447B-451C, esp. 448C; II, col. 557BC; and throughout book V: e.g. ibid., 
V, col. 905C-D, 926C-D, 945C-D, 1000B-D, 1010C-D, and esp. 998B-1000A.   
578 This is, by necessity, a highly simplified account, which omits many of the important distinctions such as the different 
kinds of visio and faculties which might be involved, whether it is possible in this life or the next, whether quid est or quia 
est knowledge of God is available, whether God’s essence is knowable even to God himself, etc. For a comprehensive look 
at this medieval debate and its sources, see the authoritative and exhaustive C. TROTTMANN, La vision béatifique. Des 
disputes scolastiques a sa definition par Benoit XII, Rome 1995. 
579 This is an oft-treated theme in Aquinas; see TROTTMANN, La vision béatifique, pp. 302-320; for an in-depth study see 
W. HOYE, Actualitas omnium actuum. Man’s beatific Vision of God as Apprehended by Thomas Aquinas, Meisenheim am 
Glan 1975. 
580 Cf. e.g. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Super Mysticam Theologiam, II, in Opera Omnia (Cologne edition), vol. 37/2, I.74, p. 460; 
II.8-9, p. 465; and esp. ID., Summa theologiae, tr. 3, q. 13, cap. 1, in Opera Omnia (Cologne edition), vol. 34/1, esp. p. 40, 
II.39-41. Cf. TROTTMANN, La vision béatifique, pp. 282-302. On Albert’s apophaticism (one of the influences on Cusanus, 
as we have already seen in a number of passages where Cusanus relies on his interpretation of Pseudo-Dionysius), see e.g. 
E. WEBER, Langage et methode negatifs chez Albert le Grand, in «Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques» 65 
(1981), pp. 75-99.  
581 Cf. e.g., for Eckhart’s strong version of apophaticism, MEISTER ECKHART, Deutsche Werke, vol. III, Sermon 71, pp. 211-
231 (on the revelation of Paul), esp. p. 214, II.6-7; p. 215, II.9-11; p. 231, II.1-2. Cf. also ID., Sermo in die B. Augustini, in 
Lateinische Werke, vol. V, pp. 594-595; ID. Sermo XXII, in Lateinische Werke, vol. IV, pp. 197-203. (All references to 
Eckhart’s works are to the two parts, in Latin and German, of the modern critical edition, MEISTER ECKHART, Die deutschen 
und lateinischen Werke, Stuttgart - Berlin, 1936-). For a general account of Eckhart’s mystical theology, see B. MCGINN, 
The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart. The Man from Whom God Hid Nothing, New York 2001. 
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have seen, Cusanus conceptualizes the relationship between man and God (cf. creatura-creator, 
principiata-principium) as, on one hand, a radical skepticism about any possibility for a finite being to 
have any kind of ‘access’ to the infinite God, combined paradoxically with a radical ‘optimism’ about 
the possibility of some type of ‘knowledge’, associated always with a special visio intellectualis, and 
which goes above both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ theology582. At the core of this epistemological 
construction, as we have seen, lies the rejection of the principle of non-contradiction for certain objects 
(namely the realm of the intellectus/beryllus intellectualis); the coincidentia oppositorum is the key to 
overcoming the impossible situation of the finite human being wanting to ‘reach’ God; somehow, this 
‘logically tragic’ situation should be overcome, and the impossible made possible through the judicious 
application of coincidentia oppositorum. His characteristic idea here in De Beryllo appears to be that 
this can be ‘instrumentalized’ in order to derive ‘divine names’ (in continuity, according to his own 
interpretation, with Pseudo-Dionysius) and in order to make possible a particular type of vision, in De 
Beryllo called visio intellectualis583 (and the faculty correlated with it visus subtilissimus), ultimately 
aiming at such an ‘access’ to the inaccessible infinite—but how? This is the theological (and indeed 
soteriological) scope of the method of the beryllus that we are analyzing. 
 Klaus Reinhardt, in a recent article on the notion of intellectus in De Beryllo and a number of 
near-contemporary sermons584, identifies this crucial theme of the problematic ‘access’ to God for a 
human being in the epistemology that Cusanus presents in some sermons dating from the time during 
which Cusanus worked on De Beryllo, and this deserves careful consideration in relation to what 
Cusanus actually says in our text about the nature of the faculties, particularly the intellectus. 
 In these sermons, one finds the same fundamental notion that also has crucial importance for 
De Beryllo: that the human mind by itself is deficient585, particularly for ‘knowing’/’seeing’/’attaining 
                                                          
582 See note 193 and the literature cited there about the ‘three-step’ formulations of his method, on the basis of interpretations 
of Pseudo-Dionysius. 
583 See note 307 and the discussion there. 
584 REINHARDT, Der Intellekt als Prinzip des Seins in De Beryllo und Sermo CLXXXVII Spiritus autem Paraclitus, esp. pp. 
15-16. 
585 Cf. De Beryllo, 1, p. 3, 5: «infirmus intellectus». 
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to’ God, and requires a certain kind of assistance. Thus, in Sermon CLXXXVII («Spiritus autem 
paraclitus», preached on Pentecost in 1455), Cusanus lays out a familiar ontological scheme, but 
emphasizing an element that has been missing so far in our analysis in De Beryllo: namely the 
teleological aspect of the princpium being the finis for the principiata (and thus God being the goal of 
human beings), what this implies, and how, indeed, this ‘goal’ could be reachable, since the beryllus 
structure seems to show a fundamental and irreconcilable separation between the two ontological levels 
involved. Accordingly, in this sermon, Cusanus says that, while the human being is created to know 
about the divitiae gloriae Dei, they are unable to attain this, or know God, by their own forces (ex 
propriis viribus)586; in particular, man is unable to see God (deus excelsus non videtur per 
intellectum)587, as indeed God’s light would have to ‘be poor’ to be visible with the intellectualis oculus 
of a creature588. But since God (lit. God’s gloria) wants to show himself (se ostendere), he created 
creatures to whom he gave intellect, by which they can know that God is their creator, although 
incomprehensible589. That does not, however, solve the problem that visio gloriae [Dei] is impossible. 
Therefore, Cusanus says: «But as the weak natural light [of man] cannot proceed all the way to the 
vision of [God’s] glory (ad visionem gloriae pertingere), therefore, God wanted to show (ostendere) 
the riches of His glory in [its] very infinity, in the light of [God’s] glory, by adding something to 
(superaddendo) the natural light [of man] for the one disposed in the best way to receive [Him]»590. In 
this way, «by the gift of the most merciful king (clementissimi regis), we are freed of the defect and 
                                                          
586 Sermon CLXXXVII, in Sermones XVIII/4, 8, p. 345, 5-6: «ad cognitionem Dei non potest homo pervenire ex omnibus 
viribus suis…;» 8-12: «Homo igitur, etsi creatus sit, ut sibi notae fiant divitiae gloriae Dei, et hoc in laudem ipsius gloriae 
Dei, tamen non sic quod ex propriis viribus ad hoc pertingere possit».  
587 Ibid., 14-19: «Sicut excellens sensibile citius corrumpit sensum quam per victoriam sensus capiatur, ita Deus excelsus 
non videtur per intellectum, immo minus quam claritas solis per oculum, licet nihil plus sit visibile quam claritas, quae 
semet ingerit in oculum». 
588 Ibid., 9, p. 345, 1-2: «Parvae igitur forent divitiae Dei, si per creaturam capi possent, et parva lux, si per creatum 
intellectualem oculum foret inoffense visibilis». 
589 Ibid., 6-13: «Quapropter gloria Dei, quae non potest se ostendere, uti est, visibilem, quia omnem visum creabilem in 
infinitum excedit, divitias bonitatis et clementiae suae meliori modo, quo creatura illas capere possit, ostendere volens, 
creavit creaturam cui dedit intellectum, per quem pertingere posset ad sciendum ipsum Deum creatorem suum esse, licet 
incomprehensibilem, sicut visus hominis pertingit claritatem solis esse et tamen incomprehensibilem». 
590 Ibid., 14-20: «Sed quia debile lumen naturae non potest usque ad visionem gloriae pertingere, tunc in hac ιnfinitate voluit 
Deus ostendere divitias gloriae et servavit largitati suae infinitae facultatem dandi creaturae potestatem attingendi «divitias 
gloriae suae» in lumine gloriae superaddendo lumini naturae optime disposito ad receptionem eius».  
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poverty of nature»591, and thus are able to acquire said «riches» (and, taking the argument further in 
terms of ‘Premise 1’ in De Beryllo, be able to attain our finis, or indeed attain to the thesaurum, 
according to the terms introduced in paragraph 2). 
 Thus, the natural condition of man is to be radically unable to know God; however, in addition 
to the gift of the intellectus, God will offer man ‘something further’ (superaddendo) in order to be able 
to partake of his gloria. Where is this ‘something further’ in De Beryllo, and how can we understand it 
in terms of the beryllus structures that Cusanus builds throughout? 
5.3 Where does Christ fit in a beryllus structure? A structural proposal 
 
 A beryllus structure, as we have previously pointed out, identifies a relationship between objects 
of one type (Level II) and an object of another type (Level I), the second being identified as a 
coincidentia oppositorum in relation to Level I objects, when considered according to a particular 
criterion. However, at the same time that it identifies this relationship, this structure asserts a radical 
separation between these two levels. This is a core feature of the method: for instance, in an angulus – 
linea structure, no finite angle (only the principium angulorum) could ever coincide with the line; they 
are seen as radically, ontologically separate. In this view, if one constructs an 
ontology/epistemology/teleology by using repeated applications of this structure (as we see Cusanus 
trying to do throughout De Beryllo), one is left with what may be called a fundamentally bleak, indeed 
tragic, ontological outlook, particularly (but not exclusively) according to the Christian terminology 
Cusanus is always maintaining in the background. If indeed we are left with a situation in which, on 
one hand the intellectus conditor, is the finis (end goal) of his creations (De Beryllo, 4, p. 6, 5; 25, p. 
29, 9) and their (greatest) desire (desiderium – 25, p. 29, 10), and they, ‘like the parts of a body’, want 
nothing else than to achieve an inseparable union (25, p. 29, 11) with their creator as their highest good 
(bonum ultimum – 25, p. 29, 12), and all these elements function within standard beryllus structures, as 
                                                          
591 Ibid., 21-26: «In hoc enim manifestantur thesauri bonitatis et clementiae eius, quando dono clementissimi regis liberamur 
a defectu et paupertate naturae et efficimur divites in donis, ne quisquam in assecutione felicitatis sibi gloriam ascribere 
possit, sed solum illi datori eius». 
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we have seen, then this ultimate goal for creatures is, simply put, impossible. No creature can ever 
obtain the fulfilment of this greatest desire, as they will always be, in effect, infinitely distant from their 
principium; the ‘parts of the body’ are not only not in the union they seek with the whole, but they are 
effectively ‘cut off’. This is a structural feature of the beryllus method, and no way of overcoming it 
seems to be possible within the standard structure itself. But it is equally clear from the sermon we have 
examined above that this ‘tragic’ situation is not Cusanus’ ultimate view. 
 Indeed, the very fact that the beryllus involves identifying a clear distinction between (in general 
terms) principium and principiata provides the conceptual possibility for a new type of object to be 
considered. Namely, one can apply the principle of the coincidentia oppositorum to the ‘opposites’ that 
the beryllus method itself identifies, and construct an object that would be both at the same time – cause 
and caused, original and image, and (at the limit, considering this for the case of the omnium – 
principium opposition) creature and creator. This would be a new type of object in a beryllus structure, 
building up new relationships between it and the other elements.  
 This argument we have just outlined is very similar to the one Cusanus makes at the beginning 
of book III of De Docta Ignorantia, when he introduces a similar paradoxically-defined object, 
maximus absolutus simul et contractus592, which is then identified as Christ. Although some 
commentators have argued that this ultimately represents an ‘inconsistency’ in Cusanus’ thought593, 
others have remarked that this fits perfectly well within the logic of the coincidentia oppositorum, and 
that this Christological concept is in fact a paradigmatic example of it594. Following the same logic, we 
will identify in our structural conceptualization of the ‘B-structure’ (cf. Chapter 2.3) an extra element 
                                                          
592 De docta ignorantia, III, Prologus, 181, p. 117, 1 – 3, 202, 129, 14. This extended argument takes up the first three 
chapters of the ‘Christological’ book III. 
593 Notably HOPKINS, Translator’s introduction, p. 42. 
594 Cf. e.g. MILLER, Reading Cusanus, pp. 58-64, esp. 60; BOND, Selected Spiritual Writings, pp. 34-35. Nancy Hudson’s 
Eastern Christian theology-influenced reading is also geared towards such an interpretation: HUDSON, Becoming God: The 
Doctrine of Theosis in Nicholas of Cusa. Another highly interesting interpretation of De Docta Ignorantia focusing on 
Christ as the paradigmatic coincidentia oppositorum around which the whole work is structured is Ulrich Offermann’s 
Christus: Wahrheit des Denkens: U. OFFERMANN, Christus: Wahrheit des Denkens, Beiträge zur Geschichte der 
Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 33, Münster 1991. 
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meant to represent the coincidence of Level I and Level II objects as we have described them in the 
construction.   
We will note, for simplicity, this ‘extra’ coincidental element as ‘C’ (and will refer to it also as 
a ‘C-type’ element, as there is no requirement strictly within the method itself that it be unique). Its 
presence will require, in fact, the development of a new form of the B-structure, as the relationships 
between it and other elements will not be easily representable in the standard notation we have 
proposed. Thus we propose the following notation, for whenever such an element is identified: 
B[Level II objects, ordering criterion A] -> Level I object 
 - relation a holds between the Level II objects and Level I object 
 - relation b holds between the Level II objects and Level I object 
  … 
  - C is both a Level II object and the Level I object 
  B[another set of objects, ordering criterion B] -> C 
   - relation c holds between the set of objects and C 
   - relation d holds between the set of objects and C 
   … 
 
Thus, we propose a notation with ‘nested’ B-structures, one ‘included’ in the other (represented 
by an extra level of indentation), signifying in a simple and intuitive way that the X object is built as 
an ‘extra’ coincidentia oppositorum within an original B-structure. X is defined from the start as having 
all the properties of both Level I and Level II objects, with all the consequences that follow – thus, one 
can ‘read’ its properties by looking at the set of relations found in the original B-structure. However, 
one can also consider C in relation to a different set of objects altogether, which is why it is proper to 
insert it into its own structure, using the extra indentation as a sign of the ‘dependencies’ involved. 
With this new notation, the interpretive benefits will become apparent, as we will be better able 
to conceptualize the passages where Christ explicitly appears in De Beryllo: 69, 70 and 72595. 
 
                                                          
595 This presupposes, of course, that Cusanus’ basic views regarding Christ’s ontological status as coincidentia oppositorum 
did not change from the time of De Docta Ignorantia to the time of De Beryllo. There is no evidence for such a change; 
Cusanus’ conception of Christ seems to have remained consistent throughout his sermons across this lengthy period of time, 
and no strong ‘periodization’ of his Christological views in the sermons has been proposed so far. See e.g. the excellent 
recent (2014) overview in REINHARDT, Die Rolle der Christologie im Denken des Cusanus, pp. 61-71. 
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5.4 Reading the Christological passages – 69-70, 72 
 
 We will examine here the passages at the end of De Beryllo where Christ is introduced, not 
merely in the context of Trinitarian speculation (which, as we have seen, Cusanus can befigure by 
means of the beryllus without any particular difficulty, cf. Chapter 3.4.4), but with a clearly different, 
‘Incarnational’ role, which renders the regular beryllus structures Cusanus has used fundamentally 
problematic, and necessitates the introduction of the ‘C-element’ notation. 
5.4.1 Paragraph 69 – De Beryllo, 69, p. 80, 1 – 81, 14 
 
 In paragraph 69596, after giving a general image applying his developed hierarchical-ontological 
structures to the example of the rose and the image of the imperator gloriosus in paragraph 68 (cf. our 
analysis in Chapter 4.1.6), Cusanus explicitly combines the homo mensura rerum doctrine of ‘Premise 
3’ (paragraph 6) with the image in ‘Premise 1’ (paragraph 4): ut suam gloriam manifestetur (cf. our 
analysis in Chapter 3.3). Now Cusanus has finally built up all the necessary structures in order to explain 
the teleological aspect of this view: how God can be the finis, and how that can be attained, which had 
remained up to now an unresolved question. He also quotes Aristotle at the beginning of the 
paragraph597, in support of his ontological (and also ‘beryllic’) scheme of sensus – sensibilia in ‘Premise 
                                                          
596 De Beryllo, 69, p. 80, 1 – 81, 14: «Vidit Aristoteles id ipsum, scilicet semota sensitiva cognitione esse et sensibilia 
semota, quando dicit in Metaphysica: «Si animata non essent, sensus non esset neque sensibilia», et plura ibi de hoc. Recte 
igitur dicebat Protagoras hominem rerum mensuram, qui ex natura suae sensitivae sciens sensibilia esse propter ipsam 
mensurat sensibilia, ut sensibiliter divini intellectus gloriam possit apprehendere. Sic de intelligibilibus ea ad cognitionem 
referendo intellectivam, et demum ex eodem contemplatur naturam illam intellectivam immortalem, ut se divinus intellectus 
in sua immortalitate eidem ostendere possit. Et ita evangelica doctrina manifestior fit, quae finem creationis ponit, ut 
videatur «deus deorum in Sion» in maiestate gloriae suae, quae est ostensio patris, in quo est sufficientia omnis. Et promittit 
ille noster salvator, «per quem» deus «fecit et saecula», ipsum scilicet verbum dei, quomodo in illa die se ostendet et quod 
tunc illi vivent vita aeterna». 
597 ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, 1010b30 – 1011a2; in the Bessarion translation: «necessarium enim non contingit aliter et 
aliter se habere. quare si quid necessario est, non ita et non ita habebit. et simpliciter, si sensibile solum esset, nihil esset 
profecto, cum animata non essent. sensus namque non esset. neque sensibilia itaque neque sensiones esse fortassis verum 
esset: sentientis enim haec passio est. at ipsa subiecta, quae sensum faciunt, non esse etiam absque sensu, hoc impossibile 
est: sensus namque non ipse est sui ipsius, sed est aliquid aliud etiam praeter sensum, quod necesse est prius sensu esse. 
movens enim natura prius est moto; et si ad se in vicem dicuntur, ipsa eadem nihil minus» (ARISTOTLE, Aristoteles Latine, 
p. 495). Here, in his copy (Cod. Cusanus 184, fol. 25r-25v), Cusanus adds a lengthy note summarizing Aristotle’s argument, 
particularly focusing on the dependency of sense-objects on the senses, which, as we have seen, he interprets (from 
paragraph 5 on) as elements of a beryllus structure: «et simpliciter si sensibile solum est: nil esset profecto si animate non 
essent: sensus namque non esset: Neque sensibilia itaque neque sensiones esse fortassis verum est sensientis enim hec passio 
est ipsa uero subiecta que sensum faciunt non esse et absque sensu hoc impossibile est sensus namque non est ipse sui ipsius 
sed est aliquid aliud etiam preter sensum quod necesse est prius sensu esse: mouens enim natura prius est moto etsi ad se 
invicem dicuntur ipsa eadem nihil minus». 
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2’ (paragraph 5); and then he uses the mode of concluding from the properties of the finite intellect to 
those of God (ex eodem) that he introduced in ‘Premise 4’ (paragraph 7). Paragraph 69 therefore 
represents a full reprisal of all the ‘four premises’ that Cusanus analyzed in the beginning of the work, 
a recapitulation and reintegration of the problems set out from the initial paragraphs. One might expect 
that Cusanus would perhaps choose to end the work after this tying together of its most important 
themes. What he does in paragraph 69, though, is quite unexpected: he suddenly switches fully to 
theological language on line 10598, and introduces a radically new element: that, according to the 
evangelica doctrina, the finis of creation is that the «God of gods in Zion be seen (videatur) in the 
majesty of His glory»; God’s gloria, furthermore, is said to be the ostensio of the Father. This is new: 
we have encountered ostensio before in a seemingly ‘regular’ beryllic structure, but now the goal is 
explicitly put in terms of ‘seeing’: it is a matter of no less than videre Deum. Furthermore, we know 
(after examining Plato and Aristotle’s errors, cf. Chapter 4.1.4) that the apparently ‘multiple’ elements 
should be in fact interpreted coincidentally, i.e. all of deus, gloria, pater, sufficientia, ille salvator, 
verbum dei, in various ways, name God and not created, finite things.  
 Here the beryllus construction seems to fail, if we take ille salvator and verbum dei, as we are 
obviously meant to by Cusanus, as (also) a particular human being, namely Christ. While the basic 
familiar structure of omnia creata – creator is still available, there is nowhere to place Christ without 
the extended ‘C’ notation we have formulated. And Christ is the essential element which makes 
possible, in the end, the finis set out, in particular, for human beings, ever since ‘Premise 1’ (paragraph 
4). The only way to actually achieve the goal (instead of tending asymptotically towards the infinite 
and tragically failing) is for God, who is sufficientia omnia, to offer a kind of ostensio patris (69, p. 81, 
12) that is a radically different kind of relationship from the regular, ontological ‘dat esse’. This can 
                                                          
598 All of the language Cusanus uses until the end of the paragraph has a clear Biblical source: «videbitur deus deorum in 
Sion» (Ps. 83:8); «gloria maiestate eius» (Is. 2:10-19); «tunc dominus ostendet haec et apparebit maiestas domini» (2 Macc. 
2:8); «spiritus omnipotentis magnam fecit suae ostensionis evidentiam» (2 Macc. 3:24); «Domine ostende nobis patrem et 
sufficit nobis» (John 14:8); «sufficientia nostra ex deo est» (2 Cor. 3:5); «per quem fecit et saecula» (Hebr. 1:2); «verbum 
dei» (cf. Luke 2:15); «vivent vita aeterna» (John 5:25; Rom. 2:7). For the verb se ostendet, cf. Eph. 2:7, Matt. 16:27, 24:30, 
25:31; Mark 8:38, 13:26; Luke 21:27. 
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only occur if the ontological separation seen through the beryllus between creation and creator is 
overcome: thus the new, ‘C’ element is both necessary and sufficient here. Christ’s eschatological 
promise is thus rendered into a comprehensible ontological movement: in illa die se ostendet et quod 
tunc illi vivent vita aeterna. Let us represent this basic pattern with the B-notation, using the new 
concept we have developed:  
B[homines, *gradus] -> deus/creator/pater 
 - [vita aeterna est impossibilis] 
 - C est homo et deus 
   B[illi, *gradus] -> C 
    - C se ostendet, est ostensio patris 
    - illi vivent vita aeterna [cur C vita aeterna est] 
  
 This would be a perfectly orthodox restatement of Christian eschatological doctrine in Cusanus’ 
view. Thus we see the way in which Cusanus believes that evangelica doctrina can become manifestior; 
not, in the end, according to ratio, as it involves (at least two levels of) the coincidentia oppositorum, 
but indeed according to intellectus, i.e. to the visio intellectualis we inevitably use when understanding 
this conceptual structure. In this way, fides becomes fundamentally tied to the visio Cusanus is seeking. 
5.4.2 Paragraph 70 - De Beryllo, 70, p. 81, 1 – 82, 10 
 
 In this crucial paragraph599, Cusanus aims to explain how this ostensio and visio should be 
thought of, as they are a completely new type of relationship, not the same as in a regular ‘beryllic’ 
principium – principiata structure. He does this again by a beryllus-type structure, by means of an 
image: the intellect of Euclid, its ars600, its explicatio601 in Euclid’s Elements; accordingly, the visio 
described here would be the apprehensio of the ars itself, as opposed to the understanding by our finite 
intellectus of the contents of Euclid’s book. This is not possible in the regular ontological structures 
                                                          
599 De Beryllo, 70, p. 81, 1 – 82, 10: «Haec enim ostensio est concipienda, ac si quis unico contuitu videret intellectum 
Euclidis et quod haec visio esset apprehensio eiusdem artis, quam explicat Euclides in suis Elementis. Sic intellectus divinus 
ars est omnipotentis, per quam fecit saecula et omnem vitam et intelligentiam. Apprehendisse igitur hanc artem, quando se 
nude ostendet in illa die, quando nudus et purus apparuerit coram eo intellectus, est acquisivisse dei filiationem et 
hereditatem immortalis regni. Intellectus enim si in se habuerit artem, quae est creativa vitae et laetitiae sempiternae, 
ultimam est assecutus scientiam et felicitatem». 
600 Cf. ars at the beginning of paragraph 9, see Chapter 3.4.1. 
601 For complicatio/explicatio see note 425. 
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that Cusanus has built (the intellectus has access only to intelligibilia; there is no visio by which one 
can see someone else’s intellectus), which is precisely the point. It would be necessary for Euclid’s 
intellectus to se nude et pure ostendere, just like Christ has to do in the comparative image, otherwise 
such a relationship is not possible. Thus, we have two ‘double’ beryllus structures, in a standard 
application of the method but with the extended ‘C-object’. 
The presence in the finite intellect of the infinite ars is the term used for the relationship in 
which the finis of a human being can be fulfilled. At the same time, this ars is obviously meant to be a 
name for Christ: compare per quam fecit in paragraph 70 (p. 81, 3) to 69 (p. 81, 12); and in any case 
ars and intellectus coincide in God. Thus, there is no escaping the conclusion that the human being 
must become a coincidental object themselves, a coincidence of finite and infinite intellectus, in order 
to obtain the filiatio Dei, ultima scientia, ultima felicitas, which are all immediate consequences of 
entering a type of coincidentia with God. The human being must, therefore, become ‘deified’602, and 
will have to be added in illa die to a third ‘level’ of coincidentia oppositorum.  
To understand how this works in a rigorous fashion, let us examine the example of Euclid and 
his book by means of the B-notation. The ‘regular’ situation, according to the ontological framework 
Cusanus has been building, is the following: 
B[liber Euclidis, *gradus] -> intellectus Euclidis 
Another person cannot ‘gain access’ to Euclid’s own intellect, as from their perspective the 
things they read and understand in Euclid’s books will be in a similarity relationship only to their own 
intellect (cf. the example of fire in paragraph 57, which we have analyzed in Chapter 4.1.5): 
B[liber Euclidis, *gradus] -> intellectus alius 
                                                          
602 The notion of deificatio (particularly prominent in the Eastern Christian tradition, cf. theosis) has an important role in 
Cusanus’ theology, as Nancy Hudson has clearly shown in her landmark 2007 study: HUDSON, Becoming God: the Doctrine 
of Theosis in Nicholas of Cusa. As we might expect from Cusanus’ usual patterns of thought, this entails a certain kind of 
‘coincidence’ attainable between man and God (on the model of Christ), in the life to come: Cf. De Filiatione Dei, 70, p. 
52, 5-6: «tunc recte deificamur, quando ad hoc exaltamur, ut in uno simus ipsum in quo omnia et in omnibus unum»; De 
Visione Dei, 101, p. 79, 4-5: «verbum enim dei est humanatum et homo deificatum». 
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Unless, that is, Euclid’s intellect were to show itself (ostendere) in an extraordinary, 
coincidental way, by means of a coincidental ‘C-object’: 
B[liber Euclidis, *gradus] -> intellectus Euclidis 
 - C est intellectus Euclidis et liber Euclidis 
  B[C, *gradus] -> intellectus alius 
   - C est in intellectu alio [Ergo, intellectus Euclidis est in intellectu alio] 
   
This basic pattern is an image for the Christological structure that Cusanus is proposing. One 
can obtain the exact relationship that Christ, the ‘coincidental object’, has with the world by simply 
transferring the properties of this liber Euclidis – intellectus Euclidis structure to the relationship 
between creation and the creator, as Cusanus does in paragraph 70, with a simple sic (cf. 70, p. 81, 3): 
B[liber Euclidis, *gradus] -> intellectus Euclidis 
 - C est intellectus Euclidis et liber Euclidis 
  B[C, *gradus] -> intellectus alius 
   - C est in intellectu alio [Ergo, intellectus Euclidis est in intellectu alio] 
SIC 
B[omnia, *gradus] -> creator 
 
 This is an extraordinarily important result, for the very fact that it puts a central ‘dogmatic’ 
Christian doctrine on a solid basis by means of the application of a formal-abstract method such as the 
beryllus as we have seen it used so far. It implies that, in Cusanus’ view here, one cannot maintain a 
strong distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘revealed’ theology; by means of this coincidentia 
oppositorum-based method, all the ‘positive contents’ of the Christian tradition (and even the most 
paradoxical-seeming ones, such as the Incarnation and the Trinity) are rendered just as understandable 
as any sententias et opiniones of the doctissimi generally603. 
5.4.3 Paragraph 72 – De Beryllo, 72, p. 84, 1 – 85, 13 
 
                                                          
603 Thus one can see how Flasch’s reading of Cusanus’ thought in De Beryllo becomes distorted because of him trying to 
maintain these irrelevant distinctions (see FLASCH, Nicolaus Cusanus, pp. 138-140, e.g. on p. 139, where he says that 
«Cusanus treibe keine Bibelauslegung und keine Glaubenswissenschaft» in De Beryllo, which, as we have seen, is 
misleading to say the least; or on p. 140, where he says that Cusanus is a «Theologe» only in the sense in which «Plotin und 
Cicero, Descartes, Spinoza und Leibniz, Fichte und Hegel» also were).  
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 The last paragraph604 comes after a ‘summarizing’ paragraph 71, where Cusanus invokes 
explicitly all of his newly-constructed hierarchies and decisively connects them to the overall 
metaphysical ordering principle of simplicitas, explicitly stating two simplicitas-related postulates 
connected with it: nulla cognitio possit in simplicius eo and mensura autem est simplicior quam 
mensurabilia. Thus, the validity of the beryllus structure is justified, in Cusanus’ view, by how well it 
can describe such a hierarchy of different levels of simplicitas that Cusanus is familiar with from his 
Neoplatonic-influenced sources. All his constructions, and the answer to a number of philosophical 
problems he mentions, can be found complicite in beryllo et aenigmate (an innovative use, thus placing 
the beryllus on the level of a principium in its own beryllus-based structure, with its applications as its 
‘images’). He will stop here (although, implicitly, he could continue indefinitely), brevitatis causa. 
 In the last paragraph, Cusanus returns to Plato, coming back to the topic he addressed in 
paragraph 2: why does he think that the haec alta should now be revealed and no longer kept secret, 
against Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius’ prohibition (to which is added Plato’s injunction against writing 
such things)? Cusanus is particularly subtle here: he agrees with Plato that «knowledge is very short in 
length (scientia brevissima est); it would be communicated better apart from all writing, if there were 
those who were seeking [it] and who were [suitably] disposed» (72, 84, 1 – 85, 3), and he recalls Plato’s 
strict criteria for those ‘suitably disposed’ from the Seventh Letter605, adding that such a ‘seeker’ should 
be fidelis atque deo devotus, «from whom he may obtain—by means of frequent (crebris)606 and 
imploring prayers—the gift of being enlightened (illuminari)», as «God gives wisdom (sapientia) to 
those who seek it (petentibus) with steadfast faith». We note that, as is his pattern throughout the book, 
                                                          
 
604 De Beryllo, 72, p. 84, 1 – 85, 13: «Ego autem finem libello faciens dico cum Platone: Scientia brevissima est, quae sine 
omni scriptura melius communicaretur, si essent petentes atque dispositi. Illos autem Plato putat dispositos, qui tanta cupiunt 
aviditate imbui, quod sibi potius moriendum esse putent quam carendum scientia, deinde qui a vitiis et deliciis abstinent 
corporalibus atque ingenii habent aptitudinem. Dico ego illa omnia sic esse addens quod cum hoc sit fidelis atque deo 
devotus, a quo illuminari crebris et importunis obtineat precibus. Dat enim sapientiam firma fide, quantum saluti sufficit, 
petentibus. His iste quamquam minus bene digestus libellus dabit materiam cogitandi secretioraque inveniendi et altiora 
attingendi et in laudibus dei, ad quem aspirat omnis anima, semper perseverandi, «qui facit mirabilia solus» [Ps. 71:18-19, 
cf. Ps. 135:4] et est in aevum benedictus. Deo laus». 
605 Cf. PLATO, Epistulas VII, 340b-340e. 
606 Cusanus uses the same word in an adverbial form in his account of his own activities in his other books, in paragraph 1: 
in coincidentiam oppositorum crebrius versatum. 
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Cusanus is establishing, by means of his use of the ambiguous word petentes to signify both ‘seekers 
for knowledge’ according to Plato and Christians praying for divine enlightenment, and by his use of 
sapientia for what is obtained as a result, an equal status between ‘philosophy’ and ‘theology’. Cusanus 
then goes on to say what this somewhat ‘less well organized’ (minus bene digestus) book offers to such 
a ‘seeker’ (his), namely materia for an interesting triad: cogitandi, secretiora inveniendi and altiora 
attingendi, and, in addition, for always perseverandi in laudibus dei, as God is ad quem aspirat omnis 
anima, reiterating the theme of the theological finis in paragraphs 69-70. However, commentators 
usually miss607 a crucial aspect of the construction of this passage: it all hinges on the hypothetical 
clause si essent petentes atque dispositi—‘if seekers were to exist with the right disposition’. But what, 
indeed, if they do not? If such exist, Cusanus seems to say, Plato is right, and they can be taught in a 
better way than in books (including De Beryllo) the scientia which is brevissima. However, Cusanus 
still believes he is right to write about haec alta, in implicit disagreement with Plato (as we saw in 
paragraph 2), as shown by the fact that he wrote this book. While he emphasizes at the end the benefits 
his book would bring (also) to one of the ‘well-disposed seekers’, he is specifically not mentioning 
anything about all his other readers who do not fit all the stringent criteria put forward by Plato in the 
Seventh Letter and by Cusanus himself here: it is enough to compare the much less stringent 
requirements put forth in paragraph 2608 with the ones mentioned in this paragraph. As we have seen in 
analyzing that paragraph (in Chapter 3.2.2), Cusanus seems to promise that he can take a reader even 
from the condition of homo animalis to perceiving the thesaurus inexhauribilis. There is no sign, 
indeed, that he is renouncing this promise here in the last paragraph. What he does mention (how those 
people who happen to fit such strict criteria, both in philosophical aptitude and devotion to God, and 
for whom scientia is brevissima, would also benefit from his book—if they exist at all) is in fact less 
important, for the average reader, than what he does not mention but leaves implicit here: that the book 
is meant to help also those who do not fit these criteria (even starting from the homo animalis stage), 
                                                          
607 For instance, Corrieras takes these strict Seventh Letter ‘criteria’ at face value, as meant to be applied generally for 
Cusanus’ own endeavor (not only Plato’s): CORRIERAS, Le traité du béryl, pp. 115-116. 
608 Cf. De Beryllo, 2, p. 4, 7 – 5, 11, and the extended analysis in Chapter 3.2.2. 
243 
 
and who might be helped to get to the point of fitting these criteria by means of De Beryllo, and 
particularly the praxis it presents. Crucially, sapientia is described as a donum given by God609 (a term 
with clear Christological connotations), and we must interpret the recapitulation of these ‘requirements’ 
in light of the powerfully Christological paragraph 69 and the new ‘C-object’ it introduces in the regular 
beryllus scheme—offering the ultimate sapientia in an ostensio that surely cannot be said to be 
conditioned by Plato’s stringent Seventh Letter criteria.  
 In the end, the key to interpreting this passage seems to be that the scientia aenigmatica that 
Cusanus is offering in De Beryllo appears to be something different from the scientia brevissima of 
Plato that he mentions here; and perhaps the scientia aenigmatica is more fit for a reader who does not 
‘qualify’ for that Platonic scientia which is not to be written down, as its ‘access criteria’ are much 
lower (i.e. those set out in paragraph 2). However, the important and subtle point Cusanus is making 
here—while claiming to agree with Plato—is that both of these are (types of) scientia: and that, in the 
end, only the paradoxical ostensio of God (as a ‘C-object’) offers access to ultima scientia (70, p. 82, 
10). It is this which is the true goal of a human being, and all different types of scientia, whether 
‘philosophical’ or ‘theological’, whether aenigmatica or brevissima, are images of it/subordinate to 
it/aiming at it as their goal. This argument (built according to a familiar beryllus-type structure, 
involving the novel ‘C-element’) justifies Cusanus’ project in De Beryllo, which is no less than a true 
synthesis (according to the mode of thought he provides) between these different aspects of scientia—
including also, most particularly, the philosophical and theological. 
5.5 The beryllus as a Christological image 
 
 What is the beryllus of the title—or, to be more precise, what is the beryllus intellectualis, in 
relation to our Christological considerations? We have seen already that Cusanus would have seen the 
beryllus as a stone with particular powers (and a number of explicitly Christological connotations when 
used as an image in the tradition). We have also looked at the image of Christ as lapis in Sermon 
                                                          
609 Cf. James 1:5, Prov. 2:6, Job 32:8. 
244 
 
CXXVI, one that makes use of the ‘small stone’ that was (in a ‘beryllic’ structure) the maximum, or 
‘infinitization’, of the powers of all the stones. Finally, we have seen how essential structural elements 
in the arguments in De Beryllo point to the necessity of what we have termed a ‘C’-type of object, 
formed by a ‘double coincidentia oppositorum’, and which Christ would indeed fit perfectly—and we 
have seen that at the end of the book, Cusanus himself identifies ille nostre salvator (69, p. 81, 13) as 
fulfilling these structural roles. 
 But what is the beryllus, in the end? Can we characterize it properly as a Christological image, 
and De Beryllo, at an important level, as a Christological treatise? Let us look again at the structure 
where Cusanus introduces it, in paragraph 3 (previously analyzed in Chapter 3.3.1). 
 After the hierarchical-ontological constructions that De Beryllo builds later in the book, we are 
able to analyze the beryllus – beryllus intellectualis construction in paragraph 3 much easier. Thus, it 
appears to be a parallel between a relationship on the level of sensus/corpus (with the physical beryllus) 
with one on the level of the intellectus: to the intellectualis oculis is fitted a beryllus intellectualis. But 
appearances (and terminology) can be superficially deceiving: if the parallel were to hold between the 
sensus and intellectus levels, the beryllus would be a help for the intellect to better understand its regular 
objects, at its own ontological-epistemological level, i.e. the intellectibilia (which include, for instance, 
mathematical figures, human creations per artem, and, indeed, aenigmata). However, the beryllus 
intellectualis is clearly not intended by Cusanus for helping us understand, for instance, mathematical 
problems. Instead, and most crucially, the beryllus intellectualis is connected to visio intellectualis, 
which is not the same as the ‘regular’ activity of the intellectus, and it has as its object something that 
is not among the intelligibilia: the indivisibile omnium principium. The beryllus intellectualis is not 
meant to be an aid for the intellect in its common operations, but rather offers it access to a higher 
ontological level, described, as we have seen, by the terms visio intellectualis – intellectuales oculi – 
in excessu – quae excedant and, indeed, principium. Thus, the comparison between beryllus and 
beryllus intellectualis does not actually hold: the beryllus intellectualis offered in the book is not like 
the physical beryllus at all, but rather (extrapolating and speculating) as if one could look through a 
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physical lens and actually ‘see’ objects on a higher ontological level than that of sight (for instance, one 
could see the species of objects, not in their sensible form)610. Thus, the beryllus intellectualis is an 
extraordinary type of object, which seems to be a type of ‘mediator’ between ontological levels. This 
is clear from the language Cusanus uses for the beryllus, namely the ‘per + Accusative’, e.g. per 
beryllum videre, which is built on the pattern of per suam [X] speciem/similitudinem language 
developed at 6, p. 8, 5-11 for the modi cognoscitivi. In paragraph 8, Cusanus says clearly how we are 
to understand what the beryllus is, in one of the most striking ‘metholodogical’ statements: «[veritas] 
videtur per omnem similitudinem maximam pariter et minimam absolutum primum principium omnis 
suae similitudinis» (8, p. 11, 14-15; cf. also 8, p. 11, 10-11: per absolutam similitudinem videbimus). 
Therefore, the beryllus intellectualis is identified with a similitudo maxima pariter et minima, which 
also makes it easy to understand why the beryllus works: it is something like a ‘paradigm’ for 
aenigmata. Pursuing the argument further, the beryllus intellectualis must be, in the end, an 
‘infinitization’ of the physical beryl stone—but this is arguably exactly the maximal lapis/calculus that 
we have seen Cusanus construct in Sermon CXXVI, paragraphs 10-11, presenting it as an explicit 
Christological image.  
 It appears, therefore, that Cusanus decided to use the exact same fundamental image that he 
built for this sermon (from June 1453) for constructing the De Beryllo (which he had been planning 
before 1454, possibly from mid-1452, as we have seen), as the ‘infinitized’ version of the regular beryl 
stone, to which he gave the name beryllus intellectualis611, thus also preserving all the connotations and 
meanings of the physical beryl stone and ‘infinitizing’ its role as an aid for sight. But the fundamental 
image (an ‘infinite stone’, possessing all the virtutes of all the stones, and at the same time being found 
in the form of one of them in particular) appears to be paradigmatically Christological. 
                                                          
610 One could make an interesting parallel with how the mode of knowledge of the intelligentiae, the angels, is briefly 
described; see notes 436 and 437. 
611 Intellectualis here seems to refer, in the end, to being in (or a product of) the human intellect, in the same way in which 
all aenigmata are intellectualis, like all ‘infinitzed’ constructions. But it is a special case in Cusanus’ usage of terms.   
246 
 
 But what is the ontological status of this object? Cusanus seems to characterize the beryllus as 
a speculum et aenigma (1, p. 3, 5). Thus, it would be a construct of the human intellectus, like the linea 
– angulus construction or any other of the innumerabiles modi. Therefore, according to Cusanus’ view 
on the status of human creations, the beryllus intellectualis (in the manner of, say, a circle – cf. 
paragraph 57, analyzed in Chapter 4.1.5), is an image of, and exists most truly in, the human intellectus. 
 However, we can certainly ask what would happen if such a thing as the beryllus intellectualis 
in fact existed in the universe—as Cusanus himself asks in De Docta Ignorantia book III about the 
infinite line612, another one of his paradigmatic constructed geometrical images. He concludes that this 
is not possible (leaving the matter as a quomodo ergo rhetorical question at the end), because this object, 
which would be both infinite (and thus the maximum, and thus God) and at the same time a line, would 
end up, accordingly, in actuality (actu), everything that can be from a line (omne id, quod ex linea fieri 
potest – De Docta Ignorantia, 196, p. 126, 13), i.e. considered as a principium (which would thus 
include, presumably, according to Cusanus’ similar geometrical derivations in De Docta Ignorantia, 
all of corpus). However, Cusanus points out that a line does not have life (vita) or intellect 
(intellectus)—as he assumes the ontological triad, familiar also in De Beryllo, of esse – vivere – 
intelligere. Therefore, the infinite line would not reach the fullness of all natures (plenitudinem 
naturarum non attingit – De Docta Ignorantia, 196, p. 126, 15-16), since it would be ‘stuck’, so to 
speak, within its own ontological ‘region’, and it would be a maximum that could be greater (maius esse 
posset), which is a contradiction in terms. As such, Cusanus feels confident he can assert that an infinite 
line, and generally any coincidental object on the model of what we defined as a ‘C-type object’ in the 
beryllus structure, cannot exist in reality613 and is only a creation of the human intellect, a mere 
                                                          
612 De docta ιgnorantia, III, 196, p. 126, 8-16: «Si enim ipsa inferiorum natura consideratur, et aliquid talium entium ad 
maximitatem elevetur, erit tale Deus et ipsum, ut in linea maxima exemplum datur. Nam ipsa cum sit infinita per infinitatem 
absolutam et maxima per maximitatem, cui necessario unitur, si maxima est, Deus erit per maximitatem, et remanet linea 
per contractionem; et ita erit actu omne id, quod ex linea fieri potest. Linea autem non includit neque vitam neque 
intellectum. Quomodo ergo linea ad ipsum maximum gradum poterit assumi, si plenitudinem naturarum non attingit? Esset 
enim maximum, quod maius esse posset, et perfectionibus careret». 
613 This was one of the accusations brought against him by Johannes Wenck, a scholastic and Aristotelian theologian who 
wrote De Ignota Litteratura in 1442/43 against Cusanus’ De Docta Ignorantia; on this controversy, see J. HOPKINS, 
Nicholas of Cusa’s Debate with John Wenck: A Translation and an Appraisal of De Ignota Litteratura and Apologia Doctae 
Ignorantiae, Minneapolis, 1988; also FLASCH, Nicolaus Cusanus, pp. 181-194. Cusanus wrote specifically about the matter 
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construction like the geometrical aenigmata. His ultimate argument in De Docta Ignorantia is that such 
an object would have to be exclusively a human being, due to human nature being a microcosmos, 
possessing within it (complicans) both intellectual and sensible nature614, which would allow being 
‘infinitzed’ in such a way without resulting in a contradiction. But it is important to note that this 
argument depends in a fundamental way on the exact ontological division and hierarchy of essere – 
vivere – intelligere, a type of hierarchy based, as we examined in Chapter 4.3, on a notion of simplicitas 
derived from the Neoplatonic tradition. Thus, it concerns Cusanus’ beliefs about the actual ontological 
order, entirely independent of the method of the beryllus (or any similar method, if we are to consider 
this in the context of the De Docta Ignorantia). While Cusanus does build beryllus-based images to 
show such an ontological threefold division, other images and other divisions are also possible to be 
built using the beryllus method, even if they don’t particularly fit Cusanus’ external metaphysical 
criterion of simplicitas. It is thus important to note that there is nothing in the beryllus method itself to 
prevent such a ‘C-object’ as we have described from being constructed and being said to exist, such as 
a line that is ‘both God and a line’, or, indeed, a maximum lapis, a stone that is ‘both God and a stone’. 
This is a crucial aspect to note regarding the method as such (the structural coincidentia oppositorum-
based beryllus) and the external simplicitas metaphysical framework Cusanus brings in, which he uses 
to ‘filter’ both his choices of arguments developed with it and its results. 
 If one assumed a metaphysical framework in which coincidental objects of type ‘C’ were 
generally possible, particularly in the case of stones (and not only in the case of natura humana as in 
De Docta Ignorantia), then the beryllus intellectualis could exist actu (as well as the lapis which is an 
                                                          
of the infinite line in his Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae, 47, p. 32, 8-11: «Neque capere potest [Wenck] exemplum de infinita 
linea, quod impugnat de falsitate, – licet supervacue, cum impossibilitas essendi lineam infinitam actu sit multipliciter in 
Docta ignorantia ostensum». One may also speculate that the reason why, embroiled in the new controversy about mystica 
theologia with Vincent of Aggsbach, he seems to have chosen to not complete De Beryllo was in fact to avoid being caught 
in the same trap, i.e. being accused of nothing less than heresy because of the (rather easy to make) erroneous interpretation 
that the beryllus actually exists. 
614 De Docta Ignorantia, III, 198, p. 127, 1 – 128, 6: «Humana vero natura est illa, quae est supra omnia Dei opera elevata 
et paulo minus angelis minorata, intellectualem et sensibilem naturam complicans ac universa intra se constringens, ut 
microcosmos aut parvus mundus a veteribus rationabiliter vocitetur. Hinc ipsa est illa, quae si elevata fuerit in unionem 




image of Christ in Sermon CXXVI, 11, p. 26, 1-13); it would presumably be coincidental with Christ—
however that might be understood (perhaps in the manner  of the Eucharist?).  
 However, although he does not address this matter directly in De Beryllo, Cusanus most likely 
still agrees entirely with his arguments in De Docta Ignorantia and the Apologia Doctae Ignornatiae 
regarding the general impossibility of the existence of such objects, as he seems to share in De Beryllo, 
as we have seen, the same fundamental Neoplatonic simplicitas-based ontological premises expressed 
in the esse – vivere – intelligere triad. Therefore, in Cusanus’ view, the beryllus intellectualis is an 
aenigma that does not exist in actu—but is nonetheless an extraordinarily powerful and complex image 
of Christ, of such a nature as to occasion, in Cusanus’ own words—«most sweet speculations»615.  
  
                                                          






 The treatise De Beryllo is a highly interesting work that needs to be studied more, both in terms 
of its philosophy and theology, and, in particular, in terms of the innovative and well-structured 
synthesis it claims to achieve (and appears surprisingly successful at achieving) between them, in 
addition to the crucial role it likely plays in the development of Nicolaus Cusanus’ later thought. 
 This investigation has shown that Cusanus’ claims in the first two paragraphs as to the 
extraordinary potential of his beryllus method are worthy of being taken seriously: namely, that he does 
in fact formulate a highly consistent pattern of thought, which is able to produce, when used 
consistently, novel philosophical and theological insights, and that one can analyze this fruitfully in 
terms of a Strukturanalyse, with the help of a type of ‘formal’ notation like the ‘B-structure’ notation I 
have proposed and used. Yet, at the same time, this method-focused, formalized, abstract-sounding 
(and even ‘modern-sounding’) mode of thought, when applied consistently, does not lead to a 
weakening, but rather to a strengthening of some of the fundamental propositions of ‘positive’ Christian 
faith and tradition, even (and particularly so) in its most paradoxical elements: the Trinity and the 
Incarnation—according, of course, to Cusanus’ own view, but which, once we reconstruct his 
arguments, is surprisingly philosophically powerful, coherent, and worthy of serious consideration—
particularly given the recent developments in non-Aristotelian/non-classical logic in our time, which 
allow for a more rigorous treatment of ‘paradoxical’ objects or objects with contradictory properties, 
such as those the coincidentia oppositorum seems to propose. The beryllus-constructed structures, even 
when isolated from Cusanus’ metaphysical presuppositions of a hierarchy of simplicitas, are meant to 
show the possibility of developing a unified philosophical-theological intellectual approach, one in 
which (as Cusanus seems to promise) the Incarnation and the Trinity are no more difficult, or 
problematic, than analyzing the simple geometrical illustrations, featuring lines and angles, that he 
devises for the core of his method’s application. The fact that the De Beryllo allows for both a 
theologically-focused and philosophically-formalizing interpretation of the titular image of a beryllus 
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(a beryl stone, used as a ‘lens’), and in fact for a fruitful combination of both, as I have tried to show in 
this work, is itself a testament to its novelty, and to the unexpected intellectual riches that Cusanus’ 
unique approach might offer. 
We have analyzed closely the characteristics of Cusanus’ proposed method to a deeper level of 
detail than previously attempted, and we have investigated the De Beryllo within the overall framework 
of a Strukturanalyse, identifying the recurrent structure that the method represents in Cusanus’ 
development of his arguments. We have accordingly proposed a system of notation, the B-notation, 
which has proved to be helpful in analyzing passages in terms of the presence of this particular structure, 
especially due to the wide variety of terms Cusanus uses for the same underlying argumentative 
patterns. At the same time, in Chapter 4 we have distinguished the formal core of the method from the 
metaphysical presuppositions that guide Cusanus in using it, and have analyzed throughout the way in 
which he reinterprets and reconstructs the elements in his tradition (both ‘philosophical’ and 
‘theological’) with the help of his beryllus. And we have followed the effects of such a 
‘deconstruction/reconstruction’ on the core of the Christological and Incarnational image (of which the 
beryllus itself is an illustration) that he proposes at the end of the work, as we analyzed in Chapter 5. 
In the end, taking into view the general character of the work as a whole, one might speculate 
that he did not finish it and did not send it to his Tegernsee friends perhaps because he felt that his 
ultimate synthesis of intellectual pursuit and Christian mystical visio was, in fact, in a certain sense, too 
powerful: due to the power and arguable flexibility of this method, the risk was too great that his 
Christological beryllus would be misused and misinterpreted by his opponents (like Johannes Wenck 
had done some years before with Cusanus’ simple image of an infinite line in De Docta Ignorantia).  
The apparent fruitfulness of the methodological approach that we have developed points to a 
number of promising avenues for future research. First of all, the same approach, or a similar one, 
should be tried for analyzing the small treatises De Aequalitate and De Principio, on which Cusanus 
was working in close proximity to (if not, as is likely, precisely during) the time of writing De Beryllo 
(i.e. during Cusanus’ ‘exile’ in Andraz Castle in 1458). In particular, reading De Aequalitate, a highly 
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Christologically-focused work, with the help of the ‘B-notation’ and the general form of the beryllus 
method seems particularly promising, in order to examine whether the special ‘C-type’ Christological 
object, based on a ‘double’ coincidentia oppositorum, can also be identified there in relation to the 
‘regular’ principium-principiata structures, as we have identified it in De Beryllo. If this methodology 
succeeds, this could prove highly enlightening regarding the presence of (heretofore unacknowledged) 
Christological-type elements in other works by Cusanus, from the ‘late period’ or even generally; 
furthermore, the identification of such a ‘double coincidentia’ and its distinction from regular 
coincidentia oppositorum might go a long way towards dispelling the misunderstandings and 
misreadings of the text that the presence of such unacknowledged complex structures would 
undoubtedly have caused.   
Another interesting avenue of research concerns De Visione Dei, Cusanus’ preceding 
speculative work (written towards the end of 1453), which one would expect to have significant 
similarities with De Beryllo, particularly given that it is also explicitly focused on the themes of visio 
and mystica theologia. However, our investigation of De Beryllo has uncovered many fewer points of 
contact than one would expect: while we have noted a number of common themes that De Beryllo, De 
Visione Dei and Sermon CXXVI from 1453 all share (particularly the notion of speculum sine macula616 
and spiritus lapidis regarding precious stones617), as well as commonalities between De Beryllo and De 
Visione Dei such as the introduction of the crucial theme of praxis618, the theological theme of 
thesaurus619, as well as the switch from the terminology of symbolum to aenigma pointed out by Katrin 
Platzer620, and even though the ‘image’/’icon’ that De Visione Dei (also called De Icona) is built around 
shows very interesting similarities to the role of beryllus as a Christological image (cf. Chapter 5.5), it 
seems difficult to relate the different approaches taken by these two works, or to identify significant 
similarities (beyond the use of images for the purpose of developing ‘divine names’ and the pervasive 
                                                          
616 See notes 277, 279, 280, and 281. 
617 See note 284. 
618 See note 343. 
619 See note 391. 
620 Cf. PLATZER, Symbolica venatio, p. 93. 
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theme of the coincidentia oppositorum, which are common themes in a great number of works by 
Cusanus). It seems that, in certain respects, Cusanus must have had a different philosophical-theological 
approach in mind in 1458, when finishing De Beryllo, than he had had in 1453 (one sign of this is, for 
instance, the fact that, although visio, particularly ‘of God/the principium’, is a strong common theme621 
between the two works, in De Beryllo this is restricted to visio on the part of the finite creature, while 
the visio by God is not mentioned; instead, God’s faculties being focused on are intentio and voluntas, 
as we have seen). The question of the large differences between De Visione Dei and De Beryllo and the 
nature of this apparent ‘change’ in Cusanus’ approach, in light of the development of the beryllus 
method, would be a very interesting one to investigate further. 
While the methodology introduced and developed here, while highly promising, remains, of 
course, to be further refined and improved in future work, the central result of this thesis remains, given 
the wealth of evidence, undeniable: that De Beryllo represents a very important step in Cusanus’ 
intellectual development and a highly interesting philosophical (and theological) work in its own right, 
which definitely deserves more scholarly attention than it has received so far—not only from scholars 
working on intellectual history, but even (and particularly so) from those working on cutting-edge 
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APPENDIX I – Index of passages in De Beryllo establishing the simplicitas 
hierarchical principles 
 
1) simplex elementum de se explicat elementatum … Simplicitas enim elementalis est ex mobili et 
immobili, sicut principium naturale est principium motus et quietis (19, p. 24, 18-22) 
 
2) Experimur autem ipsum esse verorum in trino gradu, in eo quod quaedam sunt tantum, alia vero 
veritatis gestant simpliciorem similitudinem, quorum esse est virtuosius, quia eo quod sunt vivunt. Alia 
adhuc simpliciorem, quae eo ipso quod sunt vivunt et intelligunt. Esse autem quanto simplicius, tanto 
virtuosius et potentius. Ideo absoluta simplicitas seu veritas est omnipotens. (20, p. 24, 7-13) 
 
3) Linea autem plus participat simplicitatem puncti quam superficies, et superficies quam corpus. (23, 
p. 26, 11-13) 
 
4) Unde per aenigma poteris differentias talium formarum investigare, quae sunt multum materiales et 
immersae et quae minus et quae valde simplices. (44, p. 51, 13-15). 
 
5) Et quanto quantitas discreta est simplicior quantitate continua, tanto species melius in aenigmate 
quantitatis discretae videtur quam continuae. (63, p. 72, 3-6) 
 
6) Simplicior autem est magnitudo discreta quam continua et spiritualior atque speciei, quae penitus 
simplex est, similior, licet utique speciei simplicitas, quae est quiditas, sit ante simplicitatem illius 
discretae magnitudinis. (63, p. 72, 8-11) 
 
7) Est autem principalius cognoscere et nobilius, quia habet altiorem et incorruptibiliorem finem. (65, 
p. 76, 11) 
 
8) Sic de intellectu, cuius forma est simplicitas intelligibilium formarum, quas ex propria natura 
cognoscit, quando nudae sibi praesentantur, et ita sursum ad intelligentias ascendendo, quae habent 
simplicitatem formae subtiliorem et omnia vident etiam sine eo, quod eis in phantasmate praesententur; 
et demum quomodo omnia in primo intellectu ita cognoscitive, quod cognitio dat esse cognitis sicut 
omnium formarum causativum exemplar se ipsum exemplificando; et cur sensus non attingit 
intelligibilia neque intellectus intelligentias et eo superiora, scilicet cum nulla cognitio possit in 
simplicius eo. Cognoscere enim mensurare est. Mensura autem est simplicior quam mensurabilia sicut 
unitas mensura numeri. (71, p. 83, 8 - 84, 19) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
